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ILBS/FNBS [1993] IECA 19 (9th June, 1993)
Notification
No. CA/17/93 - Irish Life Building Society/First National Building Society.
Decision
No. 19
Introduction
1. Arrangements
for the transfer of engagements of Irish Life Building Society (ILBS) to First
National Building Society (FNBS) in accordance with Part X of the Building
Societies Acts, 1989, were notified to the Competition Authority on 12 May,
1993. The notification requested a certificate, or in the event of a refusal
by the Authority to grant a certificate, a licence.
The
Facts
(a)
The Subject of the Notification
2. The
notification relates to an Instrument of Transfer of Engagements in accordance
with
section 96 of the
Building Societies Act, 1989, dated 19 March 1993,
whereby ILBS proposes to transfer its engagements and FNBS undertakes to fulfil
its engagements. The agreement does not include any non-compete clauses.
(b)
The Parties
(c)
Legislation
4.
Section
95 of the
Building Societies Act allows two or more building societies to
amalgamate by forming a building society as their successor.
Section 96 allows
a society to transfer its engagements to any extent to another society which
undertakes to fulfil those engagements in accordance with that section.
Section 97(7) provides that where all its engagements have been transferred a
society shall be dissolved. The transfer of engagements must be confirmed by
the Central Bank.
(d)
The Product and the Market.
5. Building
societies, with one exception, are constituted as mutual institutions
[1].
They traditionally specialised in raising funds from members and depositors
for lending to members largely for house purchase by way of a mortgage loan.
Prior to the enactment of the
Building Societies Act, 1989 societies were not
permitted to engage in unsecured lending and were thus confined to mortgage
lending. The latter Act provides that societies may, subject to the approval
of the Central Bank, engage in a wider range of lending activities. The 1980s
saw a decline in the number of societies as a result of a series of
amalgamations. Whereas there were 16 societies in 1981, only 8 remained by
early 1993. The present arrangements will see a further reduction in the
number of societies. Details of the assets of existing building societies are
given in Table 1.
Table
1: Building Society Group Assets as at 31 December 1992.
£M %
of total.
Irish
Permanent
2,236
33.6
First
National
1,440
21.3
EBS 1,225
18.4
ICS
957
14.4
Irish
Nationwide
589
8.8
Irish
Life
135
2.0
Norwich
Irish (a)
73
1.1
Midland
& Western (a)
30
0.5
Total
6,685
100.0
(a)
Based on figures for the year ended 31 December 1991.
Source:
Annual Reports.
6. The
four largest societies between them account for almost 88% of total building
society assets. FNBS is the second largest society in terms of assets
accounting for 21% of total society assets. ILBS accounts for only 2% of total
society assets.
7. Societies
compete with other financial institutions for deposits. Traditionally
societies concentrated on personal sector deposits although in recent years
they have begun to compete for wholesale deposits. Up to the mid 1980s
societies enjoyed certain fiscal privileges which gave them an advantage in
attracting personal deposits. These have now been removed. On the lending
side the bulk of societies' business is still accounted for by mortgage lending
although, since the passage of the
Building Societies Act, a number of
societies have begun to offer unsecured loans to the personal sector. Some
societies have also begun to provide a limited range of money transmission
services. The ending of the societies' fiscal privileges in respect of
deposits and other regulatory changes undertaken during the 1980s have resulted
in other financial institutions such as the associated banks becoming much more
actively involved in the mortgage market. Thus the building societies do not
provide products or services which are unique to them but rather they offer
financial services in competition with other financial institutions. The
relevant market is that for deposits and lending particularly mortgage lending.
Table
2: Money and Other Liquid Assets
(%
distribution)
Year Currency Associated Non-
Building
State
Total
Banks Associated
Societies
1990
6.4
36.1
19.1
19.2
19.2
100.0
1991
6.5
35.6
16.7
20.9
20.3
100.0
1992
5.9
32.4
19.7
22.0
20.0
100.0
Notes:
State includes Government savings instruments as well as deposits with the
POSB, TSBs, ACC and ICC.
Source;
Central Bank Annual Reports 1991 and 1992.
8. Details
of the public's holdings of money and other liquid assets is given in Table 2.
In 1992 the building societies combined share of such holdings was 22%. The
societies' share is similar in size to that of the non-associated banks and the
State sector but is significantly less than that of the 4 associated banks.
Table
3: Non Government Credit
(%
distribution)
Year Associated
Non-Associated
Building
HP
Cos
Other Total
Banks Banks
Societies
1991
35.5
32.6
20.5
3.6
7.7
100.0
1992
41.6
24.8
22.8
3.2
7.6
100.0
Source;
Central Bank Annual Report 1992.
9. Building
societies accounted for almost 23% of non-government credit in 1992. This is
slightly less than the share of the non-associated banks. In contrast the
associated banks accounted for almost 42% of non-government credit.
Table
4: Mortgage Funds Advanced.
(%
distribution)
Year Associated
Building
Local
Housing
Other Total
Banks
Societies
Authorities Finance
Agency
1980
4.6
74.3
19.3
0.0
1.8 100.0
1985
8.3
64.3
11.9
15.0
0.6 100.0
1990
34.5
51.0
2.1
0.0
12.4 100.0
1991
28.9
54.4
2.0
0.0
14.7 100.0
1992
17.4
70.8
1.6
0.0
10.3 100.0
Source:
Department of the Environment: Annual Housing Statistics Bulletin.
10. The
table shows that building societies accounted for 71% of the value of mortgage
lending in 1992. Having lost market share significantly in the late 1980s the
societies have regained much of the lost ground in recent years. Although the
associated banks' market share has fallen sharply since 1990 they still account
for a far higher proportion of mortgage lending than was the case in the early
1980s.
Table
5: % Share of Mortgage Funds Advanced.
FNBS ILBS Combined
Share
1991 18.8
2.3
21.1
1992 18.9
1.2
20.1
Source:
Annual Reports.
11. FNBS
accounted for almost 19% of total mortgage lending in each of the past two years
[2].
In contrast ILBS accounted for just over 1% of total mortgage lending in 1992
down from 2% the previous year. The two societies combined accounted for over
20% of total mortgage advances in 1992 and over 28% of advances made by
building societies.
(e)
The Arrangements
12. The
agreement relates to the transfer of engagements of ILBS to FNBS. The
Instrument of Transfer of Engagements provides for the transfer of all the
engagements of the ILBS to the FNBS. The effect of the transfer is that the
business of ILBS will be absorbed in the business of FNBS. Its deposits will
become deposits of FNBS, its shareholders will become shareholders of FNBS and
its borrowers will become borrowers of FNBS. The transfer was approved at an
extraordinary general meeting of ILBS on 22 April 1993. The agreement was
notified to, and cleared by, the Minister for Enterprise and Employment under
the Mergers Acts. It was also notified to the Central Bank in accordance with
section 98 of the
Building Societies Act. The agreement does not include any
non-compete clauses.
(f)
Submissions of the Parties
13. The
parties have argued that the arrangement does not have the object or effect of
preventing, restricting or distorting competition. They argue that the
transfer of ILBS engagements to FNBS will add less than 2% to the latter's
market share. In addition they argue that as the building societies account
for only 17% of the assets of all credit institutions, the enlarged FNBS will
account for less than 4% of this total.
Assessment
(a) Section
4(1)
14.
Section
4(1) of the Competition Act states that 'all agreements between undertakings,
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
in trade in any goods or services in the State or in any part of the State are
prohibited and void.'
(b) The
Undertakings
15.
Section
3(1) of the Competition Act defines an undertaking as 'a person being an
individual, a body corporate or an unincorporated body of persons engaged for
gain in the production, supply or distribution of goods or the provision of a
service.' Both FNBS and ILBS are engaged for gain in the provisions of
services specifically mortgages and other loans.
(c)
Applicability of Section 4(1)
16. The
present arrangements therefore constitute an agreement between undertakings
whereby effectively the business of ILBS will be transferred to FNBS and ILBS
will cease to operate. The arrangements are in many respects the equivalent of
a merger or takeover of ILBS by FNBS and they were in fact notified to the
Minister under the Mergers Acts. The Authority has stated in previous
decisions that so long as such an arrangement did not result, or was not likely
to result in, a diminution of competition, then, in its opinion, it would not
offend against
section 4(1)
[3].
17. The
Authority clarified its views further in Scully/Tyrrell where it stated that:
´Among
the factors which the Authority believes needs to be considered in order to
decide whether a merger would result, or would be likely to result in a
diminution of competition is the actual level of competition in that market,
the degree of market concentration and how it is affected by the merger, the
ease with which new competitors may enter the market and the extent to which
imports may provide competition to domestic suppliers
[4].
18. The
Authority went on to state that:
´The
Authority believes that it would generally be accepted that a market where the
four
firm concentration ratio fell below 40 percent is effectively competitive.....It
follows
from this that, if the four firm concentration ratio following a merger is less
than
40 percent, the Authority would regard it as unlikely that the merger could
prevent,
restrict or distort competition and hence offend against
Section 4(1).'
19. As
pointed out the Authority does not believe that the type of financial services
provided by building societies constitute a separate market and that the
appropriate markets are those for deposits, particularly personal deposits, and
personal lending, particularly mortgage lending. These are now considered in
turn.
20. The
figures in Table 2 give some indication of shares of different types of
financial institution in the deposit market. A more detailed breakdown would
be required to establish the four firm concentration ratio. There is a strong
probability that the ratio exceeds 40 percent
[5].
Table 3 shows that the four associated banks accounted for over 40% of private
sector lending in 1992 while building societies had just over 20% of the
market. Table 4 indicated that over 70% of mortgage lending was accounted for
by the 8 building societies. The three smaller societies operating at that
time accounted for a relatively small proportion of this, (as noted ILBS
accounted for just over 1%), so that the share of the four largest societies
exceeded 40%.
21. Inadequate
date makes it difficult to estimate the four firm concentration ratio in any of
the markets with a high degree of accuracy
[6].
The Authority is satisfied nonetheless that there is evidence of a relatively
high degree of concentration in each of the relevant markets. In
Scully/Tyrrell the Authority stated that it did not believe that where market
concentration following a merger was found to be relatively high the merger
would necessarily restrict competition. It went on to state that;
´where
the degree of concentration in a market post merger is relatively high it will
conduct a more detailed examination of the agreement than would otherwise be
the case.
[7]'
22. There
are a large number of financial institutions competing in the market for
personal deposits within the State. These include the associated banks as well
as the building societies and the TSB. In addition the ACCBank and ICC also
compete to some degree in this market particularly in respect of larger
deposits in the latter case. The Post Savings Bank is a further competitor for
small savings. Various Government savings schemes such as savings certificates
also represent an alternative to deposits for personal sector savings. The
Authority believes that given the relatively small share of the personal
deposit market held by ILBS the arrangements will not result in any lessening
of competition in that market.
23. In
the case of personal lending other than residential mortgages the Authority
again believes that the arrangements will not lead to any decrease in the level
of competition. It is relevant in this context that until relatively recently
the building societies were legally excluded from non-mortgage lending and
consequently account for a very small proportion of such lending.
24. The
Authority notes that there has been a sharp increase in competition in the
mortgage lending market in recent years with the associated banks and certain
other institutions now far more important in this market than was the case a
decade ago. While the building societies still have a substantial share of
this market, this appears to be a result of the competitive process, and not
due to any fiscal or regulatory distortions which appear to have restricted the
ability of other institutions to compete in this market in the past. As a
result of increased competition mortgages are apparently more readily available
than in the past. There has also been a considerable expansion in the range of
mortgage products offered, providing consumers with greater choice and with the
option of choosing a mortgage more suited to their particular needs. In such
circumstances the Authority does not believe that the potential increase in
FNBS market share and in the degree of concentration in the mortgage lending
market as a result of this arrangement is likely to lead to any lessening of
competition in this market.
The
Decision
25. In
the Authority's opinion, First National Building Society and Irish Life
Building Society are undertakings within the meaning of
Section 3(1) of the
Competition Act, and the notified arrangements for the transfer of engagements
of ILBS to FNBS constitute an agreement between undertakings. In the
Authority's opinion the arrangements will not have the effect of preventing,
restricting or distorting competition within the State. It is also satisfied
that the object of the agreement was not to prevent, restrict or distort
competition within the State. The agreement for the transfer of engagements of
ILBS to FNBS does not, in the Authority's opinion, offend against
Section 4(1)
of the
Competition Act, 1991.
The
Certificate
26.
The Competition Authority has issued the following certificate:
The
Competition Authority certifies that in its opinion, on the basis of the facts
in its possession, the agreement for the transfer of engagements of Irish Life
Building Society to First National Building Society, (notification no.
CA/17/93), notified on 12 May 1993 under
Section 7, does not offend against
Section 4(1) of the
Competition Act, 1991.
For
the Competition Authority
Patrick
Massey
Member
9
June 1993.
Notes:-
1. Changes
in legislation have enabled building societies to change from being mutual
institutions to quoted companies and there are indications that a number of
societies intend to change their status.
3. Competition
Authority decision no. 6 Woodchester Bank Ltd.,/UDT (CA/10/92), 4 August 1992.
4. Competition
Authority decision no. 12, Scully/Tyrrell & Company and Edberg Limited,
(CA/57/92), 29 January 1993.
5. Some
of the non-associated banks are wholly owned subsidiaries of the four
associated banks so that combining these subsidiaries' share of deposits with
that of their four parent companies would almost certainly give this group more
than forty percent of the market.
6. For
this reason it was not possible to estimate the HHI as was done in Scully/Tyrell.
7. para.
55.
© 1993 Irish Competition Authority
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