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England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Burrows v Smith & Anor [2010] EWHC 22 (Ch) (20 January 2010) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2010/22.html Cite as: [2010] EWHC 22 (Ch) |
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CHANCERY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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STUART JEREMY BURROWS |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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ADRIAN EMMETT SMITH CRUSH DIGITAL MEDIA LIMITED |
Defendants |
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Mr Henry Ward (instructed by direct access) for the First Defendant
Hearing dates: 17 and 18 November 2009
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Norris………………………………………………………………20 January 2010
Mr Justice Norris :
"Every trade secret, invention,…. design,…….know how……process, method scheme, product or product design (each of which is hereinafter called "an invention") whether patentable or not, and every design note….idea, algorithm…..source code, graphic, artwork, picture or like material, and any other matter which is the subject of copyright or is otherwise capable of protection through intellectual property rights……..which is made, developed, perfected, devised, conceived or first reduced to practice by [you] either solely or in collaboration with others during your employment with the company, whether or not during regular working hours, relating in any way to the business …products or activities of the company or which is capable of use in relation thereto shall be the sole and exclusive property of the company"
The clause thus dealt with two groups of ideas: those ideas themselves which were defined as "inventions" (which Mr Ward for Circle categorised as "hard IP") and those records of ideas which were the subject of copyright or otherwise protectable as intellectual property (which he categorised as "soft IP").
"..including a game he had designed a number of years previously known at the time as "Trak Trix". That game subsequently became known as "Train Trax" after various changes to the graphic style. The basis of the game however was exactly as had been designed prior to his employment."
They asserted that the game was a literary work in which copyright subsisted, and that Mr Burrows was its author. They alleged that Mr Smith was infringing that copyright by "[taking] the game to various publishers": and they threatened proceedings unless they received a written acknowledgement "that all intellectual property rights in the game known at various times as "Traktrix" or "Traintrax" (the Game) belong to our client", delivery up of all copies of the Game, and payment of damages (or an account of profits) together with costs on an indemnity basis. This aggressive and ill-advised letter contained a number of factual and legal errors: but most crucially it proceeded on the footing that there was a single identifiable "Game" which simply bore different names.
"Without admission of liability, our client is prepared to transfer ownership of all its intellectual property rights in Traintrax to your client. We would be grateful if you could provide a draft assignment for our client's approval."
The proceedings were pursued. Mr Burrows wanted a permanent injunction, his entire costs (including a CFA uplift) and damages or an account of profits.
(a) Paragraph 6 pleaded that in 1998 "the Claimant created and crystallised the concept for a computer game entitled TRAKTRIX ("the Concept")…".
(b) Paragraph 9 said that the principles of the Concept were set out in "the 1998 Document" and it set out an extensive quotation beginning with the words "Traktrix's gameplay is very simple: get the ball from one side of an environment to another and enter the "Finish Area" within a time limit. The player achieves this by laying a track in front of the ball as it progresses".
(c) Paragraph 10 said that Mr Burrows kept the Concept confidential and only disclosed it in circumstances which imported an obligation of confidence.
(d) Paragraph 11 said that "the 1998 Document" was an original literary work and that Mr Burrows owned the copyright in it.
(e) Paragraph 19 said that at no time did Mr Burrows assign to Circle "any intellectual property rights in the Concept and/or the 1998 Document".
(f) Paragraph 20 asserted that the 2006 Document "copies significant passages from the 1998 Document".
(g) Paragraph 25 contained the claim that "without the permission of the Claimant each of the Defendants is (1) using the Concept and/or (2) disclosing the Concept to one or more third parties"; but it set out no particulars.
(h) Paragraph 26 contained the claim that "without the permission of the Claimant each of the Defendants is (1) copying the 2006 Document and /or (2) issuing copies of the 2006 Document without the deletion of the relevant passages from the 1998 Document".
(i) Paragraph 4 (c) alleged that Mr Smith was "a director and the guiding mind" of Crush.
(a) Put Mr Burrows to strict proof that he owned the copyright in the game entitled "Traintrax".
(b) Denied that Mr Burrows imposed any confidentiality obligations upon Circle in relation to the Concept (and argued that it was Circle that was entitled to assert confidence against third parties).
(c) Averred that Mr Burrows had worked on the Concept as an employee of Circle and had never disclosed the existence of the 1998 Document so that Circle was entirely unaware of the alleged copyright material (and that Mr Burrows must have consented to its use).
(d) Denied paragraph 25 of the Particulars of Claim but admitted that Circle and Crush had "disclosed the Concept to a number of third parties and the Claimant was and remains aware of all parties to which the Concept was disclosed". For the purposes of that admission the pleader is obviously treating "Traktrix" and "Traintrax" as a single game, both versions of which embody "the Concept". Having regard to the correspondence which preceded the issue of the Claim Form (and indeed the terms of the letter that accompanied the draft Particulars of Claim) I can well understand why this should be so.
(e) Averred that Crush had ceased to disclose or promote "the Concept" as it had no commercial value, had offered to assign it to Mr Burrows at no cost, and had no intention of using the Concept in any way.
(f) Denied that Mr Smith was "the guiding mind" of Crush and asserted that he was one of its two directors and a 50% shareholder with that other director.
"This claim is based on a game known variously as "Forever Rolling", "Trax Tris" "Traktrix" and "Traintrax". For ease I shall refer to the various stages of the game as "Trak Trix" as my generic description of the game in its various guises".
Furthermore, the expert report which Mr Burrows' solicitors commissioned from Mr Sykes (but did not in the event adduce at trial) had as a key part a "comparison of Traktrix and the 2007 Traintrax games". Finally, the apparent connection between the two was maintained in Mr Chapple's skeleton argument, paragraph 22 of which identified the matter of complaint as "the use by the Defendant of each of the Concept and the 1998 Document in the Traintrax concept and documentation": that seems to be a clear assertion that Mr Burrows had some sort of interest in "Traintrax".
"The argument ran that [P] owned the copyright in the Mark 3 software. This had become embedded in ADS as it stood in 1986. [Counsel] said it followed that there was a licence from [P] which he could revoke. This would mean that all the improvements and additions made over the years, mainly by [P] himself, would be useless. The whole foundation of PK's (or any successor in title's) business would be at his mercy. Even given the premise of ownership of copyright there would surely be an estoppel on those facts. That must be so even without the clause providing that all PK software is the property of PK. That clause makes it even more inconceivable that [P] could have any right to stop the use of it".
Mr Justice Norris………………………………………………….20 January 2010.