BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?

No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!



BAILII [Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]

High Court of Ireland Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Wise Finance Company Ltd. v. Hughes [1998] IEHC 63 (27th April, 1998)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/1998/63.html
Cite as: [1998] IEHC 63

[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]


Wise Finance Company Ltd. v. Hughes [1998] IEHC 63 (27th April, 1998)

THE HIGH COURT
1997 No.232 Sp.
BETWEEN
THE WISE FINANCE COMPANY LIMITED
PLAINTIFF
AND
JAMES HUGHES
DEFENDANT

Judgment of Ms. Justice Laffoy delivered on 27th April, 1998

In these proceedings the Plaintiff's claim is for possession pursuant to Section 62(7) of the Registration of Title Act, 1964 of the lands registered on Folio 12583 of the Register of Freeholders County Longford which were the subject of a charge dated 15th December, 1994 given by the Defendant to the Plaintiff, which charge is registered as a burden on Folio 12583, the Plaintiff being registered as the owner of the charge.

1. By virtue of the charge, in consideration of the sum of £25,000, the Defendant charged all the lands registered on Folio 12583 with payment to the Plaintiff "as more particularly set out on the terms and conditions within the Commitment Letter executed by [the Defendant] on the 18th day of November, 1997". It is acknowledged by the Plaintiff that there is an error in the charge, in that, while in a Commitment Letter dated 18th November, 1994 the Defendant sought and the Plaintiff committed funds (£60,000), the funds were never drawn down.

2. The charge should have referred to a Commitment Letter which was signed on behalf of the Plaintiff on 29th November, 1994 and by the Defendant on 9th December, 1994. In that Commitment Letter a loan of £25,000 to the Defendant for a term of three months was sanctioned. It was provided that interest would be charged during the currency of the term at the rate of 2% per month and that the interest for the three month period would be deducted at draw-down. Should the loan not be repaid in full within the three month term, interest thereafter would be payable in advance at 3% per month on the unpaid balance. In addition to the three months interest in advance, which amounted to £1,500, the Commitment Letter provided for the deduction of a procurement fee of £3,000 and a Broker's fee of £500 at draw-down, so that the nett proceeds of the loan to be paid into the Defendant's hands was £20,000.

3. The nett proceeds of the loan were drawn down, but the loan was not repaid at the end of the three month term, although the Defendant paid the monthly interest at the rate of 3% per month for approximately a year after the termination of the three month term. At the time these proceedings were instituted at the beginning of June 1997, the Plaintiff was claiming that the Defendant owed it £33,500 on his account with it. By this stage, in addition to the disbursements from the loan, which amounted to £5,000 and included £1,500 interest, the Defendant had paid £11,750 in respect of interest to the Plaintiff.

4. The operative Commitment Letter, the Commitment Letter signed by the Defendant on 9th December, 1994, provided as follows:-


"This Commitment Letter shall be governed by and construed in all respects in accordance with English Law and custom. The Commitment Letter shall be deemed to have been made in England and the construction, validity and performance of the terms and conditions of this Commitment Letter shall be governed in all respects by English Law and the Borrower hereby irrevocably submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English Courts."

5. The Plaintiff is a company registered in England. However, the Plaintiff has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court to enforce the security it claims to have for the Defendant's liability for the loan. That security is land to which the lex situs applies. Therefore, the validity of the loan and the security falls to be determined in accordance with Irish law.

6. The loan having been advanced before the enactment and the coming into operation of the Consumer Credit Act, 1995, while the Moneylenders Acts, 1900 and 1933 were still in force, the question which must be considered is whether the Plaintiff was a "moneylender" within the meaning of both Acts, so that it required a licence under Section 5 of the Act of 1933 to carry on the business of money lending lawfully in this jurisdiction. The stance of the Plaintiff is that, although it did not have a licence under Section 5 of the Act of 1933, it was entitled to operate as an unlicensed moneylender in making the advance to and taking the security from the Defendant.

In Section 6 of the Act of 1900 the expression, "moneylender" was defined as including:-

"....every person whose business is that of money lending, or who advertises or announces himself or holds himself out in any way as carrying on that business...."

7. It is clear from the evidence that the Plaintiff's business was at the material time that of moneylender and, indeed, this is acknowledged. Section 6 then went on to exclude certain persons from the definition of "moneylender", namely:-


(a) Any pawnbroker in respect of business carried on by him in accordance with the provisions of the Acts for the time being in force in relation to pawnbrokers. This exclusion did not apply to the Plaintiff.

(b) Any registered society within the meaning of the Friendly Societies Act, 1896 or any society registered or having rules certified under Sections 2 and 4 of that Act or under the Benefit Buildings Societies Act, 1836, or the Loan Societies Act, 1840 or the Building Societies Acts, 1874 to 1894. This exclusion did not apply to the Plaintiff.

(c) Any body corporate, incorporated or empowered by a special Act of Parliament to lend money in accordance with such special Act. This exclusion did not apply to the Plaintiff.

(d) Any person bona fide carrying on the business of banking or insurance or bona fide carrying on any business not having for its primary object the lending of money, in the course of which and for the purposes whereof he lends money. This exclusion did not apply to the Plaintiff.

(e) Any body corporate for the time being exempted from the Act of 1901 by order of the Board of Trade. Since 1934, applications for exemptions have been governed by the Moneylenders (Exemption of Bodies Corporate) Regulations 1934 (SR&O No. 11 of 1934). There is no evidence that the Plaintiff had obtained any such exemption in 1994 and the only inference which can be drawn from the stance adopted by the Plaintiff is that it had obtained no such exemption.

8. An additional category of exclusion was added to Section 6 by the Moneylenders Act, 1900 [Section 6(f)] Order 1983 (S.I. No. 344 of 1983). This exclusion related to certain classes of Industrial and Provident Societies. This exclusion did not apply to the Plaintiff.

Section 5(5) of the Act of 1933 provided, inter alia, that, if any person carried
on business as a moneylender, without having in force a proper moneylender's licence authorising him so to do, such person would be guilty of an offence under Section 5. Moreover, it was well settled that a transaction entered into in contravention of the restrictions contained in the Act of 1933 was unlawful, and any contract which formed part of it conferred no rights on the moneylender [see, for instance, Cornelius -v- Phillips (1918) A.C. 199], who cannot now maintain any action to recover the money lent or enforce any security taken by him in the course of the transaction.

9. The Defendant has filed two affidavits in answer to the Plaintiff's claim for possession. The first was sworn on 22nd October, 1997 and in it the Defendant advanced a number of defences to the Plaintiff's claim but did not allege that the transaction was void. The second was sworn on 20th April, 1998 and filed in Court on that day, the day the Plaintiff's application was heard. In that affidavit the Defendant averred that he had been advised that the loan was void and unenforceable unless the lender had the appropriate licence to act in this jurisdiction and that the charge is also void and unenforceable and is tainted by the loan transaction. The Plaintiff did not seek an adjournment to deal with this averment and I can only assume that the Plaintiff was not taken by surprise by it and had nothing further to say on the point.

10. On the evidence before me, it would appear that the advance to the Defendant was an advance made in this jurisdiction by the Plaintiff, who was a person carrying on the business of moneylending in this jurisdiction without a licence, and in the circumstances was made in contravention of Section 5 of the Act of 1933. Accordingly, the advance is irrecoverable and the security is unenforceable.

11. The Plaintiff's application is refused.


© 1998 Irish High Court


BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/1998/63.html