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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Sandbrook Solicitors, Re [2015] EWHC 2473 (Admin) (On 18 May 2015) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2015/2473.html Cite as: [2015] EWHC 2473 (Admin)

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Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)

		Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre
		On 18th May 2015

Mr Justice Green:

A. Introduction

1. There is before the Tribunal an issue which has arisen out of a concern that the firm of Sandbrook Solicitors ("Sandbrook") has engaged in a systematic course of conduct designed to undermine the immigration system which amounts to a persistent abuse of process of the Court. In particular, the cases which are before us exhibit a pattern whereby injunctions to restrain imminent removal, invariably upon a without-notice basis, are being sought in immigration cases but, when granted, are not pursued by the service of proceedings. The pattern emerging suggests that a strategy or tactic is being deployed whereby without-notice injunctions are sought and then when granted the case is permitted to fade away from sight with the consequence that the failed asylum seeker or immigrant remains in the United Kingdom below the radar. It is typical of such case that the person subject to removal is in detention pending removal but that once interim relief is granted the individual is released from detention. In many such cases the individual then absconds. In some cases, when the Secretary of State for the Home Department ("SSHD") has finally caught up with the applicant and seeks, yet again, to remove the person from the UK, further without-notice applications for injunctive relief are then sought and obtained without informing the Judge hearing the application of the prior history to the case. The stratagem is also facilitated by the legal representative simply refusing to respond to requests from Court officials or the Home Office or Treasury Solicitors.
2. In a recent judgment of the Divisional Court, The Queen on the application of Adil Akram & Amir Akram v SSHD (20^th April 2015) the President of the Queen's Bench Division stated, also in a case in which the conduct of solicitors acting on behalf of asylum seekers was in issue:

"It is not surprising that those who seek asylum or to regulate their immigration status in order to remain in this country or take whatever steps are open to them in order to do so. To that extent, they are vulnerable and those who practice in this area of the law must always be acutely conscious of the need for a thorough understanding of the law, fully appreciating that pursuing litigation without arguable grounds is potentially unprofessional. This Court has demonstrated its intention to take a proactive approach to such cases in order to enforce standards and to ensure that the time of the Court (not to say public and private funding of such litigation) is not wasted. That much is clear from the principles set out in the earlier decisions of this Court in Hamid [2012] EWHC 3070 (Admin) and Butt [2014] EWHC 264 (Admin). Similar statements of principle and concern have been made in the context of appeals and jurisdiction conducted before the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) ("UTIAC"): See Okundu & Abdussalam v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKUT 377 (IAC)".

3. In that case the Court emphasised that there was a pressing need for all legal representatives in judicial review proceedings to act in a professional manner both towards their clients but also, and critically, towards the Court, bearing in mind that their paramount duty was to the Court itself and that this took precedence over the duty they owed to their clients. The need for the warning to be taken seriously increases as the resources available to the Courts and Tribunals to act efficiently and fairly decrease. If the time of the Courts and the Tribunals and their resources are absorbed dealing with utterly hopeless and/or unprofessionally prepared and conducted cases, then other cases, that are properly advanced and properly prepared, risk not having devoted to them the resources they deserve.
4. The facts that are set out below reflect what has become an all too familiar and depressing pattern in which legal representatives demonstrate a lack of care and concern for the substantive and procedural rules governing claims for judicial review. They suggest, in our view, a deliberate disregard for the professional duties that all legal representatives owe to the Court, and in the present case to the Tribunal.
5. As has now been made very clear in a growing body of case law the Courts and the Tribunal have the power and right to refer to relevant authorities, including the Solicitors Regulation Authority ("SRA"), the conduct of legal representatives who seem to the Court or Tribunal to fall below the standards required of professionals appearing on behalf of immigrants and asylum seekers.

B. The facts

6. There are before the Tribunal five cases that have given rise to the above concerns. I set out below a summary of the facts of each of the relevant cases.

Meiyan Wang aka Meiyan Zhou (hereafter "Wang"):

7. The case of Wang involves two separate applications for judicial review. On 8^th July 2014 the Home Office wrote to Sandbrook on behalf of Wang informing them that her application for reconsideration of their prior removal directions on the grounds of "extenuating circumstances" had been rejected. The Home Office stated that they were aware that Sandbrook had been taking instructions from Wang since at least 4^th July 2014 and would have had sight of the client's immigration factual summary. This included the fact that her asylum and human rights appeals had been rejected by the First-tier Tribunal ("FtT") on 19^th May 2014.
8. On the same day Sandbrook applied on Wang's behalf for an Order restraining removal pending final disposal of her claim for judicial review. On 9^th July 2014 the application was granted by HHJ Pelling QC sitting as a Judge of this Tribunal. He gave reasons for his decision. However, notwithstanding that the specific terms of the injunction were that the defendant was restrained "…until after final disposal of this claim or further Order" from removing or requiring, causing or permitting the removal of Wang, Sandbrook served no claim for judicial review upon the Defendant.
9. On 1^st August 2014 the UTIAC wrote to Sandbrook reminding them that within 9 days of making an application for permission to bring judicial review proceedings they were required to provide copies of applications and accompanying documents to all such persons named as respondents or interested parties to the application and that they were also required to serve upon the UTIAC a written statement of when and how this was done in accordance with Rule 28A(2) Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. They were also informed that if the UTIAC had not received such a document within 7 days then the case would be struck out.
10. No response was received to this letter from Sandbrook.
11. On 2^nd October 2014 the case was closed due to non-service. Logically, the restraining Order should have been rescinded and the claim struck out but there is no record on the file of this, in fact, ever having occurred. Removal directions were thereafter given for 21^st November 2014. However, on 21^st November 2014 Sandbrook made a further claim for judicial review of the removal directions and on the same day made an application for urgent consideration. The flight was due to leave at 17.40hrs on 21^st November 2014. HHJ Bird made an Order restraining the claimant's removal until determination of the new application for judicial review or earlier Order. It was stated that the issue of permission to apply for judicial review would be addressed once time for receipt of an Acknowledgement of Service had passed. However, once again, no application was ever served.
12. On 8^th January 2015 UTIAC sent a letter to Sandbrook reminding them of the need to file a certificate of service. The result yet again was silence.
13. On 20^th January 2015 Treasury Solicitor on behalf of the Defendant sent a letter to the Manchester UTIAC explaining that Sandbrook had failed to serve papers upon the Defendant. It was stated that the Defendant had made every effort to obtain a copy of the Appellant's papers but no response had been received.
14. On 24^th February 2015 the Treasury Solicitor confirmed, once again, that the claim still had not been served. On 4^th March 2015 Swift J made an Order refusing permission to apply for judicial review as totally without merit and an abuse of process. The Judge revoked the Order of HHJ Bird.

Ailing Zhuang (hereafter "Zhuang")

15. Ailing Zhuang entered the United Kingdom on a business visit visa in January 2007. This expired in June of the same year. However, she remained in the United Kingdom re-married and had a son. On 14^th February 2013 Zhuang was convicted of five counts of managing a brothel and was sentenced to 21 months imprisonment. Subsequently, she was given an additional 3 months imprisonment in default of observance of a confiscation Order. On 1^st May 2013 Zhuang claimed asylum. She completed her prison sentence on 30^th July 2013 and was transferred to immigration detention. On 1^st August 2013 she was granted bail. Later in the same month, on 14^th August, her asylum claim was refused. A deportation Order was signed on 17^th September 2013. She appealed against the refusal to revoke the deportation Order but by 4^th August 2014 her appeal rights had been exhausted. Removal directions were set on 22^nd November 2014 effective on 3^rd December 2014.
16. At the very last moment, on 2^nd December 2014 a claim for judicial review was made which challenged the removal directions. An application for a stay of removal was refused by the UTIAC on 3^rd December 2014.
17. It appears that the case was transferred to Sandbrook on 9^th December 2014. On 2^nd January 2015 the UTIAC refused permission to apply for judicial review and declared the application totally without merit. Removal directions were made on 12^th January 2015 effective on 31^st January 2015.
18. On 26^th January 2015 a fresh letter before claim was sent by Sandbrook. However, the previous application of 2^nd December 2014, and its refusal as totally without merit, were not mentioned.
19. On 30^th January 2015 Sandbrook made an application for urgent consideration given the imminence of the removal scheduled for 31^st January 2015. From what we can gather from the papers no reference was made to the prior history in the course of the application for interim relief. HHJ Platts ordered that the removal directions be stayed pending determination of the application for permission or further Order. The Defendant was ordered to file and serve an Acknowledgement of Service by 4pm on 13^th February 2015 with the papers thereafter to be placed before a Single Judge for consideration.
20. On 12^th February 2015 the Defendant issued an application to discharge the Order of HHJ Platts in order that removal could occur. An AOS was served on 20^th February 2015 which, inter alia, disclosed the failure on the part of Sandbrook to disclose the fact of the previous application for judicial review alleging abuse of process and an attempt to mislead the Court. It is worth setting out a portion of the Defendant's Summary Grounds of Defence. Paragraphs [3]-[5] stated as follows:

"3. The Respondent further submits that the application is clearly an abuse of process. The Applicant made a previous judicial review application on 2 December 2014 (less than two months before this application), on substantially the same grounds, challenging a previous set of removal directions and also referring to further submissions. Following the submission of the Respondent's Acknowledgement of Service and Summary Grounds of Defence, permission was refused totally without merit by UTJ McGeachy on 2 January 2015. A copy of his Order is attached. It states:

"Although in the Grounds the Applicant refers to the right of her child these were properly considered by the Tribunal who dismissed her appeal. Further submissions made are not significant different from those considered by the Tribunal who dismissed the Applicant's appeal. In all the circumstances of this case the Respondent was unarguably entitled to make the decision to deport the Applicant to China".

4. The Claimant's Grounds of this judicial review are based on "new submissions" which are clearly not significantly different from those considered by the Tribunal, and considered as part of the previous Judicial Review application. Only a few documents appear to have been included which were not submitted previously, and these are repetitious of previous documents regarding the Claimant's family life.

5. It is noted that at no point in her documentation does the Applicant refer to this refusal, and it is submitted by the Respondent that this is a transparent attempt to mislead the Court so as to obtain injunctive relief and prevent lawful removal. The Respondent's further submission is that, notwithstanding the above, this application for Judicial Review on its own merits amounts to nothing more than a mechanism to frustrate removal".

21. On 24^th February 2015 Sandbrook responded to the Defendant's application to discharge the Order of HHJ Platts. The Solicitors stated:

"Please note the Claimant's intentions to contest this application. Furthermore, [it] is averred that a hearing would be appropriate due to the complexity nature of this matter and the fact that it raises issues relating to the European Convention on Human Rights and inter alia".

22. On 4^th March 2015 Swift J made an Order refusing permission to apply for Judicial Review on the basis that the Grounds were totally without merit and an abuse of process. The Order of HHJ Platts was revoked.

Siu Lin Micky Tse aka Siu Lin Micky Cheung (hereafter "Tse")

23. On 14^th November 1999 Tse was encountered entering the United Kingdom at Aberdeen Airport. She was granted temporary admission with reporting conditions. However, she did not report and became an absconder. Between November 2001 and January 2002 correspondence ensued with the Home Office with regard to an application for leave to remain but she failed to cooperate in relation to attendance at interviews. On 30^th July 2014 Tse was encountered, identified as an illegal absconder and detained. At or about this time, Sandbrook became involved. On 4^th August 2014 they submitted an application for leave to remain on her behalf. However, on 8^th August 2014 removal directions were issued. On 15^th August 2014 a claim for Judicial Review of those directions was made. The application included a request for urgent consideration given the imminence of the removal flight. HHJ Raynor QC made an Order restraining removal until final determination of her application for permission to apply for Judicial Review or until further Order. It is perhaps a statement of the obvious but the relief granted was of course temporary pending determination of Tse's application for permission to proceed. Notwithstanding on 27^th August 2014 Sandbrook wrote to officials within the UTIAC in the following terms asking them to withdraw the application for permission:

"We write further to the above matter and understand that there is no currency of the claim since the respectful Judge of the Upper Tribunal has granted the interim relief. For the sake of clarity, please withdraw the Judicial Review application since it is now academic".

24. On 4^th September 2014 the Clerk to the UTIAC responded in the following terms:

"Please can you clarify what you are asking. As far as our records show, removal has been restrained but permission is yet to be determined. Therefore the matter does not appear to be merely academic, and it is not appropriate therefore to withdraw".

25. On 23^rd September 2014 Sandbrook issued a certificate of service of the Judicial Review application. In that document, it is stated the application was served on the Defendant on 15^th August 2014. However, the Treasury Solicitor has confirmed that it has no record of ever having received such a claim. In particular, the Treasury Solicitor checked the Applicant's details including her date of birth and the alleged Judicial Review reference and there is no record of any such claim ever having been lodged upon their system.
26. On 4^th March 2015 Swift J made an Order refusing permission to apply for Judicial Review as totally without merit and an abuse of process. The reasons given by the Judge were in the following terms:

"Between her entry into the UK in July 2014 (when she was detained as an illegal absconder), the Claimant wholly failed to cooperate with the Defendant in pursuing her application for leave to remain in the United Kingdom. In August 2014, following her detention, she made a claim for Judicial Review and secured an injunction restraining her removal. Having got the injunction, she made no effort to progress her permission to apply for Judicial Review. It appears from the letter of her Solicitors dated 27 August 2014 that, having obtained the injunction, they have chosen to treat the Judicial Review proceedings as at an end, stating that there is now "no currency in the claim". It is clear that the claim was made with the sole intention of obtaining an injunction to stop her removal and was therefore an abuse of process".

Ping Zhao (hereafter "Zhao")

27. On 29^th January 2005 Zhao entered the United Kingdom and was encountered and detained. She claimed asylum. That application was refused on 19^th May 2005. She was, however, released from detention but failed to report thereafter. On 24^th May, she lodged an appeal but her appeal rights were exhausted by 27^th June 2006. She did not attend the hearing and was subsequently identified as an absconder.
28. On 8^th December 2010 she made representations as a "legacy" applicant but these were rejected. She was detained on 14^th March 2014. At about this time, Sandbrook became involved in the case. Removal directions were issued on 19^th March 2014 effective on 27^th March 2014. On 26^th March 2014 Sandbrook lodged an application for Judicial Review together with an urgent application for interim relief given the imminence of the removal date. HHJ Stephen Davies issued an Order restraining removal pending a final determination of the case or further Order. Though permission was given to the Defendant to apply for that Order to be set aside or varied. On 27^th March 2014, and in consequence of the Judge's Order, Zhao was released from detention. However, proceedings were never served upon the Defendant. On 14^th April 2014 further representations, made by Zhao, were refused. Yet further representations were advanced on 9^th May 2014. On 29^th September 2014 the Judicial Review was concluded because of non-service. On 8^th October 2014 the Home Office rejected further representations.
29. Zhao was detained at a reporting centre on 3^rd November 2014 and removal directions were issued on 6^th November 2014. A further application for Judicial Review was lodged on 14^th November 2014. This is a detailed document running to 23 pages replete with references to case law and legal analysis. However, it purports to be from Zhao alone; no solicitor is stated to be on the record. In that application Zhao refers to the fact that removal directions were successfully deferred. However, there is no reference to the fact that interim relief was granted and that the related application for Judicial Review was not served. In paragraph [16] of the Grounds the following is stated:

"I have made no application for Judicial Review in the last three months and I believe that the respectful Judge needs to assess the Home Office's conduct and action in that I was served with the refusal letter and removal directions in a very short space of time. This does not allow me to respond to the Home Office and collate all my documentary evidence since I am detained".

30. On 21^st November 2014 the Defendant sent a letter to the Claimant requesting a copy of the Claimant's Grounds indicating that in the absence of service of such documents they would seek to discharge the injunction staying removal. An AOS was served seeking, inter alia, discharge of the Order of HHJ Sycamore on 8^th December 2014.
31. On 4^th March 2015 an Order was made refusing permission to apply for Judicial Review as totally without merit and an abuse of process and the Order restraining removal was revoked.

Guoqing Li (hereafter "Li")

32. Li was detained on 13^th July 2013 in the process of claiming asylum at the port of entry. That application was refused on 19^th July 2003 and Li was refused leave to enter. However, on 21^st July 2003 he was released from detention and he lodged an appeal on 24^th July. His appeal rights were exhausted on 16^th September 2003. He did not leave the country. On 27^th September 2010 further submissions were filed upon his behalf by other solicitors. These were rejected on 20^th October 2010. Li was encountered working illegally by an enforcement team on 4^th April 2013 and was arrested and detained. Removal directions were fixed on 9^th April 2013 effective on 14^th April 2014. At or about this time Sandbrook became involved. On 11^th April further submissions were made by them on behalf of Li as their "client". An appeal was lodged to the FtT. The Notice of Appeal was not accepted and appeal rights were treated as exhausted on 12^th April 2013. On the same day an application for Judicial Review was lodged and for an urgent injunction to prevent removal. An Order was made on 14^th April 2013 by HHJ Graham Wood QC restraining removal. On 15^th April an application to set aside refusal to accept the Notice of Appeal was refused by the UTIAC.
33. On 12^th May 2013 further submissions were rejected. On 12^th June 2013 the application to apply for Judicial Review was refused by HHJ Stephen Davies as having no real prospect of success. The Judge discharged the injunction unless Li filed and served a request for reconsideration by oral hearing. On 21^st June 2013 an oral hearing was convened at which permission to apply for Judicial Review was refused. Further submissions ensued on 8^th July 2013. All further submissions were rejected by the Defendant on 8^th December 2014. Li was detained on 12^th January 2015 at a reporting point and removal directions were issued on 16^th January 2015. Sandbrook sent submissions on 20^th, 21^st, 22^nd and 23^rd January 2015. A claim for Judicial Review of the decision was served on 23^rd January 2015 together with, yet again, an urgent application for an injunction to prevent removal. HHJ Pelling QC restrained removal pending final disposal of the claim or further Order. It appears that the Judge was not informed of the detailed history to the case. Once again, the claim was not served upon the Defendant.
34. On 13^th February 2015 UTIAC sent a letter to Li reminding him of the duty to serve proceedings and to inform UTIAC of the fact that this had been done. The claim form, upon this occasion, has as Li's address "Pennine House, Terminal 2, Manchester Airport". Sandbrook had been engaged in correspondence until the day that this application was filed and they had previously acted on behalf of Li and referred to him as their "client".
35. On 6^th March 2015 Swift J refused permission to apply for Judicial Review as totally without merit and an abuse of process and she revoked the prior restraining Order of HHJ Pelling QC.

C. Procedure leading up to the present hearing: Failure to cooperate with the Tribunal

36. In view of the concerns which have been set out at paragraphs [1] – [4] above, it was decided that Sandbrook, and in particular their managing partner and relevant caseworkers, should attend before the Tribunal to address the concerns arising in the cases summarised above. The concerns arose because Mrs Justice Swift DBE, having reviewed a number of cases prepared by Sandbrook, considered that the legal representatives were falling substantially below the requisite professional standard required of them. On 6^th May 2015 a formal letter was sent to Sandbrook which identified the 5 cases in issue, and then stated:

"The caseworker and solicitor with conduct of these cases, including Mr Imran Javid, as the managing partner, are required to attend on that date to show cause why you should not be dealt with in accordance with the principles set out in Hamid [2012] EWHC 3070 (Admin) and Awuku [2012] EWHC 3298 (Admin), recently reiterated in Butt [2014] EWHC 264 (Admin)".

37. No response was received from Sandbrook to this letter. On 13^th May 2015, a chaser email was sent in the following terms:

"On 6^th May 2015 a letter was sent to your office informing you that there will be a Hamid Court hearing at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 18^th May 2015 at 09:45….A list of cases that were referred to Mr Justice Green and Mrs Justice Swift DBE were included in that letter. The caseworker and solicitor with conduct of these cases, including Mr Imran Javid, are required to attend this hearing. To date the Court has not received confirmation of your attendance at this hearing. I require an IMMEDIATE reply as to whether you will be appearing by Counsel. I must also warn you that failure to attend may constitute contempt of Court".

38. Mr Imran Javid is identified on the firm's website as being responsible for immigration cases within the firm. In order to ensure that Mr Javid and Sandbrook were fully aware of the position an official telephoned them at 11:30am on 13^th May 2015. The official spoke to the receptionist. He was put on hold and then was told that there was nobody who was available to speak to him but that someone would answer the email that day. The official informed them of the letter sent on 6^th May 2015 and said that either the letter or the email must be replied to urgently. The official was assured that a representative would either email or call the official that same day. Subsequently, it was confirmed that representatives of Sandbrook would as required appear before the Tribunal on 18^th May 2015.
39. At the commencement of the case a Mr Hanif appeared for Sandbrook. He is a Solicitor Advocate who was instructed by Mr Vay Sui Ip, as his instructing solicitor. Mr Ip was admitted as a solicitor in 2009. His partner, Mr Imran Javid, was admitted as a solicitor in June 2007. Mr Ip and Mr Javid are the only two partners in the firm of Sandbrook.
40. Mr Hanif explained to us that, out of the blue, at or about 8.30am that morning Mr Javid had phoned Mr Ip to tell him that he was unwell and would not attend Court. He conveyed his apologies. However, no medical note was provided and no one was able to explain what medical ailment had suddenly overcome Mr Javid which was so serious that it prevented him from coming before the Tribunal. Mr Hanif also told us that he had been instructed the previous Thursday but had not reviewed any of the files referred to in the letter of 6^th May 2015. He was thus unable to afford us any assistance on those files. We were also informed that Mr Ip had only the broadest knowledge of those five files and equally would not be able to answer specific questions in relation to them. Finally, we were informed that each of the files had been dealt with by a junior caseworker (a Mr Hakim) but that he had been suspended on 11^th May 2015 and was not available even though the letter from the Court had indicated that the relevant caseworker should also attend.
41. Accordingly, no one attended who was willing or able to assist the Tribunal with the questions it had. In view of the manner in which Sandbrook had treated the Tribunal in the past we were not entirely surprised at this turn of events.
42. Notwithstanding all of the above it was still represented to us that Sandbrook were not aware of any serious defaults or errors upon their part in any of the cases in question and that there was no possible basis upon which a reference to the SRA should be made. We expressed the view that the position was profoundly unsatisfactory. Sandbrook had been given ample time in which to review the files of each of the five cases and to respond to the serious criticisms made of them in the Orders refusing permission to apply for judicial review which described the cases as totally without merit and an abuse of process. The matters that we wished to raise had also been complained of by the Defendant in their summary grounds in a number of cases: See for instance the observations set out at paragraph [20] above. The hearing had been convened specifically to afford Sandbrook the opportunity to explain the position in each of the cases. At best this was an opportunity which has been conspicuously rejected; at worst the approach adopted was a continuation of the obstructive approach reflected in the court papers on the five cases we have reviewed. The end result is that the specific questions that we had identified and were seeking answers to were not addressed.

D. Conclusion: Summary of concerns

43. We have considered in detail the relevant papers in respect of all of the above cases and we maintain serious concerns that the conduct of the legal representatives has fallen materially below the bare minimum standard that we consider it proper for a solicitor to adopt in relation to its duty to the Court and Tribunal. We are aware of other court files in which Sandbook are the legal representatives where a similar pattern of conduct is evident.
44. We emphasise that in this judgment we have made no formal findings against Sandbrook or any solicitor working within that practice. We simply record our concerns. However, in view of the above, we conclude that the appropriate course is to refer Sandbrook to the Solicitors Regulation Authority for a fuller investigation. We set out below the issues that we consider are reflected in the papers on the Court files.
45. First, the merits of each of the cases we have reviewed were hopeless and were found by a High Court Judge to be "totally without merit". In Okondu, and, Abdussalam v SSHD [2014] UKUT 377 (IAC), this Tribunal emphasised that the mere fact that legal representatives advanced an application that failed on paper, or upon a renewed oral basis, was not, in and of itself, a reason for the Tribunal to impose any sanction. Applicants with weak cases were entitled to seek to advance their case and have the merits of the case adjudicated upon. That is a fundamental aspect of having a right of access to a Court. But the Tribunal emphasised that there was a wealth of difference between the advancing of a case that was held to be unarguable in a fair, professional and proper manner and an unarguable case advanced in a professionally improper manner. The cases advanced by Sandbrook with which we have been concerned have led the Judge ruling upon the application for permission to label them as "totally without merit" and an abuse of process. It seems to us that Sandbrook had been prepared to advance virtually any ground however tenuous or hopeless, simply to provide a platform for the interim relief application which then ensues.
46. Secondly, it is axiomatic that a legal representative applying upon a without-notice basis to a Court or Tribunal for interim relief must comply with the duty of candour. That means that the representative must place all relevant facts on the table before the Court or Tribunal and must, expressly, identify any serious points that exist against the application. In the present case we are struck by the fact that Sandbrook have not placed full facts before Judges hearing applications for interim relief. For example, Judges have not been appraised of the fact that previous claims have been made for judicial review which, in some cases, have been rejected or not pursued. It is the clear duty of legal representatives seeking without-notice interim relief to place the full facts before the Judge hearing the application and this includes all previous approaches made to a Court or Tribunal. Judges who hear interim application to restrain removal are routinely told that the case is so urgent that the representative has not been able to obtain full instructions. Frequently it is clear that there has been some degree of delay. We would observe that all judges hearing such applications should take steps to verify whether there has been delay and to ensure that the representatives have put as full a set of facts as they can before the Tribunal.
47. Thirdly, once interim relief is granted, the legal representative must, in strict accordance with the rules, serve and pursue the proceedings. It is, in our view, a serious breach of professional conduct rules to obtain the relief and then fail to pursue the substantive claim for judicial review. This means that proceedings must be served both on the Defendant and upon the Tribunal. The documents before this Tribunal make quite clear that all interim Orders were contingent upon decisions by future Judges as to permission to apply for judicial review, or a further with-notice hearing, or further order of the Tribunal. They all assumed that proceedings would be served and continued with and Mr Hanif accepted in response to questions from the Tribunal that any solicitor even remotely familiar with judicial review would (and most certainly should) know this full well. Attempts to undermine the process by not pursuing proceedings amount to an attempt to undermine the integrity of the Court process and is, as Mrs Justice Swift observed, an abuse of process. There is a very important wider context to this as well to which we have already made reference above. It is well known that once interim relief is granted persons subject to removal directions are then released from detention. It is also a notorious fact that many of those persons then abscond. As such, a strategy designed to obtain interim relief but not pursue hopeless applications thereafter strikes at the very heart of the system of immigration control which Parliament has instituted.
48. Fourthly, attempts to persuade Tribunal officials that claims for judicial review are academic are also, in our view, improper (see paragraph [23] above in the case of Tse). We cannot conceive of a situation where the legal representatives will not have known that what they were asking for was simply not unavailable as a matter of elementary principle. This conduct seems to us to be part and parcel of a wider pattern of seeking to pursue interim relief without pursuing the substantive, underlying, claim. To seek to persuade Tribunal officials to further this object is a most disquieting aspect of the present case.
49. Fifthly, the papers reveal what appear to be repeated failures to respond to queries and requests from Tribunal officials and from the Defendant. We are concerned that this is a further component of a strategy on the part of Sandbrook to lie low and hope that a case will go away in the future.
50. Finally, we have no doubt but that the strategy which has given rise to the present concerns may be of material benefit to the clients of Sandbrook, all of whom we understand are privately paying clients. There may well hence be an economic incentive for the legal representatives to "play the system". It is therefore necessary to reiterate that all legal representatives owe their primary duty to the Court and Tribunal and to the extent that representatives place the interests of clients above those of the Court or Tribunal then that may constitute evidence of the representative failing in his or her professional duties.

E. Reference to SRA

51. For all the above reasons, we entertain serious concerns as to the conduct of Sandbrook in the conduct of its immigration practice. We reiterate that we make no formal findings of fact against either Sandbrook or any individual solicitor employed therein. However, we refer the conduct of Sandbrook, and its solicitors, to the SRA for investigation. We will send to the SRA the Court files on the cases which are of concern to us together with a copy of this judgment.

F. PostScript

52. By way of postscript we would add only this for future reference. Judges hearing urgent interim applications for relief against removal should always make clear, when they grant relief, that the legal representative must comply with the rules for service of relevant documents. Wherever possible, this should be recorded in any Order of the Court.

His Honour Judge Raynor :

53. I agree.

Signed




Date




(sitting as) Judges of the Upper Tribunal