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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Kownacki, R (on the application of) v District Court In Olsztyn Poland [2010] EWHC 3027 (Admin) (05 November 2010) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2010/3027.html Cite as: [2010] EWHC 3027 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		5th November 2010

1. MR JUSTICE McCOMBE: This is an appeal pursuant to section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 (as amended) against a decision of District Judge Evans sitting at the City of Westminster Magistrates' Court on 7th June of this year to order the extradition of the appellant to Poland.
2. The order was made in implementation of two European Arrest Warrants, one issued on 22nd February 2010 for the purposes of requiring the appellant to serve a 18 months' custodial sentence in respect of driving while intoxicated and whilst disqualified and eight months' imprisonment in respect of driving while disqualified. The second warrant concerns the conviction of the appellant and an order that he serve a two year custodial sentence in respect of the handling of stolen goods, namely three motorcars.
3. The appellant was arrested on the first warrant on 18th March 2010 and the initial hearing, the extradition hearing, was opened and adjourned to 14th April. An adjournment application was made to enable the appellant to obtain legal aid. He also indicated at that time that he was awaiting documents from Poland. There was a further application, successfully made, for an adjournment on 5th May and he was arrested on 28th May at Tilbury Docks in respect of the second warrant. He was taken to the Magistrates' Court and the matter was adjourned to 2nd June. On that date, the appellant did not attend owing to ill health and the hearing was adjourned to 7th June.
4. On that date, on 7th June, a further application for adjournment was made on grounds that were not entirely clear and no indication was being given as to the issues that might be raised if the case was postponed to a later date.
5. The application for an adjournment was opposed. It was refused and the case proceeded to a substantive hearing in which it was accepted that the conduct outlined on both warrants constituted extradition offences and no specific bars to extradition were raised by the appellant at the time, although he was represented by legal advisers.
6. A notice of appeal was filed on 11th June, specifying simply the desire to appeal without any substantive grounds being cited. By a letter dated 26th of last month to the court, the appellant wrote to confirm that he had been advised there are no proper grounds to appeal in this case but that he still wished to argue his case before this court today and that he would therefore be representing himself. The appellant has accordingly appeared before me, most helpfully assisted by an interpreter who has translated to me everything I believe that the appellant wishes to say. His submissions have been polite and courteous throughout and I have listened to him very carefully.
7. Mr Kownacki's two points are these. I add that these were points not raised before the learned District Judge in the Magistrates' Court. First, he tells me that on an occasion while he was in prison in respect of one or other of these matters he was ill treated by policemen in the presence of an assistant prosecutor. He was taken to hospital and then discharged. He was released from detention because, he tells me, although no formal evidence has been adduced, that this was because his life might be in danger from further custody. Summarising his submission, he contends that this incident suggests that he cannot be capably protected by the Polish authorities from mistreatment. He also says that, in view of this incident, he took proceedings in the local courts against the police and the prosecution. He says that this led to the issue of the second arrest warrant. He suggests that this should give the court cause to doubt the bona fides of the Polish authorities in requesting his return to Poland.
8. His second point is that I should reverse the decision of the learned District Judge because of his family's circumstances. He is a man with a longstanding partner. They have a 14 year-old son and a very young child of 21 months, who, it is said, has a difficult health problem which is not receiving proper attention in this country. He says for those reasons he would quite like to return to Poland because he is not happy with the medical treatment that his son is receiving here. On the other hand, if he does go back to Poland, his family will have no means to support themselves.
9. Translating these submissions into points of law, his arguments are that his return would constitute a potential breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights because of exposing him to ill treatment in Poland and secondly that his rights under Article 8 of the same Convention would be broken by returning him to Poland in these delicate family circumstances which I have endeavoured to outline.
10. In opposition to the appeal, Ms Lindfield, in helpful written and oral argument, has pointed out to me the clear and undisputed fact that none of these issues were properly raised before the learned Magistrate when it would have been open to the appellant to give evidence about all these matters but he failed to do so. She submits that none of the conditions indicated in section 27 of the 2003 Act pertaining to the raising of new issues on appeals are satisfied and that accordingly for that reason alone I should not entertain the arguments that are now raised.
11. I consider that there is force in that submission and I would say now that, all things being equal, I do accept that submission and on that ground alone this appeal must fail. However, I have also heard the case on its merits. I have heard in full the points that the appellant now wishes to raise and they are of the nature that I have indicated. It is clear that issues arising under Article 3 and Article 8 of the Convention require to balanced against the public interest in enforcing extradition. There is also a great public interest in recognising the trust between Member States of the Convention in respect of the procedures to be embarked upon and the capability of Member States to implement the European Convention on Human Rights affording protection to those who are surrendered pursuant to extradition proceedings.
12. As Ms Lindfield submits, I have not seen in respect of that ground any striking or unusual facts that would require me to consider that the learned judge's order was in any sense wrong. Equally, while I have the very greatest sympathy with the appellant's family predicament and his natural concern for the health of his son, those are not either matters which are sufficient to render disproportionate the extradition of this appellant pursuant to the extradition order that has been made by the judge in proper compliance with the request made by the warrant.
13. The arguments are more fully set out in most helpful written arguments on behalf of the judicial authority. I have not recited them all but have endeavoured to summarise my reasons for rejecting this appeal. Those fuller reasons are quite properly set out by Ms Lindfield in her argument, which the appellant has seen and he can read again. I am in full agreement with those arguments and, for the reasons indicated, this appeal is dismissed.