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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> English and Welsh Courts - Miscellaneous >> Sweett (UK) Ltd v Michael Wight Homes Ltd [2012] EW Misc 3 (CC) (23 February 2012) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/Misc/2012/3.html Cite as: [2012] EW Misc 3 (CC) |
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(Sitting in Plymouth)
B e f o r e :
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Sweett (UK) Limited (formerly Cyril Sweett Limited) |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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Michael Wight Homes Limited |
Defendant |
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Hearing commenced: 20th February 2012.
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Crown Copyright ©
Name | Role | Statements / reports – pages |
Peter Acers (sometimes spelt as Acres) | Director of Diamond | Not a witness or a party. |
Cliff Barnes | Claimant's regional director. | 285 |
Myles Clough | Claimant's project director. | 262 and 272. |
Stephen Hart (of Hart-Ireson). | Defendant's expert building surveyor. | 235 |
Tim Hartley | Surveyor who assisted Mr Clough on behalf of the Claimant. | No statement. He was not a witness. |
Charles Haywood (of MacConvilles) | Claimant's expert surveyor. | 218 |
Moody Venture Capital. | Funder of project (for whom a Susan Firby worked). | No statement and not a witness |
Natwest Bank | Funder of project. | No witness from the bank gave evidence. |
Michael Wight | Defendant's former director (but now through bankruptcy, an employee). | 295 |
David Young | Representative of Diamond (he had apparently been contracted in by them and is not a director of Diamond). | No statement and not a witness or party. |
1. Is the Claimant entitled to further payment in respect of the services provided to the Defendant? [Agreed answer: Yes].
2. If so, to what sum is the Claimant entitled? [Agreed answer: £10,000 inclusive of VAT and interest].
3. What is the scope of the Claimant's duties under its retainer with the Defendant?
4. In relation to the performance bond:
a) Did the Claimant owe an absolute duty to ensure a bond was provided, or was its duty limited to exercising reasonable skill and care?
b) Was the Claimant in breach of duty in relation to the provision of a performance bond?
c) If the Claimant had complied with its duty as identified in a) above, would a performance bond have been provided by the contractor?
5. In relation to the sequence of the works, was the Claimant in breach of duty in relation to advising thereon? [Withdrawn by Defendant].
i) The services included a requirement on the Claimant to prepare the works contract and associated contract documents and arrange for such documents to be executed. The Claimant was therefore responsible to ensure that Diamond executed a performance bond equal to 10% of the contract sum.
ii) The Claimant drafted a performance bond but it failed to arrange for it to be executed by Diamond or the surety.
iii) The requirement for the Claimant to arrange for the performance bond to be executed was an absolute obligation. The failure by the Claimant to arrange for the performance bond to be executed was a breach of contract.
iv) Alternatively, if the requirement to arrange for the performance bond to be executed was not an absolute obligation then it was an implied term of the contract that the Claimant would use reasonable skill and care to arrange for the performance bond to be executed. It is submitted that the failure by the Claimant to arrange for the performance bond to be executed was a breach of that implied term.
v) The services included a requirement for the Claimant to review the work and advise the Defendant on any risks and the potential consequences.
vi) Notwithstanding the fact that the Claimant was under a duty to arrange for the performance bond to be executed, the Claimant was also under a duty to advise the Defendant of the risk and consequence of Diamond starting work and continuing work without a performance bond in place. The Claimant failed to advise the Defendant of that risk.
i. As Employer's Agent and Quantity Surveyor, the Claimant was contractually obliged only to review and identify risks between the parties to the Works Contract, that is, the Defendant and Diamond. The Claimant was not responsible for identifying any other risks and consequences.
ii. The Claimant advised the Defendant of the need to have a performance bond in place on several occasions, including at meetings on the 28th January and 5th February 2008.
iii. …it is admitted that it was an implied term of the contract that the Claimant would perform its contractual duties with the reasonable skill and care to be expected of reasonably competent Employer's agents and Quantity Surveyors.
iv. …the Defendant has failed to particularise the basis upon which a tortious duty of care is generated and owed. In so far as such a duty of care is owed, it is averred that it mirrors the contractual duty set out at paragraph 22 of this Defence to Counterclaim.
v. …It is denied that the Claimant was responsible for ensuring that Diamond executed a performance bond, either as set out at paragraph 25 of the Counterclaim or at all. While it is admitted that the Claimant had a duty to assist with compiling the draft contractual documentation, it is denied that this included a duty to ensure that any other party executed either a performance bond or any other documentation.
vi. …it is admitted that the performance bond was not executed by Diamond or the surety, but it is denied that the Claimant had any duty to arrange this.
vii. …The Defendant has not pleaded the factual or legal basis upon which it can be said that this alleged absolute obligation was an express or implied part of the Claimant's contract, and it is averred that no such basis exists.
viii. …the Defendant is required to prove that it was a contractual term that the Claimant should use reasonable skill and care to arrange for the Performance Bond to be executed. Further and in any event, it is averred that the Claimant did use reasonable skill and care to arrange for the Performance Bond to be executed. In particular:
(i) In a meeting with Diamond on the 5th February 2008, the Claimants advised them that a performance bond was required.
(ii) The wording of the bond was sent to Diamond on the 22nd February 2008.
(iii) In an e-mail dated 26th February 2008 to the Defendant and Diamond, the Claimant recommended a performance bond in the form provided.
(iv) On the 5th March 2008, the Claimant left a voicemail message with Diamond asking for an update on the performance bond.
(v) On the 6th March 2008, the Claimant sent an e-mail to Diamond asking for an update on the bond.
(vi) On the 14th March 2008, the Claimant sent an e-mail to Diamond asking for an update on the bond.
(vii) On the 16th April 2008, the Claimant sent an e-mail to Diamond and the Defendant asking for comments on the bond's wording.
(viii) On the 21st April 2008, the Claimant sent an e-mail to Diamond asking for confirmation that the wording of the bond was acceptable.
(ix) On the 23rd April 2008, Diamond e-mailed the Claimant stating that the bond was with a bank for it to comment on it.
(x) On the 25th April 2008, the Claimant met with Diamond and the Defendant, and it was agreed that Diamond's secretary would chase up the issue of the bond.
(xi) On the 7th May 2008, the Claimant e-mailed Diamond asking for an update on the bond.
(xii) On the 30th May 2008, the Claimant met with Diamond and the Defendant and the bond was discussed. The minutes record that it was agreed that the bond was still outstanding.
(xiii) On the 24th June 2008, the Claimant met with Diamond and the Defendant and the bond was discussed. The minutes record that it was agreed that the bond was still outstanding.
(xiv) On the 26th June 2008, the Claimant e-mailed Diamond asking for an update on the bond.
(xv) On or around the 2nd July 2008, the Claimant spoke to Peter Acres, director of Diamond, about the bond. Mr Acres stated that the cost was £2500, not £1000 as he had thought.
(xvi) On the 24th July 2008, the Claimant met with Diamond and the Defendant and the bond was discussed. The minutes record that the bond had been signed and was with the insurance company for processing.
(xvii) On the 28th August 2008, the Claimant met with Diamond and the Defendant and the bond was discussed. The minutes record that it was agreed that Peter Acres would contact the Claimant regarding the bond.
(xviii) On the 28th August 2008, Diamond e-mailed the Claimant stating that the fee for the bond was in excess of £4500, that they had not allowed for this in their quotation, and that they were not prepared to provide this.
(xix) Between the 2nd and the 4th September 2008, the Claimant attempted to contact Peter Acres three times.
(xx) On the 10th September 2008, the Claimant contacted the Defendant and confirmed that it had spoken to Peter Acres about the bond a number of times previously.
ix. With regard to paragraph 30 of the Counterclaim, the Claimant did advise the Defendant as to the need for a performance bond and the risk of continuing work without one, including on the 28th January 2008, the 5th February 2008 and subsequently.
i) The performance bond was discussed in the initial meeting held at Nisbet's offices on 28 January 2008: see Myles Clough 1st w/s para 4 at [2/1/263] and Michael Wight w/s para 10 at [2/4/297]. Myles Clough explained the reasons for having a bond, but MWH wanted to start the works without the bond being in place: Myles Clough 1st w/s para 10 at [2/1/266].
ii) The Employer's Requirements drafted by Cyril Sweett on 4 February 2008 included the provision of a Performance Bond equal to 10% of the Contract Sum (clause 3.4 at [1/3/138]).
iii) Contrary to MWH's assertion, there was plainly no absolute obligation on Cyril Sweett to ensure that Diamond obtained a performance bond. Cyril Sweett's obligation was to take reasonable care to ensure it was obtained: see Jackson & Powell at 9-239 (it should be noted that the architect found to be negligent in Convent Hospital v Eberlin (1989) 23 Con LR 112 had completely forgotten about the requirement for a performance bond, a situation far removed from the present).
iv) The steps taken by Cyril Sweett in relation to the performance bond are summarised at paragraph 28 of the Reply and Defence to Counterclaim [1/4/172]. These steps were sufficient and appropriate in the circumstances. Mr Hart is of the opinion that Cyril Sweett could have withheld the full value of the bond (£93,300) from Diamond's first payment application: report at para 2.1.14 at [1/9/242]. The first payment application was made on 29 May 2008 and certified on 30 May 2008 [3/761]. Given that the contract was only executed on 23 May 2008 this position is untenable.
v) Further, the funders (whose money was at risk and who engaged their own QS in the form of William Martin) do not appear to have had any concerns in relation to proceeding without the bond in place or to have suggested that sums should be withheld on this basis. There is no suggestion that MWH made any attempt to persuade Diamond to obtain a performance bond between Cyril Sweett terminating its contract in September 2008 and Diamond's insolvency in June 2009: either MWH was not concerned about it or it too was unable to successfully persuade Diamond.
i) By the time of the Claimant's involvement the Defendant and Diamond had already completed substantial negotiations in relation to the project and the price. There had however been no discussion of the provision by Diamond of a performance bond. This was something that the Claimant suggested once it became involved (see [263]).
ii) It is not in dispute that among the Claimant's duties was to 'prepare contract documentation and arrange for such documents to be executed by the parties thereto'. The performance bond was part of the contract documentation, and the Claimant provided draft wording for the bond: see [729]. Execution of the bond was a contractual obligation on the part of Diamond, but in fact it was never executed.
iii) The purpose of a bond is to provide a guarantee to the employer (here, the Defendant) of the contractor's liability under the contract, subject to a maximum fixed in the contract. The contract provided (conventionally) for this maximum to be 10% of the contract sum, which in this case would be £94,344.76. Matters of quantum are for another day, but (given the delays to the work and Diamond's insolvency) had the bond been provided by Diamond as it should have been, and had it been called in, the surety would undoubtedly have been liable for the full amount.
iv) The Defendant's primary position is that the wording of the Claimant's engagement made it the Claimant's strict duty to see that the bond was executed. Put shortly it was to 'arrange for the bond to be executed', as the wording above states, not merely to take reasonable care to arrange for the bond to be executed. In the Defendant's submission this is the sort of 'clear language' which can denote the undertaking of an obligation stricter than that to take reasonable care: see Platform Funding v Bank of Scotland [2008] EWCA Civ 930. And since the bond was not executed, the Claimant is in breach of that obligation.
v) Even if the obligation was merely to take reasonable care to see that the bond was executed by Diamond, however, the Claimant failed to do so. The Claimant's own expert surveyor (Charles Haywood of MacConvilles) states (at [224]) that: 'Negotiation and placing the bond does take time and contractors often need chasing as they are reluctant to tie up business capital any longer than they need to. ... In my experience an Employer's Agent often has to push a contractor to execute a bond. He cannot be forced to but the Employer's Agent should use reasonable endeavours to cajole the contractor into complying with his contractual obligations, keeping the employer informed of progress'.
vi) With due respect to Mr Haywood's conclusion that that was what the Claimant did, the Defendant submits that the Claimant's efforts in this regard fell well short of the sort of 'cajoling' that would have been possible and should have been undertaken. The precise facts are of course a matter of evidence but in truth all the Claimant can show that it did was to raise the matter of the bond with Diamond on a number of occasions – and that despite the fact that this 'strategy' had, over time, clearly not proved to be effective.
vii) As to what the Claimant ought to have done, the Defendant relies on the evidence of Stephen Hart (see report at [235&ff]), chartered building surveyor.
viii) Primarily, the Claimant ought to have withheld (or advised the Defendant to withhold) sums from interim payments otherwise due to Diamond, in order to apply pressure to get it to comply with its contractual obligation. Even if it was not realistic to expect Diamond to execute the bond until after the contract was signed (and there is some suggestion in the Claimant's correspondence that it did not necessarily take that view at the time: see for example [742], [757]), the Claimant certified four separate (and substantial) interim payments (see [760], [786], [796] and [816]) to Diamond after the contract had been signed. The appropriate step to take would have been (see Hart at [242]) to serve a withholding notice in relation to one of those payments: 'to withhold from the payment due to the Contractor the full amount of the proposed bond... until such time as the Contractor provided the bond. This would have given the Employer the same level of protection, by way of retention, as the bond would have provided. It is likely that the Contractor then would very quickly have provided the bond... following which the Employer would have paid the withheld sum to the Contractor'.
ix) The withholding of sums from interim certificates is specifically envisaged by the JCT contract: see clause 4.10.4 at [68]. Not only that, but the whole process of withholding sums by way of notice such as this is enshrined in statute (s 111 of the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996). Withholding notices are extremely common in practice, and where (as here) a contractor is in breach of an explicit and unambiguous contractual obligation, such a notice would be entirely appropriate.
x) Mr Haywood suggests [247] that such withholding might have been outside the Claimant's powers. This suggestion is not understood – not least since as the Employer's Agent the Claimant explicitly had the power to issue notices on the Defendant's behalf: see [25]. If it is intended to mean that, notwithstanding s 111 and clause 4.10.4, the Defendant did not have the power to issue such a notice, the Defendant must respectfully disagree with Mr Haywood.
xi) Mr Haywood's other contention [248] is that withholding such a substantial sum would have 'undoubtedly hastened the Contractor's demise". This misses the point. As Mr Hart explains (see above), once the bond had been obtained (at very much less expense than the amount withheld), the withheld amount would have been released.
xii) The reality therefore is that there was a clear mechanism for applying pressure to Diamond to make it comply with its contractual obligation to provide the bond. Despite this, the Claimant never took that step, and never suggested or advised that the Defendant could or should take that step. This is all the more unacceptable when one considers that:
xiii) Mr Clough of the Claimant apparently knew [266] from early July 2008 that Diamond appeared to be in financial difficulties, so that the bond assumed even greater significance, being something on which the Defendant might genuinely need to rely in due course; and
xiv) by late August 2008 Diamond had explicitly [806] indicated its refusal to execute the bond, complaining that the cost of it was too expensive at some £4,500. Even after that point blank refusal, the Claimant happily recommended [816] that the Defendant pay further substantial sums to Diamond, without making any suggestion as to how it might be 'pushed' or 'cajoled' into reconsidering its clearly stated position.
xv) Mr Hart also suggests an alternative approach. Recognising that the cost of the bond might not have been accounted for in the contract sum (something about which Diamond did ultimately complain: [806]) he says (see [242]) that it might have been appropriate to increase the contract sum to reflect the cost of the bond. The Claimant "could have advised that such an amendment was appropriate and that may have avoided the dispute that subsequently arose".
xvi) In fact, by August 2008 when Diamond indicated its firm refusal to execute the bond, citing the cost (which the Claimant apparently regarded as reasonable at about £4,500: see [805]), the key thing was to ensure that the bond was in fact purchased, to give the Defendant some protection – and all the more so if there were concerns about Diamond's financial position. It would have been far better even at this stage for the Claimant to suggest that the Defendant met the cost of the bond (or perhaps negotiated with Diamond to meet at least part of the cost) so that that protection could be obtained.
xvii) Instead the Claimant did nothing more than attempt to chase one representative of Diamond with several phone calls. Given the lapse of significant time since the contract had been signed, Diamond's expressed refusal to execute the bond, and the abject failure of the Claimant's passive approach to the issue throughout, this fell well short of the sort of measures necessary to see that the bond was properly executed.
xviii) The Defendant also complains of the Claimant's failure to make clear to it the significance of the bond. It is accepted that the Claimant originally suggested, and then later 'recommended', that a bond be obtained, and that the Defendant understood the purpose of the bond and to some extent its importance. But Diamond's failure to execute the bond posed a significant risk to the Defendant, and it was part of the Claimant's duty to identify development risks and their potential consequences. The Claimant did not make this risk clear enough to the Defendant.
xix) And in particular, Mr Clough accepts [266] that by early July 2008 he was 'worried' about Diamond's financial status and credit worthiness. If so, the bond (an issue which Diamond was consistently ducking at this point) assumed even greater significance. Although Mr Clough claims to have expressed these concerns to Mr Wight of the Defendant, there is no evidence that he did so and certainly no evidence that he highlighted the increased significance of the bond should his concerns prove correct. This failure was also a breach of the Claimant's obligations.
i) At page 681 (Cliff Barnes to Michael Wight, dated 4th February 2008): 'I attach a revised fee proposal and schedule of duties which I trust reflects your requirements. I would be grateful if you could confirm your agreement of these proposals to allow us to make a start on the contract documents in readiness for our meeting tomorrow'.
ii) At page 684 (Michael Wight to Cliff Barnes, dated 4th February 2008): 'Further to your email please accept this reply as confirmation of acceptance of the terms as discussed and agreed. Please could you confirm to me the payment schedule as I would wish to be clear on this. I would be happy to agree to pay an equal amount if that was acceptable to you'.
iii) At page 684A (Mr Barnes to Mr Wight, dated 4th February 2008). 'Many thanks Michael; I would be happy with a monthly amount if that suits you. Could I suggest 12 equal payments from Feb 08 to Jan 09 inclusive. This would give a sum of £1667 per month. I understand that you will not be requiring CDM co-ordinator services (sorry I left this in the fee proposal by mistake). See you tomorrow' In evidence Mr Barnes explained that 'CDM stands for the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations'.
1. Meet with Diamond Construction and the design team to agree the employer's requirements, contractor's proposals and health and safety plan.
2. Review the scheme content, identifying development risks, their potential consequences and allocation to the parties to the contract.
3. Agree contractor's cash flow, stage payments, programme and contract sum analysis.
4. Prepare contract documentation and arrange for such documents to be executed by the parties thereto.
5. Convene and chair a pre-contract meeting.
6. Agree valuation payments to the contractor based on the contract sum analysis, or such other basis of valuation as may e agreed under the terms of the contract and report thereon.
7. Advise on values in respect of insurance.
8. Agree the final account with the contractor and issue a final statement.
9. Issue all necessary statements, etc, relating to the final account that may be required by the Employer.
10. Visit the site, as appropriate to
- Attend site meetings including chairing meetings, issuing agendas and minutes.
- Periodically monitor the progress and quality of the works.
- Ascertain, generally, that the terms and content of the contract are being completed.
11. Discharge the responsibilities of the CDM coordinator as set down in the CDM regulations and advise the employer of his responsibilities.
12. Co-ordinate and monitor any of the following that may be required:
- Pre-handover inspection;
- Handover inspections;
- Notices of practical completion;
- Schedule of defects;
- Notices of making good defects.
13. Determine any extensions of time due and comply with requirements regarding notices etc.
Exclusions
1. The preparation of documents for and liaison with funders.
2. The preparation and issue of financial statements.
3. The issue of any change or Employer's agent instruction to the contract and assessment of time and cost implications.
4. Agreement of any partial possession to the contract.
5. Monitoring of defects rectification during the defects liability period. The fee allows for sign-off at practical completion and a further inspection at the end of the defects liability period.
i) Paragraph 48 where, after analyzing a number of cases, Rix LJ said: 'I see no reason to give any of these cases, all of them in this court, any prominence over any other. They all turn on their own particular facts. They nevertheless allow the following conclusions: (1) that the default obligation is one limited to the taking and exercise of reasonable care; (2) that it requires special facts or clear language to impose an obligation stricter than that of reasonable care; (3) that a professional man will not readily be supposed to undertake to achieve a guaranteed result; and (4) that if he is undertaking with care that which he was retained or instructed to do, he will not readily be found to have nevertheless warranted to be responsible for a misfortune caused by the fraud of another. It follows from the jurisprudence and from these conclusions to be derived from them, however, that it is not possible to support a blanket approach whereby, even in the absence of an express warranty, a professional's responsibility is nevertheless always limited to the taking of reasonable care.
ii) Paragraph 53, where Rix LJ said: 'the point before us is one of construction, of retainer and/or certificate, free of any merits or demerits so far as presence or want of care are concerned'.
iii) Paragraph 30, where Moore Bick said: 'A number of conclusions may be drawn from these decisions. Perhaps the most obvious is that although there is a presumption that those who provide professional services normally do no more than undertake to exercise the degree of care and skill to be expected of a competent professional in the relevant field, there is nothing to prevent them from assuming an unqualified obligation in relation to particular aspects of their work. Whether a professional person has undertaken an unqualified obligation of any kind in any given case will depend on the terms of the contract under which he has agreed to provide his services.
iv) Paragraph 68 where Sir Anthony Clarke MR (who dissented on the outcome) said: Since drafting the above I have seen a draft of the judgment of Rix LJ. I agree with him that the default position is as he has stated it at [48], namely that, while each case turns on its own particular facts, the decided cases allow these conclusions: i) that the default obligation is one limited to the taking and exercise of reasonable care; ii) that it requires special facts or clear language to impose an obligation stricter than that of reasonable care; iii) that a professional man will not readily be supposed to undertake to achieve a guaranteed result; and iv) that if he is undertaking with care that which he was retained or instructed to do, he will not readily be found to have nevertheless warranted to be responsible for a misfortune caused by the fraud of another. I also agree with Rix LJ that it follows from the jurisprudence and from these conclusions to be derived from them that it is not possible to support a blanket approach whereby, even in the absence of an express warranty, a professional's responsibility is nevertheless always limited to the taking of reasonable care. It may be necessary in a particular case to imply such a warranty.
i) At the time in issue there was no contract between the Defendant and Diamond. If I interpreted the agreement in the way Mr Horne suggests it would have meant that the Cyril Sweett Limited had given an absolute commitment to ensuring that Diamond entered into all contractual documentation (i.e. the contract itself), even before the terms of that documentation were finalised. Although parties may chose what they commit themselves to by contract (subject to illegality) that would have been a very unusual and onerous commitment for the Claimant to have made and can not have been remotely contemplated by either of the parties to this litigation;
ii) The wording of a contract needs to be interpreted on its face and at the time that the agreement was made. Mr Horne sought to suggest that the meaning of the wording changed once the contract was signed. Thus he suggested, as a secondary position, that once the contract was signed the obligation became absolute. I do not accept that. I do not accept that there should or could be a wavering construction of the term involved. I do not accept that the wording suggests any such changing definition. There is nothing to suggest that either party viewed the matter in this way (certainly the Claimant did not). Further the execution of the bond only became relevant at the time of the execution of the contract since there was no contractual obligation on the contractor to take out the bond until the contract was signed.
iii) As a tertiary position, Mr Horne argued that, even if the wording did not create an absolute obligation, it did impose a higher duty that the default duty of taking and exercising reasonable care. As will be plain, I do not accept that is so. The wording of the agreement, as correctly constructed in my opinion, did not create a higher duty than the default duty. The contractual duty was to prepare the documents and arrange for them to be executed (which was what the Claimant did). The default duty arose when the arrangements for the execution of the bond had failed and Diamond did not sign the bond. The Claimant then owed the default duty as quantity surveyor and employer's agent.
i) Mr Winser referred me to paragraph 9-128 in which there is reference to a passage from the judgment of the late Bingham LJ (as he then was) in Eckersley v Binnie Properties [1988] 18 Con.LR 1 in which he said: 'a professional man…should be alert to the hazards and risks inherent in any professional task he undertakes to the extent that other ordinarily competent members of the profession would be alert….The law does not require of a professional man that he be a paragon combining the qualities of polymath and prophet'. To that, Mr Winser said must be added, a professional man should not ascribed foresight before the event;
ii) Paragraph 9-132 which states: 'Once it is established that a professional owes a duty to provide advice or services to his client, the fact that is client has special skill in the same area does not reduce the standard of care which is required in order to discharge that duty'. This is relevant to the submission that Mr Horne made that, even if Mr Wight did know about the importance of the bond that did not diminish the duties of the Claimant in relation to it. Mr Horne submitted in closing that 'the obligation was not on Mr Wight to stipulate how the Claimant should perform its duties', a point that I accept.
iii) Mr Winser referred me to Paragraph 9-140 where it is said that 'The standard of reasonable care and skill is usually established by reference to the general practice of the construction profession concerned. In Nye Saunders and Partners v Alan E Bristow [1987] 37 BLR 92 Stephen Brown LJ expressly applied the test in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 to decide whether an architect had fulfilled the required standard: 'where there is a conflict as to whether he has discharged that duty the courts approach the matter on the basis of considering where there was evidence that at the time a responsible boy of architects would have taken the view that the way in which the subject of enquiry had carried out his duties was an appropriate way of carrying out the duty, and would not hold him guilty of negligence merely because there was a body of competent professional opinion which held that he was at fault';
iv) Mr Horne referred me to the qualifications of the above passage at paragraph 9-142 which arise in 'i) cases in which the court considers that there is no logical basis for the body of opinion in accordance with which the defendant acted….ii) cases in which the expert evidence called by the defendant is in reality no more than the personal opinion of an expert witness as to what he would have done in the position of the defendant'. Mr Horne said that this was directly applicable to the facts of this case and, on the second point, to the evidence of Mr Haywood. Mr Horne submitted that Mr Haywood gave evidence that was confined to his own personal opinion and had no logic (points which I say immediately I do not accept, do not represent a correct analysis of Mr Haywood's report or evidence and, in relation to the second of those points, was not suggested to him in evidence);
v) Paragraph 9-149 where it is stated that 'care is required in the selection and presentation of expert evidence. In the first place, evidence will be admitted only from a member of the profession to which the defendant belongs'. The passage goes on to cite Slade LJ in Investors in Industry Commercial Properties v South Bedfordshire DC [1986] 1 All ER 787 where an expert had given evidence outside his field and Slade LJ said that 'little reliance can be placed on their answers to these particular questions, which related to a profession other than their own'. The passage goes on to cite Butler Sloss LJ in the case of Sansom v Metcalfe Humbleton and Co [1998] P.N.L.R 542 where she said: 'a court should be slow to find a professionally qualified man guilty of a breach of his duty of skill and care towards a client (or third party) without evidence from those within the same profession as to the standard expected on the facts of the case and the failure of the professionally qualified man to measure up to that standard'. This was raised by Mr Winser as a basis for an attack on the evidence of Mr Hart who is a building surveyor and has never acted as an employer's agent (whereas Mr Haywood has many years experience both as a quantity surveyor and as an employer's agent). I return to this later when I consider the expert evidence.
i) His experience is that contractors need a bit of pushing to issue the bonds and that the issue of the bond arises in the tender phase usually. However, he said that this project was unusual in that the employer came to the Claimant with a contractor already in place. It does often require a little cajoling to get the contractor to issue the bond even though it may be agreed in principle.
ii) Normally, the cost of the performance bond is part of the contract price (and thus, in effect, the employer pays for it). Here that had not occurred. Mr Clough said that he would have made it pretty clear to Mr Wight that the contractor would have to pay a premium for the bond and that Mr Wight, as the employer, would then bear that expense (since it would be incorporated into the contract sum). He said that David Young appeared not to have included the cost of this within the contract price.
iii) Normally the employer's agent will not get involved in the premium for a performance bond – it is essentially a matter for the contractor to sort out the cost himself. For the contractor to pass this on to the employer the cost would have to be identified before the contract sum was agreed; that did not happen here (which meant, of course, that it was to the advantage of the Defendant that the premium for the bond was left with the contractor).
iv) He did not give Mr Young the names of sureties but did tell him where he could get a bond from.
i) The intention is that a contract will be executed by the two parties based on JCT 2005 Design and Build, but incorporating agreed amendments;
ii) The work would be carried out in the terms of the draft contract documents. The work would start on 25th March 2008 and would be completed on 30th January 2009;
iii) If a contract was not entered into, Michael Wight Homes Limited would reimburse Diamond Property Construction Limited for their reasonable expenditure up to £50,000 'plus overheads and profit 5% and VAT';
iv) Stage payments would be made. Diamond were to take out 'all risks, employers / public liability insurance as required in accordance with the contract conditions (there is no mention of a bond in the letter)
i) Mr Wight was very anxious for the work to progress;
ii) The funders were putting pressure for the completion of documentation (which did not separately include the bond);
iii) The contractors had been working on site for 43 days;
iv) The issue of the bond had been raised repeatedly by the Claimant and its importance was well known to Mr Wight.
i) The bond had been drafted and incorporated into the contract at the contractors expense;
ii) The Defendant was very well informed about the bond and of the lack of action by Diamond;
iii) The Defendant knew what action Mr Clough was taking and was not pressing for more action;
iv) The contractor was saying that that it was chasing up the bond;
v) Payments were being made than were less that those certified (which plainly would have financial implications for Diamond);
vi) Work was progressing well on the site.
- there was no discussion of making good the underpayment conditional on the provision of the bond;
- there was no discussion of withholding sums from future payments; and
- even though at this time, as Mr Clough accepted, it was of utmost importance that the bond was obtained to give the Defendant protection against the possible default of a contractor thought to be in financial difficulties, there was not even any discussion of the possibility that the Defendant could pay for (or contribute towards) the cost of the bond. Doing so would have obtained significant protection for limited outlay'.
1. Nisbets / Cyril Sweett (CS) were not involved in the contract negotiations so I gained none of your benefits at that point.
2. Every single recommendation for payment has not matched up with a practical payment made. None of the ongoing paperwork matches up with where we are so it is of no value.
3. One of the most important parts of a contract, the performance bond is still not in place'
4. Health and Safety induction?
5. Price scope of works to cottage still waiting…
…Diamond are progressing well with the project and I am pleased with them and their working ethos. I do feel that we too could work together in the future. For absolute clarity, in reflection this project is not giving us both an opportunity to work well together. Having said that, I do believe that you and Cyril Sweett Limited as a company could be able to bring value to future projects.
I would like to agree with you a fair and reasonable payment for the services that I have actually received from you. I will stand by what we finally agree. I do hope that this will not then affect our relationship going forward on other projects/….It is unfortunate that this has gone the way that it has. I do believe that if we are both aware of the reasons why we have had issues, that we can look forward to a good working relationship in the future. Please call me so that we can talk through the above and sorry to you Myles if this has caused you grief with the powers that be at CS'.
- 'I agree with you and am sure that we could have offered a more valued service were we more involved at the outset.
- We have made all of your recommendations in line with the payment schedule in the contract documents. It is now acknowledged that the bank and their monitor are entirely responsible for the paperwork not matching up. Even this most recent valuation has ended up with different values being recommended, though we arranged for the bank monitor to be present at site and confirmed the completed stages with him. As agreed last week, you were going to ask the bank for a breakdown of the bank's recommendations so we can make some sense of their payments.
- I have called Peter Acres three / four times since we met on Tuesday. I have spoken to Peter Acres a number of times previously. From the outset, I have been chasing David Young and we have recorded at each project meeting the outstanding item.
- …We believe that we are carrying out our duties agreed with you as Employer's agent and are disappointed that you are disappointed. We are fortunate on this project that Diamond have performed so well on site. However, they are poor at keeping up with the paperwork and we do spend much time chasing actions and recording this…
- …We are of course not responsible for liaising with the bank at all, as this was a duty omitted from our fee agreement. It is just unfortunate that this is where all the payment issues have stemmed.
- I believe that we can add immense value to projects and would agree that our involvement from the outset will demonstrate this. Even at Westward Ho! You appear to have wrapped up a contract sum and agreed payments schedules with the bank!! However, there is value that we can still bring and I have written to you on this project with a proposal. I will give you a call'.
2.01 The experts agreed that the bond was a contractual obligation contained within the employer's requirements, that its purpose had been explained to the defendant, and the original premium for the bond was not separately identified in the contract sum analysis.
2.02 Mr Hart maintains that Cyril Sweett Limited should have advised Michael Wight Homes Limited of the increased premium. Mr Haywood however is of the opinion that the claimant's duties appended to their appointment did not require them to keep the defendant abreast of variations or changes with a cost implication.
2.03 Notwithstanding this, Cyril Sweett Limited did notify the defendant in an email dated 28.08.08 that the bond quote was in excess of £4,500. This had increased from the £2,500 verbally conveyed to he defendant by Mr Clough following an internal email dated 02.07.08.
2.04 The experts agreed that it is not unusual for bonds to be executed post-commencement. Mr Hart considered the period Diamond had to take out the bond was more than reasonable and the contractor had filed to out the bond in place within a reasonable period of time. Mr Haywood noted that the defendant also had no success in obtaining the bond after the claimant terminated their service.
2.05 Mr Haywood stated that Mr Wight was commercially astute and therefore would have understood the implications of not having a bond in place.
2.06 Mr Hart's view is that Cyril Sweett could have done more to persuade the contractor to take out the bond by withholding the full value of the bond, i.e. £93,000. Mr Haywood's view was that this was likely to be outside the powers of the employer's agent under the contract terms and would undoubtedly hasten any contractor's demise. Mr Haywood's view is that the claimant had used reasonable endeavours to persuade the contactors to take out the bond.
- While I have not seen the numerous communications chasing Diamond for the bond there appears to be no argument that the performance bond was a contractual requirement, the wording was issued to the contractor at an appropriate time and the claimant chased Diamond repeatedly for its execution.
- The defendant says the claimant had a duty to make him aware of the risks of commencing the works without a bond and the claimant had a duty to ensure that the bond was executed.
- The claimant says that he did advise on the risk of continuing work without the bond in place and had no obligation to ensure that the bond was executed.
- In my experience it is common practice for bonds to be executed post commencement because there is often limited lead in time between the contractor being instructed to start and physically commencing work. Negotiations and placing the bond does take time and contractors often need chasing as they are reluctant to tie up business capital any longer than they need to. I believe the defendant, having discussed the requirement for a bond, would have understood its purpose and benefits and would therefore have known there was an element of risk in commencing without it.
- In my experience an employer's agent often has to push a contractor to execute a bond. He cannot be forced to but the employer's agent should use reasonable endeavours to cajole the contractor into complying with his contractual obligations, keeping the employer informed of progress. I believe that the claimant did exactly this up to the point he terminated his services'.
- [p238] 'In the issues that I have considered as instructed, there is documentation showing that Cyril Sweett Limited advised on the need for a performance bond, included this within the contract documentation, but allowed the contract documentation to go forward without a performance bond being obtained. In my opinion Cyril Sweett failed in their duty to act with reasonable skill and care by not advising the employer of the risk of proceedings without a bond in place. They also failed in their duty to act with reasonable skill and care by not advising the employer to withhold a sum from the first application for payment until such time as the performance bond was provided…
- [p240]…In my opinion, Cyril Sweett Limited have recognised the importance of the performance bond and the need for this to be in place. Cyril Sweett Limited were clearly aware of the risk, and steps taken to ensure procurement of a performance bond by the contractor, Diamond Property Construction…
- [p241]…2.1.8 - Cyril Sweett Limited were fully aware that a letter of intent was being issued prior to a performance bond being in place and in my opinion should have advised of the risk of allowing Diamond Property Construction Limited to start work without bond. Had they done so, the risk of commencing at that stage under the letter of intent would have been with Michael Wight Homes Limited. On this basis, Cyril Sweett Limited should not have allowed Diamond Property Construction to start works without a performance bond in place…
- 2.1.10 - In my opinion, the contract documentation would include the performance bond and contractor's insurance to be in place, and therefore the contract should not have been executed and Michael Wight Homes Limited advised of this.
- 2.1.11 - The question arises as to whether Cyril Sweett acted with reasonable skill and care to ensure that a performance bond was in place before and subsequently after the contract had been executed…
- 2.1.12 - The advice was for the need of a performance bond. In my opinion there is a failure on the part of Cyril Sweett Limited, despite the requirement within the documentation, to pursue and follow through obtaining this document from the contractor as the employer's agent….
- 2.1.14 - The lack of there being a performance bond in place put the employer at risk and amounted to a breach of contract by the contractor. There is a mechanism available within the contract where a withholding notice can be issued following an application for payment by the contractor if there is a legitimate reason for the employer to withhold part or all of a payment. A withholding notice could have been served following the first application for payment to withhold from the payment due to the contractor the full amount of the proposed bond (i.e. £93,444) until such time as the contractor provided the bond. This would have given the employer the same level of protection by way of retention as the bond would have provided. It is likely that the contractor then would very quickly have provided the bond, which I understand would have cost them £4,500, following which the employer would have paid the withheld sum to the contractor. It would not have been possible for the employer to obtain the bond themselves.
- 2.1.15 - Bonds cost money. Normally the cost of the bond would be passed on to the employer through the contract sum. In this case the contract sum had been agreed before the requirement for a performance bond was raised. The contractor may have been justified in requesting that the contract sum be increased to reflect this. Cyril Sweett cold have advised that such an amendment was appropriate and that may have avoided the dispute that subsequently arose about the contractor providing the bind. Once the contract was executed using the original contract sum Cyril Sweett should have made it clear to the contractor that they were contractually obliged to provide the bond and should have taken the steps set out above to enforce this contractual obligation'.
Stephen Wildblood QC
23rd February 2012.