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England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions >> Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation & Ors v Yuri Privalov & Ors [2014] EWHC 3102 (Comm) (03 October 2014) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2014/3102.html Cite as: [2014] EWHC 3102 (Comm) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation & ors |
Claimants |
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- and - |
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Yuri Privalov & ors |
Defendants |
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Michael Brindle QC, Dominic Dowley QC and Justin Higgo
(instructed by Ince & Co) for the Claimants
Hearing date: 28 July 2014
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Andrew Smith:
Introduction
"The schemes between defendants that are said to be corrupt … are these:
i) The "Sovcomflot Clarkson commissions" scheme, by which between 2001 and 2004 it was arranged that Clarkson should act as brokers for the Sovcomflot group, to buy and sell ships and should pay "commission" upon the purchases and sales to Mr. Nikitin or at his direction. It is said that as a result the Standard Maritime defendants and other companies … have been paid over $30 million, ….
ii) The "Tam commissions" scheme, whereby, when in 2001 the Sovcomflot group were buying in the so-called "Athenian transaction" (which was itself one of the purchases comprised in the Sovcomflot Clarkson commissions scheme) six ships which were being built by Hyundai Heavy Industries ("HHI"), address commissions paid by HHI amounting to $1.2 million were diverted to Milmont.
iii)….
iv) ….
v) The "RCB" scheme, whereby, as the claimants allege, in 2001 Mr. Nikitin arranged for Meino to acquire a debt owed (or said to be owed) by the Sovcomflot group to the Russian Commercial Bank Ltd. ("RCB"), and Mr Skarga was party to arranging for the debt to be discharged on terms that improperly benefited Mr. Nikitin. The claim in respect of this scheme is about $3 million.
vi) The "SLB arrangements" scheme, whereby in 2002 the Sovcomflot group sold eight vessels, the Arbat vessels, to Standard Maritime defendants upon terms that they were to be leased back to the sellers on bareboat charters and re-purchased at the end of the charter periods. It is alleged that these arrangements (the sale and leaseback or "SLB" arrangements) were uncommercial and designed to benefit Mr. Nikitin and the Standard Maritime defendants at the expense of the Sovcomflot group. The compensatory damages claimed in respect of this scheme are some $17 million, and there is also a claim for an account of profits.
vii) The "termination of the SLB arrangements" scheme, whereby in 2004 the Standard Maritime defendants sold the eight Arbat vessels which were the subject of the SLB arrangements, and Sovcomflot were paid $20 million for their rights in respect of them. It is alleged that this was inadequate compensation for the rights that Sovcomflot relinquished. The claimants' primary compensatory claim is for some $159 million, and there is also a claim for an account of profits.
viii) The "newbuildings" scheme, whereby in 2003 and 2004 Sovcomflot entered into agreements with HHI and Daewoo Shipbuilding Marine Engineering Company Ltd. ("Daewoo"), and contracted to buy ships by way of newbuildings and acquired options to buy other vessels. It is alleged that they allowed some of the Standard Maritime defendants to acquire the benefit of options for no proper consideration, and also to acquire the benefit of contracts with HHI (by acquiring the vehicle companies who had entered into newbuilding contracts) at an undervalue. This gives rise to claims of some $212 million.
ix) The "Sovcomflot time charters" scheme, which relates to agreements that were made between 2001 and 2004 whereby certain of the claimants hired eight vessels to Standard Maritime defendants on time charterparties and also granted options to extend the period of hire of some of them. The charterparties and options are said to have been designed, at least in some cases, to benefit the Standard Maritime defendants and correspondingly to have been to the disadvantage of the claimants. The claimants claim some $219 million in respect of these allegations.
x) …"
Should be cross-undertakings be enforced?
"The court has no power to compel an applicant for an interim injunction to furnish an undertaking as to damages. All it can do is to refuse the application if he declines to do so. The undertaking is not given to the defendant but to the court itself. Non-performance of it is contempt of court, not breach of contract, and attracts the remedies available for contempts, but the court exacts the undertaking for the defendant's benefit. It retains a discretion not to enforce the undertaking if it considers that the conduct of the defendant in relation to the obtaining or continuing of the injunction or the enforcement of the undertaking makes it inequitable to do so, but if the undertaking is enforced the measure of the damages payable under it is not discretionary. It is assessed on an inquiry into damages at which principles to be applied are fixed and clear. The assessment is made upon the same basis as that upon which damages for breach of contract would be assessed if the undertaking had been a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant that the plaintiff would not prevent the defendant from doing that which he was restrained from doing by the terms of the injunction: see Smith v. Day (1882) 21 Ch.D. 421 per Brett L.J., at p.427."
i) What conduct is relevant in deciding whether an inquiry should be refused; andii) Whether in any event it would be proper to refuse an inquiry.
i) Mr Nikitin had dishonestly conducted the Tam commissions scheme;ii) He had dishonestly bribed Mr Privalov to act against the claimants' interests, using secret offshore accounts and sham agreements to this end; and
iii) He and Mr Skarga dishonestly created forged and backdated documents, including the Supplemental Agreement and what purported to be an employment contract between FML and Mr Privalov (see paras 1405ff of the December 2010 judgment).
In support of the 2007 order Mr Shepherd also relied on Mr Nikitin's involvement in the Sovcomflot Clarkson commissions scheme. To my mind, the significance of his dishonesty in relation to the commissions schemes goes beyond the claims directly relating to them and his liability resulting from those schemes: more generally these allegations supported the claimants' case that he was involved in a wider conspiracy.
i) That, as the board minutes recorded, many of the transactions of which they complained, had been considered by and were carried out with the approval of the Executive Board of Sovcomflot.ii) That Sovcomflot had had the wrongdoing of which they complained investigated by investigators who had, to their knowledge, used unlawful methods to obtain information: see paras 224 and 228 of the December 2010 judgment.
Is there sufficient evidence that the applicants may have suffered loss?
i) The rules in Hadley v Baxendale are presumably applied by reference to the knowledge of or attributed to those who obtained the interim relief and gave the cross-undertaking, and not that of both parties to the undertaking (the applicants and the court) or both parties to the subsequent inquiry (not least because the interim order might have been obtained without notice to the other party to the inquiry).ii) The principles are to be applied (and in Hone were applied in relation to the "marble" head of claim: loc cit at paras 91ff) not only by reference to knowledge at the time that the undertaking was given but also by reference to knowledge while the interim order was continuing.
i) In a witness statement dated 22 December 2005 served in support of an application that the undertaking in damages given in support of the 2005 orders should be fortified with security, Ms Imogen Rumbold, a solicitor and then a partner in Messrs Lawrence Graham LLP, who were solicitors for some defendants including the applicants, did not suggest that the 2005 orders were preventing or hampering investment in newbuildings or that loss was being so caused. On the contrary, she indicated that loss from the $208.5 million being provided as security might be quantified either on the basis of Standard Maritime's historical average return on capital or by reference to evidence of investment opportunities in high risk financial projects.ii) In a letter dated 18 January 2006 Laurence Graham said that the $208.5 million came primarily from the sale of three newbuildings and continued, "Mr Nikitin had been looking for projects in which to invest the proceeds of sale but had not finalised anything by the time [the claimants] started their legal action".
iii) In a witness statement dated 18 September 2006 served in opposition to the application for the 2007 order, Mr Michael Lax, who also is a solicitor and formerly was a partner in Lawrence Graham, said this: "Apart from the charters of vessels, and the sale of some vessels since September 2005 … and the continuation of the existing shipbuilding order for Hull 5274 … Mr Nikitin currently has no other business nor plans for other business until this litigation has concluded. … it is not his intention to embark on new adventures until this dispute has been disposed of, and his funds and other assets released from the undertakings which have been given". The statement was not directly about what Mr Nikitin would have done but for the orders, but it might be interpreted as suggesting that he was not pursuing new ventures because of the litigation rather than because of the freezing orders.
i) That, if it had earned interest calculated at 3 months US$ LIBOR, during the period to 17 December 2010 (the date of my December 2010 judgment) it would have earned interest of some $71.39 million, or some $37.90 million more than it in fact earned while it was held to provide security pursuant to the 2005 orders.ii) That, if it had been invested with reasonable caution in investments that a UK based financial adviser might reasonably have advised, the $208.5 million would have earned a return of $69.12 million, or some $35.43 million more than it in fact earned while it was held to provide security pursuant to the 2005 orders.
i) In view of what was being said in the evidence and by the solicitors' correspondence, any such damage from the continuation of the freezing orders is too remote to be recoverable; andii) If the applicants did suffer such damage, it was because they did not mitigate their loss by seeking that sufficient funds be released to enable them to conduct their business by contracting to buy newbuildings and making payments for them.
I am not persuaded by these submissions. Even if there is some tension between Mr Nikitin's evidence and what was said by Ms Rumbold, Mr Lax and Lawrence Graham, there is no direct contradiction, and there is ample scope for argument about what significance is to be attached to what they said. The claimants would certainly have opposed vigorously any application to release the security or the frozen funds, and the argument that the applicants did not mitigate their loss seems to me a difficult one.
Conclusion