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England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions >> Tewkesbury Borough Council v Brown & Ors [2006] EWHC 2697 (QB) (31 October 2006) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2006/2697.html Cite as: [2006] EWHC 2697 (QB) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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Tewkesbury Borough Council |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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(1) Jeffrey C Brown (2) Joseph Castle (3) Charmaine Castle (4) Daniel Coles (5) Alexis Elezabeth Coles (6) Joseph Jones (7) Tracey Jones (8) Jason Kerry Danter (9) Jonathan Mason (10) Lene Elizabeth Mason (11) Heath William Roberts (12) Sally Roberts (13) Shady William Scarrot, (14)Denise Scarrot (15) Joseph Whiteleg (16)Alexandra Whiteleg |
Defendants |
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Hearing dates: 5th and 6th October 2006
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice David Clarke :
"(1) Where a local planning authority considers it necessary or expedient for any actual or apprehended breach of planning control to be restrained by injunction they may apply to the court for an injunction whether or not they have exercised or are proposing to exercise any of their other powers under this Part."
(2) On an application under subsection (1) the Court may grant such an injunction as the Court thinks appropriate for the purpose of restraining the breach."
"38. I would unhesitatingly reject the more extreme submissions made on either side. It seems to me perfectly clear that the judge on a section 187B application is not required, nor even entitled, to reach his own independent view of the planning merits of the case. These he is required to take as decided within the planning process, the actual or anticipated breach of planning control being a given when he comes to exercise his discretion. But it seems to me no less plain that the judge should not grant injunctive relief unless he would be prepared if necessary to contemplate committing the defendant to prison for breach of the order, and that he would not be of this mind unless he had considered for himself all questions of hardship for the defendant and his family if required to move, necessarily including, therefore, the availability of suitable alternative sites. I cannot accept that the consideration of those matters is, as Burton J suggested was the case in the pre-1998 Act era "entirely foreclosed" at the injunction stage. Questions of the family's health and education will inevitably be of relevance. But so too, of course, will countervailing considerations such as the need to enforce planning control in the general interest and, importantly therefore, the planning history of the site. The degree and flagrancy of the postulated breach of planning control may well prove critical. If conventional enforcement measures have failed over a prolonged period of time to remedy the breach, then the court would obviously be the readier to use its own, more coercive powers. Conversely, however the court might well be reluctant to use its powers in a case where enforcement action had never been taken. On the other hand, there might be some urgency in the situation sufficient to justify the pre-emptive avoidance of an anticipated breach of planning control. Considerations of health and safety might arise. Preventing a gipsy moving onto the site might, indeed, involve him in less hardship than moving him out after a long period of occupation. Previous planning decisions will always be relevant; how relevant, however, will inevitably depend on a variety of matters, including not least how recent they are, the extent to which considerations of hardship and availability of alternative sites were taken into account, the strength of the conclusions reach on land use and environmental issues, and whether the defendant had and properly took the opportunity to make his case for at least a temporary personal planning permission.
39. Relevant too will be the local authority's decision under section 187B(1) to seek injunctive relief. They, after all, are the democratically elected and accountable body principally responsible for planning control in their area. Again, however, the relevance and weight of their decision will depend above all on the extent to which they can be shown to have had regard to all the material considerations and to have properly pose and approached the article 8(2 ) questions as to necessity and proportionality.
40. Whilst it is not for the court to question the correctness of the existing planning status of the land, the court in deciding whether or not grant an injunction (and, if so, whether and for how long to suspend it) is bound to come to some broad view as to the degree of environmental damage resulting from the breach and the urgency or otherwise of bringing it to an end. In this regard the court need not shut its mind to the possibility of the planning authority itself coming to reach a different planning judgment in the case."
"Proportionality requires not only that the injunction be appropriate and necessary for the attainment of the public interest objective sought – here the safeguarding of the environment – but also that it does not impose an excessive burden on the individual whose private interests - here the gipsy's private life and home and the retention of his ethnic identity - are at stake."
i) shall cease using the land and cease allowing the land to be used for residential use by 8 January 2007; and
ii) shall remove all caravans, mobile homes, vehicles, trailers (including residential trailers), machinery, fairground equipment and domestic paraphernalia from the land by 8 January 2007.
Note 1 The wife of the 8th Defendant (Jason Danter) was omitted from the list of Defendants, apparently inadvertently, but nothing turns on this in the circumstances [Back] Note 2 Mr Appleton is not one of those who moved to the Aston Cross site and is therefore not a Defendant in the present action [Back]