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	England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Bucior v Second Penal Division of the District Court (Poland) [2015] EWHC 3412 (Admin) (21 October 2015) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2015/3412.html Cite as: [2015] EWHC 3412 (Admin)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		21 October 2015

1. MR JUSTICE IRWIN: This is an extradition appeal pursuant to section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003, from a decision of District Judge Rose given on 14 July 2015, that the appellant, Robert Bucior, should be extradited to Poland. Permission was given by Collins J on 4 September.
2. The facts and chronology are in summary as follows. The European Arrest Warrant recites that on 9 January 2002 in Zamosc, Province of Lublin, the appellant stole a wallet with documents within it, an identification card and driving licence and student cards. Subsequently, on 10 January 2002 (the following day), he stole a jacket and a woman's coat. On 29 July 2002 the Regional Court of Zamosc passed a sentence of 1 year 6 months' imprisonment, suspended for 3 years. That sentence was made final on 6 August.
3. However, subsequently, the regional court in Zamosc activated the suspended sentence, as during the 3-year period the appellant committed another offence, an offence of drink-driving, and he had failed to "make up for the damage caused by the crime", no doubt meaning fulfil obligations of compensation.
4. The appellant came to the United Kingdom in June 2005 and it is clear on the evidence that he was a fugitive. In January 2007 he was found guilty of drink-driving in England, with a further similar offence in March of that year. On 25 June, therefore subsequent to those two offences, the regional court in Poland issued a wanted notice for him within Poland.
5. In July 2007 he was found guilty in England of driving whilst disqualified, and underwent a short prison sentence. But again, by that stage, no European Arrest Warrant had been issued; nor was there any reason for the English authorities to conclude that he might be wanted in Poland. The European Arrest Warrant was in the event issued on 10 December 2008.
6. In February the following year, the first enquiry reached the UK from Poland and then communications began between Interpol in Warsaw and the authorities in Britain. This part of the history is drawn from a witness statement dated 10 June 2015 from Mr or Ms Gribben, an officer of the National Crime Agency. He or she was working entirely from the records held by the NCA, looking at the delay in the case.
7. The essential history thereafter is that between March 2009 and October 2009, there were communications between the predecessor of the NCA and Poland, and in October 2009 the NCA or their predecessors received an email message from Lincolnshire Police with a confirmed United Kingdom address for the appellant. There was a message to Poland requesting a copy of the EAW and identification materials in October 2009, but no evidence of a response.
8. In February 2010, the NCA's predecessors received a telephone call from police in Essex stating that the appellant had been arrested for driving offences. So clearly the official systems were connecting the NCA's predecessors with the police, but no action seems to have flowed from that so far as Poland were concerned; nor was the warrant served. On 24 February 2010 he was convicted of drink-driving in front of the Essex magistrates and received a penalty.
9. On 23 July 2011 there was a further notification on the Police National Computer that the appellant had been stopped and detained by police in Lincolnshire, although no conviction appears to have resulted from that stop. We are told that in July 2011, a few days after the notification, a further message was sent to Interpol in Warsaw requesting the EAW with identification materials. The message back was received on 3 August. That appears to have been the third request for the material which generated the necessary documentation. The warrant was certified on 11 August 2011.
10. When he gave evidence before the district judge, it was the appellant's evidence, apparently accepted by her, that he had been living at the same address in Spalding from before that date. There then followed a period between August 2011 and May 2015 when, without any real explanation, there was no arrest of the appellant on the basis of the warrant which by then had been received. He was arrested on 17 May 2015. According to the statement of Mr or Ms Gribben, that followed a period between February 2012 and March 2014 when "new checks" were carried out to establish the location of the appellant, without success. No further explanation is forthcoming. Following his arrest in May, the full extradition hearing took place before the district judge on 14 July.
11. In the course of her judgment, the district judge recited the evidence from the appellant to the effect that he lived in Spalding with his sister, her husband and her son. That was confirmed by his sister giving evidence. The house was owned by the sister and husband. He had shared that with her for several years. He has no other family in the United Kingdom. He is now self-employed, running his own company driving private-hire vehicles. He has a 13-year-old daughter living in Poland. He was divorced from the girl's mother some years ago and there is little or no contact between them. The evidence from the appellant, who was at that stage unrepresented, was that his business was doing well, that he had a lot to lose, but although he had been in trouble up to 2010 he had ceased to drink at that point and had reestablished himself. He said even if he was released early from his sentence in Poland, he would have to start all over again. He has a girlfriend in England. They do not live together. She has one child of her own and one adopted child. He has no responsibility to support anyone other than himself.
12. The district judge had directed herself, as I have found, completely appropriately as to previous authority and as to the balancing act which she had to undergo following the dicta set out in HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC 25 and Celinski & Ors [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin). The district judge recited paragraph 13 of that judgment, where the Lord Chief Justice gave guidance in relation to conviction cases of this kind. It is not necessary for me to repeat that or to recite the high public interest emphasised by the Lord Chief Justice. Equally, she addressed paragraph 9 of that decision dealing with fugitives. There is a very high public interest, said the Lord Chief Justice, in discouraging persons from seeing the UK as a state willing to accept fugitives from justice.
13. With that principle in mind, the learned district judge recited the fact of delay; that some of it remained unexplained. She touched on the history. She accepted in effect that he had remained at the same address since 2011. She commented on the fact that these were not the most serious offences, but she said this:

"To be balanced against that is the fact that Mr Bucior accepts that he never paid the compensation and that he committed another offence, drink-driving, during the period of the suspended sentence, and that he knew the sentence might be activated. He said 'I didn't commit this offence so I didn't want to pay'."

The district judge went on to say that counsel:

"... also relies upon his history of non-compliance with court orders since coming to the UK. Although he has not been before the courts for five years, he has three separate convictions for driving whilst disqualified."

14. The district judge then returned to Celinski, noted the strong public interest in honouring extradition and concluded that on the facts here the balancing exercise meant she could not find it was disproportionate to order him to return to Poland.
15. I too accept that this is not a case with the most serious offences; I too accept that there has been considerable delay. It does not appear to me to be important whether that derives from the independent Judicial Authority or from the National Crime Agency, or their predecessor. I do accept that it appears the appellant has turned his life around since 2010. But there is a background here of consistent offending and failure to observe court orders, both in Poland leading to the activation of the sentencing meaning it is no longer suspended, and in England, albeit some time ago. There is also not present here a family life and there is a limited private life.
16. In those circumstances, this is one of those cases which is not easy, and others might reach different conclusions, but District Judge Rose's thoughtful approach seems to me to be well within the reasonable outcome on a consideration of these facts. It was not wrong, and in those circumstances the appeal is dismissed.