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England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions >> B (A Child) [2014] EWHC B1 (Fam) (21 March 2014) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2014/B1.html Cite as: [2014] EWHC B1 (Fam) |
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FAMILY DIVISION
NOTTINGHAM DISTRICT REGISTRY
B e f o r e :
Sitting as a Judge of the High Court
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RE B (A child) |
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Frank Feehan QC and Christopher Butterfield for the First Respondent mother, instructed by Wollen Mitchelmore, Torquay.
Jeremy Weston QC and Michelle Brown for the Second Respondent father, instructed by Brendan Fleming Solicitors, Birmingham
Maria Mulrennan for the Child's Guardian, instructed by Anderson Partnership, Chesterfield
Hearing dates 4,5,6,7,10,11 and 12 March 2014
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Crown Copyright ©
i. The bilateral chronic subdural haematomas were likely to have been caused by an earlier inflicted injury which occurred several weeks or more before 4th June 2013 for which no account or explanation has been provided by either of the parents.ii. The acute L sided subdural haematoma was likely to have been caused on 4th June 2013 and was likely to have been caused by a further non-accidental inflicted injury for which no consistent account or explanation has been provided by either of the parents.
iii. The most likely cause of any inflicted injury caused to B was shaking, with or without an impact with a semi-yielding object.
iv. The retinal bleeding was most likely to have been caused by shaking.
v. The only people who cared for B during the period in which he suffered the injuries, apart from short or insignificant periods, were the parents, and neither can be exculpated as potential perpetrators of the injuries.
i. B suffered acute subdural bleeding, hypoxic-ischaemic brain injury and retinal bleeding on 4th June 2013 caused by a non-accidental injury for which no consistent account or explanation has been provided by either of the parents.ii. the most likely mechanism of the injuries caused to B was shaking, with or without an impact with a semi-yielding object.
i. The legal burden of establishing the existence of the threshold conditions in s.31 (2) CA 1989 rests on NCC as the local authority applying for the care order. I remind myself that it is for NCC to establish that the injuries sustained by B on 4th June were non-accidental and that it is not for the parents to prove an innocent explanation for them.ii. The standard of proof is the simple balance of probabilities. Neither the seriousness of the allegation nor the seriousness of the consequences should make any difference to the standard of proof to be applied in determining the facts. The inherent probabilities are simply something to be taken into account, where relevant, in deciding where the truth lies.
iii. In considering the standard of proof the court should apply the binary system confirmed in Re B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35, namely that – "if a legal rule requires a fact to be proved (a 'fact in issue "), a judge or jury must decide whether or not it happened. There is no room for a finding that it might have happened. The law operates a binary system in which the only values are 0 and 1. The fact either happened or it did not. If the tribunal is left in doubt, the doubt is resolved by a rule that one party or the other carries the burden of proof. If the party who bears the burden of proof fails to discharge it, a value of 0 is returned and the fact is treated as not having happened. If he does discharge it, a value of 1 is returned and the fact is treated as having happened" (Lord Hoffmann at para [2]).
iv. Given the seriousness of a finding that a parent has inflicted non-accidental injury to its child there is a clear public interest in the Court making such a finding where on the evidence it can do so or exculpating an innocent parent where on the evidence it can properly do so. The Court should not however "strain" the evidence in an attempt to identify the perpetrator of injury. If it is clear that identification of the perpetrator is not possible and the judge remains genuinely uncertain then the judge should reach that conclusion.
v. the court must decide whether the threshold criteria are proved on the facts proved on the balance of probability before it – suspicion is not sufficient Re M and R (Child Abuse: Evidence) [1996] 2 FLR195, Re B and W (Threshold Criteria) [1999] 2 FLR 933.
vi. In Re S-B [2009] UKSC 17 the Supreme Court ruled that it is not appropriate to seek to apportion responsibility as between possible perpetrators and to suggest that one is more likely to be the perpetrator if it has not proved possible to determine which one of them was the perpetrator on the balance of probabilities. The correct test for whether or not a person is a possible perpetrator is the "real possibility test" and not whether the person can be "excluded" as a perpetrator: so the test is does the evidence establish that there is a likelihood or real possibility that a given person perpetrated the injuries in question?
vii. where the Court is satisfied that a child has suffered significant harm the threshold conditions will be met in relation to that child even though the Court is unable to identify who within the pool of possible perpetrators inflicted the harm.
viii. I remind myself of the case of In re U: ReB [2004] 2 FLR 263 and the guidance given at para 23 by Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P and to other authorities which elaborate on the approach to be taken to expert evidence . In particular I remind myself that properly reasoned expert evidence carries considerable weight but it is for me to make the final decision as to non-accidental injury having regard to all of the evidence and not simply to the medical evidence.
ix. As was said in Re T [2004] 2 FLR 838 "Evidence cannot be evaluated and assessed in separate compartments. A judge in these difficult cases has to have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence, and exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward by the local authority has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof."
x. Finally when considering whether a witness may have lied either in a witness statement or to the police or in Court I take into account by way of self-direction that lies do not of themselves prove guilt but may support adverse findings if there is no reasonable explanation for those lies. `
Mr Newman Consultant Paediatric Ophthalmologist, Mr Richards, Consultant Paediatric Neurosurgeon, Professor Pope whose special expertise lies in the clinical diagnosis and classification of Inherited Diseases of Connective Tissues, from both maternal and paternal grandmothers, AW and SC and from the parents themselves.
The local authority did not go that far. At no point was it directly put to the mother that she had injured her son as alleged in the threshold finding which I am invited to make. The evidence as to the mother's mental health difficulties falls short of providing some form of trigger for the mother to suddenly behave in a violent way to her son.
21.3.2014
HHJ LEA