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England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Jones & Ors v Jones (Re Estate of Daphne Penelope Jones) [2023] EWHC 1457 (Ch) (16 June 2023) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2023/1457.html Cite as: [2023] EWHC 1457 (Ch) |
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THE BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS IN WALES
PROPERTY TRUST AND PROBATE LIST (ChD)
In the estate of Daphne Penelope Jones deceased
2 Park Street, Cardiff, CF10 1ET |
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B e f o r e :
Sitting as a judge of the High Court
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(1) CATHERINE JONES (2) JACQUELINE JONES (3) STACEY O'GARA (4) ROBERT O'GARA (5) JOHN O'GARA (6) BETHAN O'GARA |
Claimants |
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- and - |
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CERI JONES |
Defendant |
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The defendant appeared in person
Hearing dates: 5-6 June 2023
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Crown Copyright ©
HHJ JARMAN KC:
Introduction
Background
Events in 2021 leading to the making of the will
"Whilst she has a diagnosis of early Vascular Dementia I did not feel that cognitive ability was impaired to the degree that it affected her ability to make decisions. I felt that she understood the implications of the decision she was going to make and was able to make these decisions herself and communicate them effectively. In my opinion, when assessed Daphne Jones had the capacity to make her own decisions about her will and appointing a Power of Attorney for when her vascular dementia deteriorates in the future to the point she is no longer able to make these decisions for herself."
The making of the will
Events after the making of the will
"No concerns about the wellbeing of Daphne-able to engage fully in conversation and give her point of view. House was clean and tidy. I believe this is a civil issue over money. I believe that Daphne currently is capable of making her own decisions."
Testamentary capacity
"[a] shall understand the nature of the act and its effects; [b] shall understand the extent of the property of which he is disposing; [c] shall be able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect; and, with a view to the latter object, [d] that no disorder of the mind shall poison his affections, pervert his sense of right, or prevent the exercise of his natural faculties…"
"If there is evidence of actual understanding, then that would prove the requisite capacity, but there will often be no such evidence, and the court must then look at all the evidence to see what inferences can properly be drawn as to capacity. Such evidence may relate to the execution of the Will but it may also relate to prior or subsequent events. It would be absurd for the law to insist in every case on proof of actual understanding at the time of execution."
"I do not believe that previous authority goes to the length of requiring an understanding of the collateral consequences of a disposition as opposed to its immediate consequences. Nor do I think it desirable that the law should go that far. "
"The substance of the golden rule is that when a solicitor is instructed to prepare a will for an aged testator, or for one who has been seriously ill, he should arrange for a medical practitioner first to satisfy himself as to the capacity and understanding of the testator, and to make a contemporaneous record of his examination and findings…"
Knowledge and approval
"The reason for this requirement is the need for evidence to rebut suspicious circumstances: Perrins v Holland [2010] EWCA Civ 840; [2011] Ch 270 at [25]. Normally proof of instructions and reading over the will will suffice: ibid at [25]. The correct approach for the trial judge is clearly set out in Gill v Woodall [2010] EWCA Civ 1430; [2011] Ch 380 . It is a holistic exercise based on the evaluation of all the evidence both factual and expert. The judge's starting point in our case was one of "initial suspicion", given that the disputed will was prepared and executed without a solicitor and without Mrs Simon having been medically examined: see [11]. But having heard the evidence he held that his initial suspicion had been dispelled. He found it clear that Mrs Simon knew that she was making a will, took a conscious decision to make it and approved its terms. This conclusion was, in my judgment, fully supported by the evidence that the judge accepted."
Undue influence
"i) In a case of a testamentary disposition of assets, unlike a lifetime disposition, there is no presumption of undue influence;
ii) Whether undue influence has procured the execution of a will is therefore a question of fact;
iii) The burden of proving it lies on the person who asserts it. It is not enough to prove that the facts are consistent with the hypothesis of undue influence. What must be shown is that the facts are inconsistent with any other hypothesis. In the modern law this is, perhaps, no more than a reminder of the high burden, even on the civil standard, that a claimant bears in proving undue influence as vitiating a testamentary disposition;
iv) In this context undue influence means influence exercised either by coercion, in the sense that the testator's will must be overborne, or by fraud;
v) Coercion is pressure that overpowers the volition without convincing the testator's judgment. It is to be distinguished from mere persuasion, appeals to ties of affection or pity for future destitution, all of which are legitimate. Pressure which causes a testator to succumb for the sake of a quiet life, if carried to an extent that overbears the testator's free judgment discretion or wishes, is enough to amount to coercion in this sense;
vi) The physical and mental strength of the testator are relevant factors in determining how much pressure is necessary in order to overbear the will. The will of a weak and ill person may be more easily overborne than that of a hale and hearty one. As was said in one case simply to a weak and feeble testator may so fatigue the brain that a sick person may be induced for quietness' sake to do anything. A 'drip drip' approach may be highly effective in sapping the will;
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ix) The question is not whether the court considers that the testator's testamentary disposition is fair because, subject to statutory powers of intervention, a testator may dispose of his estate as he wishes. The question, in the end, is whether in making his dispositions, the testator has acted as a free agent."
"If I don't get the house, then I will never step foot in Wales again…My father wanted to leave the house to me. It was Vicky who said it was unfair…The money means nothing to me. I was born in the house, I'd like to die here and if I can't then I won't be returning to Wales…When nan goes, there's no reason to return here unless I bought the house."
Conclusions