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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> UPM Kymmene Corporation v. BWG Ltd. [1999] IEHC 178 (11th June, 1999) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/1999/178.html Cite as: [1999] IEHC 178 |
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1. The
alleged wrong which founds the Plaintiffs' claim against the Defendant in these
proceedings is a breach of warranty in relation to the funding of pension
schemes contained in a share purchase agreement dated 21st December, 1981 (the
Share Purchase Agreement) made between Brooks Watson Group Limited, as vendor,
and Rauma-Repola OY, as purchaser. At the time Brooks Watson Group Limited,
the Defendant, which is now incorporated under the name BWG Limited, which will
be referred to as "the Vendor" in this judgment, was the owner of the entire
issued share capital in three companies, namely, Brooks Thomas Limited, the
third named Plaintiff; Brooks Haughton Limited, the fourth named Plaintiff; and
Brooks Hanley Limited, the fifth named Plaintiff, which will be referred to as
"Thomas", "Haughton", and "Hanley" respectively and collectively as "the
Companies" in this judgment. In the Share Purchase Agreement, the Vendor
agreed to sell the entire issued share capital in Thomas, Haughton and Hanley
to Rauma-Repola OY, a public company incorporated in Finland which, by reason
of subsequent mergers, is now known as UPM Kymmene Corporation, the first named
Plaintiff, which will be referred to as "the Purchaser" in this judgment. In
broad terms, the relief which the Plaintiffs, which for simplicity will be
regarded as being synonymous with the Purchaser in this judgment, seek in these
proceedings is an indemnity and damages for breach of contract.
2. During
and for many years, prior to 1981, Thomas, Haughton and Hanley operated
builders' providers and hardware businesses in Dublin, Cork and Sligo
respectively. By 1980, the Companies were experiencing serious trading and
financial difficulties and were losing money. The financial status of Thomas
was such that its auditors, Price Waterhouse & Company, noted in the
accounts for the year ended 31st December, 1980 that the accounts were prepared
on a "going concern" basis by reason of confirmation by the parent company, the
Vendor, that it would continue to provide Thomas with the finance necessary to
fund its budgeted operating requirements during 1981. The Purchaser was a
major Finnish Corporation engaged in forestry, ship building and engineering.
It was the biggest producer of sawed timber in Europe at the time and still is.
It had had a long term trading relationship with Thomas, Haughton and Hanley
and between 80% and 90% of imports of its product into this country was through
those companies.
3. The
take-over of Thomas, Haughton and Hanley by the Purchaser was anything but
hostile. In fact, it was initiated by the Vendor by a contact in March 1981.
The contact was welcomed because the Purchaser was interested in distribution
as well as production of timber and wanted to test the waters in Europe by
starting in a small country like Ireland. The evidence shows that the reality
of the transaction was that both parties were not merely willing, but eager.
4. However,
the evidence shows that, on the Purchaser's side, the eagerness was tempered by
caution. First, early on in the negotiations it became obvious to the
Purchaser that Thomas was grossly over-staffed and that there was a need for
about one hundred redundancies, which the Purchaser required the Vendor to
effect before the transaction was completed. Because of this requirement, it
was necessary that secrecy should surround the negotiations. Secondly, the
Purchaser performed a due diligence process during the negotiations and the
internal auditors of the Purchaser visited the Companies. Thirdly, the
Purchasers retained legal and accountancy expertise in this jurisdiction in
relation to the proposed acquisition: legal advice from Messrs. Gerard Scallon
& O'Brien, Solicitors, the partner dealing with the transaction being Mr.
Timothy Crowley; and, with the approbation of the Vendor, to avoid a conflict
of interest, commercial, accountancy and taxation advice from Price Waterhouse
& Company, the partner dealing with the transaction on behalf of the
Purchaser being Mr. Frank Belton, who had not been involved in the audit of the
Companies. The Purchaser also consulted banks in this jurisdiction, Bank of
Ireland, Ulster Bank Limited and Ulster Investment Bank Limited because the
acquisition was to be funded by borrowings in Ireland. The Purchaser did not
retain any consultant actuary or pension advisor in this jurisdiction in
relation to the pension schemes which are at issue in these proceedings.
5. The
negotiations between the parties proceeded over the spring, summer and early
autumn of 1981 and culminated in a crucial meeting on 9th September, 1981 at
which the Vendor was represented by, among others, John Harnett who, at the
time, was the Group Financial Director of the Brooks Watson Group and Mr.
Michael Williams, a partner in the firm of McCann Fitzgerald Roche &
Dudley, Solicitors, who were acting for the Vendor in the transaction. The
Purchaser was represented by Mr. Kari Makkonen who, at the time, was the
Financial Director of the saw milling division of the Purchaser, Mr. Akso
Matula who, at the time, was the Senior Vice President and General Counsel for
corporate legal affairs of the Purchaser, Mr. Crowley and Mr. Belton. I will
return to that meeting later to consider what transpired at it in relation to
the pension schemes. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that at
the end of the meeting, a letter of offer, signed by Mr. Makkonen on behalf of
the Purchaser, was given to the Vendor in which the Purchaser offered to
purchase the entire issued share capital of the Companies on the terms of a
share purchase agreement attached to the letter. The attached document was the
Share Purchase Agreement, which was ultimately executed on 21st December, 1981.
The offer was open for acceptance between 30th September, 1981 and 30th
October, 1981 and was irrevocable up to 30th October, 1981. Completion was to
take place on the expiry of seven days from acceptance. The consideration was
a combination of a cash payment of £675,474 and repayment of long term and
short term loans due by the Companies to the Vendor and its subsidiaries. It
is common case that the acquisition was at a discount to net assets.
6. That
offer was subsequently revoked by mutual agreement on 29th October, 1981 and
replaced by a call option given by the Vendor to the Purchaser and a put option
given by the Purchaser to the Vendor in relation to the entire issued share
capital in the Companies on the terms of the Share Purchase Agreement, the
options to be exercised on or before 1st December, 1981. The cash
consideration was paid on the execution of this agreement. By a further
agreement dated 1st December, 1981, the period for the exercise of the options
was extended to 23rd December, 1981.
7. As
I understand it, the rather tortuous course of the transaction was occasioned
by the fact that the redundancies required by the Purchaser were being effected
in the background.
8. At
any rate, the transaction was finalised on 21st December, 1981 by the execution
of the Share Purchase Agreement in the terms agreed on 9th September, 1981.
Completion of the Share Purchase Agreement took place on the same day,
whereupon the Purchaser became the owner of the Companies.
10. In
the Share Purchase Agreement, the expressions "the Balance Sheet" and "the
Balance Sheet Date" were defined as meaning the balance sheets and accounts of
the Companies as at 31st December, 1980. The Disclosure Letter was a letter
from the Vendor's solicitors to the Purchaser's solicitors of the same date as
the Share Purchase Agreement, 21st December, 1981, in which, as the preliminary
recitals in the Share Purchase Agreement recited, the Vendor had disclosed to
the Purchaser "certain exceptions to the warranties" contained in the Share
Purchase Agreement, the terms of the Disclosure Letter having been agreed on
9th September, 1981.
11. The
principal warranty in issue in these proceedings is paragraph 25 of Part I of
the Second Schedule which provided as follows:-
13. In
relation to paragraph 25 and in so far as it is relevant to the issues in these
proceedings, the Disclosure Letter contained two sub-paragraphs. The first
provided as follows:-
14. The
second sub-paragraph related to the pension entitlement of a former director
which was covered in the provision for retirement benefits in the balance sheet
of Thomas at 31st December, 1980 and, in effect was an undertaking by the
Vendor to complete the funding of the pension, which it had agreed to "fully
fund", by making a payment to Irish Pensions Trust Limited (IPT) on 31st
December, 1981.
15. Appendix
4 contained three letters dated respectively 27th August, 1981, 3rd September,
1981 and 3rd September, 1981 from IPT to the Vendor. IPT was the Vendor's
pension advisor and the trustee of the five pension schemes which were in place
for the Companies' employees. Four of the schemes are in issue in these
proceedings, namely, the Staff Pension Fund, which related to employees in all
three Companies and which was by far the biggest of the funds, the estimated
pensionable salaries of the members aggregating £1.888 million in 1981;
the Cork Timber and Hardware Trade Group Fund which related to wage earners not
only in Haughton but in other companies in the Cork area, the estimated
pensionable salaries of the Haughton members aggregating £0.59 million in
1981; the Thomas Fund for Manual Workers, the wages of the members aggregating
£0.845 million in 1981; and the Pension Fund for Directors and Senior
Executives, the smallest of the funds with just thirteen members in 1980 whose
salaries aggregated £0.189 million. The investment medium in the case of
each of the funds was contracts of insurance with Irish Life Assurance Company
Limited (Irish Life). Irish Life carried out periodic valuations of the funds
for and gave actuarial advice to IPT and the Vendor.
16. As
the core issue on liability is the extent, if any, to which the three letters
"watered down" the substance of the unqualified warranty given in paragraph 25,
it is necessary to quote from the letters extensively. I propose to do so
without putting any interpretative gloss on the content of the letters at this
juncture.
17. The
letter of 27th August, 1981 primarily related to the Staff Pension Fund. The
letter recorded that the triennial valuation of that fund as at 1st January,
1981 had been completed by Irish Life in accordance with IPT's instructions and
the results had been analysed by IPT. It was then divided into four segments.
In the second, it recorded that the valuation disclosed the "profile" of the
pension fund over the three years of the review, which was set out, showing the
number of members and the aggregate of pensionable salaries in each of the
three years under review (1979, 1980 and 1981), in relation to each of the
Companies, the figures for 1981 being estimated. It also recorded that in 1981
the funding rate as a percentage of pensionable salaries was 10% in the case of
Thomas, 12.6% in the case of Haughton and 12.3% in the case of Hanley. There
followed a statement in the following terms:-
18. The
third segment of the letter went on to state that the same valuation
assumptions as at 1st January, 1978 had been again employed and the assumptions
were then listed. Two items in the list of assumptions, in particular, were
the subject of comment during the hearing. The first was item 9 which was in
the following terms:-
20. The
fourth segment of the letter was the subject of very considerable debate during
the hearing and was in the following terms:-
21. While
the letter of 27th August, 1981 was primarily concerned with the Staff Pension
Fund, two matters were dealt with at the outset in the first segment. First,
there was confirmation that the valuation excluded "ex-gratia" pensions paid to
retired staff as these were valued separately by IPT in January each year for
the purposes of the Group accounts. The second matter was subsequently covered
in the first letter of 3rd September, 1981.
22. In
relation to the Cork Timber and Hardware Trade Group Fund, the salient features
of the fund were outlined. These disclosed that a uniform funding rate applied
to all participating employers. The last valuation had been carried out as of
1st January, 1981 and the funding rate recommended for pensions and death
benefits was 13.9%, which was a marginal increase over the rate recommended by
the previous valuation completed in 1978. In relation to valuation
assumptions, it was stated as follows:-
24. It
was further stated that negotiations were then underway to improve the
definition of Final Pensionable Salary to the average of the last twelve months
and if adopted this would add .8% to the funding rate.
25. In
relation to the Thomas Fund for Manual Workers, the letter contained a brief
summary of the nature of the fund, the benefits payable under it, the funding
method and the valuation date. In relation to valuation assumptions, it was
stated that the same assumptions were employed as set out in page 2 of the
report of 27th August, 1981 on the Staff Pension Fund with the past service
liability spread over 50 years. There followed a profile of the fund over the
years 1979 to 1981 giving details of number of members, actual wages, members
contributions and Thomas' outlay. In relation to the "Standard Valuation Test"
it was stated as follows:-
26. The
second letter of 3rd September, 1981 related to the Pension Fund for Directors
and Senior Executives. It contained a description of the nature of the fund
and a brief resume of the benefits structure. It disclosed that each member's
benefit was re-costed individually at 1st January in each year based on his
then salary. In other words, the cost was reviewed each year and no specific
provision was built in for salary increases. Past service liability was spread
over the remaining term to age 65 for each member and, consequently, the
question of a sufficiency test did not arise. The fund profile for 1978, 1979
and 1980 was set out showing the number of members, the actual salaries and the
fund cost.
27. There
were two further warranties in the Share Purchase Agreement on which the
Purchaser relies.
28. First,
in paragraph 1 of Part I of the 2nd Schedule, the Vendor warranted in relation
to the Balance Sheet, that it had been prepared on a consistent basis and in
accordance with general accepted accounting principles and standards, was
accurate in all material respects and showed a true and fair view of the state
of affairs of the relevant Company and of its results for the financial year in
question and, in particular, that it contained proper provision or notes of
"all material contingent liabilities". The balance sheet
29. There
was corresponding provision and a similar note in the accounts of Haughton and
Hanley, the amounts provided for being £49,507 and £65,000
respectively. These provisions and notes refer to the so called (probably
inaccurately) "ex-gratia" pensions referred to in the letter of 27th August,
1981 from IPT.
30. Secondly,
in paragraph 33 of Part I of the 2nd Schedule, the Vendor warranted that all
information contained in the Disclosure Letter was when given true and accurate
in all material respects and all other information and documents concerning the
Companies supplied to the Purchaser within the previous twelve months were when
given true and accurate in all material respects and the Vendor went on to
warrant that-
31. In
Clause 5 of the Share Purchase Agreement the Vendor entered into an indemnity
with the Purchaser in the following terms:-
34. Prior
to the crucial meeting of 9th September, 1981, the negotiations between the
Vendor and the Purchaser had been ongoing for over four months. The Purchaser
had been furnished with the audited accounts of the Companies for the year
ended 31st December, 1980 and probably also with management accounts for the
half year ended 30th June, 1981. The due diligence process had taken place.
The preparation of the contract documentation was at an advanced stage. The
Share Purchase Agreement had been drafted by Mr. Crowley and submitted to the
Vendor's solicitors. In relation to paragraph 25, Mr. Crowley testified that
he based the wording of it on a precedent being conscious of the financial
position of the Companies, which he knew were in very significant financial
trouble. The Disclosure Letter had been drafted by the Vendor's solicitors.
On the day prior to the meeting, 8th September, 1981, the Vendor's solicitors
had furnished the Disclosure Letter and the three IPT letters to the
Purchaser's solicitors who, in turn, had furnished them to Price Waterhouse
& Company.
35. As
to the circumstances in which disclosure in relation to the pension funds was
made by reference to the IPT letters, Mr. Williams testified that on the basis
of his instructions he understood that the pension funds were not adequately
funded and he advised the Vendor that the level of under-funding was a matter
which required to be disclosed. In discussions with his client on the matter
it was agreed that, with a view to giving a precise description of the
situation, letters would be sought from IPT to append to the disclosure letter.
Mr. David Craig, who at the time was the Group Financial Controller of the
Vendor and to whom the IPT letters were addressed, testified that IPT was made
aware that the Vendor was negotiating the sale of the Companies and that the
letters were required to inform a prospective purchaser of the pension situation.
36. It
is common case that the meeting of 9th September, 1981 was a long meeting which
lasted nine or ten hours. The redundancy issue was the major controversial
issue. The pension issue absorbed only fifteen or twenty minutes of the entire
meeting.
37. It
is the Purchaser's contention that the Purchaser was given a verbal assurance
at the meeting on 9th September, 1981 that the pension schemes were fully
funded as regards past liability. Mr. Matula testified that he asked Mr.
Harnett what the Disclosure Letter and the three IPT letters meant and Mr.
Harnett responded that they meant that the pensions were fully funded. Mr.
Matula then explained the situation to Mr. Makkonen. Mr. Makkonen testified
that he understood that Mr. Harnett confirmed to Mr. Matula that the pensions
were fully funded and that Mr. Williams had given a similar assurance to Mr.
Crowley. Mr. Harnett denied that he had given any assurance to Mr. Matula or
to any other representative of the Purchaser that the pension schemes were
"fully funded" or used words which would have conveyed that impression. His
view was that the IPT letters clearly disclosed that the schemes were not fully
funded.
38. Mr.
Crowley testified that when he received the Disclosure Letter and the IPT
letters and read them, they underpinned his belief that the pension schemes
were fully funded. He understood that the letters were given for the purposes
of establishing that past service liabilities were fully funded. That
assumption was backed by the general conversation which took place at the
meeting on the following day with Mr. Harnett and Mr. Matula that there was no
under-funding of past service. His recollection of his conversation with Mr.
Williams was that he came away from the meeting assured by Mr. Williams that
the pensions were fully funded. Mr. Williams was adamant, however, that he did
not make any statement oral or otherwise to indicate that the pensions were
adequately funded. In the light of this, Mr. Crowley acknowledged that
something must have happened between himself and Mr. Williams which caused a
misunderstanding between them.
39. The
three representatives of the Vendor who testified in relation to the meeting
and the IPT letters, Mr. Harnett, Mr. Craig and Mr. Williams, all testified
that they were surprised that the IPT letters had evoked no reaction from the
Purchaser's representatives.
40. When
it was first alleged by the Purchaser in correspondence in May 1984 that the
Purchaser had repeatedly required assurances from the Vendor that the pension
schemes were fully funded and that those assurances had been given verbally,
McCann Fitzgerald Roche & Dudley, who were acting for the Vendor at the
time, repudiated the allegation of oral misrepresentation on the basis that it
was unfounded and unjustified. The Plaintiffs have not based their claim in
these proceedings on any allegation of oral misrepresentation. The relevance
of what transpired at the meeting on 9th September, 1981 arises out of the
Purchasers' joinder of issue with the Vendor's plea of contributory negligence
on the part of the Purchaser and its professional advisors.
41. On
the evidence, I find that at the meeting on 9th September, 1981 the Purchasers'
representatives were not given any oral assurances that the pension schemes
were fully funded as to past service liabilities. In fact, the actuarial
advice which the Vendor had from Irish Life and IPT indicated that the pension
schemes were grossly under-funded as to past service liabilities. The officers
of the Vendor and its professional advisers who were negotiating with the
Purchaser were aware of that fact and they were aware of the necessity to
disclose it to the Purchaser. They sought to make such disclosure by means of
the IPT letters and the contents of the letters themselves, in my view, bear
this out. It is inconceivable, in my view, that the officers or professional
advisers of the Vendor would have asserted that the pension schemes were fully
funded as to past liabilities in the face of the IPT letters. I believe that
when they testified seventeen years after the event, Mr. Makkonen and Mr.
Matula were mistaken in their recollection of what transpired at the meeting on
9th September, 1981, notwithstanding that Mr. Makkonen was not prepared to
admit of this possibility because, as he testified, he had to first collect his
mind in relation to the matter in 1983, just one and a half years after the
event. The transaction discussed at the meeting on 9th September, 1981 was a
very complex transaction. The letter of offer with the attached Share Purchase
Agreement and its appendices, which was signed at the conclusion of the
meeting, ran to 226 pages. The issue which was of paramount importance was the
issue of the redundancies. In these circumstances, a mistaken recollection is
understandable.
42. The
take-over of the Companies by the Purchaser coincided with a period of economic
recession. In the early years, the Companies incurred severe trading losses.
It became necessary to reduce the work force drastically and to effect
redundancies over and above the redundancies which were effected prior to
completion. The post completion redundancies cost the Purchaser about £4
million. Eventually trading improved and after six bad years, the Companies
had ten good years and, in the final analysis, the take-over was not considered
a failure.
43. The
first notification given by the Purchaser to the Vendor of a claim on foot of
the warranty in the Share Purchase Agreement in relation to the funding of the
pension schemes of the Companies was contained in a telex of 9th March, 1984
from Mr. Crowley to Mr. Williams. This telex coincided with an announcement of
a proposed take-over of the Brooks Watson Group by Irish Distillers Group.
These proceedings were initiated by a plenary summons which issued on 28th
September, 1987. The primary relief sought by the Purchaser in the proceedings
is a declaration that the Purchaser is entitled to be indemnified by the
Defendant in respect of all payments made or to be made by the Purchaser for
the purpose of eliminating or reducing the shortfall in the funding of the
pension schemes of the Companies which existed at 21st December, 1981. The
Purchaser also claims damages for breach of agreement and interest.
44. At
the hearing it was acknowledged on behalf of the Vendor that, on the basis of
the actuarial assumptions used by Irish Life and IPT in valuing the funds, the
pension schemes were not adequately funded to fully secure past liabilities as
at 21st December, 1981. However, the evidence establishes that neither the
Purchaser, the Companies nor the second named Plaintiff has had to make any
payment to anybody on account of that shortfall. The evidence further
establishes that after completion neither the Purchaser, the Companies, nor the
second named Plaintiff had to make any contributions to the pension schemes
beyond the level provided for in the IPT letters to secure benefits in respect
of the service of employees of the Companies. However, it is the Purchaser's
position that this outcome arose because of the redundancies effected post
completion, which cost the Purchaser £4 million and which resulted in
reduced membership of the pension schemes. The Purchaser also complains that
it has been prevented from availing of contribution holidays and reduced rates
of contribution in the years since completion because of the existence of the
shortfall.
45. Having
regard to the pleadings and the evidence, the issues which fall for
determination are as follows:-
46. The
principal witness called on behalf of the Purchaser on the actuarial aspects of
the matter was Mr. Alan W. Botterill, an actuary and a principal in the firm of
Towers Perrin, a firm of actuaries and pension advisers which operates on a
global basis advising on employee benefits and human resources issues. Mr.
Botterill's professional qualifications were gained and all his experience as
an actuary is based on practice in the United Kingdom. Mr. Botterill's
evidence was supplemented by the evidence of Mr. Peter Delaney, an experienced
actuary practising in this jurisdiction for over thirty years.
47. The
principal actuarial expert called on behalf of the Vendor was Mr. Derek
McNamee, a principal in the firm of Buck Consultants, which also operates on a
global basis and is one of the largest employee benefit actuarial firms in the
world. Mr. McNamee is a member of the Irish branch of Buck Consultants and for
over twenty years he has been working exclusively in the area of Irish pension
schemes. Mr. McNamee's evidence was supplemented by the evidence of Paul
Kelly, an actuary who has thirty years experience in pensions, over the last
twenty years in this jurisdiction with Mercers. Mr. Breffni John Byrne, a
chartered accountant and a senior partner in Arthur Andersen, also testified on
behalf of the Vendor, on the commercial and accountancy aspects of the matter.
The Vendor has served third party notices on IPT and McCann Fitzgerald. The
issues between the Vendor and the Third Parties and issues between the Third
Parties inter se have been postponed until the determination of the Purchaser's
claim against the Vendor. Both Mr. Kelly and Mr. Byrne were originally
instructed by McCann Fitzgerald in connection with the matter.
48. While
there was a wide divergence of opinion between the experts on each side on the
outcome of the liability and quantum issues, the actuarial principles
applicable to resolution of those issues were clearly identified in the
evidence and there was a large measure of agreement among the experts as to
their proper application in the circumstances prevailing in this case.
49. Broadly
speaking, the Purchaser's contention is that the Vendor warranted in paragraph
25 that the pension schemes were fully funded to secure past service
liabilities as at 21st December, 1981 and that neither the Disclosure Letter
nor the IPT letters effectively qualified or varied that representation. The
Vendor's position is that, while paragraph 25 standing alone has the meaning
ascribed to it by the Purchaser, paragraph 25 was materially qualified by the
IPT letters which disclosed the fact of under-funding and also the contribution
rates which would have to be paid in the future to rectify the problem.
50. In
order to ascertain what representation was made by the Vendor it is necessary
to interpret paragraph 25 in conjunction with the Disclosure Letter and the
three IPT letters in the context of the Share Purchase Agreement and all of the
provisions thereof including Clause 13 and the utmost good faith provision in
paragraph 33. A similar exercise is necessary in relation to paragraph 1,
which must be construed in conjunction with the Disclosure Letter and the IPT
letters and the notes to the accounts for the year ended 31st December, 1980.
Before indicating what I consider to be the true meaning of these provisions
and what the Vendor represented, I propose outlining the general principles I
consider applicable in construing the provisions.
51. First,
the basic rules of construction which the Court must apply in interpreting the
documents which contain the parties' agreement are not in dispute. The Court's
task is to ascertain the intention of the parties and that intention must be
ascertained from the language they have used considered in the light of the
surrounding circumstances and the object of the contract. Moreover, in
attempting to ascertain the presumed intention of the parties, the Court should
adopt an objective, rather than a subjective approach, and should consider what
would have been the intention of reasonable persons in the position of the
parties.
52. Secondly,
the parties are not agreed as to how the contra proferentem rule of
construction is to be applied if an ambiguity is found in the language of the
agreement. The Vendor's contention is that, as the Share Purchase Agreement
was drafted by Mr. Crowley, the warranty must be construed narrowly against the
Purchaser. I do not accept this proposition. While it is true that the Share
Purchase Agreement, including paragraph 25, was drafted by Mr. Crowley on
behalf of the Purchaser, the representation made and the warranty given was
comprised in Clause 25, which was adopted by the Vendor, and in the Disclosure
Letter and the IPT letters, which were the Vendor's documents. The maker of
the representation and the profferer of the warranty in relation to the funded
status of the pension schemes was the Vendor and, insofar as it is relevant,
the contra proferentem rule operates against the Vendor.
53. Thirdly,
having regard to the circumstances in which the entire agreement was put
together, in my view, the "utmost good faith" obligation assumed by the Vendor
under paragraph 33 is not of particular significance. The fact is that in
seeking a warranty in the terms of paragraph 25, which, standing on its own,
represented that past service liabilities as at completion were fully funded,
whatever that means, the Purchaser put the onus on the Vendor to make candid,
full and proper disclosure as to the funded status of past service liabilities
as at that date if the Vendor was to create an effective exception to the full
rigors of paragraph 25. In the circumstances, the duty of disclosure on the
Vendor would have been no less if paragraph 33 had been omitted.
54. Fourthly,
the representation the meaning of which is sought to be ascertained was
compounded by several statements contained in a number of documents. The
general rule of construction is that all the statements must be considered in
their entirety, and in their bearing on one another, the primary object being
to ascertain whether the conjoint effect of the whole complex representation is
true or false of the whole of the facts. While it is pointed out in paragraph
1054 of Volume 31 of Halsbury's
Laws
of England,
4th Edition, that the general rule is subject to the qualification that, if one
of the several statements, not inseparably nor necessarily bound up with the
others, has a clear and definite meaning by itself, and that meaning is false
or true, the representee or representor, as the case may be, is entitled to
rely on this falsity or truth respectively, in my view, the exception to the
general rule does not apply in this case. The statements which together make
up the Vendor's representation, namely, Clause 4, paragraph 25, the Disclosure
Letter and the IPT letters are inseparably and necessarily bound together and
none of the statements stands alone.
55. When
one telescopes all the components of the representation, the nub of what the
Vendor was saying can be paraphrased as follows: I say that no sums will in the
future become payable by the Company to secure or otherwise fund in full any
pension or other benefit in respect of service prior to completion subject to
the exceptions disclosed in the IPT letters, which tell you the basis on which
the benefits are being funded. While the representation was framed as a
promise as to what would not occur, in substance, it was and intended to be a
statement of the then current funded status of the pension schemes in respect
of past liabilities. In endeavouring to ascertain the conjoint effect of the
whole representation the crucial question is whether the contents of the IPT
letters constituted an exception or exceptions to the statement in Clause 25
that past service liability was fully funded as of 21st December, 1981.
56. Before
considering the terms of the IPT letters, I would make two observations.
First, I do not accept the argument advanced on behalf of the Purchaser that,
if the IPT letters disclosed, for instance, that the past service liabilities
were, say, 50% funded as at 21st December, 1981, the mechanism of the
disclosure was deficient and ineffective, in that the situation was not one of
an exceptional matter being disclosed as a variation of a general position but
rather the negation of the general position. In my view, if it was clearly
stated in the IPT letters that past service liabilities as of 21st December,
1981 were only funded to the level of, say, 50%, that statement would operate
as a valid exception to the warranty contained in paragraph 25 which, in
essence, is a warranty that as of that date past service liabilities were 100%
funded. While making the representation in that manner would have been both
inelegant and convoluted, the fundamental consideration is whether the
Purchaser would have been properly alerted to the disclosure. In my view the
Purchaser would have been properly alerted to the disclosure and could not have
been lured into a false state of complacency as to what the true position was,
as the Purchaser suggested. Secondly, if the IPT letters clearly disclosed,
say, a 50% funding level of past service liabilities as of 21st December, 1981,
the failure of the disclosure to elicit any reaction from the Purchaser's
representatives to the surprise of the Vendor's representatives would not have
imposed any onus on the Vendor's representatives to further apprise the
Purchaser's representatives of the true position.
57. I
propose now considering what, if anything, the IPT letter of 27th August, 1981
disclosed as to the funding of past service liabilities of the Staff Pension
Fund. Taking an overview of the letter, Mr. Botterill's opinion was that it
did not give him any information about the extent to which the assets in the
pension scheme covered the benefits accrued for service before completion.
58. The
second segment of that letter, which recorded the "profile" of the staff
pension fund over the three years covered by the then most recent Irish Life
valuation, gave anyone reading it a considerable amount of information about
that fund. A simple calculation would have enabled the reader to ascertain the
estimated amount of the contribution which each of the Companies would have to
make to that fund in 1981. It also gave an insight into the approach of Thomas
historically to contributing to that fund. The funding rate recommended by the
actuarial advisor, Irish Life, on the previous valuation review in 1978 had not
been adopted by Thomas but instead was being phased in over five years. By
1981 Thomas's contribution for that year (10% of pensionable salaries) was
2.25% short of the recommended funding rate of 12.25% of pensionable salaries.
While this information gave no precise indication about the funded status of
past service liabilities, in the case of a company such as Thomas which was
experiencing trading difficulties and serious financial difficulties, the
obvious inference to be drawn from it was that the accruing liabilities of the
pension scheme over the years in question were not being sufficiently funded.
Mr. Botterill acknowledged that this was a reasonable conclusion to draw.
59. The
third segment of the letter recorded the valuation assumptions used by Irish
Life in valuing the Staff Pension Fund. This gave the reader with the
appropriate expertise the information to assess the reasonableness or otherwise
of the assumptions underlying Irish Life's valuation. Mr. Botterill
characterised item 9, "past service - spread over 40 years" as a statement of
methodology rather than an assumption. While he acknowledged that one could
draw the conclusion from it that part of the Company's annual contribution to
the pension fund would be addressing some element of past service, his opinion
was that one could not conclude from the statement that there was a deficit in
the fund. However, against the background of a trading and financial history
such as that of Thomas, Mr. Botterill acknowledged that, if he was advising a
client on an acquisition, he would investigate further. In my view, the
disclosure in item 9 would have put a reasonable purchaser on enquiry as to the
funded status of past service liabilities. Similarly, item 10, which outlined
the policy in relation to sufficiency testing, would have put a reasonable
purchaser on such enquiry.
60. The
fourth segment of the letter set out the results of Irish Life's valuation of
the Staff Pension Fund as at 1st January, 1981 in terms of the revised funding
rate recommended by Irish Life, which showed an increase on the 1978 funding
levels. From the perspective of a prospective purchaser of the Companies that
was very useful information because it enabled the prospective purchaser to
estimate the level of contribution it would be advisable to make in future
years. That segment also set out the results of a "further standard test". As
I have stated earlier, there was considerable debate as to the meaning of that
portion of the letter during the hearing and, indeed, the Purchaser queried as
to whether it was intelligible at all. The results of the test were expressed
in percentages, for example, in the case of Thomas, as 33%. It is obvious that
the application of the test formula identified - t/n x Pensionable Salary at a
specific date - would not give a result expressed in percentage terms. Mr.
Botterill's view was that the "t/n test" described in the letter did not
provide any meaningful information on whether the assets of the fund as of the
calculation date would be adequate to provide for expected benefits for service
completed up to the date at which the calculations were made. That would
undoubtedly have been the case if the only exercise involved in the "further
standard test" was the application of the "test formula" described. Both Mr.
McNamee and Mr. Kelly, who had considerable experience of Irish Life actuarial
valuations, explained that the "test formula" as described merely set out the
parameters of the test. The objective of the standard test was to compare
assets which had already been accumulated within the fund with the liabilities
which had accrued in respect of past service of members. Mr. Kelly explained
that the "test formula" as described gave him two vital pieces of information
as to how the test had been carried out. The first was that the calculation
was posited on service with the employer, as opposed to membership of the
scheme. The second was that the pensions were calculated by reference to
pensionable salary at the assessment date, as opposed to an estimate of
pensionable salary at retirement so that the valuation was on a discontinuance,
rather than an ongoing, basis.
61. It
is clear from Mr. Kelly's evidence that the application of the standard test
referred to by IPT is a complex process designed to arrive at the value of the
assets of the fund in aggregate and the value of the liabilities of the fund in
aggregate. The test result is the percentage produced by the division of the
asset value by the liability value. The assessment of the value of the
liabilities in aggregate involves calculating the accrued pension of every
member of the scheme. The first step in that process is calculating the
projected pension the member would be entitled to if he remained in service
until retirement date. The second step is a determination of how much of that
pension has accrued up to the date of assessment. It is in these calculations
that the "test formula" or the test parameters come into play, identifying the
pensionable salary by reference to which the pension is calculated, depending
on whether the valuation is on an ongoing or a discontinuance basis, and
identifying the factor by which accrual is determined, whether it is service
while in employment or service while a member of the scheme. In calculating
the value of the liabilities of the funds in assessing the shortfall as of 21st
December, 1981, Mr. Botterill went through the very same process, save that the
first step in his calculation of the projected pension was based on projected
final pensionable salary. In other words, his valuation was an ongoing or
funded level basis.
62. Reading
the description of the standard test and the result of the standard test as set
out in the IPT letter of 27th August, 1981 objectively in the light of the
expert actuarial evidence as to the process involved in the standard test, in
my view, what was represented by the Vendor through the medium of that letter
was that as of 1st January, 1981 the Staff Pension Fund was funded to the
extent of 33% in the case of Thomas, 53% in the case of Haughton and 54% in the
case of Hanley to secure benefits accrued in respect of service prior to 1st
January, 1981 on a discontinuance, rather than an ongoing on funded level,
basis, that is to say, not allowing for future salary increases. That
disclosure, in my view, was unambiguous, so that there is no need to resort to
the contra proferentem rule and it properly and in a meaningful way qualified
the statement in paragraph 25. Both the statement and the disclosure were
directed to the same objective: stating the extent to which the relevant scheme
benefits were secured in respect of service prior to a specific date. The
disclosure substituted 1st January, 1981 for 21st December, 1981 as the
relevant date, because that was the date by reference to which the valuation
had been carried out by Irish Life. The disclosure also clarified that the
assessment was done on a discontinuance basis, whereas paragraph 25 did not
address that issue. It follows as a matter of logic and common sense that the
funding deficit would be greater if the calculation was done on an ongoing
basis and future salary increases were taken into account. The disclosure also
clarified that it was service with the Company which formed the basis of the
calculation of the accrued liability. Finally, the disclosure established that
the extent of the funding was, in the case of Thomas, 33% not 100%, so that
there was a deficit of 67%. Similarly, it was implicit that there was a
deficit of 47% in the case of Haughton and a 46% in the case of Hanley.
63. The
first of the IPT letters of 3rd September, 1981 disclosed that the same
standard valuation test has been applied or considered in relation to the two
funds referred to in that letter as had been applied to the Staff Pension Fund.
In the case of the Cork Timber and Hardware Fund, the result disclosed that the
extent of funding of past service liabilities at 1st January, 1981 was 48%, so
that there was a deficit of 52%. That disclosure materially qualified
paragraph 25. In the case of the Thomas Fund for Manual Workers, it disclosed
that the next valuation was not due until 1st July, 1982, but IPT's opinion
was that the next valuation should not require a major upward adjustment in the
funding rate. This disclosure materially qualified paragraph 25, in that it
made it clear that the exercise to ascertain the funded status of the fund as
to past liabilities had not been carried out and, instead of a test result, the
Vendor was giving the Purchaser IPT's opinion as to the likely level of the
recommended funding rate at the next review. The second IPT letter of 3rd
September, 1981 made it clear that the cost of funding the Pension Fund for
Directors and Senior Executives was reviewed annually and that past service
liability was factored into each year's costs. This disclosure also materially
qualified the statement in paragraph 25, because, by definition, that fund was
always going to have a past service liability.
64. It
was urged on behalf of the Purchaser that the duty of the Vendor was to
disclose to the Purchaser in plain and unequivocal terms that the funds were
under-funded or inadequately funded as to past service liabilities. In my
view, that approach would not have enhanced the Purchaser's knowledge of the
true state of affairs. The terminology used in paragraph 25, "fund in full",
was vague and imprecise, in that it did not indicate whether the level of
funding was being assessed on an ongoing or on a discontinuance basis or what
actuarial assumptions were used in the assessment. A disclosure in the
Disclosure Letter or the IPT letters of under-funding or inadequate or
insufficient funding without more would have been equally vague and imprecise.
Moreover, it would have inevitably led to an enquiry as to the extent of the
under-funding, which would inevitably have led to a disclosure in the terms of
the disclosure in the letter of 27th August, 1981. To a reader with advice
from an actuary, there was clear disclosure that the Staff Pension Fund was
under-funded in relation to each Company and the extent of under-funding was,
by implication, disclosed in percentage terms. To a reader with commercial
acumen, as Mr. Byrne's evidence indicated, a similar message was conveyed.
IPT, had it been asked, could have translated the percentages into absolute
terms, as it did in the case of Thomas, translating the implied shortfall of
67% to £802,800, in response to an enquiry from the Personnel Manager of
Thomas on 1st May, 1984.
65. The
facts disclosed in the letter of 27th August, 1981 were of a technical nature
and were conveyed in precise technical language by an actuarial expert. A
reasonable purchaser would have sought actuarial advice if in doubt as to the
meaning of the letter. On the evidence I am satisfied that there were several
independent actuarial and pension consultants practising in Dublin in 1981
whose advice could have been obtained. While the Purchaser became
contractually bound when the letter of offer was signed on 9th September, 1981,
in the sense that the offer was irrevocable up to 30th October, 1981, the
Purchaser was not locked into the contract in the event of a misrepresentation.
It was provided in Clause 4 of the Share Purchase Agreement that, in the event
of it becoming apparent on or before completion that the Vendor was in material
breach of any warranty, the Purchaser might rescind the agreement. The
Purchaser had an opportunity between 9th September, 1981 and 21st December,
1981 to get expert actuarial advice on the IPT letters.
66. Turning
to paragraph 1, the Purchaser's contention that the representation contained in
paragraph 1 was untrue, in that the balance sheets of the Companies did not
contain proper provision or notes of all material contingent liabilities, was
based on the proposition that there was an implied representation in the notes
to the audited accounts that the pension schemes were fully funded. The notes
explained the items in the three balance sheets described as "provision for
retirement benefits", which, it was explained, represented the estimate of the
capitalised value of the relevant Company's liability for pension benefits not
covered by the pension schemes. The notes were informative in that they
disclosed that the main pension liabilities of the Companies were funded by
insurance schemes and that the balance sheet provision was the only contingent
liability for pensions not so funded, in other words, the pensions regarded as
"ex-gratia" pensions by IPT. On an fair reading of the note, in my view, a
reasonable inference could be drawn that the Company's pension liability other
than the liability appearing on the balance sheet was fully funded by the
pension schemes. However, the issue in this case is not whether the Company's
off balance sheet pension liabilities were fully funded by insurance schemes.
The issue is whether at a particular time, at completion, the pension schemes
were adequately funded to cover past service liabilities. As one would expect,
the notes did not speak to that issue at all. They said nothing about the
funding objectives of the schemes or how the funding of past service
liabilities, whether in respect of service before membership or arising out of
improved benefits, was spread. No reasonable person reading the notes would
make any deduction as to the funded status of the off balance sheet pension
schemes at any particular time. Similarly, no reasonable person would make any
deduction as to the funded status of the off balance sheet pension schemes from
the reference to the agreement by Thomas to "fully fund" an ex-gratia pension
in the second sub-paragraph in relation to paragraph 25 in the Disclosure
Letter. Taking the contract documentation in its entirety, it is quite clear
that the pension liabilities for which provision was made in the accounts were
separate and distinct from pensions funded by the insurance contracts with
Irish Life and that the manner of funding of the latter over time was very
complex. By way of general observation, in my view, none of the statements
contained in the contract documentation in relation to the ex-gratia pension
liabilities qualified or modified or on any material way affected the express
statements therein in relation to the pension schemes funded by insurance
contracts.
67. To
summarise my conclusions as to what the Share Purchase Agreement read in
conjunction with the Disclosure Letter and the IPT letters represented in
relation to the funded status of the pension schemes, they are as follows:-
68. On
the evidence it is clear that the foregoing representations were true.
Therefore, in my view, the Purchaser has not established the breach of warranty
alleged.
69. Having
regard to the conclusion I have reached that the Vendor did not misrepresent
the funded status of the pension schemes in relation to past service liability,
so that the Vendor was not in breach of any warranty in the Share Purchase
Agreement, the other issues do not arise. Nonetheless, I propose to make some
general observations on the issue of the remedy which would have been available
to the Purchaser if there had been a breach of warranty in relation to the
funded status of the pension schemes in the circumstances which prevailed in
this case, because they tie in with and hopefully will amplify my views on the
proper construction of the representation in the contract documentation.
70. It
was urged on behalf of the Vendor that the only remedy available to the
Purchaser for breach of warranty was to enforce the indemnity given by the
Vendor in Clause 5 to indemnify the Purchaser against any payment by any of the
Companies or any other depletion or diminution in the value of the assets of
any of the Companies resulting from, inter alia, a breach of warranty. It was
further urged that the Purchaser's approach to the assessment of damages by
reference to the measure of the shortfall in the pension schemes in relation to
past service liabilities at the date of completion was inappropriate because it
did not come within the ambit of the indemnity and that the Purchaser was not
entitled to enlarge upon its rights under the indemnity against the Vendor by
invoking a particular form of measurement of the deficiency in the pension
schemes at the completion date.
71. In
my view, the Purchaser was not confined to one remedy only, namely, to enforce
the indemnity contained in Clause 5, for breach of a warranty in the Share
Purchase Agreement. Clause 5 itself recognised that in addition to the
indemnity, the Purchaser had a right to have its loss as a result of a breach
of warranty made good or compensated for by a payment in accordance with Clause
4. On the proper construction of the Share Purchase Agreement, in my view, it
provided two remedies for breach of warranty. First, it allowed for the normal
measure of damages for breach of warranty. As is pointed out in McGregor on
Damages,
16th Edition (1997) at paragraph 1106, where shares are in some way not up to
the promised standard, this is in the nature of a breach of warranty of quality
and the normal measure is of value as warranted less value in fact. Secondly,
the indemnity included in Clause 5 provided for a measure of restitution of
monies outlayed or assets lost by reason of the warranty not being true. The
measure of damages contended for by the Purchaser clearly would not be
allowable under the indemnity. The question which remains is whether it would
represent the normal measure of damages for breach of warranty in a sale of
shares.
72. If
the Vendor had misrepresented the funded status of the pension schemes as to
past service liabilities, the Purchaser would have acquired the shares and the
Companies burdened with contingent liabilities it had not bargained for. I
think such liabilities would be correctly characterised as contingent, because
any measurement of past service liabilities at any given time is notional,
being based on a large number of assumptions which may or may not represent the
ultimate out-turn. In assessing the normal measure of damages for breach of
warranty in this case, had there been a breach, the crucial question would have
been what was the difference between the value of the shares in the Companies
burdened with those contingent liabilities on 21st December, 1981 and their
value not so burdened. No evidence was adduced as to the value of the shares
in the Companies as of 21st December, 1981 on the two bases, although Mr.
Makonnen testified that, if he had been aware of the under-funding of past
service liabilities, he would have sought compensation, presumably by means of
a reduction of the purchase price, and, if it had not been paid, he would not
have proceeded with the purchase. Therefore, the question which arises is
whether it can be assumed that the quantification of the under-funding of past
service liabilities of the pension schemes in issue would represent the
difference between the valuation of the shares on the two bases. In my view,
in broad terms, it would, although the Court, on the basis of evidence, could
properly allow for the fact that in the particular sale and purchase context
the Purchaser might take a more or less benign view of the pension situation.
I do not accept that the notional basis of the quantification of the shortfall
would render this approach inappropriate as a measure of damages, as submitted
on behalf of the Vendor; it would be no less appropriate than assessing
compensation for future loss of earnings on an actuarial basis and discounting
for adverse contingencies.
73. However,
when one analyses the quantification of the under-funding of the past service
liabilities advanced by Mr. Botterill on behalf of the Purchaser, it cannot be
said that it reflects the "value as warranted" by the Vendor on the basis of
the Purchaser's contention that the warranty is to be found in paragraph 25
alone. In valuing the liabilities of the funds, Mr. Botterill has used the
Irish Life assumptions. However, paragraph 25 on its own without reference to
the IPT letters, did not indicate the actuarial assumptions by reference to
which the pension schemes were funded in full. Even if there were to be
implied into paragraph 25 a term that they were funded in full by reference to
reasonable assumptions, it would be open to the Vendor to argue, as indeed the
Vendor did, that the shortfall should be determined in accordance with any
reasonable set of assumptions, not necessarily the Irish Life assumptions.
This, in my view, highlights the vagueness and the imprecision of paragraph 25
on its own. More significantly, Mr. Botterill calculated the accrued past
service liability on an ongoing or funded level basis. However, the Vendor did
not represent in paragraph 25, taking on its own, that the schemes were funded
in full on an ongoing basis. Again, this highlights the vagueness and
imprecision of paragraph 25, despite Mr. Delaney's assertion that he would not
associate "fully funded" with a discontinuance calculation. When viewed as a
reflection of value as warranted, the quantification of the shortfall advanced
by the Purchaser does not stand up for the simple reason that it does not
reflect what was stated in paragraph 25. It reflects a re-write of paragraph
25.
74. In
contradistinction to the vagueness and imprecision of paragraph 25, by
producing the letter of 27th August, 1981, the Vendor re-wrote the warranty
with precision and accuracy and told the Purchaser in precise terms what the
funded status of the Staff Pension Fund as regards past service liabilities
was: using the Irish Life assumptions and valuing liabilities on a
discontinuance basis, it was under-funded, the extent of the under-funding
being stated in percentage terms and being capable of being stated in absolute
terms on the same basis.