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Westport Property Construction Company Ltd., Re [1996] IEHC 14 (13th September, 1996)
THE
HIGH COURT
1996
211 COS
WESTPORT
PROPERTY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED
(IN RECEIVERSHIP)
AND
IN
THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES AMENDMENT ACT 1990
PETITION
TO APPOINT AN EXAMINER
Judgment
of Mr. Justice Budd delivered on the 13th day of September 1996.
I
regret my inability to have given an ex-tempore judgment on Friday the
6th
September, 1996. I have been abroad on legal matters in Belgium and Luxembourg
since then. I was apprehensive that evening that the effect of several very
long days vacation sittings and of a long and late hearing until 8 p.m. on that
Friday evening might cause me to reach some overhasty conclusions in making
definite decisions on the very eloquent and persuasive submissions which were
made by Counsel for all the parties in the matter. I felt there was good
reason to defer my decision and to reflect on the submissions that had been
made. Furthermore, the Petitioners had engaged previously a firm of
Accountants, who had been working on their accounts and on producing a business
plan and indeed were still preparing up-to-date accounts of the company on such
books and information as had been furnished by the directors of the company and
in particular by Michael Conway. It is urged on behalf of the Petitioners that
the company has a viable prospect and that another financial institution is
waiting in the wings to step into the role of main lender of the sums required
to pay off the I.C.C. and also as a lender of funds to complete the proposed
second phase of the development in Westport. Counsel for the I.C.C. and for
the receiver have both made strong submissions that the accounts furnished so
far by the Petitioners are inconsistent and unreliable and that the prospect of
a loan from Anglo Irish Bank is nothing more that a mirage. While speedy
finality is very desirable on such an application for the appointment of an
Examiner, perhaps the deferral of the decision may have allowed for the
completion of up-to-date accounts as an ingredient in satisfying a potential
investor. I am very conscious that the I.C.C. has already been paid
£598,000 on foot of its loan and with the prospect of over £40,000
more in the near future, on the sale of the last flat from Phase 1, the
outstanding debt on the loan of £500,000 plus interest seems likely to be
about £120,000.
This
petition is presented pursuant to
Section 2 of the
Companies (Amendment) Act,
1990 (hereinafter called "the Act") for the appointment of an Examiner, John
McStay to Westport Property and Construction Limited, ("the Company"). The
first Defendant is the I.C.C. which lent £500,000 to the Company on the
security of a debenture dated the 17th August, 1992 supported by guarantees
given by the then two directors of the Company, Michael Conway and Vincent
Coakley. Michael Conway holds 60% of the shares in the Company and Vincent
Coakley holds the other 40%. Differences arose between them and Mr. Coakley
has resigned as a director. He does not support the petition to appoint an
Examiner. Mary Conway, wife of Michael Conway has taken his place as a
director. The Company has no employees. While services put in for Phase 1 may
also be utilised in
Phase
2, the construction of the second block of apartments has not yet begun.
1. The
Company has been in financial difficulty. Mr. Conway has put substantial sums
into the Company. The I.C.C. bank has been paid £598,000 but, despite
this, lost patience with the Petitioners and on Monday the 19th August, 1996
Michael McEvoy was appointed as a Receiver over the assets and undertakings of
the Company. On Wednesday, the 21st August, 1996, the petition was presented
on the ex-parte application of the Petitioners. Mr. Justice Barr deferred the
case and on the 28th August, 1996 the President of the High Court, Mr. Justice
Costello, gave directions as to the service and advertising of the petition and
fixed Wednesday the 4th of September, 1996 for the hearing to take place.
Unfortunately on that day I was engaged in hearing an urgent Habeas Corpus
application in relation to three young children and had to defer the hearing of
this petition until Friday the 6th September, 1996.
2. The
appointment of an Examiner was opposed by the I.C.C. and by the receiver.
Counsel for the Revenue Commissioners indicated that the Commissioners had
moved from a position of opposition to an examinership to mild support for the
appointment of the Examiner. Unless a new financial backer comes forward the
Revenue's prospects of payment appear remote. Several affidavits have been
filed, namely, the affidavit of Michael Conway grounding the petition, which
affidavit was sworn on the 20th August, 1996 and his supplementary affidavit
sworn on the 5th September, 1996, there is also an affidavit from
3. Mr.
Michael Browne, the Petitioners' Solicitor. Affidavits have also been sworn
and filed on behalf of the I.C.C., an affidavit having been sworn by Michael
O'Connor and there is also an affidavit from Michael McEvoy and one from
Vincent Coakley, the former director of the Company who is now the 40%
shareholder in the Company.
4. There
is some conflict. Nevertheless certain aspects emerge as being fairly clear.
With regard to the situation of the Company, most of the necessary investments
in services and the putting in of roads and drains I understand to have been
done. The remainder of the site (the area of Phase 2) has a value, that is,
the site area has a value of about £190,000, according to Brian Moran, a
valuer. Secondly, disagreements arose between Michael Conway and Vincent
Coakley and as a result Vincent Coakley resigned as a director of the Company
on the 7th May, 1996 and Mary Conway, Mr. Conway's wife, was appointed in his
place. Mr. Coakley is still a substantial shareholder. Clearly, the two
previous directors were not pulling in tandem and no doubt that had
considerable disadvantages from the point of view of the running of the
company. Thirdly, Bourke, Quinn and O'Meara prepared Statements of Affairs and
are still preparing more up-to-date accounts. They also prepared a management
type of plan which has been exhibited by Mr. Conway. Fourthly, Anglo Irish
Bank corp. have expressed positive interest in lending to the project. This is
summed up in a letter of the 27th August, 1996, a copy of which is exhibited
and is in the booklet before me, this is a letter to Mr. Brown, the
Petitioners' Solicitor and it is dated the 27th August, 1996, which reads:-
"Dear
Sirs,
I
refer to recent discussions regarding above project.
The
letter is headed Parklands Apartment, Westport Property and Construction
Limited in receivership.
I
hereby confirm that the bank will look on this proposal in a positive light and
expect a full approval for the project within the next seven days. Any
approval will be subject to our normal banking conditions and we foresee
adequate funding level to repay I.C.C. approximately £160,000. The bank
is also considering the finance application to build out the apartments in a
positive light."
5. That
is from Mr. Heskin who is the Banking Manager of Area West of Anglo Irish Bank
Corp.
6. I
accept that uncertainty about the fate of this petition will create an
atmosphere which is not conducive to bringing about negotiations which would
come to a conclusion favourable to the Company. However, I felt that on last
Friday evening that I had no alternative but to defer giving judgment.
7. The
Company, fifthly, has no employees. However, if the project does proceed then
there must be some potential for the giving of employment in the vicinity and
in particular to the giving of employment in construction work and all the
ancillary services involving sub-contractors and the like which is an area in
which Mr. Conway has had some considerable experience over the years.
8. Sixthly,
if an Examiner is appointed then the receiver is ousted for the present at
least and Mr. Conway who was culpable in respect of the inadequate accounts and
the inadequacy of returns being made to the Companies Office would continue to
have a role in conjunction with the Examiner in respect of the Company.
9. Seventhly,
the attitude of the Revenue is more supportive than opposing of an
examinership. This is indicative of a belief, as I see it, that if the
Receiver is kept in situ then the Revenue would have scant prospect of payment
of the sums due of about £117,000, whereas the prospect of refinancing and
of a completed project does hold out a hope that creditors and the Revenue may
in future be paid.
10. Eighthly,
it is suggested that the cost of an examinership bringing in a definitive
report in three weeks time on the viability of the Company would not exceed
£20,000. In my view, if an Examiner is appointed he would be in a
position to assess the situation thoroughly and he may speedily be put in a
position so that he can reassure and deal with such a prospective lender or
else in the alternative his prognosis of the situation on the basis of his
study will be so dire as to bring about the demise of the examinership very
speedily.
11. As
for the legal principles to be applied I adopt the conclusions as to the law
succinctly stated by Keane J. in
Butlers
Engineering Limited
delivered on the 1st of March, 1996 which is an unreported case, quoting from
page 5:-
"The
legal principles applicable must next be considered. Section 2 of the Act
provides:
'(1) Where
it appears to the court that
(a)
a
company is or is likely to be unable to pay its debts, and
(b)
no
notice of a resolution for the winding-up of the company has been given under
Section 252 of the principal Act more than seven days before the application
hereinafter referred to, and
(c)
no
order has been made for the winding-up of the company, it may on application by
petition presented appoint an Examiner to the company for the purpose of
examining the state of the company's affairs and performing such duties in
relation to the company as may be imposed by or under this Act.
'(2) Without
prejudice to the general power of the court under sub-section (1), it may in
particular make an order under this section if it considers that such an order
would be likely to facilitate the survival of the company and the whole or any
part of its undertaking as a going concern.'
'
'A
petition presented under Section 2 shall be supported by such evidence as the
court may require for the purpose of showing that the petitioner has good
reason for requiring the appointment of an Examiner.'
The
factors which should be taken into account by the court in deciding whether an
Examiner should be appointed have been considered by the Supreme Court in two
cases. In
Re
Atlantic Magnetics Limited,
(1993) 2 I.R. 561. Lardner J. said:
'In
some cases the evidence may make it clear that the survival of the company is
not a practical possibility and the order is likely to be refused. In other
cases the evidence may give a strong possibility of requisite adjustment. With
requisite adjustment the company will survive and prosper therein. Here it may
be clearly possible to make an order appointing the Examiner. In other cases,
such as the present, the evidence may not lead to a clear-cut conclusion.
There may, as here, be a conflict of evidence on matters concerning the
company's affairs. In such a case by what standards should the court make its
decision? It seems to me that the standard is this: does the evidence lead to
the conclusion that in all the circumstances it appears worthwhile to order an
investigation by the Examiner into the company's affairs and see can it
survive, there being some reasonable prospect of survival?'
Finlay
CJ, with whose judgment Hederman, Egan and O'Flaherty JJ concurred, said of
this passage:
'I
am satisfied that this analysis of the situation arising under Section 2 and,
in particular, the learned trial judge's statement of the standard to be
applied to the question in a case which was not clear-cut is correct, subject
to the minor qualification that I would consider it more in accordance with my
view of the true standard if the last line of the quotation were to read:
'there being some prospect of survival.'
At
an earlier part of his judgment the learned Chief Justice rejected the
criterion that had found favour in England when the courts were considering the
corresponding legislation in that jurisdiction, ie, that the court should be
satisfied that there was 'a real prospect' of the survival of the company. He
also said that the importance of the evaluation carried out by the court at the
stage when the petition was being presented:
'goes
no further than that a court should be very slow indeed to make an order
pursuant to either of the sub-sections of Section 2 where it considers that
there is no identifiable possibility of the survival of the company.'
McCarthy
J. with whom Egan J., also agreed said:
'I
reject the real prospect test: I would adopt the test applied by Lardner J.
omitting the words 'there being some reasonable prospect of survival'. It is
not that I consider such may not enter the equation but it appears to me to be
difficult to come to any firm conclusion on such a matter until the Examiner
has carried out his preliminary task within the first statutory period, that of
three weeks.'
McCarthy
J. also explained the policy of the Act thus:
'It
is, I believe, of great importance to bear in mind in the application of the
Act that its purpose is protection: protection of the company and consequently
of its shareholders, its work force and its creditors. It is clear that
Parliament intended that the fate of the company and those who depend upon it
should not lie solely in the hands of one or more large creditors who can, by
appointing a Receiver pursuant to a debenture, effectively terminate its
operation and secure, as best they may, the discharge of the monies due to the
inevitable disadvantage of those less protected. The Act is to provide a
breathing space albeit at the expense of some creditor or creditors. The time
scale is short: the role of the Examiner is hedged around by duties and the
restrictions of time.'
The
latter passage was expressly approved by Finlay CJ in the case of
Re:
Holidair Limited,
1994, 1 ILRM, 483, in a judgment in which he also reaffirmed the criteria he
had indicated in
Re:
Atlantic Magnetics Limited
and
with which the other members of the court unanimously agreed.
The
jurisdiction of the court to appoint an Examiner is not limited, as Finlay CJ
noted, to cases in which the court considers that it would be likely to
facilitate the survival of the company and the whole or part of its undertaking
as a going concern. It arises in every case where the company is or is likely
to be unable to pay its debts and has not been wound up or no petition for
winding-up has been presented within the preceding seven days. It would
appear, however, that while the jurisdiction is not thus confined to cases
where it will facilitate the survival of the business, the court should be very
slow to make the order unless, in the words of the Chief Justice, there is at
least an identifiable possibility that it will survive. It is also clear that
the terms of Section 2 confer a wide discretion on the court in deciding
whether to appoint an Examiner. While the court is bound to exercise that
discretion having regard to the particular circumstances of each case, it must
do so judicially and with strict regard to the criteria laid down by the
Supreme Court in the decisions already cited.
In
that context, it should be noted that the majority judgments in the Supreme
Court in
Re
Atlantic Magnetics Limited
expressly approved the formulation of the test by Lardner J. at first instance
with what Finlay CJ described as the minor qualification of the omission of the
adjective 'reasonable' in the last sentence. To the extent that the judgment
of McCarthy J. suggests that the passage in Lardner J.'s judgment only
represents the appropriate test if one omits the words 'there being some
reasonable prospect of survival', it appears in my respectful view to go
further than what is contained in the judgment approved by the majority and not
to form part of the
ratio
of the decision.
It
is also, of course, the case that elsewhere in the judgment Finlay CJ spoke of
the extreme hesitation with which a court should appoint an Examiner where
there is no identifiable possibility of the survival of the company. It is not
altogether clear, given the immediate context of that remark, that it was
intended to suggest a lower threshold for the appointment of an Examiner than
that indicated by Lardner J. with the qualification already mentioned. It
should be borne in mind that, as already mentioned, the court is not confined
in appointing an Examiner to cases in which the company may survive. For
example, even if the Examiner reports that the company will not survive, the
breathing space thus afforded and the information assembled by the Examiner
might lead a creditor to the conclusion that its interests would be better
served by the appointment of a receiver rather than a winding-up.
Considerations
of that nature might lead the court to appoint an Examiner even where there was
no possibility of the company's surviving. However, I think I should approach
the present case on the basis that the court's jurisdiction to appoint the
Examiner will arise provided that there is at least a possibility that the
company will survive if an Examiner is appointed.
It
is also relevant in the present case to note that Lardner J., again in a
passage approved by Finlay CJ, drew a distinction between cases in which there
is a contest of evidence as to the state of the company's affairs and those in
which the evidence makes it clear that the survival of the company is not, in
his words, a practical possibility. Clearly where there is such a conflict,
the application of the criteria approved by the Supreme Court becomes of
particular significance, although they must be borne in mind by the court
considering the petition in every case.
It
is almost superfluous to point out that while the purpose of the Act is the
protection of the company and, as a result, its shareholders, employees and
creditors, the court must never lose sight of the drastic abridgement that the
giving of that protection effects to the rights of the last mentioned category
and I do not think that the judgments to which I have referred would lend any
support to the view that the court must disregard those consequences in
deciding whether an Examiner should be appointed. In particular, it should be
borne in mind that even the comparatively short breathing space of three weeks
given by the appointment may have serious consequences for the creditors, given
the fact that their normal remedies remain in abeyance, while the control of
the company remains in the hands of those who, in some cases at least, have
contributed significantly to its insolvency.
The
onus clearly rests on those presenting the petition to establish that there is,
at least, an identifiable possibility that the company will survive as a going
concern if an Examiner is appointed. This is obviously not met by a bald
assertion that such a possibility exists."
12. I
adopt the test set out by Keane J, as being, is there an identifiable
possibility that the company will survive as a going concern if an examiner is
appointed? What
13. Mr.
Justice Keane said at page 11 in the Butlers Engineering case is instructive as
to the matters which he considered in applying the test:
"In
this case there is no doubt that the initial requirements of Section 2(1) have
been met. Nor indeed is there is any serious contest on some matters. The
three companies are grossly insolvent and, if anything, the scenario suggested
by their own financial advisers is gloomier than that favoured by, for example,
the receiver. Nor is there any conflict as to a primary cause of the
companies' present calamitous position. It is related by the petitioners
themselves to the dispute of BSC which has forced the companies to look
elsewhere for their supplies of raw materials. There is not a scintilla of
evidence before the Court to suggest that there are any proposals in being to
remedy this critical situation. On the contrary, one of the companies' major
suppliers, Preussag Stahl AG, is not only declining to supply the company but
is actively opposing the appointment of an Examiner. The contracts which the
petitioners hope may rescue the company from its present light will be
incapable of fulfilment unless the companies can obtain the necessary raw
materials. There is no indication in the affidavits supporting the petition as
to how this difficulty will be overcome if an Examiner is appointed. In such
circumstances, the possibility of outside investment is obviously of critical
importance if the companies are to have any hope of being saved by the
appointment of an Examiner.
The
information as to the possibility of new investors coming forward is sparse in
the extreme and while I fully understand the need for commercial
confidentiality to be observed in matters of this nature, it is obvious from
what is said in the last report of the companies' present financial advisers
that the potential investors who had been approached in mid-December last had
been presented with information which, through no fault of those advisers, had
proved to be misleading and the hoped-for investment had failed to materialise.
I
have already referred to the state of the companies' accounts. A
petitioner
who undertakes the onus, however modest, of satisfying the Court that there is
an identifiable possibility of the survival of the company or at least a part
of its undertaking as a going concern most present the Court with at least some
reliable evidence as to the state of the company's finances. That is probably
of importance in most cases. In a case such as the present where the companies
are insolvent on a catastrophic scale and their borrowing requirements, if they
are to keep trading during the limited period the examinership, may well exceed
£1,000,000, it is vital. Yet the Court is left in the position, on
evidence that is uncontradicted, that far from there being such evidence before
the Court, the fundamental statutory obligation of the companies to keep proper
books and records has been disregarded to such an extent that their auditors
felt obliged to qualify their statutory certificate to the comprehensive extent
already mentioned. It is also by no means clear that the present application
enjoys the unqualified support of all the directors of the companies and, while
this is not a conclusive consideration, it cannot increase one's confidence in
the course proposed on behalf of the petitioning creditors.
I
am satisfied that the petitioners have not established that there is any
identifiable possibility that these companies or the whole or any part of their
undertaking will survive as a going concern if an Examiner is appointed."
14. I
also think that the head note in
Re:
Atlantic Magnetics Limited
,
1993 2IR 561 gives a useful summary of the relevant provisions and also
indicates the approach of the Supreme Court. The critical part of the head
note is the holding by the Supreme Court that, upon construction of the
framework and detail of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1990 including the
specific time scales imposed requiring an Examiner to report back to the High
Court within three weeks from the date of his appointment and the termination
of the examinership within three months unless by special order that period
were extended for a further 30 days, the basic purpose of the appointment of an
Examiner was for him to examine the situation, affairs and prospects of the
company and therefore there was no onus of proof on the petitioner to establish
as a matter of probability that the company was capable of surviving as a going
concern: instead, the Court should enquire does the evidence lead to the
conclusion that in all the circumstances it appears worthwhile to order an
investigation by the Examiner into the company's affairs to see whether it can
survive, there being some prospect of survival. The test which has been
adopted by the Supreme Court is certainly a considerably less stringent test
than that adopted by the English Courts dealing with the comparable provisions
in England. I adopt the test, as being an elucidation of the principles set
out by Supreme Court, as stated by Mr. Justice Keane and I propose to apply his
test to the findings which I make on the material before me.
15. It
is urged on behalf of the Petitioners that:-
1. The
Company has a potential viability and that there is an identifiable possibility
of the survival of the Company.
2. That
Mr. Conway in his past enterprises and as an entrepreneur in that part of the
world has always paid his creditors in the past and he himself stresses that he
regards his reputation in this respect as being very much on the line.
3. £598,000
has already been paid to the I.C.C. The amount outstanding to the I.C.C. is on
one calculation £160,000 or on another calculation £120,000 (if the
proceeds of sale of the last flat in the first phase has gone through and the
money been paid to the I.C.C.). Thus only £160,000 or £120,000 is
presently due to the I.C.C. on foot of this loan. The remnant of the site
after the Phase 1 apartments have been sold off is worth about £190,000
according to Mr. Moran and the I.C.C. also has the security of guarantees from
Mr. Conway and from Mr. Coakley and the guarantee given by Mr. Conway is in
addition supported by the equitable deposit of the title deeds of a property of
considerable value; and evidence has certainly been adduced before me that it
is of value well in excess of £160,000.
4. Difficulties
arose because of a conflict on the Board of the Company which have since been
resolved by the resignation by Mr. Coakley as a director. Now of course Mr.
Coakley is still a holder of 40% shareholding in the Company but for the fact
of day to day pulling in tandem of two directors of the Company that would not
appear to be an immediate problem at this stage. The slump in the property
market in 1994 and 1995 has, it was urged, ceased and thus there are better
prospects for sales of such apartments picking up. The hope is expressed that
the high interest rates previously prevailing and certain costs, which were
incurred in respect of a related development, will not recur. Those costs in
respect of the related development were the subject of very strong criticism
indeed by Counsel for the I.C.C.
5. If
Phase 2 can be completed at a cost of £620,000 as suggested on behalf of
the Petitioners and the units can be sold for at least £60,000 each then,
if those figures are correct, there would appear to be a viable prospect of
creditors receiving payment.
16. Counsel
for the petitioners contrasted this situation and this prospect with the
utterly hopeless situation that was prevailing in the
Butlers
Engineering
case.
17. Counsel
on behalf of the I.C.C. in retort submits that firstly the petition should be
dismissed "in limine" for two reasons:
1. He
says that the petition was not accompanied as required by
Section 33(c) of the
Act by a proper statement of the assets and liabilities of the Company. I
think that an attempt has been made to put in a Statement of Affairs in so far
as figures were known to Mr. Conway. In paragraph 9 in particular of Michael
Conway's affidavit figures were given and a Statement of the Affairs of the
Company was also exhibited as of the 10th July, 1996 as drawn up by Bourke,
Quinn and O'Meara. Part of the contents of his supplementary affidavit is an
update of this information. Counsel for the I.C.C. points to a discrepancy in
the figures between those in paragraph 9 and those on page 81 of the booklet
being Exhibit A in Mr. Conway's supplemental affidavit. However, this copy of
the faxed accounts from Bourke, Quinn and O'Meara is dated the 27th August,
1996 and I accept this was produced in order to try to comply with the
undertaking given by Mr. Conway to produce a further Statement of Affairs dated
within seven days of the petition. While this further Statement of Affairs may
not have reached the I.C.C. within the seven days and criticism can and is made
of the further Statement of Affairs, nevertheless it seems to me that I should
not stop the matter at the threshold of the Court in all the circumstances.
2. It
is submitted that the Statement of Affairs is unreliable and that the viability
of the company all hinges on the intervention of the alternative lender putting
up at least £160,000 plus the further development costs of about
£620,000.
3. The
I.C.C.'s security will be whittled away if the appointment of an Examiner is
made. I might add to this also that there is the factor of uncertainty and
delay which is introduced into the work of a Receiver, who is stopped in his
tracks, if there is the appointment of an Examiner and that no lending
institution likes to have its power of putting in a Receiver fast under a
debenture taken away or at least watered down and diluted.
18. As
for the Receiver's situation, at the outset objection was taken by Counsel for
the Petitioners to the locus standi of Counsel for the Receiver. I ruled that
Counsel for the Receiver was entitled to be heard. This had been done in a
number of such cases and the Receiver's Counsel had been heard by Costello P.
already in this case (see Order made 28/8/96). In my view the Receiver has a
real interest in the matter and can assist the Court from his, albeit brief,
perusal of the books and his study of the assets and liabilities of the
company. For the Receiver it was submitted:-
1. The
books and records furnished by Mr. Conway were inadequate, incomplete and
unreliable with a lack of information on cash receipts, planning and legal
matters and the alleged debt to Mr. Conway and an alleged and disputed debt of
Mr. Coakley.
2. The
Statement of Affairs takes no account of the costs of receivership,
examinership, VAT or interest accruing.
3. The
appointment sought is to protect a proprietary company rather than employees, a
feature in other such petitions.
19. It
is true that the Company has no employees in the strict sense, but if Phase 2
does go ahead then this would be likely to give employment in the vicinity of
Westport.
20. I
have come to the conclusion after reflection that the Petitioners do satisfy
the test set out by the Supreme Court in
Altantic
Magnetics
and elucidated by Keane J. in
Butlers
Engineering
.
Despite the cogent criticisms of Counsel for the I.C.C. and the Receiver, I am
persuaded that there is at least a viable possibility that the Company will
survive if an Examiner is appointed. His examination also may well provide
more complete figures so as to convince a lender of the feasibility of the
completion of the entire project. Furthermore, I am impressed by the sums
already paid to the I.C.C. and Mr. Conway's desire to preserve his good
reputation with creditors. The I.C.C. also seems to have adequate security to
cover the outstanding sum whether of £160,000 or £120,000, despite
such "whittling away" as may occur at least during the period of 3 weeks while
the Examiner assesses and reports, which hopefully will produce a restoration
of confidence previously eroded by Mr. Conway's failure to ensure proper
accounts and to keep the I.C.C. in particular adequately informed so as to give
faith in the Company's enterprise.
© 1996 Irish High Court
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