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England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> MR, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWHC 469 (Admin) (10 March 2017) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2017/469.html Cite as: [2017] EWHC 469 (Admin) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
AND
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE SUPPERSTONE
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The Queen (on the application of MR) |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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The Secretary of State for the Home Department |
Defendant |
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Nathalie Lieven QC and David Blundell (instructed by Government Legal Department) for the Defendant
Angus McCullough QC and Shaheen Rahman (instructed by Special Advocates Support Office) appeared as special advocates
Hearing dates: 1st and 2nd December 2016
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Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Bean:
"There is no entitlement to a passport. The decision to issue, withdraw or refuse to issue a British passport is a matter for the Secretary of State for the Home Department (the Home Secretary). On behalf of the Home Secretary, the Minister of State for Immigration and Security considers that it is not in the public interest that you should hold a passport.
You are a British national who is involved in terrorism-related activity. It is assessed that you are likely to travel overseas in future in order to engage in terrorism-related activity. You were deported from Bulgaria to the UK on national security grounds in November 2014. It is assessed that these activities would present a risk to the national security of the United Kingdom. You are therefore considered a person whose past, present or proposed activities, actual or suspected, are so undesirable that the grant or continued enjoyment of passport facilities is believed to be contrary to the public interest.
The passport remains the property of the Crown and Her Majesty's Passport Office requests that you return the passport to the police officer delivering the letter.
It is open to you to apply for a passport at a later date. The issue of a passport will be determined on the circumstances at the time of any application. If you require any further information, please contact Her Majesty's Passport Office, quoting the above reference number."
HMG Policy on the Issuing, Withdrawal or Refusal of Passports
"The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Theresa May): The British passport is a secure document issued in accordance with international standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organisation. The British passport achieves a very high standard of security to protect the identity of the individual, to enable the freedom of travel for British citizens and to contribute to public protection in the United Kingdom and overseas.
There is no entitlement to a passport and no statutory right to have access to a passport. The decision to issue, withdraw, or refuse a British passport is at the discretion of the Secretary of State for the Home Department (the Home Secretary) under the Royal Prerogative.
This Written Ministerial Statement updates previous statements made to Parliament from time to time on the exercise of the Royal Prerogative and sets out the circumstances under which a passport can be issued, withdrawn, or refused. It redefines the public interest criteria to refuse or withdraw a passport.
A decision to refuse or withdraw a passport must be necessary and proportionate. The decision to withdraw or refuse a passport and the reason for that decision will be conveyed to the applicant or passport holder. The disclosure of information used to determine such a decision will be subject to the individual circumstances of the case.
The decision to refuse or to withdraw a passport under the public interest criteria will be used only sparingly. The exercise of this criteria will be subject to careful consideration of a person's past, present or proposed activities.
For example, passport facilities may be refused to or withdrawn from British nationals who may seek to harm the UK or its allies by travelling on a British passport to, for example, engage in terrorism-related activity or other serious or organised criminal activity.
This may include individuals who seek to engage in fighting, extremist activity or terrorist training outside the United Kingdom, for example, and then return to the UK with enhanced capabilities that they then use to conduct an attack on UK soil. The need to disrupt people who travel for these purposes has become increasingly apparent with developments in various parts of the world.
Operational responsibility for the application of the criteria for issuance or refusal is a matter for the Identity and Passport Service (IPS) acting on behalf of the Home Secretary. The criteria under which IPS can issue, withdraw or refuse a passport is set out below.
Passports are issued when the Home Secretary is satisfied as to:
i the identity of an applicant; and
ii the British nationality of applicants, in accordance with relevant nationality legislation; and
iii there being no other reasons (as set out below) for refusing a passport. IPS may make any checks necessary to ensure that the applicant is entitled to a British passport.
A passport application may be refused or an existing passport may be withdrawn. These are the persons who may be refused a British passport or who may have their existing passport withdrawn:
[…]
iv A person may be prevented from benefitting from the possession of a passport if the Home Secretary is satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so. This may be the case where:
- a person has been repatriated from abroad at public expense and their debt has not yet been repaid. This is because the passport fee supports the provision of consular services for British citizens overseas; or
- a person whose past, present or proposed activities, actual or suspected, are believed by the Home Secretary to be so undesirable that the grant or continued enjoyment of passport facilities is contrary to the public interest.
There may be circumstances in which the application of legislative powers is not appropriate to the individual applicant but there is a need to restrict the ability of a person to travel abroad.
The application of discretion by the Home Secretary will primarily focus on preventing overseas travel. There may be cases in which the Home Secretary believes that the past, present or proposed activities (actual or suspected) of the applicant or passport holder should prevent their enjoyment of a passport facility whether overseas travel was or was not a critical factor."
[emphasis added]
Grounds of Claim
"1. First, the reasons that have been given for the Decision in a "gist" disclosed to [MR] in July 2016 show that the decision was flawed on public law grounds. It was illogical, not properly supported by evidence and made without reference to relevant considerations. Furthermore, the reasons given for the Decision show that it is not in conformity with the Passport Policy itself in that the withdraw of [MR]'s passport has not been shown to be "necessary and proportionate" as required by the policy…...
2. Second, the Decision represents a serious restriction on [MR]'s rights as an EU citizen, in particular the rights conferred by Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to reside freely within the territory of the Member States ("the Citizen's Rights Directive"), as well as Treaty rights of free movement. The Decision must be justified under Article 27 of the Citizen's Rights Directive. These requirements of justification were elaborated in Case C-430/10 Gaydarov [2011] ECR I-11637 and associated case law ("the Gaydarov criteria"). The Decision fails to conform to the Gaydarov criteria because:
(1) The Decision is not based on a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to the fundamental interests of society.
(2) The Decision goes beyond what is necessary and proportionate in particular in light of its indefinite nature.
(3) The Decision is not subject to effective judicial review of the factual basis for the decision.
3. Third, the Decision is an abuse of power because,
(1) The Passport Policy prohibits use of the prerogative power unless it would be inappropriate to use applicable statutory powers. The Secretary of State has not demonstrated that it would be inappropriate.
(2) The Decision circumvents statutory protections for the individual."
"… we are in no doubt that it is not to be implied that Parliament intended to abrogate the Royal Prerogative power in relation to terrorism related activities when it enacted the TPIM Act."
The court also held that the WMS on the use of the Prerogative to withdraw or refuse a passport does not infringe the principle of legal certainty: see paragraphs 70-71.
Was the decision to withdraw the Claimant's passport flawed on public law grounds?
Was the review decision of July 2015 flawed on public law grounds?
"Where a decision-maker has taken a legally irrelevant factor into account when making his decision, the normal principle is that the decision is liable to be held to be invalid unless the factor played no significant part in the decision-making exercise……. Thus, in Simplex GE (Holdings) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1988) 57 P & CR 306, 325–326, Purchas LJ (with whom the other two members of the Court of Appeal agreed) approved an observation of Forbes J in R v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council, Ex p Cromer Ring Mill Ltd [1982] 3 All ER 761, 770, explaining that a decision would not be set aside where the irrelevant factor was "insignificant or insubstantial", as opposed to a case where the irrelevant factor's "influence was substantial.
Even where the irrelevant factor played a significant or substantial part in the decision-maker's thinking, the decision may, exceptionally, still be upheld, provided that the court is satisfied that it is clear that, even without the irrelevant factor, the decision-maker would have reached the same conclusion. Thus, in the Simplex case 57 P & CR 306, 326, Purchas LJ approved the following passage in the judgment of May LJ in R v Broadcasting Complaints Commission, Ex p Owen [1985] QB 1153, 1177:
"Where the reasons given by a statutory body for taking … a particular course of action are not mixed and can clearly be disentangled, but where the court is quite satisfied that even though one reason may be bad in law, nevertheless the statutory body would have reached precisely the same decision on the other valid reasons, then this court will not interfere by way of judicial review.
In R (Smith) v North Eastern Derbyshire Primary Care Trust [2006] 1 WLR 3315, para 10 (a different) May LJ said this:
"Probability is not enough. The defendant would have to show that the decision would inevitably have been the same and the court must not unconsciously stray from its proper province of reviewing the propriety of the decision making process into the forbidden territory of evaluating the substantial merits of the decision."
Did either the March or July decision infringe the claimant's rights of free movement in EU law?
"15. As I have said, Mr Eadie did not really pursue what had at one time been the SSHD's primary argument, that the cancellation of the passport did not engage the rights under Articles 4 and 27 of the Directive. It is obvious that they do. There is no relevant distinction between "engaging" and "breaching" here. Unless justified within the terms of the Directive, the cancellation of the passport breaches it.
16. After all, the avowed aim of the cancellation was to make it very difficult for MR to travel abroad, and it is clear that it would have that effect. Although an identity card or other means of proving nationality can be used, the UK does not issue identity cards for the purpose of proving nationality; and a UK citizen relying on other means of proving nationality than a passport will encounter difficulties in air and Eurostar travel, as Mr Chamberlain QC for the Claimant demonstrated by his researches on the internet for what airlines and Eurostar required. Case C-215/03 Oulane v The Netherlands Minister for Aliens and Integration [2005] QB 1055 ECJ, at [22-28], which affirms that where nationality can be proved unequivocally by means other than a passport or identity card it has to be recognised for the purposes of Directive 2004/38, also points out that the requirement for a passport or valid identity card is aimed at simplifying the resolution of problems relating to the right of residence for citizens and national authorities, and at establishing a maximum which Member States can require.
17. The language of the Directive is not confined to barring a legal prohibition on departure from the country of nationality, unless the derogation in Article 27 is made out. The right is to reside and move freely. There is an obligation to issue a passport to nationals but it may be "restricted": Article 27. It is restriction and not only prohibition which engages the derogation in Article 27. Some CJEU authorities refer to "prohibition" but that is because that is the nature of the restriction with which it was dealing; the Court was not confining "restriction" to "prohibition"."
"….the whole purpose of the cancellation of the passport is to prevent XH from leaving the United Kingdom. The interference with XH's freedom of movement in the EU, if not absolute, is near absolute. A compelling justification is required for such interference."
"(1) Subject to the provisions of this chapter Member States may restrict the freedom of movement and residence of union citizens and their family members, irrespective of nationality on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. These grounds shall not be invoked to serve economic ends.
(2) Measures taken on grounds of public policy or public security shall comply with the principle of proportionality and shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned. Previous criminal convictions shall not in themselves constitute grounds for taking such measures."
"When making such an assessment, the referring court will have also to determine whether that restriction on the right to leave is appropriate to ensure the achievement of the objective it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain it. According to Article 27(2) of Directive 2004/38 and the Court's settled case law, a measure which restricts the right of freedom of movement may be justified only if it respects the principle of proportionality…."
"… present association with an organisation associated with organised crime can only be taken into account insofar as the circumstances of the membership are evidence of personal conduct constituting a genuinely, present and sufficiently serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of society."
"National measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner. They must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest. They must be suitable to securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue and they must not go beyond what is necessary to obtain it."
"If an applicant for permission to move for judicial review claims that the Secretary of State's decision is vitiated by some form of illegality he will file evidence to that effect. The Court will not shut out evidence which is relevant to the issues. Indeed, it may order disclosure of evidence necessary for disposing fairly of the application. The evidence is not strictly limited to evidence which was or should have been before the Secretary of State at the time of the decision."
Conclusion
"Gist" served on 29 July 2016
a) On 10 March 2015, the Secretary of State was invited to exercise the Royal Prerogative to cancel the Claimant's British passport on the grounds that he aspired to travel to Syria to engage in terrorism related activities. The decision was subject to review in July 2015 following correspondence from the Claimant's open representatives, The outcome of this review was that the decision was maintained.b) There is written administrative guidance setting out the process by which the Secretary of State is invited to exercise her power under the Royal Prerogative to cancel a British passport on the grounds of national security. That process was followed in the case of this claimant.
c) She was provided with a written submission and supporting material which recommended that she agree that the public interest criteria for exercising the prerogative are met and that the passport should be cancelled.
d) This submission was discussed with colleagues. There were no dissenting views. OSCT finance colleagues agreed that exercising the Royal Prerogative in cases such as this has no immediate affordability impact.
e) The paragraphs below contain a summary of that submission:
f) The Claimant is a British national with access to Bangladeshi citizenship, born in Bangladesh in 1982, who currently resides in London.
g) The Claimant is believed to have an intention to travel to Syria for undesirable purposes and that there a national security need to disrupt such travel. The Claimant travelled to Turkey in February 2014 in connection with this aim.
h) Following his travel to Turkey in February 2014, the Claimant was subsequently arrested there in June 2014. It is assessed that between his arrival in Turkey and his arrest, the Claimant travelled to Syria to engage in terrorism-related activity, likely including fighting on behalf of an Islamist extremist group.
i) At the time of the decision to exercise the Royal Prerogative, the Claimant was assessed to have maintained (and may continue to maintain) a close association with members of the proscribed Islamist extremist group, Al Muhajiroun (ALM) for a significant period, notably a close, ongoing relationship with Anjem Choudary. It is also believed that the Claimant had previously played and may continue to play a significant role within ALM.
j) It is believed that members of ALM have travelled to ISIL controlled territory in Syria. Some of them are believed to have engaged in terrorism-related activity including fighting alongside ISIL and encouraging others to do so, and openly calling for attacks in the UK. For example:
- Abu Rahin Aziz who travelled to Syria in March 2014. Aziz stated on his Twitter account in February 2015 that he was a "Citizen & Soldier of the Islamic State";
- Haroon Ahmed Khurshid and Mohammed Haroon Saleem, who travelled to Istanbul, Turkey in November 2013. It is believed that Khurshid and Saleem travelled onward to Syria;
- Siddhartha Dhar who left the UK while on bail following his arrest on 25 September 2014 and travelled to ISIL-controlled territory. Recent media reporting has stated that Dhar is the masked individual in an ISIL propaganda video released on 3 January 2016 depicting the murder of five individuals and threatening attacks in the UK;
- Mohammed Rezaul Haque who, media reporting has indicated, travelled to Turkey in January 2014 and onwards to Syria. Furthermore, media reporting has stated that Hague may be one of the masked individuals alongside Dhar in the ISIL propaganda video released on 3 January 2016.
- Omar All Hussain who travelled to Syria in December 2013 and joined ISL. On 20 August 2014, an interview with Hussain appeared on BBC Newsnight. During the interview, Hussain commented that he had been involved in the beheading of at least three or four individuals in Syria. Furthermore, Hussain has called on British Muslims to "rise up" against their own country;
k) Due to his association with ALM and his assessed travel to Syria between February and June 2014, the Claimant may have associated with other ALM members whilst located in Syria and shared in their activities; which may have included Aziz, Khurshid, Salaam, Hussain and/or Hague.
l) The Claimant was deported from Turkey to Sweden in June 2014, then travelled to Egypt, Greece and Bulgaria.
m) In October 2014, it is believed that the Claimant travelled to Bulgaria and intended to enter Turkey for onward travel to Syria to engage in terrorism-related activities.
n) In November 2014, the Claimant was deported from Bulgaria on national security grounds of which the Defendant did not have sight of.
o) The Claimant was interviewed under Schedule 7 of TACT upon his return from Bulgaria on 14 November 2014. The Claimant's account in his TACT interview on 14 November 2014 is not accepted. The Secretary of State considers that the Claimant deliberately withheld the fact of his travel to Syria.
p) It was previously assessed, however no longer assessed, that the Claimant's trip to Prague in 2015 was a dry run to conduct reconnaissance of UK border security. This runs counter to the assessment that the Claimant was planning to travel to Syria.
q) It is assessed that should his passport be returned, the Claimant may travel to engage in terrorism-related activity in Syria.
r) It is assessed that the Claimant has maintained an association with Islamist extremists interested in Syria. Should the Claimant seek to travel to Syria, he may use these contacts to re-engage in Islamist extremist activities.