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High Court of Ireland Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Cavan County Council v. Eircell Ltd. [1999] IEHC 125 (10th March, 1999) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/1999/125.html Cite as: [1999] IEHC 125 |
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1. It
seems clear from the terms of Article 9 of the Local Government (Planning and
Development) Regulations, 1994 (S.I. No.86 of 1994) when read in conjunction
with Clause 29, Part I of the second Schedule to those Regulations, that the
development complained of does not fall within the exemptions contained in
those provisions. It was not an "exempted development" within the meaning of
the Planning Act.
2. It
follows that Cavan County Council is acting properly in seeking injunctions
under Section 27 of the 1976 Act, as amended.
3. The
only question which arises is whether this Court, in its limited discretion,
should refuse such injunctions. I fail to see that there are any grounds which
would justify such refusal or even an adjournment of the application.
4. It
undoubtedly happens from time to time that a County Council consents to an
adjournment of a Section 27 Application pending the outcome of an application
for retention permission. But there is no such consent in this case. The
Council had given the Respondent an earlier opportunity to regularise its
planning permission obligations for all its similar developments throughout the
county but that opportunity had not been availed of.
5. A
Court should be slow to adjourn a Section 27 application pending an application
for retention permission if such adjournment is opposed by the Planning
Authority vested with the important statutory obligation to enforce the
planning laws within the county. There are cases where it might be
appropriate, as for instance, where an individual quite innocently went ahead
with a single development unaware that the permission was required.
6. But
this case is quite different. The developer here is a major commercial company
in competition with another major company in the same business. It is a
subsidiary of one of the most important semi-state companies in the country.
It seems to me inconceivable that such a company would not have got the best
legal advice on the planning implications of its intended erections of poles
and antennae. If it did not, it was reckless.
8. There
is a widespread belief (the truth or falsely of which is irrelevant) that a
retention permission is easier to obtain than an original permission for
development. It is important that there would not be a public perception that
the Respondent might be abusing the system in this way in order to achieve its
ends even if that is not in fact the case.
9. I
understand that in another case Kearns J. may have delayed granting an
injunction but I must decide this case on the facts before me.