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GECC/GPA [1993] IECA 137 (20th October, 1993)
Competition
Authority Decision of 20 October 1993 relating to a notification under Section
4 of the Competition Act, 1991
Notification
Nos. CA/44/93, CA/46/93, CA/47/93, CA/48/93, CA/49/93, CA/51/93, CA/52/93,
CA/53/93, CA/54/93, CA/55/93, CA/57/93 - General Electric Capital Corporation/
GPA Group PLC.
Decision
No. 137
Introduction
1. Arrangements
whereby General Electric Capital Corporation (GE Capital) would, in effect,
acquire control over GPA's competitive presence in the market for the provision
of aircraft were notified to the Competition Authority on 30th August, 1993.
The notification requested a certificate, or in the event of a refusal by the
Competition Authority to issue a certificate, a licence.
2. Notice
of intention to grant a certificate in respect of these notifications was
published in the Irish Times on 8 October 1993. No submissions were received
from third parties.
The
Facts
(a) The
subject of the notification
3. The
notification concerns a series of related agreements which, together, result in
GE Capital acquiring effective control over the competitive presence of GPA in
the aircraft provision market. In all, 14 agreements were notified to the
Authority, and they are listed below:-
1. The
Omnibus Agreement.
2. The
Master Aircraft Sale Agreement and the Master Deferred Payment Agreement.
3. The
Subscription Option Agreement.
4. The
Management Agreement.
5. The
Air Tara Option Agreement.
6. The
Asset Purchase Agreement.
7. The
Treasury MIS Licence Agreement
[1].
8. The
Licence Agreement.
9. The
Shareholders' Agreement.
10. The
Sublease.
11. The
Interested Party Agreement.
12. The
GPA Management Asset Consent and Boeing Consents.
13. The
Deferral Agreements
[2].
14. The
Loan Stock Trust Deed
[3].
The
Omnibus Agreement is the framework agreement for all of the other agreements.
In addition to the Omnibus Agreement the other important agreements are; The
Master Aircraft Sale Agreement
[4],
The Subscription Option Agreement and the Management Agreement. These
Agreements contain provisions whereby:-
(a) GE
Capital will acquire aircraft and assets from GPA, and
(b) Will
receive an option to purchase (within 5 years) between 65% and 80% of GPA's
voting equity and
(c) Contractual
arrangements whereby General Electric Capital Aviation Management will acquire
(for 15 years) exclusive management of GPA's aircraft and related assets.
The
arrangements were the subject of two notifications to the Minister for
Enterprise and Employment under the Mergers Act. The Minister decided not to
make an Order under section 9 of that Act in both cases.
(b) The
parties
4. GE
Capital, a US company based in Connecticut is the financial services subsidiary
of the General Electric Group whose ultimate parent company is General Electric
Company (GE Company). GE Company owns all the outstanding common stock of GE
Capital Services which is the sole owner of the common stock of GE Capital. GE
Company is one of the largest and most diversified industrial corporations in
the world.
5. GE
Capital is involved primarily in asset management
and
financial services and, on a smaller scale, in the insurance industry. Its
financing activities include a full range of leasing, loan and asset management
services. Two components of GE Capital, namely; Polaris Holding Company
(Polaris) and Transportation and Industrial Funding Corporation (T&I) are
responsible for GE Capital's aircraft leasing business.
6. GPA
Group PLC (GPA), a Shannon based Company, was established in 1975, and is the
parent company of the GPA group. Initially GPA concentrated on brokering
aircraft and later became involved in the business of purchasing commercial
aircraft and leasing them to airlines throughout the world. It also sells
aircraft as operating assets and, since the mid-1980s has sold aircraft with
operating leases in place to investors. GPA also provides extensive management
and technical support services to airlines and investors. In the course of its
business GPA has acquired control of a significant number of special purpose
entities which are used in the implementation and completion of transactions in
which it is involved. Air Tara Limited, an Irish company which is a wholly
owned subsidiary of GPA, provides technical support to GPA and is used for
aircraft registration purposes.
(c) The
product and the market
7. The
notification concerns the market for providing commercial jet aircraft to air
carriers. There are essentially three main options open to air carriers in
order to acquire additional aircraft.
(a) To
purchase new aircraft from airframe manufacturers or from intermediaries e.g.
lessors of aircraft.
(b) To
purchase used aircraft from airframe manufacturers, an airline, bank or other
financial institution or from an intermediary (for example a broker or a lessor).
(c) To
lease aircraft from an airline manufacturer, an airline, a bank or other
financial institution or from a leasing company.
There
are two principal types of aircraft leases; operating leases and finance leases.
8. As
a general matter, in an operating lease the risks and rewards of ownership
remain with the lessor. Where finance or capital leases are concerned the
risks and rewards of ownership generally remain with the lessee. Finance
leases are usually for longer periods with the lessee often obtaining the right
to acquire the aircraft at the end of the lease period.
9. Air
carriers do not just choose one method of acquiring aircraft but use a
combination of these methods in order to provide themselves with aircraft.
These options have relative degrees of attractiveness for an air carrier and
each is price/rate sensitive to the other because they each represent
alternative economic choices as to how to obtain aircraft.
10. Aircraft
leases can take many forms. Each of these is price/rate sensitive to the other
because they each represent alternative economic choices available to finance
the acquisition of aircraft. Depending on its evaluation of particular needs
(in terms of customer and route demand) an air carrier will compare and choose
the type of lease which would optimise the benefits involved. In addition the
lease may be able to be structured to provide the lessor with tax and/or
accounting advantages, which may reduce the cost of the lease.
11. GPA
and GE Capital have over 200 competitors worldwide in the aircraft provisioning
market. These competitors assist air carriers in obtaining aircraft whether by
sales, financing assistance, leasing or a combination of these methods.
Competitors
include:
- Airframe
Manufacturers
- banks
and credit institutions
- financial
institutions
- air
carriers
- governments
- aircraft
investment groups
- industrial
companies etc
- pension
funds, and
- leasing
companies.
12. The
provision of aircraft is a global market. Essentially a lessor competes for
business worldwide. Although a lessor may be located in Ireland (as in the
case of GPA) they compete for business both in Ireland and elsewhere in the
world. Similarly, all 200 competitors are potentially in a position to offer
services to Irish-based air carriers.
13. The
operators of commercial jet aircraft are air carriers located throughout the
world. Operators are generally well informed with regard to market trends.
Because of the large capital commitments involved in acquiring aircraft, the
market provides substantial information to customers in relation to the supply
available. This is done mainly through brokers who ensure that potential
customers are well informed of pricing levels and competitive terms within the
market. Thus aircraft providers are in a position to have their aircraft
marketed throughout the world. This leads to a high degree of transparency in
the market. The market for commercial jet aircraft is, in many respects, a
global one. From the point of view of the Competition Act, however, the issue
is what effect the arrangements might have on Irish operators of such aircraft.
The main Irish customers for commercial jet aircraft include, Aer Lingus, Air
Turas, Ryanair and Translift airlines.
14. GE
Capital acquires aircraft primarily by purchasing new and used aircraft from
air carriers or pursuant to existing carriers' order positions, and leases them
back to air carriers. In addition GE Capital provides secured financing
involving leases structured in various forms, but mostly on a long term basis.
GPA primarily buys new aircraft from airframe manufacturers on a speculative
basis and leases them out to air carriers usually on a short term basis.
15. The
notifying parties submit that no definite industry data exists for the
calculation of exact market shares. Best estimates indicate that GPA has a
share of 3.9% of the relevant aircraft provision market worldwide with a 3.5%
share in the EC. In so far as Ireland is concerned, the parties stated that GPA
has, at most, 23.8% of operating leases, 20.83% of all types of leases and
8.33% of the relevant aircraft provisioning market. GE Capital has a share of
4.3% of the relevant market worldwide with a 1.2% share in the EC. It has no
involvement in Ireland.
16. The
table below illustrates how the commercial jet aircraft provisioning market in
Ireland is currently structured.
GPA
GE
Other Total
Owned
aircraft
2
Nil
34
36
Finance
Lease
Nil Nil
3
3
Operating
Lease
5 Nil
16
21
Total
7 Nil
53
60
17. Demand
for aircraft worldwide, and hence aircraft financing and leasing is influenced
by a number of factors including; economic conditions, political developments,
internal corporate requirements, and regulatory changes (such as tax laws or
noise level rules).
18. The
only significant barrier to entry into the aircraft provisioning market is
capital availability. This applies equally to the Irish market where there are
no significant regulatory controls or authorisation requirements. Entry occurs
both in expanding and declining markets. During the 1980's the market became
more profitable resulting in increased entry by banks, corporation lessors of
other equipment (for example ORIX expanded from shipping leasing to aircraft
leasing), utility companies etc. When the air transport market declines, as in
recent years, air carriers lease surplus aircraft offering additional services
such as fleet planning, maintenance programs, wet leases (leasing aircraft
together with crew and other support services) and other product support.
(d) The
Arrangements
19. The
notified arrangements contain a number of agreements between the parties which,
primarily, provide for the following:
(i) the
appointment of GECAS (a wholly owned subsidiary of GE Capital established for
the purpose of managing GPA's aircraft assets), as exclusive manager of GPA's
business for a period of fifteen years;
(ii) an
option from GPA to allow GE Capital to acquire between 65% and 80% of the share
capital voting rights of GPA; and
(iii)
an option from GPA to allow GE Capital purchase up to 100% of the issued share
capital of Air Tara Limited, a wholly-owned subsidiary of GPA.
The
Omnibus Agreement (CA/44/93)
20. The
parties to this agreement are GECAS Limited, GE Capital and GPA. This is
effectively, the framework agreement for all the other agreements. It
explains the basis upon which both parties enter the agreement, addresses
employee-related matters and covers the technical and procedural aspects of the
transaction.
21. Section
8.03 prevents GPA from seeking or soliciting alternative offers prior to
closing. Section 9.02 provides for the survival of many of the terms of the
agreement in some instances for up to 3 years after the management agreement
ceases.
The
Subscription Option Agreement (CA/46/93)
22. The
parties to this agreement are GE Capital and GPA Group plc. Under the terms of
this agreement, GE Capital is granted an option to subscribe for a new class of
shares in GPA constituting between 65% and 80% of GPA's voting equity. This
option is exercisable up to 31 March 1998.
23. Section
7.l0 deals with the provision of information by GPA and GE including access to
its contracts:
'(a) GPA
will cause the GPA Subsidiaries and each of the GPA Managed Affiliates to, and
will use commercially reasonable efforts to cause the other Affiliates of GPA
to, maintain all their financial records and books of account in accordance
with Irish GAAP (or with generally accepted accounting principles of the
appropriate jurisdiction) applied on a consistent basis and to provide GE
Capital and its Representative with such information with respect to its
business, assets, properties, condition (financial or otherwise) and prospects
as GE Capital and its Representatives shall reasonably request.
(b) Upon
effectiveness of a Preliminary Exercise Notice, GPA will cause each of the GPA
Subsidiaries and each of the GPA Managed Affiliates to, and will use
commercially reasonable efforts to cause the other Affiliates of GPA to, make
available for inspection by GE Capital and GE Capital's Representatives all
GPA, the GPA Subsidiaries, the GPA Managed Affiliates and such other
Affiliates' properties, assets, books of accounts, corporate records and
contracts and materials reasonably requested by GE Capital or such
Representative at such reasonable times as GE Capital or such Representative
may reasonably request and to make reasonably available to GE Capital and its
Representatives the directors, officers, employees and independent accountants
of GPA, each of the GPA Subsidiaries, each of the GPA Managed Affiliates and
each such other Affiliate for interviews to verify the information furnished to
GE Capital and its Representatives, to such reasonable extent and at such
reasonable times as GE Capital and its Representatives may reasonably request.
Further, GPA will, cause each of the GPA Subsidiaries and each of the GPA
Managed Affiliates to and will use commercially reasonable efforts to cause
each other Affiliate of GPA to, assist GE Capital and its Representatives in
becoming familiar with GPA, each of the GPA Subsidiaries, each of the GPA
Managed Affiliates and each such other Affiliate and its then existing and
prospective business, properties and assets, including to the extent reasonably
practicable, by providing access to GPA, each of the GPA Subsidiaries, each of
the GPA Managed Affiliates and each such other Affiliates' customers, lessees,
lenders and vendors, at such reasonable times as GE Capital and its
Representatives may reasonably request.'
24. Article
VIII Section 8.01 contains a number of restrictions on what GPA and its
subsidiaries can and cannot do, e.g. GPA and its subsidiaries cannot merge or
consolidate with or enter a business combination with any other person, cannot
sell, lease or transfer all or a substantial part of its properties or assets,
and cannot purchase, lease or otherwise acquire all or any substantial part of
the properties or assets of any other person.
The
Management Agreement (CA/47/93)
25. The
parties to this agreement are GECAS Limited and GPA Group plc. Under the terms
of the Management Agreement, GECAS is appointed as exclusive provider of
management services to GPA its subsidiaries and its associated companies for a
period of fifteen years. It, in effect, acquires control over the competitive
presence of GPA for this period. However, the approval of the Board of
Directors of GPA is still required before further capital expenditure is
incurred. The agreement also provides for extensions to the fifteen year
period if agreed by both parties.
26. Pursuant
to the Management Agreement GPA appoints GECAS as the exclusive provider of the
Management Services (as defined) to GPA in relation to most of the aircraft
assets owned by GPA, its subsidiaries, a number of its associated companies or
certain third parties which are covered by the Management Agreement (GPA
Managed Assets). The management arrangement is for an initial term of 15
years, subject to certain limited rights of termination of each party. In
certain circumstances, the arrangements can be automatically extended beyond
the 15-year term for rolling two-year periods, subject to the right of either
party to terminate by written notice. Pursuant to the Transaction and by
virtue of its rights and obligations under the Management Agreement, GECAS will
have acquired, in effect, GPA's competitive presence in the market for the
financing and leasing of commercial aircraft.
27. The
Management Agreement expressly contemplates that GECAS will have the necessary
autonomy, authority and responsibility for performance of the Management
Services. The Board of Directors of GPA, however, retains certain residual
authority to direct GECAS to take or cease to take any action with respect to
the GPA Managed Assets to the extent necessary to comply with its fiduciary
obligations under Irish law and to approve sales or lease transactions which
exceed certain thresholds. GPA Board approval is also required before the
Management Company makes certain capital expenditures or incurs other
liabilities, including the purchase of new aircraft, on behalf of GPA. The
Management Agreement also provides for an annual lease operating budget and an
annual expense budget to be established by GPA with respect to the GPA Managed
Assets.
28. GPA's
residual involvement is necessary for the following reasons:
- GPA
must satisfy fiduciary obligations to its shareholders and creditors;
- GPA
has retained responsibility for managing matters related to its substantial
liabilities and, accordingly remains vitally interested in the generation of
adequate cash flow to meet all its obligations as they become due; and
- GPA
must seek to maximise the overall value of the GPA Managed Assets that will
continue to be owned by GPA.
29. Pursuant
to the Management Agreement, GECAS will perform the Management Services in a
manner which is consistent with GPA's objectives outlined above.
30. Because
of the extent of GPA's current financial liabilities, GECAS is unwilling to
assume responsibility for GPA's liabilities either by outright acquisition of
GPA, by indirect control of GPA through GPA's Board of Directors or in any
other way. GECAS' management of GPA's leasing business does not render GECAS
responsible for the liabilities of GPA
[5].
This approach will facilitate the enhancement of the value of GPA through
effective management by GECAS of the GPA Managed Assets while preserving the
possibility of the future acquisition by GE Capital of between 65% and 80% of
GPA's voting equity pursuant to subsequent exercise of the Option.
31. In
order to secure the payment of Management Fees and Reimbursable Expenses (as
defined) owing to GE Capital, GPA will deliver a security deposit of US$9
million to GECAS (principally in respect of Management fees and Reimbursable
Expenses relating to GPA Managed Assets that are not security for GPA's
principal secured bank facilities). GPA has arranged with the secured banks to
give certain priority rights in cash deposits in certain GPA Bermuda collection
accounts established for and otherwise securing GPA's principal secured bank
facilities. (These priority rights are in respect of Management Fees and
Reimbursable Expenses relating to the GPA Managed Assets that are security for
GPA's Principal secured bank facilities).
32. Section
2.02 provides
inter
alia
that:
"If
following the date of this Agreement, GPA enters into any agreement (other than
the proposed agreements listed on Schedule 2.02(b)) or otherwise arranges or
agrees to provide management services in respect of any Aircraft Assets,
Management Company shall provide such management services only (1) in
accordance with this Section 2.02(b), (2) if Management Company shall have
expressly consented to such agreement or arrangement and the delegation by GPA
to Management Company of the authority, responsibility, duties and obligations
of GPA to provide such management services, (3) if any required GPA Managed
Assets Consent in respect of any such Aircraft Assets shall have been executed
and delivered by the applicable GPA Managed Affiliate or Non-GPA Owner, as the
case may be, and (4) for so long as such GPA Managed Assets Consent shall
remain in full force and effect."
33. Section
2.02 also enables GPA to continue managing assets currently managed for third
parties if they do not consent to the transfer of such functions to GECAS.
34. Section
6.08(b) prevents GPA buying or acquiring any interest in aircraft on its own
account while the Agreement is in force.
35. Section
7.07 provides that GPA retains control of decisions in relation to a group of
leases called the America West leases so that GECAS cannot reduce the rent or
take other minor decisions without approval viz:
'Notwithstanding
anything to the contrary in this Agreement or Schedule 2.02(a), Management
Company shall not, without the prior written consent of GPA, (i) amend or grant
a waiver with respect to, or declare any Event of Default (as defined in the
DIP Credit Agreement) under any of the America West GPA Agreements, (ii) change
the term of or terminate any of the America West GPA Agreements or (iii) reduce
any rent payable under any of the America West GPA Agreements.'
36. Under
Section 7.1, GECAS will provide GPA with information on the market, customers
and financing. Such information would not be provided once a Notice of
Termination had been served. Section 7.04 requires GECAS to obtain the
approval of GPA for certain actions.
The
Air Tara Option Agreement (CA/48/93)
37. The
parties to this agreement are GE Capital Corporation and GPA Group plc. The
agreement gives GE an irrevocable option to acquire up to 100% of the
outstanding share capital of Air Tara, a wholly-owned subsidiary of GPA.
38. Section
8.09 deals with the provisions of information similar to Section 7.l0 in the
Subscription Option Agreement.
39. Section
9.01 contains similar provisions to those contained in Section 8.01 of the
Subscription Option Agreement. These provide that GPA will ensure that Air
Tara or its subsidiaries will not merge, consolidate or enter a business
combination with any other person, that it will not sell, lease or transfer all
or a substantial part of its properties or assets, and cannot purchase, lease
or otherwise acquire all or any substantial part of the properties or assets of
any other person.
40. In
addition, under section 9.03, Air Tara and its Subsidiaries will not amend,
waive or modify any provision of any Operative Agreements or any other
Contract, agreement, arrangement, instrument or understanding in any respect or
in any manner that would have a Material Adverse Effect on Air Tara and its
Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, or which would violate or be in conflict with
or restrict GPA's (Air Tara's or any of its Subsidiaries') performance of, its
obligations under this Agreement, including pursuant to Section 8.11.
41. Under
Section 9.04 Air Tara and each of its subsidiaries will not permit any
amendment or modification to be made to the Memorandum and Articles of
Association of Air Tara or by-laws of Air Tara and each of its Subsidiaries or
change the corporate structure or organisation of Air Tara and each of its
Subsidiaries from that set forth on Schedule 9.06 hereof.
42. Section
9.05 provides that GPA will cause Air Tara and each of its Subsidiaries not to
engage at any time in any business or business activity other than the business
currently conducted by it and business activities reasonably incidental
thereto, to fail to maintain and operate such business (a) in substantially the
manner in which it is presently conducted and operated (other than as
contemplated herein) and (b) in a manner necessary, proper, advisable or
desirable to keep Air Tara and its Subsidiaries in good standing, and to
maintain its existing favourable relationships and reputation, with the Irish
Department of Finance, Department of Enterprise and Employment or other
relevant Governmental Authority and the Shannon Free Airport Development
Company and any other relevant Governmental Authority.
43. Section
9.06 provides that GPA will not, and will cause Air Tara and each of its
Subsidiaries not to, enter into any indenture, agreement, instrument or other
arrangement which, directly or indirectly, prohibits or restrains, or has the
effect of prohibiting or restraining, or imposes materially adverse conditions
upon, the granting or exercise of the Air Tara Option, or the benefits and
rights accruing to an owner of the Air Tara Shares.
44. Under
Section 9.07,
(a) GPA
shall not, directly or indirectly, offer, sell, transfer, assign, pledge,
convey, hypothecate or otherwise encumber or dispose of all or any part of the
Air Tara Shares or permit all or any part thereof to become subject to any Lien.
(b) GPA
shall cause Air Tara not to issue any new Air Tara Shares and shall cause each
of Air Tara's Subsidiaries not to issue any new share capital.
The
Asset Purchase Agreement (CA/49/93)
45. The
parties to this agreement are GECAS Limited and GPA Group plc. The agreement
provides for the acquisition by GECAS of assets associated with GPA's leasing
business. Among the assets included are the existing management information
software systems, office equipment and motor vehicles.
The
Licence Agreement (CA/51/93)
46. The
parties to this agreement are GECAS Limited and GPA Group plc. The agreement
provides that, upon expiration or termination of the Management Agreement, GE
Capital will licence back to GPA all software (including the treasury-related
portion) associated with the Management Information Systems at the time of
completion of the agreement. In a letter to the Competition Authority dated 17
September, 1993, A & L Goodbody stated that this agreement will not come
into effect until the Management Agreement expires or terminates.
The
Shareholders' Agreement (CA/52/93)
47. This
agreement is between the Mitsubishi Trust and Banking Corporation, Public
School Employees' Retirement Board, Citibank, N.A., Nomura International
P.L.C., and Shannon Free Airport Development Company Limited, and each other
purchaser of 8% Guaranteed Second Secured convertible notes due 2001 of GPA
Group P.L.C. of the one part, and GE Capital Corporation of the other part.
This is an agreement whereby GE Capital and certain potential investors agree
to certain matters regarding their relationships as shareholders. The issues
which form part of the agreement relate inter alia to ownership, voting rights
and certain other rights and limitations.
48. Section
3.02 obliges shareholders not to sell their shares to competitors of GE
Capital. Competitors are defined as any person with a business turnover
greater than $200m annually in aircraft manufacturing or leasing in competition
with GPA. Certain named firms are excluded although, in a letter dated 7
September, the parties indicated that some of the named firms were involved in
aircraft financing. Section 4.02 provides that if, after exercising the
option, GE sells more than 50% of the voting rights in GPA to a non GE company
or to a number of transferees so that it ceases to retain control of GPA, the
other shareholders can require GE to include them in the transfer or require GE
to buy their shares itself. Section 10.01 allows GE Capital to block certain
actions if, after exercising the option, it owns more than 5% but less than 50%
of the capital of GPA.
The
Sublease (CA/53/93)
49. The
parties to this agreement are GPA Group plc and GE Capital Aviation Services
Ltd. This agreement provides for the sublease of certain property by GPA to GE
Capital.
The
Interested Party Agreements (CA/54/93)
50. This
agreement is between GE Capital Corporation and GECAS and an Interested Party.
This is an agreement which, it is intended, will be executed between the
proposed underwriters of the transaction and each of GPA's lenders. The
agreements concern consents and acknowledgements in relation to the execution
of the Transaction and waivers in relation to certain claims which may arise
from GECAS' performance of the Management Services. There are related
indemnity agreements which provide for indemnification in the event that
certain provisions of the Interested Party Agreement are unenforceable.
The
GPA Management Assets Consent and Boeing Consent (CA/55/93)
51. The
parties to the GPA Management Assets Consent Agreement are GPA Group plc.,
GECAS Ltd and a consenting party. The parties to the Boeing Consent Agreement
are GPA Group Plc., GE Capital Corporation, GECAS and the Boeing Company.
These agreements contain the consents of third parties, whose assets are
currently managed by GPA, to the transfer of such management to GE Capital.
The GPA Managed Assets Consent includes:
(i)
The
Head Lessor Consent
(ii)
The
Joint Venture Company Managed Assets Consent
(iii)
The
Non Joint-Venture Owners Managed Assets Consent
52. The
consenting parties agree that GECAS may act as manager for third parties.
Provisions for dealing with a conflict of interest are included.
53. The
Non Joint-Venture Owners Managed Assets Consent provides that the owners may
renew their management agreement with GPA, with the consent, which will not be
unreasonably withheld, of GECAS. The renewed agreements cannot exceed the term
of the GPA/GECAS Management Agreement, i.e. they stop GPA having any agreements
in place when the Management Agreement ends.
Joint
Venture Managed Assets Consent
54. As
in the case of the Non Joint-Venture Owners Managed Assets Consents, renewed
agreements cannot extend past the end of the Management Agreement. The Boeing
Company's consent is required pursuant to its bridge loan to GPA.
The
Loan Stock Trust Deed, (CA/57/93)
55. The
parties to this agreement are (l) GPA Group plc, (2) the Original Charging
Subsidiaries and (3) Natwest Aerospace Trust Company. This deed will be
entered into pursuant to the issue by GPA to Natwest of certain loan stock.
(e)
Submissions of The Parties
(i)
Arguments In Support of a Certificate
56. The
notifying parties submitted that the transaction would not prevent, restrict or
distort competition in trade in terms of goods or services in Ireland or in any
part of Ireland. The applicants further submitted that the transaction did not
contravene
Section 4(1) of the
Competition Act, 1991 and that a Certificate
should be issued by the Competition Authority under
Section 4(4) of
the Act for
a number of reasons.
57. It
was submitted that the transaction constituted a concentration, (this was the
view of The Merger Task Force of the European Commission), and did not fall for
review under Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty and consequently it did not fall
for review under
Section 4(1) of The
Competition Act, 1991 either. The parties
argued that even if the Competition Authority regarded concentrations as coming
within the scope of
Section 4(1), the arrangements were not likely to result in
the diminution of competition in the relevant market.
58. The
parties pointed out that there was intense market competition with over 200
lessors each with three or more aircraft for lease. The merged entity of GPA
and GE Capital would have less than 9.6% of the world aircraft leasing market
according to the parties. Furthermore, the notifying parties submitted that
the aircraft leasing market was not concentrated. Using the four firm
concentration ratio they claimed that the combined market share of the top four
lessors was only 22.9%.
59. The
notifying parties further submitted that GPA and GE Capital operate in
different sectors of the aircraft provisioning market. GE Capital was primarily
involved in purchasing new and used aircraft from air carriers and leasing them
back to carriers on a long term basis in a majority of its transactions. It
was also involved in the provision of secured financing. GPA primarily bought
new aircraft on a speculative basis and leased them out to air carriers on a
short-term basis. In the EC the parties leased substantially different types of
aircraft. As to those aircraft types that both parties leased in the EC, GPA
customers were mainly chartered carriers while GE Capital customers were mainly
scheduled carriers. GE Capital did not operate in the Irish market. GPA had
23.8% of the operating lease market in Ireland.
60. It
was submitted that this transaction could not be viewed just in a national
context, as it involved a global market which was open to competition
worldwide. Competitors could be from any part of the world, with new entrants
entering the market regularly. New entrants might enter relatively easily, the
only significant barrier to entry being capital availability.
61. Overall
therefore, it was argued by the parties that the factors outlined by the
Competition Authority in Woodchester/UDT
[6]
and reiterated in Scully Tyrrell/Edberg
[7]
in relation to the findings that a concentration did not offend against
Section
4(1) applied in this case.
62. The
notifying parties also submitted that a Certificate would be more appropriate
than a licence for this transaction because licences must be granted for a
specific period of time under
Section 4(2) of the 1991 Act. The parties argued
that licences were normally unsatisfactory in the approval of concentrations as
they would either be for too short a period to be useful, or for too long a
period to be realistic. Therefore, a Certificate should issue where possible,
because of its more satisfactory nature. The parties submitted certain
arguments in support of a licence but these are not dealt with here.
Assessment
63.
Section
4(1) of the
Competition Act states that all agreements between undertakings,
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
in trade in any goods or services in the State or in any part of the State are
prohibited and void'.
(b) The
Undertakings and the Agreement
64.
Section
3(1) of the
Competition Act defines an undertaking as 'a person being an
individual, a body corporate or an unincorporated body of persons engaged for
gain in the production, supply or distribution of goods or the provision of a
service.'
65. GPA
and GE Capital are corporate bodies engaged for gain in the provision of
services and are therefore undertakings within the meaning of
the Act. The
arrangements also include agreements to which subsidiaries of GE Capital and
GPA, together with certain financial institutions are party. Each of these is
also an undertaking. Each of the agreements listed above, which form part of
the notified arrangements, constitutes an agreement between undertakings.
(c) Applicability
of Section 4(1)
(i) The
Omnibus Agreement (CA/44/93).
66. The
omnibus agreement is the framework for the overall arrangement whereby GE
Capital will acquire effective control over the assets of GPA. In many respect
it is tantamount to a merger although GE Capital will not formally acquire
control over the business of GPA immediately. The agreement is between GE
Capital, GPA and GECAS. GECAS is a wholly owned subsidiary of GE Capital
established for the purpose of managing GPA's aircraft leasing operations. It
is engaged for gain in providing such services and is therefore an undertaking.
The parties have claimed that the arrangements should be regarded as a merger
or concentration and as such should be considered to be outside the scope of
section 4(1). The Authority set out its views on this issue at length in
Woodchester and has confirmed its opinion in a number of subsequent decisions.
It sees little need to restate its opinion at length. In its view the position
was well summarised by Power following the coming into force of
the Act.
'Sections
4 and 5 of the
Competition Act are based on Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty. It has been held by the European Court of Justice that Articles 85 and
86 can apply to certain mergers and acquisitions. In the case of Article 85,
the authority for this is Cases 142 & 156/84 BAT (The Philip Morris Case)
[1987] ECR 4487. The Irish Competition Authority has said that it will follow
EC law and practice in so far as possible; by implication
Sections 4 and 5 of
the
Competition Act can apply to certain M&As'
[8].
67. In
the Authority's opinion mergers
per
se
do not offend against
section 4(1). They are not, however, excluded from the
application of
the Act, rather the issue to be decided in each case is whether
there is an agreement which has as its object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition in the State or any part of the State.
68. While
the present arrangements will undoubtedly mean that GPA and GE Capital will no
longer compete in the market for commercial jet aircraft, the Authority has
indicated in previous decisions that it does not consider a reduction in the
number of competitors is tantamount to a reduction in competition. In the
absence of the arrangements GPA might be unable to continue in the aircraft
leasing business in which case it would cease to operate as a competitor to GE
Capital.
69. The
notified arrangements will mean that GPA and GE Capital will not compete with
each other in providing commercial jet aircraft to customers in Ireland. Prior
to this GE Capital had not supplied such aircraft to any customers in Ireland,
while GPA had only provided 5 aircraft to Irish customers. Consequently, the
arrangement has no immediate effect on market shares. Nevertheless GE Capital
was a potential competitor to GPA in the Irish market for aircraft. The
Authority indicated in its first decision that it regarded competition as
including potential as well as actual competition
[9].
The Authority recognises, however, that there are a large number of suppliers
from whom Irish based airlines can obtain jet aircraft whether by buying them
outright or leasing them. These include airline manufacturers, leasing
companies and other airlines which may have purchased advanced rights over
aircraft yet to be completed. In addition aircraft may be purchased
second-hand from existing owners. The Authority believes that to some degree
second-hand aircraft may be considered to be substitutes for new aircraft.
Given the existence of such a large number of suppliers, the Authority is
satisfied that the arrangements are unlikely to have the effect of preventing,
restricting or distorting competition in the market for jet aircraft within the
State. Nor does the Authority believe that the object of the agreement was
anti-competitive.
70.
Section
8.03 of the agreement prevents GPA from seeking alternative offers prior to
closing. The Authority has previously considered such restrictions in GE
Corporation
[10]
and decided that they did not offend against
section 4(1).
71.
Section
9.02 provides for the survival of many of the warranties and undertakings
entered into by GPA for up to 3 years after the management agreement ceases to
operate. The parties have indicated that this merely involves a time limit
within which GE Capital must exercise its legal rights if it becomes aware that
any of the GPA representations and warranties is inaccurate. GPA may well be
largely owned by GE Capital before the management agreement expires. This
provision does not offend against
section 4(1).
The
Subscription Option Agreement - CA/46/93.
72. The
subscription option agreement gives GE Capital an option to acquire the
majority of the shares in GPA. The option must be exercised before 31 March,
1998 If the option is exercised then GE Capital will effectively acquire GPA.
The combined effect of the agreements, however, is that GPA's ability to act as
an independent competitor in the commercial jet aircraft market will be
eliminated from the completion date. As stated in paragraph 69 above, in the
Authority's opinion such arrangements are unlikely to prevent, restrict or
distort competition in the relevant markets. Consequently for the same reasons
the formal acquisition of control of GPA through exercise of the option
agreement is considered unlikely to adversely effect competition. Such a
conclusion is based on the Authority's view of present conditions and their
likely evolution over time. Nevertheless it is possible, albeit unlikely, that
circumstances may change before the exercise of the option, to a degree that
the complete acquisition of GPA may pose some problems from a competition
perspective. The Authority's view that the formal acquisition of GPA will not
have an adverse effect on competition is based on its views as to the likely
future state of the market at the time of such acquisition. If in fact market
circumstances proved to be different at that time, the arrangement would, in
the Authority's opinion, need to be re-examined under
section 8(6) of
the Act.
This would also apply, for example, to any non-compete clauses in the eventual
share purchase agreement.
73.
Section
7.10 requires GPA to provide information to GE Capital concerning its business
in the event of the latter giving notice of its intention to exercise its
option to acquire GPA's contracts. The information concerned extends to access
to GPA's contracts. In the Authority's opinion the exchange of commercially
sensitive information by competitors is anti-competitive and any arrangement to
do so would offend against
section 4(1). In the present instance GPA and GE
Capital will not in effect be competitors during the period in which the option
may be exercised by GE Capital. Consequently the Authority does not consider
that this provision constitutes an arrangement between competitors to exchange
information and thus it is not regarded as offending against
section 4(1).
74.
Section
8 contains a number of restrictions on what GPA and its subsidiaries can do.
Effectively these prevent GPA from taking action which would considerably alter
the worth of the business. GE Capital has obtained an option to acquire the
business. It therefore has certain proprietary rights. The Authority has
previously considered similar restrictions in shareholding agreements and
concluded that they do not offend against
section 4(1)
[11].
In the Authority's opinion the subscription option agreement does not offend
against
section 4(1).
The
Management Agreement - CA/47/93.
75. The
parties to this agreement are GPA and GE Capital Aviation Management Limited
(GECAS). This is the agreement which removes GPA as a competitive presence
from the commercial jet aircraft market by giving GECAS authority to make all
commercial decisions while stopping short of acquiring the business of GPA.
The issue of the arrangements whereby GPA and GE Capital cease to compete with
one another in the relevant market has already been considered in paragraph 69
above and found not to offend against
section 4(1). There are areas where GPA
retains powers which potentially it could exercise as an independent
undertaking in the market, e.g.
section 2.02, but apart from the overwhelming
reasons why it would not want to do so, the various powers do not add up to
enough to allow it to act usefully on its own behalf. The key provision in
this regard is 6.08 (b) which prevents GPA buying or acquiring any interest in
aircraft on its own account while the Agreement is in force. All
after-acquired aircraft automatically become subject to the Management
Agreement. As the arrangement for GECAS to manage GPA's aircraft assets does
not offend against
section 4(1), neither does this provision. While it is
possible that GPA might manage certain aircraft assets the Authority does not
believe that GPA and GE Capital could be considered competitors in such
circumstances. This also applies to
section 7.07.
76.
Section
7.04 requires GECAS to obtain the approval of GPA for certain actions. This
provision is essentially designed to protect GPA's proprietary rights in the
business. These provisions are, in the Authority's opinion, similar in nature
to those contained in
section 8 of the Subscription Option agreement, and do
not offend against
section 4(1) of
the Act.
77. GECAS
will provide GPA with research on the market, customers and financing (Section
7.1). This commercially sensitive information will not be provided, once a
Notice of Termination has been served. (The relevance of this operating on
Notice rather than on Termination is that in some circumstances, 24 months
notice of termination has to be given). Again, in the Authority's opinion,
this does not have the object or effect of preventing, restricting, or
distorting competition and do not offend against
Section 4(1).
The
Air Tara Option Agreement - CA/48/93
78. Air
Tara is a wholly owned subsidiary of GPA. It holds the registration of a
number of GPA's aircraft and also provides maintenance and certain other
back-up services to GPA. The agreement provides GE Capital with an option to
acquire the entire issued share capital of Air Tara. As Air Tara provides
certain services to GPA the relevant market is that for those services. In the
Authority's opinion the acquisition of Air Tara by GE Capital will not prevent,
restrict or distort competition in the market for such services.
79.
Section
8.09 requires Air Tara to provide certain information to GE Capital in the
event of it serving notice of its intention to exercise its option to acquire
the shares. It is similar to
section 7.10 of the Subscription Option Agreement
and in the Authority's opinion does not prevent, restrict or distort
competition for the reasons stated in paragraph 73.
80.
Section
9 contains a number of restrictions on Air Tara similar to those imposed on GPA
under
section 8 of the Subscription Option Agreement. These do not offend
against
section 4(1).
The
Asset Purchase Agreement - CA/49/93.
81. This
is an agreement whereby GE Capital agrees to purchase certain assets of GPA.
These include various computer software packages as well as items such as
office equipment and motor vehicles. In the Authority's opinion this agreement
does not contain any provisions which offend against
section 4(1).
The
Licence Agreement - CA/51/93
82. This
agreement provides for GECAS to licence the MIS software to GPA following the
expiry of the management agreement. The software to be licensed at that stage
will incorporate any modifications or upgrades made by GECAS in the intervening
period. At the present time it appears unlikely that GPA will remain as an
independent competitor to GECAS upon termination of the management agreement.
In that event the agreement involves no restriction on competition. If GPA and
GE Capital were competing undertakings, then the licensing by GECAS to GPA of
such software to GPA would be a different matter. The software in that
instance would provide GPA with detailed information on the commercial conduct
of a competitor while GE Capital would have some indication of GPA's likely
commercial conduct. Given its view that GPA is unlikely to remain as an
independent competitor, the Authority believes that the agreement does not
offend against
section 4(1). Such a view would have to be reconsidered in
accordance with
section 8(6) of
the Act if such expectations proved to be
incorrect.
The
Shareholders Agreement - CA/52/93.
83. The
parties are GE Capital on the one side, and all holders of GPA's new issue of
Convertible Notes on the other. These include a number of financial
institutions. These are undertakings within the meaning of
the Act so that the
agreement constitutes an agreement between undertakings.
84.
Section
3.02 obliges shareholders not to sell their shares to "Competitors" of GE
Capital. "Competitor" is defined as any person with a business of greater than
$200m. annually in aircraft manufacturing, or leasing in competition with GPA.
Certain named companies are included; and certain named companies are
specifically excluded from the definition of competing
lessor,
on the basis that they were not in fact in competition. In fact in a letter
dated 7 September, the parties indicated that some of the excluded firms were
competitors who were already involved in aircraft financing. The notified
arrangements do not include any proposal for the sale of GPA shares to
competitors other than GE Capital. They merely provide that other GPA
shareholders are not prevented from selling their shares to certain such
undertakings. Such a provision does not of itself offend against
section 4(1).
The question of whether any acquisition of shares in GPA by a competitor other
than GE Capital offends against
section 4(1) is not considered in the present
decision since it is not part of the notified arrangements.
85. Under
Section 4.02., once GE Capital exercises its Option to buy shares in GPA, it is
not entirely free in how it disposes of them. If it sells more than 50% of the
voting rights in GPA to a non-GE company, or to a number of transferees such
that GPA ceases to be controlled by GE, the other shareholders can require GE
to have them included in the transfer, or require GE to buy their shares
itself. There is a corresponding limitation on the other shareholders, which
is that in the above situation, GE can choose to have the other shareholders
sell at a fixed price to the new transferee or to GE.
86. The
shareholders' participation in the arrangements is based on GE Capital's
involvement. The Authority found in Cambridge/Imari that, in certain
circumstances, restrictions on shareholders disposing of shares in a business
without the consent of other shareholders did not offend against
section 4(1).
In its opinion this also applies to the present case.
87.
Section
10.01 provides that if GE Capital owns less than 50% but more than 5% of the
GPA shares after the exercise of their Option, they will nonetheless be able to
prevent certain actions, most importantly the issue of new shares, going into
voluntary winding up, and the sale of the assets/business of GPA because the
votes of a majority of the shares held by GE and their Transferees will be
required for those actions. This is a limitation on some of the few powers the
other shareholders have in relation to the business of GPA, but only in the
sense that they are prevented from doing things they could only do if they all
acted in concert. Similar restrictions were found not to offend against
section 4(1) in Cambridge/Imari.
The
Sublease - CA/53/93.
88. The
Sublease provides for GECAS to lease GPA's premises at Shannon. It contains no
restrictive provisions and does not offend against
section 4(1).
The
Interested Party Agreement - CA/54/93
89. The
interested party agreement is between GECAS and various financial institutions
which have lent money to GPA. It is therefore an agreement between
undertakings. This provides that interested parties consent to each of the
other agreements. Since these do not offend against
section 4(1), this
agreement does not offend against
section 4(1).
The
GPA Managed Asset Consents and Boeing Consents - CA/55/93.
90. This
is simply an agreement by each company for which GPA manages aircraft, that
some of GPA's services will now be provided by GECAS. Apparently GPA has
aircraft order commitments with Boeing. The Boeing Consent is Boeing's
agreement, in a similar form to the above, but without any reference to GECAS'
third party interests, that GECAS will be performing some aspects of GPA's
obligations. In the Authority's opinion the agreements do not offend against
section 4(1).
The
Loan Stock Trust Deed, CA/57/93
91. This
is an agreement between GPA, the Original Charging Subsidiaries and Natwest
Aerospace Trust Company arising out of the issue of certain convertible stock
by GPA. It does not involve any restriction of competition and does not offend
against
Section 4(1).
The
Decision
92. GE
Capital, GPA and the other parties to the notified agreements are undertakings
within the meaning of the
Competition Act. The notified agreements listed
below between General Electric Capital Corporation, GPA Group plc., and certain
third parties constitute agreements between undertakings. In the Authority's
opinion on the basis of the facts in its possession the notified agreements do
not offend against
section 4(1) of the
Competition Act.
CA/44/93 The
Omnibus Agreement
CA/46/93 The
Subscription Option Agreement
CA/47/93 The
Management Agreement
CA/48/93 The
Air Tara Option Agreement
CA/49/93 The
Asset Purchase Agreement
CA/51/93 The
License Agreement
CA/52/93 The
Shareholders Agreement
CA/53/93 The
Sublease
CA/54/93 The
Interested Party Agreement
CA/55/93 The
GPA Managed Assets Consent and Boeing Consents
CA/57/93 The
Loan Stock Trust Deed.
Certificate
The
Competition Authority has issued the following certificate.
93.
The Competition Authority certifies that, in its opinion, on the basis of
the facts in its possession, the agreements listed below, between General
Electric Capital Corporation, GPA Group plc., and certain third parties,
notified under
section 7(1) on 30 August, 1993, do not offend against
section
4(1) of the
Competition Act.
CA/44/93 The
Omnibus Agreement
CA/46/93 The
Subscription Option Agreement
CA/47/93 The
Management Agreement
CA/48/93 The
Air Tara Option Agreement
CA/49/93 The
Asset Purchase Agreement
CA/51/93 The
License Agreement
CA/52/93 The
Shareholders Agreement
CA/53/93 The
Sublease
CA/54/93 The
Interested Party Agreement
CA/55/93 The
GPA Managed Assets Consent and Boeing Consets
CA/57/93 The
Loan Stock Trust Deed.
For
the Competition Authority
Patrick
Massey
Member
20
October 1993
[ ] 1 This
notification was subsequently withdrawn.
[ ]2 This
notification was subsequently withdrawn.
[ ]3 The
original notification referred to other security instruments but these are not
dealt with in this decision.
[ ]4 This
was dealt with in Competition Authority decision No. 28 General Electric
Capital Corporation, GPA Group plc., (CA/45/93), 9 September, 1993.
[ ]5 In
this regard, GPA's residual involvement further ensures that GE Capital's role
and actions are not misconstrued under the legal principles regarding "shadow
director" and "related company" concepts which can subject third parties to
liability.
[ ]6 Competition
Authority decision No. 6 - Woodchester Bank/UDT Bank, (CA/10/92), 4 August 1992.
[ ]7 Competition
Authority decision No. 12 - Scully Tyrell/Edberg, (CA/57/92), 28 February, 1993.
[ ]8 V.
Power (1991); ' The Mergers & Acquisitions Dimension' in Competition Law -
Regulation in Ireland; Competition Press, Dublin.
[ ]9 Competition
Authority decision No 1 - Nallen/O'Toole(Belmullet), (CA/8/91), 2 April, 1992
[ ]10 Competition
Authority decision No.10 -GE Corporation/General Semiconductor Industries Inc.,
(CA/51/92 and CA/52/92), 23 October, 1992.
[ ]11 Competition
Authority decision No. 24 - Cambridge-ACT/Imari, (CA/8/92E), 21 June, 1993.
© 1993 Irish Competition Authority
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