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1. These proceeding come before this Court by way of a Case Stated pursuant to the provisions of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1857 as amended and extended by

2. The Case Stated arises out of a prosecution pursuant to the Bovine Tuberculosis (Attestation of the State and General Provisions) Order, 1989 (SI 308 of 1989) and the Diseases of Animals Act, 1966. Four summonses were issued alleging that the Defendant committed a number of offences on the 29th of November, 1993, the 30th of November, 1993 and the 3rd of December, 1993. The summonses were issued pursuant to Section 1 of the Courts (No. 3) Act, 1986 (which I shall refer to as the 1986 Act) and the date of application for the summonses was the 4th of September, 1995. They were originally returnable to the District Court at Crossmolina, Co. Mayo on the 5th October, 1995. When the matter came on for hearing before the District Judge on the 4th of January, 1996 it was submitted on behalf of the Defendant that the time limit for summonses issued pursuant to the Courts (No.3) Act, 1986 is a time limit of six months and that no other time limit arises except in the case of certain statutory offences where shorter time limits may apply. The authority given to the District Judge for this proposition was the decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of D.P.P. -v- Arthur Nolan and D.P.P. -v- District Justice Maura Roche and Paul Kelly reported at [1989] ILRM 39 (these cases are also reported at [1990] 2IR 526 and in the course of this judgment I will refer to that report).

3. The District Judge held that the point raised by the Defendant's Solicitor was valid and dismissed all four summonses. The Prosecutor then applied for a case to be stated to this Court pursuant to Section 2 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1857 as extended by Section 51 of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961 and the District Judge has accordingly sought the opinion of this Court as to whether his determination was correct in point of law.

4. The offences with which the Defendant was charged in the summonses arise under Regulations No.16(2), 19(1)(a), 32(3) and 48(1)(h) of the Bovine Tuberculosis (Attestation of the State and General Provisions) Order, 1989. Regulation 35 of that Order provides that "where a person contravenes any provision of this Order, he shall be guilty of an offence under the Act" (the Act being defined in Regulation 2 as the Diseases of Animals Act, 1966). Both the Statutory Instrument and the 1966 Act are recited in the summonses.

5. Counsel on behalf of the Prosecutor in her argument relies on this section as providing a time limit of two years rather than six months from the date of the alleged offence to the date of application for a summons under Section 1 of the 1986 Act. With regard to the authority cited in the District Court, she submits that this point also arose before the learned Barron J. in the case of D.P.P -v- Howard and was dealt with in his judgment in that case (unreported 17th November, 1989). In that judgment the learned Barron J. held that in the case of a Revenue Prosecution where the statutory limit for the issue of a summons is one year, that limit also applied where application was made for the issue of a summons under the 1986 Act.

6. Counsel on behalf of the Defendant submits that the time limit for the application for a summons under the 1986 Act cannot be longer than six months and refers me to the authority cited in the District Court. He suggests that where, as in the case of the 1979 Act, a longer statutory time limit is provided, the Prosecutor must use the complaint procedure under the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act, 1851 rather than the procedure under the 1986 Act. He also submits that where, as in this case, the Prosecutor is relying on a longer statutory time limit the statute providing for the longer time limit should be recited on the face of the summons.

7. Section 1 of the Courts (No. 3) Act, 1986, insofar as it is relevant to this case, provides as follows:-

8. The question of the time limit for the issue of a summons under the 1986 Act was considered by the Supreme Court in the cases of D.P.P. -v- Nolan and D.P.P. -v- District Justice Roche and Kelly reported at [1990] 2 IR 526. The summonses dealt with in those cases were summonses to which the general six month limit would apply under the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act, 1851 and the question which arose for decision by the Supreme Court was whether that time limit ran from the date of the alleged offence to the date of the application for a summons under Section 1 of the 1986 Act or whether it ran to the date on which the matter first came before the District Court. The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court on this point therefore seems to me to be set out in brief by the learned former Chief Justice Finlay J. at page 545 of his judgment on behalf of the Court where he states:-

9. The findings of the Supreme Court are recapitulated at page 546-7 of the report of the judgement of Finlay C.J. as follows:-

10. In the present case it was argued before the District Judge and Counsel for the Defendant also argued before me that the reference by Finlay C.J. in paragraph (2) "shorter statutory time limits" necessarily excludes any longer statutory time limit and that an absolute time limit of six months applies.

11. Referring to the Case Stated before him, the learned Judge said at page 4 to 5 of his judgment:-

12. It seems to me that the learned Barron J. is clearly correct in his interpretation and I have no difficulty in following his authority. I would add that I consider that the wording of Section 1(7)(a) of the 1986 Act clearly refers to "any provision made by or under any statute passed before the passing of this Act relating to the time for making a complaint in relation to an offence".

13. The phrase "with any necessary modifications" used in the subsection would appear, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in D.P.P. -v- Nolan , to refer, inter alia, to the change from the time limit running to the making of a complaint to the same statutory time limits running to the making of an application for the issue of a summons. Various special time limits provided in "any statute passed before the passing of this

14. In the present case therefore the time limit of two years provided under Section 18 of the Bovine Diseases (Levies) Act, 1979 applies and the applications for the issue of the present summonses were in time.

15. Counsel for the Defendant also submitted that where, as in this case, a special time limit applies under statute, the relevant statutory provision should be recited on the face of the summons. No authority was advanced for this proposition and it does not seem to me that a failure to recite the provisions of Section 18 of the 1979 Act on the face of the summonses could in any way invalidate the summonses.

16. It follows that the determination of the District Judge was wrong in law and that the prosecutions against the Defendant should continue.