BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!

1. This is an application for Judicial Review of a decision of the first named Respondent dated the 31st day of March, 1995 refusing to permit the Applicant to transmit a particular advertisement on the radio station known as "98 FM". I should state at the outset that the owners of "98 FM" had no objection to broadcasting the advertisement if they were satisfied that they were lawfully entitled to do so but they were informed by the first named Respondent, being the relevant statutory authority, that they were prohibited from doing so by virtue of Section 10(3) of the Radio and Television Act, 1988. That subsection provides that:-

2. The advertisement in question read as follows:-

3. The Applicant seeks to impugn the refusal to broadcast this advertisement on the grounds:-

4. Although Counsel for the Applicant relies on both arguments, I think it is fair to say, that the greatest stress was on the second. In support of the first argument Counsel for the Applicant suggests that the advertisement is in essence an advertisement for a showing of a video and the showing of a live communication by satellite and that it is not directly an advertisement for some religious belief or doctrine. On any fair reading of this advertisement, I think that one would have to interpret it as being more than a mere notification of an event. The question, therefore, of whether notification of a religious event necessarily infringes Section 10(3) of the Radio and Television Act, 1988 does not arise in this case and that being so I do not think it would be advisable or proper for me to make any decision on it. What I am deciding is that this particular advertisement does infringe Section 10(3) or at the very least that the first named Respondent was entitled to take the view that it did. The advertisers are called in the advertisement "The Irish Faith Centre". It is perfectly obvious from the whole tenor of the advertisement that the listener is being led to at least favourably consider the proposition that Christ is the Son of the living God and that the traditional "beliefs" about Christ are historical facts. In my opinion, the advertisement is a great deal more than a mere notification of an event. Given that Section 10(3) itself has a broad thrust, I think that the advertisement would clearly infringe the subsection.

5. I turn, therefore, to consider whether the subsection is unconstitutional. Four different provisions of the constitution are relied on by the Applicant. These are:-

6. I propose to deal with the Article 44 arguments first as they present less difficulty than the arguments based on Article 40. In my view, Section 10(3) of the 1988 Act in no way impedes freedom of conscience or the free profession or practice of religion. As Counsel for the Attorney General has pointed out, the true meaning of Article 44(2)(1) has been explained by Walsh J. in McGee -v- Attorney General 1974 IR 284 at 316, Walsh J. observed as follows:-

7. The prohibition on this advertisement is not an attack on freedom of conscience or the free practice of religion. Indeed if anything the advertisement might be an intrusion on the quiet possession of religious beliefs.

8. Nor does it appear to me that the refusal of such an advertisement as this could constitute a discrimination on the ground of religious profession, belief or status as prohibited by Article 44(2)(3). The meaning of this constitutional provision has also been elaborated on by Walsh J. in Quinn Supermarket -v- Attorney General 1972 I.R. 1. He explains that what is prohibited by the provision is the creation of a difference between persons or bodies or the distinguishing between them on the grounds of religious profession, belief or status. An advertisement of this kind would have been prohibited no matter what religion was involved and there is therefore no question of religious discrimination. I am satisfied that insofar as the Applicant relies on Article 44 to impugn the validity of Section 10(3) of the 1988 Act having regard to the Constitution, the application must fail.

9. I now turn to the much more difficult question of whether either of the provisions relied on in Article 40 by the Applicant gives him the right to have his advertisement broadcast and that that being so the subsection in the 1988 Act is repugnant to the Constitution. I think it appropriate to deal with the arguments based on Article 40(3)(1) and the arguments based on Article 40(6)(1) together. I do this because I do not accept that the two constitutional provisions are totally independent of one another. In some of the arguments put forward in this Court it seemed to be suggested that as a consequence of Attorney General -v- Paper Link Limited 1984 ILRM 373 the right to communicate factual matters arose from Article 40(3)(1) but that the right to communicate convictions and opinions arose from Article 40(6)(1). If this analysis was correct, it would seem to give rise to an anomaly. I cannot see any rational basis why the Constitution would confer an express right to communicate opinions but an implied or unenumerated right to communicate information. The key passage in Costello P's. judgment in the Paper Link case does not appear to me to support the view that there are two distinct rights of communication conferred by different provisions of the Constitution. The passage in question reads as follows at p.381:-

10. I think that in that passage Costello P. was regarding Article 40(6)(1)(i) as not conferring a new right but rather giving special protection to a particular form of exercise of the right conferred by Article 40(3)(1). At any rate it would seem to me that the wording of Article 40(6)(1). supports that interpretation independently of any authority and I will return to it later on in this judgment.

11. It seems clear from his judgment in Oblique Financial Services Limited -v- The Promise Production Company Limited 1994 1 I.L.R.M. 74 that Keane J. takes a similar view. He stated as follows:-

12. The use of the words "including conveying information" would seem to suggest that Keane J. considered, as I do, that Article 40(3)(1) was the constitutional source of the basic right to communicate whether it be information or opinion.

13. I return briefly to Article 40(6)(1)(i). I have come to the conclusion that that particular provision has no relevance to this case. I have come to that view for two quite distinct reasons. In the first place the proposed advertisement although it does implicitly contain matters of opinion has as its principal purpose the communication of information. But secondly and perhaps more importantly Article 40(6)(1)(i) would not seem to apply to every expression of opinion. Article 40(6)(1)(i) would not seem to have any application to the right of a private citizen to express private opinions with a view to influencing some other private person or persons. It would not be advisable to attempt a precise definition of what the paragraph does cover but I think that it is mainly directed at protecting the expression of opinions whether deriving from groups or otherwise with a view to influencing public opinion. Paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) in Article 40(6)(1) would each seem on a superficial view to be dealing with completely different matters and it might be suggested that there was no logic in including them all in the same subsection. But I think that the framers of the Constitution quite deliberately inserted them in the same subsection and that being so it would be wrong to interpret paragraph (i) except in the context of the entire subsection of the article which reads as follows:-

14. The following points of importance need to be considered in interpreting Section 6 of

15. For all these reasons, I conclude that the aspect of the fundamental right to communicate arising under Article 40(3)(1) which is referred to in Article 40(6)(1)(i) is the influencing of public opinion. An advertisement on radio whether it be directed towards the purchase of a soap powder or towards the attendance of a meeting is addressed to the individual listener rather than directed towards influencing public opinion. I do accept that a political advertisement might have to be regarded differently. Arguably, it is designed to influence both public opinion in general and the individual voter. But this case does not concern a political advertisement but rather an alleged religious advertisement. It was intended, in my view, to be addressed to the individual listener and if I am right in my foregoing analysis, I do not think, therefore, that Article 40(6)(1)(i) has any bearing on the issues in dispute in this case.

16. I now return, therefore, to Article 40(3)(1). It is established in all the relevant decided cases that the personal rights protected by this Section and paragraph are not absolute and that their exercise may be regulated in the common good. Before developing this theme further, I should make clear that I reject the State's argument that because of limitation of air waves and other reasons there can be no constitutional right to broadcast and that broadcasting has to be viewed in some special category apart from all other means of communication. That does not seem to be the view of the European Court of Human Rights and in this era of multi-station broadcasting and the further increase projected with the advent of digital broadcasting, there is no reason why broadcasting as such should be isolated in Irish law and placed in a special category. I would prefer an approach which recognised that broadcasting like any other means of communication must be taken into account in considering any particular exercise of the fundamental right to communicate protected by the Constitution.

17. Although the European Convention of Human Rights is not part of Irish municipal law, regard can and should be had to its provisions when considering the nature of a fundamental right and perhaps more particularly the reasonable limitations which can be placed on the exercise of that right. In this case the solution lies, in my view, in Article 10 of the European Convention. What would be considered to be reasonable limitations under that Article should equally, be considered reasonable limitations under Article 40(3) of the Constitution. The recent Report of the Constitution Review Group recommends amendment of the Constitution so as to conform with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. But I do not think that there is a serious clash between the Constitution and the Convention in this particular respect. I think that the rights protected by Article 10 of the Convention are for the most point protected by Article 40(3)(1) of the Constitution and that the limitations on the exercise of those rights in the interest of the common good largely correspond to the limitations expressly permitted by Article 10 of the Convention.

18. Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights states:-

19. In the context of broadcasting, the decision of the European Court of Human Rights which is most relevant in this case is the decision in Informationsverein Lentia -v- Austria 17 EHRR 93. In that case, the applicants had been refused broadcasting licences by the competent national authority to set up both radio and television stations in Austria on the basis of national legislation which had set up a public monopoly. They complained of a violation of their freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. The Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 10. It is not necessary to review all the facts of that case which had very little bearing on the facts of this case but two important passages in the judgment which are contained in paragraphs 32 and 35 respectively of the reported case are highly relevant to this case. They respectively read as follows:-

20. A restriction on religious advertising complained of in this case would not seem to fit easily within the exceptions permitted by paragraph 2 of Article 10. It is conceivable that if actual evidence had been called or put on affidavit to the effect that having regard perhaps to the problems in Northern Ireland or for some other reason the State could have proved that such a prohibition was necessary though I rather doubt it. Admittedly, it has been submitted on behalf of the Attorney General that religious advertising would constitute an interference with the right to practise one's religion and that therefore the restriction was necessary "for the protection of the -- rights of others". But no evidence was adduced in support of this submission.

21. It is clear, however, from paragraph 32 cited above that the licensing system of broadcasting can involve restrictions which go beyond those permitted by paragraph 2. Indeed McCullough J. in Regina -v- Radio Authority Ex Parte Bull cited above expressly refers to Paragraph 32 in the judgment of the Court of Human Rights. At p.591 of the Report he observes as follows:-

22. In this case the restriction is not a condition imposed by the broadcaster nor is it a restriction required of the broadcaster to impose as a condition of his receiving a licence to broadcast. Rather it is a blanket restriction contained in the Act itself. As I have already mentioned there is no evidence that the owners of 98 FM had any objection to inserting the proposed advertisement but the Commission considered they were not entitled to do so having regard to the Act. Whether the restriction be contained in the Act itself or be a condition of a licence it all forms part and parcel of a licensing system as contemplated by Article 10 of the Convention. I think that it would have been reasonable for the Oireachtas to take the view that in Irish society religious advertising on commercial radio might be undesirable in the public interest. For the restriction to be imposed in the context of a licensing system under Paragraph 1 there did not have to be an absolute necessity for the ban as would be required under paragraph 2 of Article 10. It is sufficient, in my view, if there were good reasons in the public interest for the ban. Irish people with religious beliefs tend to belong to particular churches and that being so religious advertising coming from a different church can be offensive to many people and might be open to the interpretation of proselytising. Religion has been a divisive factor in Northern Ireland and this is something which the Oireachtas may well have taken into account. As McCullough J. pointed out, a person listening to commercial radio is for all practical purposes compelled to listen to the advertisements. That being so, it is legitimate for any Oireachtas to have regard to the type of advertisements which might be permitted. The impugned Section enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. It is not obvious to me that a restriction on religious advertising is not a reasonable restriction in the interest of the common good on this particular form of exercise of the right to communicate.

23. Of course it has been suggested on behalf of the Applicant that a blanket restriction is not proportional and that even if some restriction would be reasonable it would have to be less draconian. The absolute restriction according to the argument of Counsel for the Applicant infringes the doctrine of proportionality. I cannot accept this view. On the legislation as it stands there are very few limitations on the right to advertise and in that sense proportionality has already been taken into account. But at any rate, I do not think that one could subdivide religious advertising. Once a reasonable view can be put forward that religious advertising might be undesirable in the public interest, it would be impossible in practice to devise a wording that might have the effect of permitting certain alleged categories of innocuous religious advertising. It is the fact that the advertisement is directed towards a religious end and not some particular aspect of a religious end which might be potentially offensive to the public. I, therefore, hold that the Section is not invalid having regard to the Constitution and that this application for Judicial Review must be refused.

24. I realise that even if I had taken the opposite view it would now be too late to advertise for the particular events intended. But the application would still not have been a moot as presumably the Applicant wants to be in a position on future occasions to have similar type advertisements broadcast on commercial radio and the constitutional validity or otherwise of the statutory provision is of considerable importance to him.