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England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Chemistree Homecare Ltd & Ors v Roche Products Ltd [2011] EWHC 1579 (Ch) (16 June 2011) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2011/1579.html Cite as: [2011] EWHC 1579 (Ch) |
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CHANCERY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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Chemistree Homecare Limited Blackbay Ventures Limited Zanrex Limited |
Claimants |
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- and - |
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Roche Products Limited |
Defendant |
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101 Finsbury Pavement London EC2A 1ER
Tel No: 020 7422 6131 Fax No: 020 7422 6134
Web: www.merrillcorp.com/mls Email: [email protected]
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
Geraldine Andrews QC and Ronit Kreisberger (instructed by Eversheds LLP)
for the Defendant
16 June 2011
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Kitchin:
"17. I do not believe that the two hours currently listed will be sufficient. This is because Chemistree will not have sufficient free cash (not profit) without jeopardising patient care to meet any order for security for costs. Therefore, the judge at the security for costs hearing will need to consider Chemistree's overall prospects in the case and whether, as Roche suggests, the claim should be struck out. Accordingly, Lord Denning MR's guidance on these matters is relevant and the merits of the case will carry a disproportionate weighting for the presiding judge in deciding the outcome of this application. "
"8. Before I deal with the procedural difficulties that have since arisen, I think I ought to make two comments on that application notice. Although the application notice seeks security up to and including the trial of this action, it may very well be that the judge hearing the security for costs application would not order security for the entirety of the period but would instead deal with the period until trial and the trial itself in bitesize stages. For example, the court may take the view that costs up to the end of the interim injunction application might be the subject of a security order and leave over what is to happen thereafter. Further, if the matter continues after the interim injunction application (and I assume that it will), then the court might decide to order security up to the end of the disclosure process or some other convenient demarcation point in the run-up to a trial. I am not going to bind the hands of the judge who hears the security for costs application, but what I have said I think is everyday experience of such applications."
"15. Having looked at the witness statement of Mr Budhdeo, this does not begin to be a case where I could possibly accede to the relief which is sought in the application notice of adjourning this matter for a lengthy period, certainly not adjourning it to a date which is after the interim injunction application. It seems to me to be very important that this matter is dealt with soon and it is dealt with in good time before 18 July 2011. I say good time because if an order for security is made (and I make no prediction whatever about that) it is important that the question of security is resolved. Will it be provided? Will it not be provided? Time will be taken for that purpose and the defendant needs to know where it stands before it incurs substantial costs in dealing with the interim injunction application."
"23. The relevant passage in the judgment of Sir Donald Nicholls V-C in the Unisoft case was, at p.534:
"Before me there was a dispute between the parties on the proper interpretation of section 726(1) and, in particular, of the effect of the words 'if it appears by credible testimony that there is reason to believe'. Mr Potts QC, for the respondents to the petition, submitted that the question is not whether the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that if the plaintiff loses it will definitely be unable to pay the costs of the defendants; the test is whether there is reason to believe, being a belief derived from credible evidence, that the company will be unable to pay if it loses. If there is such evidence, the threshold requirement is satisfied even though there may be contrary evidence from the plaintiff company.
I start consideration of the subsection by noting that the phrase 'the company will be unable to pay the defendant's costs if successful in his defence', is clear and unequivocal. The phrase is 'will be unable', not 'may be unable'. 'Inability to pay' in this context I take to mean inability to pay the costs as and when they fall due for payment. Thus the question is, will the company be able to meet the costs order at the time when the order is made and requires to be met? That is a question to be judged and answered as matters stand when the application is heard by the court, although the court will take into account and give appropriate weight to evidence about what is expected to happen in the interval before the costs order would fall to be met. The court will draw appropriate inferences and here, as elsewhere, it will not let common sense fly out of the window.
The phrase 'the company will be unable to pay' is preceded by the words 'if it appears by credible testimony that there is reason to believe'. I do not think this latter phrase has the effect of watering down the words which follow. The court, on the basis of credible testimony, must have 'reason to believe', that is, to accept, 'that the company will be unable to pay'. If this were not so, and the test is not whether the court, on the basis of credible testimony, believes the company will be unable to pay, then it is difficult to identify what is the proper approach and what is the test being prescribed by the statute. It cannot, surely, suffice that the applicant's accountant, for example, who is a credible witness, puts forward a case of inability to pay. If there is conflicting evidence the court must have regard to that also. The court must reach a conclusion on the basis of the totality of the evidence placed before it, giving such weight to the various matters deposed to as is appropriate in the circumstances. The matter on which, in the end, the court is required to reach a conclusion is whether the company will be unable to pay."
24. In my judgment, Mr Driscoll is correct in his submission that the Vice-Chancellor was primarily concerned with answering the submission by counsel that if there was evidence which could be described as credible testimony that the company would not be able to pay the costs if ordered to do so, the threshold requirement in s.726 was satisfied even though there might be contrary evidence from the company. The answer given by the Vice-Chancellor contains a number of points. First, as the Vice-Chancellor makes clear, the phrase "the company will be unable to pay" requires more than simply that there is doubt whether the company will pay. Otherwise the second limb would have to say "the company may be unable to pay the costs". Secondly, the Vice-Chancellor holds that the court must have regard to conflicting evidence. The court must reach its conclusion as to whether the conditions in the statute are satisfied by reference to the totality of the evidence".
i) Chemistree's combined balance sheet showed they had net liabilities of £1.8 million.
ii) Deduction of goodwill from those net liabilities resulted in a tangible net liabilities figure of £3.4 million.
iii) The cash balance held by Chemistree totalled £121,556.
iv) Chemistree had combined net current liabilities of £2.2 million.
v) Chemistree were insolvent on a balance sheet and cashflow basis, having a combined excess of liabilities over assets of approximately £1.8 million and a combined excess of current liabilities over current assets of approximately £2.2 million, indicating that they were not able to meet their liabilities as they fell due.