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England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions >> World Trade Corporation Ltd. v C Czarnikow Sugar Ltd. [2004] EWHC 2332 (Comm) (18 October 2004) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2004/2332.html Cite as: [2004] 2 All ER (Comm) 813, [2004] EWHC 2332 (Comm), [2005] 1 Lloyd's Rep 422, [2005] 1 LLR 422 |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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WORLD TRADE CORPORATION LTD |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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C CZARNIKOW SUGAR LTD |
Defendant |
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Mr Simon Rainey QC and Mr Nicholas Craig (instructed by Richards Butler) for the Respondent
Hearing dates: 3 and 6 August 2004
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Crown Copyright ©
The Hon Mr Justice Colman :
Introduction
Threshold Points
"An application or appeal may not be brought if the applicant or appellant has not first exhausted:-
(a) any available arbitral process of appeal or review, and
(b) any available recourse under section 57 (correction of award or additional award)."
"The tribunal may on its own initiative or on the application of a party:
(a) correct an award so as to remove any clerical mistake or error arising from an accidental slip or omission or clarify or remove any ambiguity in the award, or
(b) make an additional award in respect of any claim (including a claim for interest or costs) which was presented to the tribunal but was not dealt with in the award.
These powers shall not be exercised without first affording the other parties a reasonable opportunity to make representations to the tribunal."
"The Court does not have a general supervisory jurisdiction over arbitrations. We have listed the specific cases where a challenge can be made under this clause. The test of "substantial injustice" is intended to be applied by way of support for arbitral process, not by way of interference with that process. Thus it is only in those cases where it can be said that what has happened is so far removed from what could reasonably be expected of the arbitral process that we would expect the Court to take action. The test is not what would have happened had the matter been litigated. To apply such a test would be to ignore the fact that the parties have agreed to arbitrate, not litigate. Having chosen arbitration, the parties cannot validly complain of substantial injustice unless what has happened cannot on any view be defended as an acceptable consequence of that choice."
"If however Torch had reverted to him, applying for clarification as to whether he had decided against it on inducement by the second representation, it would have been clear in this court whether or not he had determined the issue. It seems to me that section 57(3)(a) can be used to request further reasons from the arbitrator or reasons where none exist. The policy which underlies the Act is one of enabling the arbitral process to correct itself where possible, without the intervention of the Court. Torch contended that it was clear that the arbitrator had not decided the issue and that therefore there was no ambiguity in the award which required clarification, but the very existence of a genuine dispute on this question militates against that argument. If there was unarguably a clear failure to deal with an issue, it could be said that there was no ambiguity in the award, but as set out in Al Hadha at paragraph 70, an award which contains inadequate rationale or incomplete reasons for a decision is likely to be ambiguous or need clarification. There was therefore room for an application by Torch under section 57."
Section 68(2)(d): General Principles
"….s 68(2)(d) is not to be used as a means of launching a detailed enquiry into the manner in which the tribunal considered the various issues. It is concerned with a failure, that is to say where the arbitral tribunal has not dealt at all with the case of a party so that substantial injustice has resulted eg. where a claim has been overlooked or where the decision cannot be justified as a particular key issue has not been decided which is crucial to the result. It is not concerned with a failure on the part of the tribunal to arrive at the right answer to an issue. In the former instance the tribunal has not done what it was asked to do, namely to give the parties a decision on all issues necessary to resolve the dispute or disputes (which does not of course mean a decision on all the issues that were ventilated but only those required for the award). In the latter instance the tribunal will have done what it was asked to do (or will have purported to do so) but its decision or reasoning may be wrong or flawed. The arbitral tribunal may therefore have failed to deal properly with the issues but it will not have failed to deal with them."
"Nor is it incumbent on arbitrators to deal with every argument on every point raised. But an award should deal, however concisely, with all essential issues. One of the heads of serious irregularity recognised in s.68(2)(d) is 'Failure by the tribunal to deal with all the issues that were put to it'. The central point raised by Ascot on its appeal was that if the bills of lading were pledged as security, as appears on the face of the October 1998 contract, Olam's loss was not to be approached in the same way as if they were beneficial owners of the cargo. The point has, with respect, not been addressed."
"I do not consider that s.68(2)(d) requires a tribunal to set out each step by which they reach their conclusion or deal with each point made by a party in an arbitration. Any failure by the arbitrators in that respect is not a failure to deal with an issue that was put to it. It may amount to a criticism of the reasoning, but it is no more than that."
"Deficiency of reasoning in an award is therefore the subject of a specific remedy under the 1996 Act. It is accordingly self-evident that:
(i) failure to deal with an "issue" under Section 68(2)(d) is not equivalent to failure to deal with an argument that had been advanced at the hearing and therefore to have omitted the reasons for rejecting it;
(ii) Parliament cannot have intended to create co-extensive remedies for deficiency of reasons one of which (Section 68) was a general remedy which might involve setting aside or remitting the award in a case of serious injustice and one of which (Section 70(4)) was designed to provide a specific remedy for a specific problem;
(iii) the court's powers under Section 68(2) being engaged only in a case where the serious irregularity has caused substantial injustice, the availability of the facility to apply for reasons or further reasons under section 70(4) would make it impossible to contend that any "substantial injustice" had been caused by deficiency of reasons."
Mitigation and the Cost of Insurance
"In view of the evidence overall, we are not satisfied that there was a firm and binding contract with Mr Kones for the following reasons:
(a) we have not seen a contract;
(b) WTC on 15 July 1996 simply referred to an "offer" and withdrew it with no apparent consequences;
(c) WTC were still offering the cargo to other potential purchasers on 5 July 1996;
(d) no letter of credit was ever provided."
"170. Having considered all of the evidence and the submissions, we find it difficult to make WTC and Premjee's version of events fit with the fax from Premjee EA to WTC of 10 July 1996. At that stage, Premjee EA's concern appeared to be to get the letter of credit from Mr Kones, and they said in this fax that they had until noon to do so. That is not consistent with Mr Mead having told Czarnikow the previous day that Premjee would pay for the documents and that the documents should be presented to RZB for payment.
Overall, on the evidence we are not satisfied that a formal offer was put forward by Premjee to Czarnikow to pay for the cargo at the Contract price. Indeed, given that it is Mr Mead's evidence that the discussions in which Premjee offered to buy the cargo took place over three days (9-11 July), it is extremely surprising that nothing was put in writing as might have been expected for a cargo worth some US$2.6 million."
"We come to the conclusion that none of the alternatives other than those which were taken by Czarnikow were sufficiently firm to justify Czarnikow waiting any longer in reselling the cargo. Although there might have been what could loosely be called "interest" in the cargo, they appear to have been little more than hypothetical; the fact is that the cargo was distressed and we adopt what was said in the Banco de Portugal case to the effect that it is easy for the party in breach to criticise after the event. We see no reason why Czarnikow would wish to sell the cargo other than at the best realisable price and although the deposit would have given them some comfort, the absence of any evidence as to any other firm buying interest leads us to the conclusion that the prices obtained on the re-sales must be accepted as forming the basis for the assessment of Czarnikow's losses."
"Where the sufferer from a breach of contract finds himself in consequence of that breach placed in a position of embarrassment the measures which he may be driven to adopt in order to extricate himself ought not to be weighed in nice scales at the instance of the party whose breach of contract has occasioned the difficulty. It is often easy after an emergency has passed to criticise the steps which have been taken to meet it, but such criticism does not come well from those who have themselves created the emergency. The law is satisfied if the party placed in a difficult situation by reason of the breach of a duty owed to him has acted reasonably in the adoption of remedial measures, and he will not be held disentitled to recover the cost of such measures merely because the party in breach can suggest that other measures less burdensome to him might have been taken."
"The insurance premium paid by Czarnikow was criticised by WTC, who submitted that they had been able to secure a premium of 1.4125% (although this was on the assumption that the vessel was not going to Berbera, in a war risk zone).
Looking at the matter overall, we do not regard the premiums paid by Czarnikow as unreasonable."
"It was WTC's case that there was more evidence on that point than the tribunal appears to have considered and that it was in WTC's favour."
"22. The only evidence produced by Czarnikow in relation to market price or its own efforts to mitigate its loss was documentation (of a not particularly substantial nature) showing the two sales which is actually concluded – with Establissement Djama Omar Said for 3,000 tons of whites (pages 81 to 84 of JP2) and the Mohammed Enterprises Limited for 7,000 tons of raws (pages 88 to 90 of JP2).
23. The absence of evidence from Czarnikow is all the more surprising and perhaps indicative given the contemporaneous complaints by WTC which are evidenced in the correspondence referred to above.
24. One would have expected to see offers of sale or notes of Czarnikow's attempts to contract with other potential purchasers, perhaps along the lines of the note which William Rook said that he kept in respect of his conversation with WTC (described at paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Award). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be inferred that Czarnikow did not contact well-known purchasers of sugar in East Africa, or even those suggested by WTC, such as E D & F Mann or Kakira Sugar of Uganda. Reference is made to the following documents previously before the tribunal.
a. WTC's fax to Czarnikow dated 13 July 1996 (serial number 96/4030/SP – pages 73 to 75 of JP2)
b. WTC's fax to Czarnikow dated 24 June 1996 (serial number 96/3915/SP pages 31 to 33 of JP2)
25. One would also have expected to see evidence of Czarnikow investigating the potentially more advantageous sale which might have been concluded with G Premjee. That Czarnikow was in contact with G Premjee was admitted by Czarnikow's witness, Mr Guy Toller, at paragraph 27 of his first witness statement (exhibited hereto at page 6 of JP6). This is confirmed in the statement of Barry Mead of G Premjee (exhibited hereto at page 5 of JP5), who also indicates that his attempts to contact Mr Toller and Mr Rook of Czarnikow appeared to be ignored.
26. Mr Mead was a witness independent of WTC and his statement was prepared some years before the arbitration took place. In these circumstances, I respectfully suggest that the tribunal should have considered the implications of what he said for Czarnikow's apparent failure to mitigate its losses.
27. It is also surprising that Czarnikow did not appear to seek a buyer in Kenya, where prices were likely to be better than in Somalia. Reference is made to the fax from Cargill Kenya Limited to Premjee EA (exhibited hereto at page 64 pf JP2), in which a price of 41.50 shillings per kilo is quoted CIFFO Mombasa. I believe that this would have equated to about US$418 per metric ton at the time."
"It is my belief that WTC raised a good case to the effect that Czarnikow's resales were not made at the best price likely to be obtained in the market at the relevant time. In comparison, Czarnikow produced next to nothing. The tribunal however did not consider the relevance of these points apart perhaps from the very brief paragraph 172. It was most important for it to do so, since any increase in the notional market price with Czarnikow should have obtained would have lead directly to an increase in the amount of money which Czarnikow would have been ordered to repay to WTC."
The fax dated 10 April 1996
"24. The Written Terms provided for a price on the basis C&FFO Dar Es Salaam Tanzania, made up of three elements:
(a) the weighted average of the prices at which Czarnikow bought 197 lots of the May 1996 New York No. 11 contract, on buyer's executable orders;
(b) a premium of US$103 per MT for the raw sugar and US$113 per MT for the white sugar;
(c) the actual cost of freight paid by Czarnikow in chartering a vessel to ship the sugar to Dar Es Salaam Tanzania.
25. The Written Terms provided that pricing was to be completed two days before the expiry of the May 1996 No. 11 contract, and that shipment was to be during May 1996.
26. The Written Terms also provided for WTC to transfer by latest 15 April 1996 the sum of U$150,000 as a "non-returnable performance deposit" to Czarnikow's bank account. The Written Terms stated that this deposit "shall secure the contract" but that if the May 1996 New York No. 11 contract moved lower then the weighted average of the price of the sugar, Czarnikow would be entitled to call for adverse margin cover in the event that the difference exceeded US$50,000. For the balance of the Contract value, WTC were to open an irrevocable letter of credit through RZB Bank in London prior to shipment. A fully operable letter of credit was to be received before the seller would ship the sugar."
"We regard the above matters as sufficient to cast doubt on whether the fax really did reflect what WTC thought they had agreed with Czarnikow. It may be that WTC wished to give RZB a general picture of what was agreed, but without being too specific and perhaps putting the Contract in a better light."
"… on the totality of the evidence and on the balance of probabilities that the Written Terms in all material respects reflected the agreement reached between the parties on 10 April 1996."
The fax dated 3 June 1996
Conclusion