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England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions >> An NHS Foundation Trust v AB [2014] EWHC 1031 (Fam) (04 April 2014) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2014/1031.html Cite as: [2014] EWHC 1031 (Fam) |
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FAMILY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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An NHS Foundation Trust |
Applicant |
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- and - |
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AB |
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- and- |
1st & 2nd Respondents |
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CD |
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- and - |
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EF (A Child) By His Children's Guardian) |
3rd Respondent |
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Mr Andrew Hockton, (instructed by Leigh Day & Co) for the 1st & 2nd Respondents
Mr Mike Hinchliffe (Cafcass Legal) for the 3rd Respondent
Hearing dates: 26th & 31st March, & 3rd April 2014
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Crown Copyright ©
Mrs Justice Theis DBE :
Introduction
Legal Framework
" But the law around this topic is now well established and tolerably clear and can, I believe, be shortly stated in the following propositions without the need for copious reference to authority. The essence of these propositions lies in the "intellectual milestones" to which the Court of Appeal referred in paragraph 87 of the reserved judgment of the court in Wyatt v Portsmouth Hospital NHS Trust [2005] EWCA Civ 1181
i) As a dispute has arisen between the treating doctors and the parents, and one, and now both, parties have asked the court to make a decision, it is the role and duty of the court to do so and to exercise its own independent and objective judgment.
ii) The right and power of the court to do so only arises because the patient, in this case because he is a child, lacks the capacity to make a decision for himself.
iii) I am not deciding what decision I might make for myself if I was, hypothetically, in the situation of the patient; nor for a child of my own if in that situation; nor whether the respective decisions of the doctors on the one hand or the parents on the other are reasonable decisions.
iv) The matter must be decided by the application of an objective approach or test.
v) That test is the best interests of the patient. Best interests are used in the widest sense and include every kind of consideration capable of impacting on the decision. These include, non-exhaustively, medical, emotional, sensory (pleasure, pain and suffering) and instinctive (the human instinct to survive) considerations.
vi) It is impossible to weigh such considerations mathematically, but the court must do the best it can to balance all the conflicting considerations in a particular case and see where the final balance of the best interests lies.
vii) Considerable weight (Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR referred to "a very strong presumption") must be attached to the prolongation of life because the individual human instinct and desire to survive is strong and must be presumed to be strong in the patient. But it is not absolute, nor necessarily decisive; and may be outweighed if the pleasures and the quality of life are sufficiently small and the pain and suffering or other burdens of living are sufficiently great.
viii) These considerations remain well expressed in the words as relatively long ago now as 1991 of Lord Donaldson of Lymington in Re J (A minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1991] Fam 33 at page 46 where he said: "There is without doubt a very strong presumption in favour of a course of action which will prolong life, but … it is not irrebuttable … Account has to be taken of the pain and suffering and quality of life which the child will experience if life is prolonged. Account has also to be taken of the pain and suffering involved in the proposed treatment … We know that the instinct and desire for survival is very strong. We all believe in and assert the sanctity of human life …. Even very severely handicapped people find a quality of life rewarding which to the unhandicapped may seem manifestly intolerable. People have an amazing adaptability. But in the end there will be cases in which the answer must be that it is not in the interests of the child to subject it to treatment which will cause it increased suffering and produce no commensurate benefit, giving the fullest possible weight to the child's and mankind's desire to survive."
ix) All these cases are very fact specific, i.e. they depend entirely on the facts of the individual case.
x) The views and opinions of both the doctors and the parents must be carefully considered. Where, as in this case, the parents spend a great deal of time with their child, their views may have particular value because they know the patient and how he reacts so well; although the court needs to be mindful that the views of any parents may, very understandably, be coloured by their own emotion or sentiment. It is important to stress that the reference is to the views and opinions of the parents. Their own wishes, however understandable in human terms, are wholly irrelevant to consideration of the objective best interests of the child save to the extent in any given case that they may illuminate the quality and value to the child of the child/parent relationship.
19. The applicant considers that EF falls within the category of children described within the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health Guidelines (January 2014) who have only a limited quality of life and who will suffer an "inevitable demise."
"3.1.3.2 Limited quality of life: where burdens exceed
benefits
A. Burdens of treatments
Some forms of medical treatments in themselves cause pain and distress, which may be physical, psychological and emotional. If a child's life can only be sustained at the cost of significant pain and distress it may not be in their best interests to receive such treatments e.g. use of invasive ventilation in severe neuromuscular disease. It is important that all options to relieve or overcome the negative effects of treatment are explored before proposing that it should be limited. However if such treatment can only be delivered at the expense of compromising the child's consciousness, e.g. by deep sedation, its potential benefit may be significantly reduced. Other examples of particularly burdensome treatments include ECMO, renal dialysis and, sometimes intensive chemotherapy."
Relevant Background and Evidence
"EF has had sequential EEGs which have on the most recent studies identified abnormalities not evident on earlier studies. I do not think that this in isolation would be sufficient to determine that EF has a progressive neurological disorder, because EEGs in any individual can vary from one day to the next, and because I did not see described abnormalities that would categorically place this in the domain of a degenerative disorder. Similarly although EF's EMGs which measure muscle electrical activity appear to have indicated progressive abnormality of motor nerve cells, this alone would be insufficient to categorically determine that EF has a neurodegenerative disorder in my opinion. Taken together with the clinical impression that EF has worsening apnoeas and bradycardias, the changes in EEG and EMG over time certainly support the impression of his clinicians that he has a progressive disorder. EF's condition is serious, he is unable to breathe consistently adequately, and therefore has needed recurrent ventilation. The episodes of bradycardia are further cause for concern as such episodes can sometimes precede cardiac arrest, and if the bradycardias are indicative of a neurological disorder the possibility that this may ultimately progress to cardiac arrest has to be viewed as a reasonable likelihood. I do not think EF has a curable neurological disorder." She deferred to Dr V as the treating neurologist regarding any deterioration in EF's condition, as he would have seen EF over a longer period of time.
Discussion
Decision
(1) The benefits EF may enjoy in the 24 hour period after extubation by being stabilised through bagging outweigh in that time limited period the additional burdens on him of ventilation by those means.
(2) It is on the basis that it is done at the discretion of the treating team in consultation with the parents, so far as is practicable.
(3) Whilst I accept Dr W's relative optimism about the prospects of a successful extubation, I also accept the evidence from the father about their previous experiences in the immediate period following extubations. The views of the parents in this context carry some weight.
(4) I have considered the point made on behalf of the Trust that it may hinder planning as it creates some uncertainty and an artificial time period during which this ventilation support can be given. However, the time period is based in part on the experience of the parents about EF's reactions previously, which I have no reason to doubt. It carries with it the benefits of possibly extending his life in the short term to spend time with his family which would undoubtedly be for his benefit.
(5) I am confident, based on the way the parents and the medical team have managed difficult decisions in the past that they will work together in EF's best interests.
(6) Following this limited time period his care will be managed by the Emergency Care Plan and Symptom Management Plan.