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Dynochem Ireland Limited/Irish Fertiliser Industries Limited (Urea Formaldehyde Concentrate Agreement). [1999] IECA 554 (27th May, 1999)
COMPETITION
AUTHORITY
Competition
Authority Decision of 27 May 1999 relating to a proceeding under Section 4 of
the Competition Act, 1991
Notification
No. CA/35/96 - Dynochem Ireland Limited/Irish Fertiliser Industries Limited
(Urea Formaldehyde Concentrate Agreement).
Decision
No. 554
Price £0.60
£1.00
incl. postage
Notification
No. CA/35/96 - Dynochem Ireland Limited/Irish Fertiliser Industries Limited
(Urea Formaldehyde Concentrate Agreement).
Decision
No. 554
Introduction
1. Notification
was made on 23 December 1996 with a request for a certificate under
Section
4(4) of the
Competition Act, 1991 or, in the event of a refusal by the
Authority to issue a certificate, a licence under
Section 4(2) in respect of
an agreement between Dynochem Ireland Limited and Irish Fertiliser Industries
Limited.
The
Facts
(a)
Subject of the Notification
2. The
notification concerns a long-term agreement dated 20th March 1996 between
Dynochem Ireland Limited (“Dynochem”) and Irish Fertiliser
Industries Limited (“IFI”) whereby Dynochem supplies IFI with urea
formaldehyde concentrate (UFC). This agreement is linked to another (CA/34/96)
whereby IFI supplies Dynochem with urea, an ingredient in the manufacture of
UFC, and with an ancillary Services Agreement. The urea supply agreement and
the Services Agreement are described in Decision No. 553.
(b)
The Parties Involved
3. Dynochem
is a subsidiary of Dyno Industrier ASA (“Dyno”), an international
Norwegian-owned corporation with three core businesses: explosives, chemicals
and plastics. Dyno is one of Norway’s largest industrial companies, with
more than 100 wholly or partly-owned companies in 30 countries worldwide. Dyno
is one of the world’s major producers of resins for the wood processing
industry. In 1997 Dynochem reported a loss of IR£2,279,235 on a turnover
of IR£7,824,268.
4. IFI
manufactures and sells nitrogen-based fertilisers and associated chemical
products. It is 51% owned by Nitrigin Eireann Teoranta, a state-owned company
which formerly carried on the fertiliser business now run by IFI but whose only
function now is the purchase of natural gas from Bord Gais Eireann, another
state-owned company, and its sale to IFI. The other 49% of IFI is owned by
Imperial Chemicals Inc. plc, a UK-based multinational company with wide-ranging
activities in the chemicals industry. In 1998 IFI reported a loss of
IR£10.7m on a turnover of IR£157.8m.
(c)
The Product and the Market
5. The
product involved is urea formaldehyde concentrate (UFC). It was described in
the initial notification by the parties as UFC-80, i.e. an 80% solution. The
product specification has since been changed to UFC-58, a 58% solution. The
parties state that the difference between the two is mainly the water content.
UFC is an intermediate product in the production of resin, which is used in the
manufacture of panelboard products, such as fibreboard, particleboard, plywood,
medium density fibreboard (MDF), etc. Prior to the setting up of the Dynochem
plant there were no manufacturers of the product in the State; it was entirely
imported. The parties state that there are a number of manufacturers of UFC in
the rest of the EU, mainly based in the UK, Spain and Belgium. They state that
(at the time of notification of the agreement, i.e. before Dynochem started to
produce UFC) there were two buyers of UFC in the state, namely the parties to
this agreement, who between them purchased approximately 7,000 tons per annum.
Dynochem’s estimate of its total production of all urea-based products in
1999 is 75,000 tonnes, of which 3,000 tonnes will be purchased by IFI. This
represents 4% of Dynochem’s production of urea-based products. The
parties estimate that the total turnover in the State for this product is
approximately £1.5 million to £2 million, and that the EU-wide
turnover is £25 million to £35 million. Urea formaldehyde concentrate
is a particular chemical formulation for which there are no direct substitutes.
The Authority therefore considers that the product market is that for urea
formaldehyde concentrate. Before the implementation of the agreement, urea
formaldehyde concentrate was not produced in the State but was imported. The
Authority therefore considers that the geographic market is wider than the State.
(d)
The Agreement
6. The
notification relates to an industrial supply agreement for the supply of the
product by Dynochem to IFI. The agreement forms part of an arrangement whereby
IFI, which owns and operates a manufacturing plant at Marino Point in Cork,
leases part of its property to Dynochem so that Dynochem can build and operate
plants to manufacture formaldehyde and formaldehyde derivatives. Total
investment by Dynochem is approximately IR£13 million. Technical grade
urea is a necessary input for such manufacture and UFC is an intermediate
product. IFI requires supplies of urea formaldehyde concentrate for the
operation of its plant.
7. The
term of the agreement is fifteen years. Unless otherwise terminated, the
agreement may, at IFI’s discretion, be continued on the same terms and
conditions for a further fifteen years. The agreement may be terminated
(i)
if the lease agreement terminates
(ii)
if IFI ceases permanently to manufacture urea (on 12 months’ notice to IFI)
(iii)
if Dynochem ceases permanently to manufacture UFC (on 12 months’ notice
to IFI)
(iv)
in the event of default, bankruptcy, liquidation, receivership, winding-up etc.
(v)
if either party ceases to be a subsidiary of its parent and the new owner or
controller is not acceptable to the other party.
Under
Clause 12.3, the parties are to meet every three years to review the agreement,
but there is no obligation on either party to re-negotiate, change or modify it.
8. Under
Clause 2.2 of the agreement, IFI must buy not less than 80% of its requirements
of the product from Dynochem. The remainder of its purchases may be made from
other parties. Other clauses of the agreement set out methods for planning and
estimating IFI’s requirements, and for placing purchase orders. If
IFI’s requirements exceed the output capacity or available stocks of the
product of Dynochem, IFI may purchase elsewhere. IFI may change the
specification of the product at six months’ notice, but Dynochem may
accept or decline the new specification. The agreement sets out terms for
delivery, weighing of the product, pricing and payment, storage facilities,
force majeure, etc.
9. Clause
12.6 of the agreement deals with confidentiality. The contents of the agreement
itself, and of any supplementary agreement, may not be disclosed without the
consent of the other party. All information exchanged between the parties
pursuant to the terms and operation of the agreement are also to be kept
confidential. The confidentiality obligations apply for as long as the
agreement remains in force and for five years thereafter.
(e)
Submissions of the Parties
Arguments
in support of issuing a certificate
10. The
parties submitted that the entire arrangement was part of the IDA’s
efforts to develop the panelboard industry in Ireland. The main raw materials
for this industry were timber and resins. Prior to the agreement all resins
were imported from abroad, incurring significant transport costs. Dynochem
planned to construct a facility to manufacture urea resin and supply the Irish
panelboard industry, at a cost of £13m approximately. This facility would
employ 40 people directly. The site had been leased for 51 years from IFI and
was adjacent to IFI’s own manufacturing facility. Producing all the raw
material for the panelboard industry in Ireland would reduce costs and make
Irish industry more competitive.
11. The
parties stated that UFC was an intermediate product in the manufacture of urea,
which was the main purpose of the arrangement between the parties. It was more
efficient for IFI to purchase UFC from Dynochem than to continue its current
arrangement of buying from suppliers in continental Europe. It was to the
advantage of both parties that the arrangements should last for a long period
of time. Dynochem needed to be assured of a regular and reliable supply of
urea, which was its main raw material in order to justify the size of the
investment. Similarly, it was also in IFI’s interest to have a regular
customer for its urea, and a regular supplier of UFC-80. As the plants were
located close together, transport costs would be minimised.
12. The
parties pointed out that the Authority had previously issued a certificate for
a similar type of agreement in Decision No. 390, “ESB Industrial Holdings
Limited/Irish Cement Limited - Pulverised Fuel Ash.” That agreement
operated for an initial period of 10 years, and indefinitely thereafter unless
terminated. The parties quoted the Authority’s opinion that that
agreement “... was a commercial agreement between two major industrial
companies involving a low-value bulk commodity where transport economies
appl[ied] because of the relative nearness of the companies to one
another.”
13. The
parties submitted that there was no prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition as a result of this agreement, that it was in fact pro-competitive
in nature, and that the Authority should issue a certificate.
Arguments
in support of granting a licence
14. The
parties stated that the ultimate aim of the arrangements was to make the Irish
panelboard industry more competitive. The level of investment required to set
up the manufacturing facility justified the length of the agreement. The
agreement contributed to improving the distribution of both the urea fertiliser
and technical grade urea. Transport costs for urea would be minimised because
the plants were located close together, and the distribution of IFI’s end
product would be improved, since IFI would no longer have to import the product
from abroad. The agreement therefore contributed to promoting economic progress
by creating efficiencies in both the UFC supply market and the market for the
sale of IFI’s end product. These efficiencies would be passed on to the
customers of IFI, and ultimately to consumers. Thus the agreement allowed
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.
15. The
parties submitted that the agreement did not impose on the undertakings
concerned terms which were not indispensable to the attainment of the
objectives set out in
the Act. It was in IFI’s interest to have secure
regular supplies of the product, and it would increase its efficiency. The
European Commission had held that long-term industrial supply agreements could
be justified where there was significant investment. The establishment by
Dynochem of the manufacturing plant at Marino Point would entail in investment
of approximately IR£13 million. Therefore the applicants argued that the
industrial supply agreement was justifiable. Further, the agreement did not
afford undertakings the possibility or eliminating competition in respect of a
substantial part of the products or services in question. Prior to the
establishment of Dynochem’s facility, there had been no producers of
resin in Ireland. IFI would be free to source 20% of its requirements of the
product from other suppliers. However, because of the inter-dependence of the
two plants, and their close proximity (given the significance of transport
costs in these markets), it made commercial sense to source most of the raw
materials from Dynochem.
The
Assessment
(a)
Section 4(1)
16.
Section
4(1) of the
Competition Act, 1991 prohibits and renders void all agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted
practices which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition in trade in any goods or services in the State or in
any part of the State.
(b)
The Undertakings
17.
Section
3(1) of the
Competition Act defines an undertaking as “a person being an
individual, a body corporate or an unincorporated body of persons engaged for
gain in the production, supply or distribution of goods or the provision of a
service.”
18. IFI
is engaged for gain in the production of nitrogen-based fertilisers in the
State and is an undertaking. Dynochem is engaged for gain in the production of
formaldehyde and formaldehyde derivatives and is also an undertaking. The
agreement is an agreement between undertakings and has effect within the State.
(c)
Applicability of Section 4(1)
19. Previous
Authority and European Commission decisions on industrial supply agreements are
summarised in the Authority’s decision on the Dynochem/IFI Urea Supply
Agreement (CA/34/96 - Decision No. 553). The aspects of the agreement which
could give rise to competition concerns are the proportion of the market which
is closed off to other competitors by the agreement, and its duration. The
amount of UFC covered by the exclusive purchase agreement will represent 4% of
annual production in the State. There are no other producers in the State but
there are a number of other producers in the EU, including Dynochem’s own
sister company in the UK. IFI may continue to purchase up to 20% of its
supplies from other producers of UFC. Parties other than IFI are not prevented
from obtaining supplies of UFC from Dynochem or from other sources. Thus
neither other producers nor other consumers of UFC are disadvantaged. The
Authority therefore considers that the exclusive purchase aspects of the
agreement do not have the object or effect of preventing, restricting or
distorting competition, and do not therefore contravene
Section 4(1) of the
Competition Act, 1991.
20. The
Authority considers that the duration of the supply contract must be looked at
in the context of the overall relationship between the parties. Dynochem has
entered into a 51-year lease agreement with IFI. It has entered into a 35-year
services agreement. It has made a substantial capital investment in plant and
facilities for the production of formaldehyde and formaldehyde derivatives, and
has entered into a long-term supply agreement for the purchase of urea from
IFI. In this context, the Authority believes that IFI is justified in seeking
long-term assurances regarding supply and purchase of the product, and that the
term of the agreement is a reflection of this. Furthermore, the agreement has
been freely entered into by both parties in a market where there is a number of
other suppliers and customers.
(d)
The Decision
21. In
the Authority’s opinion, Dynochem Ireland Limited and Irish Fertiliser
Industries Limited are undertakings within the meaning of
Section 3(1) of the
Competition Act, 1991, and the notified agreement is an agreement between
undertakings. In the Authority’s opinion, the notified agreement does not
have the object or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition
and therefore does not contravene
Section 4(1) of the
Competition Act, 1991, as
amended.
The
Certificate
The
Competition Authority certifies that, in its opinion, on the basis of the facts
in its possession, the Supply Agreement between Dynochem Ireland Limited and
Irish Fertiliser Industries Limited notified to it on 23 December 1996
(notification no. CA/35/96) does not contravene
Section 4(1) of the
Competition
Act, 1991, as amended.
For
the Competition Authority
Isolde
Goggin
Member
27
May 1999
© 1999 Irish Competition Authority
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URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IECompA/1999/554.html