England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions

The Chain of Charters

(1) Bareboat charter (Barecon 89) between Dream International Navigation SA of Panama and Crescent Shipping & Chartering Corporation of Manila (“Crescent”) dated 6 May 1994.

(2) Time charter (NYPE 46) between Crescent and Maritime Cargo Express SA of Panama (“Maritime Cargo”) dated 6 May 1994.

(3) Time charter (NYPE 46) between Maritime Cargo and Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Limited, the first defendants dated 25 March 1994.

(1) Revised Quantum Schedule 1 listing each of the claims; and

(2) Quantum Schedule 2 indicating the agreement reached on the value of the claimants’ cars on each deck of the vessel and each fire zone.

The Characteristics and Layout of the Vessel

The Timetable Prepared by the Master

“1530	Disch started 3 p.m. 313 units [?] used cars
1610	Bunkering started
1845	C/o informed by 3/o about fire
1845/50	Fire alarm sounded
1845	Fire pump started by 2/E
1850	Muster the crew
1855	Master went to car deck
1900	Master went back to bridge
1905	Master instructed to shut blowers
1910	Bunker barge full away
1915	2 tugs came started spraying water
1920	Master informed port control
1925	Master informed Univan
1930	Master called Univan again
1945	Evacuated first group (19 crew)
1950	Master informed C/E to release CO²
2000	Evacuated 2nd group (3 crew Master C/E E/O)”

This timetable should be read subject to my findings set out below.

The Evidence Generally

“I interviewed crew asap. Simon Scott put on job... Police have requested all 22 crew to visit police station tonight for inquiry... Khan was trying to avoid same by telling them that some crew have gone out etc... Please check if P & I lawyer can brief crew before they are sent to police station today. (Mr. Pereira) said he will assemble them and brief them... Police want full crew to be interviewed and their statements taken tonight... Tell everyone [? regarding] stevedores... [Vroon] called [Mr. Pereira] and informed that they are sending lawyers to interview... CID now on scene. Minimum information given to them...

Khan... what statements already made Naseeb.

RS Anand Crew stories... What statements already made...

Khan told that if anyone asked he should tell about stevedores being the cause for fire... CID is now on scene. Minimum required information given to them... Captain was informed about Pereira’s and RS Anand’s arrival Dubai and not to give statements to third parties prior to their arrival.”

(i) At 19.25 hours on 23 July a contemporary note of a telephone call from the Master to Hong Kong records the master as saying “...there is a fire on vessel in No. 5 Deck and it is spreading to No. 6 Deck.”

(ii) The Chief Engineer is recorded as telling the Police “I saw on the board/screen that a fire had broken out on the fifth deck...”

(iii) Able Seaman Palconit is recorded as telling the Police “...I brought the fire extinguisher to the fifth deck and I and my friend tried to extinguish the fire, but without success.”

WITNESSES CALLED BY THE DEFENDANTS

Captain Alwyn Villondo - the Master

“At exactly 6.50 p.m. on Thursday 23 July 1998 I was in my cabin on the said vessel when I heard the fire alarm. I proceeded to the control cabin on the top level aft. On checking the control screen which displays a plan of all parts of the ship, I saw the fire light on in the fourth level. The light was exactly in the fourth level and in the hall No. 2. Since the fourth floor was fully loaded with cars, I immediately notified the officer in charge of the fire location and he in turn called the crew and they all went to the fourth level where they found the fire erupting in several cars. They tried to control the fire but failed and the fire started to spread. We all left the ship without taking anything with us. The port officers contacted the civil defence who rushed quickly to the fire location. ...I can’t determine the [cause of the fire], but it is likely to be a cigarette thrown by one of the workers or it could be one of the used cars.”

Rosalino H De Guzman - the Third Officer

Roseller P. Quimat - Chief Engineer

Mark Palconit - Able Seaman

Palecanda Bopanna Subbiah

Jessie Rex Pilapil Martin

Gigimon Kalambattu John

Statements and other materials admitted under the Civil Evidence Act 1995

EXPERT EVIDENCE

Common ground between the expert witnesses

1. The gas tight doors between zones B and C could physically have been closed very soon after the fire alarm sounded.

2. No one gave any thought to closing the gas tight doors and this suggests that the crew had not been adequately trained.

3. The Emergency Procedures Manual was not as clear as it should have been, because it required the Master to select parts which applied to his ship and to ignore parts which did not apply to his ship.

4. The experts could not explain the Chief Engineer’s actions in repeatedly closing and opening the manual CO² valve.

5. Two sets of breathing apparatus were not sufficient for this particular vessel (although two represented the minimum number required by SOLAS).

6. Four walkie-talkies were insufficient.

Expert Witnesses called by the claimants

Captain Haakansson

“The simple and revealing facts are that fighting of the fire was unsuccessful still after a full hour. The fire in one vehicle led to the total loss of the vessel. I am of the opinion that the procedures, the implementation of these procedures, the maintenance of equipment or the experience/training/motivation of crew, or - most likely - a combination of all of these are to be blamed for this unhappy event. In short and as said above in my report I conclude that:

- There was no proper fire manual with specific instructions for dealing with fire in a cargo of vehicles.

- Crew response was disorganised.

- There was a lack of proper communication means.

- The major failure was not to use CO² properly and very quickly.

- The crew had a basic misunderstanding of use of CO² as a front-line fire control system.

As a consequence of these failures, a fire that should have been able to have been

controlled early on was able to destroy the cargo and the vessel.”

(i) That the briefing and instructions given to the Master were not safe and prudent to enable him to carry out his job properly.

(ii) That he did not consider that the Master was properly instructed and trained to deal with a fire on the ship.

(iii) That a proper briefing to a master of a car carrier would have underlined the special risks that apply when a car carrier is in port.

(iv) That the Master should have been allowed to read important manuals before taking command. There was a need for an overlap period between old and new masters.

(v) That the Master should not have attempted to fight the fire with hoses before using CO².

(vi) If the Master only asked himself where the stevedores were at or after 19.30, this was unacceptable.

(vii) That he would not have allowed the Master to take command of the vessel.

(i) That there should have been drills which required the crew to shut the gas tight doors and simulate the deployment of CO² on the car decks.

(ii) That there are always at least part ballast voyages in this trade, and that fire drills should be carried out in an empty (or partly empty) cargo hold.

(iii) That two members of the crew should have been on a fire fighting leader training course.

(iv) That jump-starting and refuelling are allowed on a car deck provided the ventilation is running. These operations should be carried out in an open space, separately (the two operations should not be permitted at the same time).

(v) That gangs of stevedores should be properly supervised. There should be one member of crew supervising each full gang. Such member of crew should ensure that fuelling operations and jump-starting operations are separated. If refuelling and jump-starting operations were being carried out at the same time, this should have been stopped by the supervising member of crew.

Dr. Alan Craggs

“The four extinguishers that had not, apparently, discharged much, (if any) of their contents on the weather deck and the three that were found on deck 7...that would suggest that perhaps five (at the most) of those were defective. Five...out of nine...my conclusion is the evidence indicates to me that they could have been defective. I cannot discount, for example, Captain Abell’s somewhat elaborate demonstration that it is possible to pressurise an extinguisher without ejecting the powder but...in my view the salvors would have been very unlikely to have undertaken such an exercise themselves. They would either use the extinguisher as they felt necessary or if they were in the process of testing it they would wish to see powder being ejected from the extinguisher... I cannot speak for what the salvors did, but the size of fires that would be extinguishable using such small amounts of powder are relatively small and would be of the size where one might consider just stamping it out... It just seems an unlikely thing to use a powder extinguisher on a very small fire like that.”

Expert witness called by the defendants

Captain Abell

(a) Accepted that by the standards of the Eurasian Alliance manual, there were certainly things that were wrong and there was no question that the crew were far from perfect.

(b) Repeated the statement in his letter of 15 December that if no one gave any thought to closing the gas tight doors, this would suggest that the crew had not been adequately trained.

(c) Agreed that the crew’s reaction to tackling this fire was below standard.

(d) Said that to the extent the Master failed to consider the whereabouts of the stevedores, this was another appalling bad error.

(e) Repeated the statement in his letter of 15 December that as soon as the alarm sounded a responsible person should have gone to the gangway to affirm, with the stevedores’ foreman, that all stevedores were accounted for. A properly trained crew would have implemented this procedure.

(f) Accepted that a properly trained crew would have deployed CO² much earlier if the head count was correct.

(g) Agreed that Univan’s emergency procedures for this vessel were defective.

(i) Accepted that the procedures and instructions provided by Univan should have been precise and comprehensive to the Eurasian Dream and should have included precise and comprehensive instructions as to how to prevent and deal with fires.

(j) Accepted (contrary to what appeared in his first report) that the Emergency Procedures Manual was defective. It contained nothing specific to car carriers and this was a fundamental omission. As a result the Master (provided with the manual) was not properly instructed in cargo carrier procedures and would not have been competent to take command of the vessel without proper instructions in such procedures.

(k) Accepted that there should have been specific instructions to the Master and crew about the special dangers of fire inherent in car carriers.

(l) Agreed that there should have been proper procedures in place on board the ship to ensure that gangs on decks were properly supervised.

(m) Accepted that if stevedores were engaged in jump-starting and refuelling operations they should have been closely supervised.

(n) Agreed that the managers should have specifically prohibited jump-starting and refuelling in the same place; this should have been spelt out in an emergency manual and particularly in the case of a new master. The absence of a prohibition by the owners to the crew never to allow simultaneous refuelling and jump-starting was a very serious omission.

(o) (It being common ground that there is no evidence that the Hyundai Pure Car (Truck) Carrier operation manual was on the ship) agreed that it was an extremely serious failure that such a manual was missing from the ship.

(p) Accepted that the instructions provided to the Master and crew with regard to an emergency should have spelled out all the procedures to be followed, including fundamental procedures (for example, shutting gas tight doors and evacuating spaces).

(q) Accepted that there are certain fundamental and basic rules to fighting a fire (shutting gas tight doors, carrying out a head count, evacuating spaces and deploying CO²). The crew did not follow these fundamental and basic rules. The reasonable conclusion to be drawn is that the crew was not familiar with the fundamentals and was therefore not a competent crew.

(r) Agreed that the action of the Chief Engineer in shutting the manual CO² valve was idiotic. His ignorance of which fire zone Deck 4 was in was extraordinary; it pointed to the Chief Engineer not being competent to operate the ship’s CO² system.

(s) Agreed that it would have been better to use CO² and not to waste time with hoses, CO² being the primary means of controlling fires.

THE CLAIMANTS’ CASE

- The vessel’s equipment;

- Competence/efficiency of the Master and the crew;

- Adequacy of the documentation supplied to the vessel.

(i) The fire resulted from the ship’s lack of proper procedures for, and the crew’s failure to supervise, the stevedores. In particular, the crew permitted simultaneous and proximate refuelling/jump-starting which should have been prohibited by Univan. Univan should have alerted the crew to these special risks. Had the crew (and in particular the Third Officer) followed these elementary procedures there would not have been a fire.

(ii) Further or alternatively, the original fire was not large and should have been within the capabilities of a competent crew (if they had been in attendance), equipped with functioning extinguishers. The fire damage could have been limited to only one or two vehicles.

(iii) Further or alternatively, the failure properly to deploy CO² within zone B meant that the fire was not extinguished in that zone. Had it been, the damage would have been contained as set out in Dr. Craggs’ first report.

(iv) If CO² had had to be deployed in both zones A and B, a similar position would have obtained, although the smoke damage would have been less in zone A.

THE DEFENDANTS’ CASE

(i) It is to be expected that from to time a car will catch fire without the intervention of fault on the operator or carrier’s part.

(ii) The most likely time for such a fire to happen is during/immediately after loading and during/immediately before discharge.

(iii) If a fire does happen at these times, the danger of rapid spread will be greater than normal, because of the absence of very large open decks on pure car carriers.

The defendants did not have this knowledge. When they acquired it they took appropriate action.

THE RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES

“Article III. Responsibilities and Liabilities

1. The carrier shall be bound, before and at the beginning of the voyage, to exercise due diligence to (

(a) Make the ship seaworthy;

(b) Properly man, equip and supply the ship;

(c) Make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship in which goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation.

2. Subject to the provisions of Article IV, the carrier shall properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for and discharge the goods carried.

Article IV. Rights and Immunities

1. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be liable for loss or damage arising or resulting from unseaworthiness unless caused by want of due diligence on the part of the carrier to make the ship seaworthy, and to secure that the ship is properly manned, equipped and supplied, and to make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers and all other parts of the ship in which goods are carried fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article III.

Whenever loss or damage has resulted from unseaworthiness, the burden of proving the exercise of due diligence shall be on the carrier or other person claiming exemption under this section.

2. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting from-

...

(b) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier;

..."

The burden of proof

‘The ship must have that degree of fitness which an ordinary careful owner would require his vessel to have at the commencement of her voyage having regard to all the probable circumstances of it. Would a prudent owner have required that it (sc the defect) be made good before sending his ship to sea, had he known of it?’

(1) The vessel must be in a suitable condition and suitably manned and equipped to meet the ordinary perils likely to be encountered while performing the services required of it. This aspect of the duty relates to the following matters.

(a) The physical condition of the vessel and its equipment;

(b) The competence / efficiency of the Master and crew;

(c) The adequacy of stores and documentation.

(2) The vessel must be cargoworthy in the sense that it is in a fit state to receive the specified cargo.

(1) the carrier under the bills of lading is liable for the want of due diligence by the owners or managers (The Fjord Wind [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 307 at 315 and Carver on Bills of Lading (1^st ed.), para. 9-125).

(2) the carrier is liable for the want of due diligence of the Master insofar as the carrier or the owners or managers have delegated to him their duties as to seaworthiness.

(1) It is relevant to consider ‘what other skilled men do in comparable circumstances’ (The Amstelslot [ibid] at 230 rhc per Lord Reid). The claimants’ position (which I accept) is that general practice is relevant but not conclusive; it is no excuse for negligence that everyone else was negligent too: Morris v. West Hartlepool Steam Navigation [1954] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 507 at 510 per Denning LJ.

(2) The mere fact that with hindsight it is possible to see that extra precautions could have been taken does not necessarily mean that due diligence was not exercised: ‘In a great many accidents it is clear after the event that if the defendant had taken certain extra precautions the accident would or might have been avoided. The question always is whether a reasonable man in the shoes of the defendant, with the skill and knowledge which the defendant had or ought to have had, would have taken those extra precautions.’ ([ibid] at 230 per Lord Reid) (Carver on Bills of Lading (1^st ed), para. 9-123).

(1) the appointment of a generally competent Master/crew: The Makedonia [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 316 (at 337-338 per Hewson J). That is to say, the owners / managers must have taken care to see that the Master / crew were ‘suitable men for the post’ (Moore v. Lunn (1922) 11 Ll.L.Rep. 86 at 93 (per Bailhache J). The owners / managers must take reasonable steps to satisfy themselves of this. They must satisfy themselves by inspection of the seaman’s documents, interviews and inquiries from previous employers that he is reasonably fit to occupy the post to which he is appointed: The Makedonia [ibid]; Scrutton on Charterparties (20^th ed.), p. 430.

(2) the specific competence of the Master in relation to the vessel and voyage in question. It will not necessarily be enough to rely on certificates of competence held by the seaman: The Farrandoc [ibid] (Can.Ex.Ct) (Scrutton on Charterparties (20^th ed.), p. 430). The owners/managers must provide the Master / crew with reasonably necessary specific instruction and supervision, on an ongoing basis, in relation to the vessel and voyage(s).

‘To my mind, a person taking reasonable care for his own ship or cargo or seeking to discharge this obligation even when told that the person to be employed in a position involving responsibility held a qualifying certificate would scarcely fail to make further inquiries as to his ability and experience. Even after making such inquiries he would, in my opinion, inquire how far the man’s experience fitted him for service in the particular ship and take steps to see that the man was adequately instructed with respect to any features of the particular ship with which it was necessary for him to be familiar to properly discharge the duties of his position and to avoid damage to the ship and her cargo.’ (at 282)

(See also: Standard Oil (ibid); The Makedonia [ibid] at 338) Some forms of supervision by the carrier were considered by Lord Brandon in The Marion [1984] 1 AC 563 at 575:

‘The forms of supervision used vary considerably, depending no doubt on the size of the companies concerned, the number and types of ships which they operate, and the trades in which such ships are employed. The forms of supervision used, however, include, first, regular or random checks by marine superintendents or other qualified managerial staff when ships are visited by such persons in port; secondly, the complete overhaul, in the form of inspection and checking of chart rooms and their contents, at regular or irregular intervals; and, thirdly, the complete landing of the contents of chart rooms for inspection and checking, again at regular or irregular intervals.’

Article III, rule 2

The exceptions under Article IV, rule 2

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

(See Tuckey J in The Star Sea [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 651 (at 658))

“12.2 Duty Officer and crew members should keep constant watch throughout the loading and discharging operation, so that any faulty conditions of the vehicles can be detected in the early stage. During their watch of cargo operation pay due attention to the following point:

Point 1 When a dead car is being discharged, direct fuel supply to the carburetor must be prohibited. If it is necessary to supply fuel to it, fuel must be poured into the tank. Fuel must not be supplied (sic) in the same compartment where the flat battery is being charged from another car.”

(1) The vessel called at Dubai, where approximately 300 cars were discharged. At about 13.00 hours, the vessel sailed for the nearby port of Sharjah.

(2) The vessel arrived at the Sharjah pilot station at about 14.10 hours and was alongside at 15.06 hours.

(3) 15.30 hours - Discharge started. Discharge of vehicles commenced at about 15.30 hours through both the stern ramp and the starboard side ramp.

(4) 16.10 hours - Bunkering started. Between 15.30 and 16.00 hours, the bunkering barge came alongside the vessel (port side) and bunkering commenced at about 16.10 hours. It was continuing at the time of the fire.

(5) The stevedores had service trucks on car Decks 4 and 6, which were used to assist in relation to vehicles which would not start. The service truck on Deck 4 was manned by a driver and an assistant stevedore. The service truck had three containers and a large battery set on the flat bed at its rear.

(6) Simultaneous and proximate refuelling and jump-starting operations were undertaken by stevedores on Deck 4. What happened was reflected in the contemporary manuscript note of R. S. Anand’s telephone call to Hong Kong records : ‘service truck - poured some fuel carburettor [?] ( disconnected the jumps & threw it - spark gasoline [? catch] fire’. (See also the notes of Mr. Khan’s calls to Hong Kong ‘3/O present during Jumper connection. Jerry can nearby. ... Panic all over’ and ‘As per Khan - Name of person who was using jerry can for fuelling - Naseeb’).

(The “Safe Sailing No. 11” circular sent out by Univan to its fleet on 31 July 1998 was an early appraisal of and response to the circumstances of the fire on the Eurasian Dream. It highlights the perils of simultaneous and proximate refuelling and jump-starting and is an indication that Univan recognised that this may have been what happened on the Eurasian Dream. The circular stipulated that :-

(i) ‘Direct fuel supply to the carburettor is prohibited’.

(ii) ‘If it is necessary to pour fuel into the tank, same should be done without spilling it over... In any case if any fuelling is to be done, duty officer must be informed and this must be done in his presence.’

(iii) ‘Charging battery and the Jerry cans containing fuel must not be carried on the same pick up truck.’

(iv) ‘Fuelling must not be done in the same compartment where the flat battery is being charged from another car or from the pick up truck.’

(v) ‘If any leakage of fuel is observed, battery charging operations must be stopped’.

The Eurasian Alliance ‘Fire Prevention and Fire Fighting’ manual prescribed the following fire precaution (amongst others): ‘Battery charging operations and fuel replenishment is not being undertaken at the same time and in the same compartment.’)

(7) The Third Officer was due to take over the watch from the Second Officer at 18.00 hours. Of the (at most) 4 walkie-talkies on board, 3 radios would usually be held by the Master, the Chief Officer and the Duty A/B, but 3 radios were in fact being used by the engineers during the bunkering of the vessel. I have reservations as to whether the one remaining walkie-talkie was in the possession of the Third Officer at the material time.

It is unclear whether the Third Officer did actually go to Deck 4:

(a) In his Police interview, he told the Police that he was having a meal at the time of the fire and he disavowed all knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the fire. He gave a different account in his witness statement.

(b) A/B Palconit is recorded as having told the Police in his first interview that, at the time of the fire, he was on Deck 4 with the Third Officer and that, when the fire broke out, he ‘saw the Third Officer plus five persons escaping from the deck doorway onto the port quay’. The Third Officer said that this was a lie.

What should have happened?

I have no doubt that the Third Officer (i) should have been supervising the operations of the stevedores on Deck 4; (ii) should not have permitted simultaneous and proximate refuelling and jump-starting operations (had the Third Officer followed these elementary procedures, there would not have been a fire); and (iii) (even if, contrary to the above, a fire had broken out) should have immediately raised the alarm and summoned assistance and should have been able to put out the fire with one or more fire extinguishers operated by himself and other members of the crew.

The analysis in (iii) above assumes:

(a) That the Third Officer and other members of the crew had a sufficient number of walkie-talkies. I find that they did not at the time (bunkering operations apart) have more than one between them. (I have serious reservations as to whether the one remaining walkie-talkie was in the possession of the Third Officer at the material time).

(b) That the fire extinguishers on Deck 4 were in proper working order. I find that the probability is that the fire extinguishers on the Eurasian Dream had not been properly serviced.

(c) That the Third Officer and other members of the crew had been properly instructed, trained and drilled. I find that the Master and the crew (including the Third Officer) had not been properly instructed, trained and drilled.

I emphasise that speed of reaction was critical. As the Eurasian Alliance manual states: “In fire fighting speed is the most important factor.” Speed of reaction was in turn dependent on proper instruction, training and drills. The Master and the crew had not been properly instructed, trained and drilled. If there was not a speedy reaction, the fire would quickly become beyond the point when it could be put out with fire extinguishers.

The above findings are consistent with Captain Haakansson’s experience. Captain Haakansson said that out of 35 ships for which he was responsible, there would be a report of a car catching fire on one of the ships about every two months on average. His experience extended from 1961 to 1998. During this period although there was a fire every two months in one of the vessels in a fleet of 35, a vessel was never lost. On two occasions only during this period the fire was put out using the CO² system. On all other occasions the fire was put out with one hand held extinguisher.

Even if, contrary to the above, the fire could not have been put out with fire extinguishers, I find that it should have been possible to evacuate and shut off zone B and utilise the CO² (without endangering life), and thereby prevent the spread of the fire to other parts of the ship. This again assumes that the vessel was in a suitable condition and suitably manned (with a competent and efficient Master and crew) and suitably equipped.

What in fact happened

I have no doubt that there was an attempted cover-up. The Third Officer realised ex post facto that he should have been supervising the operations of the stevedores on Deck 4 and realised ex post facto that simultaneous and proximate refuelling and jump-starting operations should not have been permitted (and that had he taken the elementary step of prohibiting this dangerous practice, there would not have been a fire). Further the Third Officer realised ex post facto that (even if a fire had broken out) he should have been able to put it out with one or more fire extinguishers operated by himself and other members of the crew. The Third Officer told the Police that he was having a meal at the time of the fire. In his witness statement he changed his account and said that he was on Deck 4 at the material time, mentioned jump-starting but omitted any reference to simultaneous and proximate refuelling operations (involving the pouring of petrol into the carburettor) and exaggerated the nature and extent of the early stages of the fire.

It is possible that no member of the crew was on Deck 4 purporting to supervise the stevedores on Deck 4, at the time of the outbreak of the

fire.

It is also possible and perhaps more likely that, having been on Deck 4 at the material time and having wrongly permitted the stevedores to engage in dangerous simultaneous and proximate refuelling and jump-starting operations and having failed to respond appropriately when the fire broke out, the Third Officer lied to the Police and lied (in different respects) in his evidence to this Court. There are references in the contemporaneous Univan documents to the Third Officer being the eye-witness to the incident (e.g.: “Captain Villondo confirmed that Third Officer De Guzman is the witness”).

If (as I consider more likely) the Third Officer was on Deck 4 at the material time, having wrongly permitted the stevedores to engage in dangerous simultaneous and proximate refuelling and jump-starting operations, he failed to respond appropriately when the fire broke out. He had (I find) been inadequately instructed, trained and drilled and he panicked. Further, the shortage of walkie-talkies probably affected the adequacy of the response. The vessel only had (at most) 4 walkie-talkies. It was usual during bunkering operations for the bunkering team to take 3 of the walkie-talkies. This left only one walkie-talkie. Thus the Third Officer being the officer on duty (if he had that walkie-talkie with him) had no means of communicating with the Master, Chief Officer or Duty A/B. I have serious reservations as to whether the one remaining radio was in the possession of the Third Officer at the material time. (The Chief Engineer said in his witness statement that he had a radio, as did the Second Engineer and (he believed) the Electrical Officer. But none of these persons when interviewed by the Police, are recorded as telling the Police that they first heard of the fire over the radio from the Third Officer). The shortage of radios probably further explains why the response to the fire was inadequate and why no member of the crew discharged a fire extinguisher. The Third Officer was probably impeded in raising the alarm quickly and appropriately by walkie-talkie (and then proceeding to use a fire extinguisher himself) either (a) because he did not have a walkie-talkie and for this reason left the scene to raise the alarm or (b) (if he did have one) because he was unable to communicate with the Master, Chief Officer and Duty A/B by walkie-talkie.

(8) The fire broke out shortly before 18.50 hours; the fire alarm sounded after 18.50 hours.

(9) As the Third Officer accepted, none of the crew actually used a fire extinguisher.

(10) As to the fire itself:-

(a) It started in the vicinity of the Hiace van.

(b) Initially, the fire was relatively small in size. The fireball described by the Third Officer was a deliberate exaggeration. None of those who claim to have been present when the fire started appear to have been severely affected by radiant heat or by direct flame contact. The stevedores who were in close proximity to the Hiace van suffered no injuries whatsoever. The initial fire was small. If (as I find) fuel was being poured into a carburettor, about an egg cup full would be required. As Dr. Craggs said, to spill a litre would be remarkably clumsy and haphazard.

(c) The Master and crew’s descriptions of the smoke in the early stages were deliberate exaggerations.

(11) 19.10 hours - Bunker Barge full away.

(12) 19.15 hours - 2 Tugs started spraying water.

(13) At 19.20 hours, the Master used the VHF radio to notify the Sharjah Port Control of the fire; by that time Port Control already knew of the fire, as they had dispatched tugs and fire crews. No-one on the vessel had spoken to them prior to this time.

(14) At 19.25 hours, the Master used the Inmarsat telephone to inform the vessel’s technical managers, Univan, of the fire.

A contemporary note reads:-

“23/7/97 (sic) 23.25 - R/O called office and put Capt on line (JSL). He informed that there is fire on Vessel in No. 5 Deck and it is spreading to No. 6 Deck. They have shut the ventilation and fire doors.

Vessel is alongside at Sharjah. They have not been able to contact agent.

Two tugs and fire brigade are fighting the fire. All crew accounted for. JSL enquired about release of CO² but Captain said crew accounted for but not sure about stevedores. JSL told him to get in touch with Fire Brigade Chief and then release CO² if all ok.”

(15) 19.29 hours - Second call from the ship to Univan.

A contemporary note reads:-

“23.29 - R/O called up. Suri took the line while JSL was calling Banerjee. R/O informed that it is becoming unbearable in accommodation and that they are vacating the vessel.”

(16) Crew rigged up fire hoses to fight the fire.

(17) Crew started spraying.

(18) 19.40 hours: Muster. (Note: the Master alleges by his timetable that he mustered the crew at 18.50 hours).

(19) 19.45 hours or 24.30 hours: CO² released. It is difficult to say with confidence that CO² was in fact released at 19.45 or 19.50 hours as the crew have now alleged. No-one professes to have heard the CO² sirens which would have sounded if this had happened and a contemporaneous note gives an alternative time of 24.30 hours, a time at which a member of the crew had returned on board the vessel.

The Eurasian Dream was an Unseaworthy Ship

The Vessel’s Equipment