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High Court of Ireland Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Eurochick (Ireland) Ltd., Re [1998] IEHC 51 (23rd March, 1998) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/1998/51.html Cite as: [1998] IEHC 51 |
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1. This
is a Petition by Oriel Poultry Co-operative Society Limited ("the Petitioner")
for an Order that Eurochick Ireland Limited (in voluntary liquidation) ("the
Company") should be wound up by the Court pursuant to the provisions of Section
213 of the Companies Act, 1963.
2. The
Company had a short and somewhat disastrous life. It was incorporated on 29th
December, 1995 and commenced trading in June 1996. On 21st April, 1997 the
Companies Bankers appointed a Receiver and Manager and the Company ceased
trading. At the end of the receivership there remained assets in the hands of
the Receiver in the sum of £18,885, and these are the only liquid assets
of the Company. On 24th October, 1997 statutory meetings were held of the
members and of the creditors of the Company and it was resolved that the
Company be wound up voluntary as it was unable to pay its debts. A Statement
of Affairs was produced at that meeting which showed a deficiency of
£653,198. By far the largest creditor was the Petitioner who is shown in
the Statement of Affairs as being owed £514.384. The Petitioner in fact
claims to be owed a considerably larger sum, but at the moment it is sufficient
to say that the Company is grossly insolvent, and it is quite clear that
ultimately the ordinary Creditors will receive little or nothing from this
liquidation.
3. At
the Extraordinary General Meeting of the Company which proposed the winding up,
it was also proposed that Mr. John Edison should be Liquidator. At the
subsequent Creditors' meeting his appointment was confirmed by ten votes to
three, one of those opposing being the Petitioner. The Petitioner now
alleges that there are a number of matters relating to the Company which ought
to be investigated, and that this should not be done by the Liquidator
appointed by the members of the Company. However, the Petitioner makes it
quite clear that there is no criticism being made of Mr. Edison personally,
either as to his ability to act as Liquidator or as to his impartiality. All
that is being said is that the Petitioner has a legitimate sense of grievance,
and that this justifies it in seeking a winding up by the Court. It should be
noted that none of the other Creditors have appeared to this Petition, either
to support or oppose it, other than Mr. David Coleman who is opposing the
Petition, and therefore it cannot be said that there is any sense of grievance
among the Creditors generally, as opposed to the sense of grievance which the
Petitioner may feel.
4. The
Petitioner is a Co-operative Society of poultry growers which was formed in
September 1994. The grounding affidavit to the Petition is sworn by Mr. Peter
Smith, who is the Chairman of the Petitioner. Initially a Ms. Elizabeth
McConnon was appointed Secretary and Mr. Dermot Crinion became manager of the
Petitioner, and subsequently in July 1995, the Petitioner's Solicitor, Mr.
David Coleman, became Chief Executive. These three persons in effect
constituted the management of the Petitioner, and conducted its day-to-day
affairs.
5. I
think it is quite clear that the Company was set up at the instigation of the
management of the Petitioner. It was incorporated in December 1995, but only
two shares were issued, one to Mr. David Coleman and one the Mr. Seamus
Crinion, a brother of Mr. Dermot Crinion. The purpose of the Company appears
to have been to process chickens sold to it by the Petitioner. It operated
from the same offices as the Petitioner and in effect had the same management.
While there was never any formal agreement as to the beneficial ownership of
the shares in the Company, and no further shares were ever issued, it is quite
clear that it was always intended that the Petitioner would beneficially own
either all or a substantial part of the Company. The Company never had any
premises of its own, but entered into an agreement with a Company called
Hannons Poultry Export Company Limited whereby it would carry out the
processing of the chickens, but the Company provided and installed a
considerable amount of machinery in its premises. The Company started trading
in June 1996, and management accounts to 30th September, 1996 showed sales in
the three months of over £700,000, and a very small profit of
£1,897.. However, the Company suffered serious losses in the months
immediately succeeding this period, and management accounts again show that in
the six months period to 31st December, 1996 there were sales of over
£1,700,000 but an operating loss of almost £130,000. At that stage
the management accounts showed that the Petitioner was owed over £500,000.
6. When
the Company collapsed in April 1997 and a Receiver was appointed, Mr. Coleman,
Mr. Crinion and Ms. McConnon all severed their connection with the Petitioner.
Investigations took place which have thrown up four specific matters complained
of by the Petitioner. If these matters are correct, they all appear to show
that the Petitioner was in fact funding Eurochick in various unorthodox ways
which would not appear or might not appear in the accounts of either Company.
The result of this would be that the Company in fact owes the Petitioner more
than either the books of the Company or the Statement of Affairs would show.
Whether the Liquidator is Mr. Edison or a Liquidator appointed by the Court,
the Petitioner will still have to prove its debt, but certainly the
relationship between the Petitioner and the Company does not seem to have been
a normal arms length relationship, and indeed is much more consistent with the
Company being regarded almost as a division of the Petitioner.
7. A
number of English cases have been cited to me which are put forward to
establish a principle that, while the making of a Winding-Up Order in these
circumstances is discretionary, the Order should be made if the creditors
otherwise have a legitimate sense of grievance, or put another way, that
justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done.
8. See
for example
Re: Magnus Consultants Limited
(1995)
1 BCLC 203 and
Re:
Falcon R. J. Development Limited
(1987) BCLC 437. Such a principle certainly appears to run through these
cases, although I am not sure that it is supported by any case in this
jurisdiction. However, those cases are based on circumstances where it can be
shown that there is some wrongdoing by the Company itself which needs to be
investigated, or perhaps can be shown that the Directors of the Company were
removing assets from the Company before the winding up. There is nothing of
that nature in the present case. What the Petitioner really is complaining
about is the conduct of its own affairs by its own management, and by extension
the conduct of the relationship between the Petitioner and the Company by its
common management. Any wrongdoing by the management appears to be wrongdoing
in their capacity as management of the Petitioner, in that they may have used
funds of the Petitioner to support the Company, but there is no suggestion that
they benefited personally in any way, or that they were guilty of any act which
would reduce the assets of the Company or increase its liability to its
creditors, other than to the Petitioner.
9. I
also think it is very relevant that while the Petitioner talks vaguely of
inquiries being necessary, it does not suggest any action which might be taken
by a Liquidator which would improve the position of the creditors of the
Company. In fact, all that would happen would be that the Petitioner would be
owed a greater sum of money, which of course would be to the detriment of the
other creditors. I also find it significant that there is no suggestion from
the Petitioner as to how any such investigations might be funded. I have been
furnished with a report by Mr. Edison dated 30th January, 1998 in which he
states that the only liquid funds realised are the balance of the monies
remaining after the receivership, namely, £18,885. He further concludes
that the other principal asset of the Company would not be realisable in
practice. If a Court liquidation takes place, the work done by Mr. Edison to
date will have to be duplicated, and investigations would have to take place
under the auspices of the Court, which would appear to me to be highly unlikely
to benefit the ordinary creditors but would merely be done at their expense.
10. The
only Irish cases cited to me are the judgment of O'Hanlon J. in
In
the Matter of Gilt Construction Limited
(1994) 2 I.L.R.M. 465 and my own unreported judgment delivered on 13th
February, 1995
In
the Matter of Naiad Limited.
In the latter case I quoted with approval from the judgment of O'Hanlon J. at
page 458 of the report, and I can do no better than to quote it again. He said:-
11. I
can only repeat that it appears to me that the mala fides alleged in this case
are the mala fides of the management of the Petitioner itself, and it is not
for the Liquidator to investigate that matter. The assets in this case are
very small compared with the liabilities, and I do not think there is any sense
of grievance among the creditors generally which would justify the application
of the principles in the English cases.
12. A
final relevant matter is that at the creditors' meeting at which Mr. Edison's
appointment was confirmed, the creditors also appointed a Committee of
Management, which in fact consists of representatives of the Petitioner. While
the powers of a Committee of Management are very vague and general, it does
mean that in effect the Petitioner can oversee the actions of Mr. Edison, and
could ask him to seek the directions of the Court under Section 280 of the
Companies Act, 1963 should they think it necessary, which ought to be a
perfectly sufficient and adequate protection for the Petitioner.