BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] | ||
High Court of Ireland Decisions |
||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> F. (G.) v. B. (J.) [2000] IEHC 112 (28th March, 2000) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2000/112.html Cite as: [2000] IEHC 112 |
[New search] [Help]
1. On
the 9th July, 1988 the marriage of the Petitioner and the Respondent herein was
solominsed as Christ Church in the District of Dun Laoghaire in the County of
Dublin under the authority of a special licence granted by his Grace the Lord
Archbishop of Dublin DD pursuant to the Marriages (Ireland) Act, 1844.
2. By
petition dated the 23rd May, 1997 the Petitioner stated, inter alia, that his
consent to the marriage ceremony was not a full, free and/or informed consent;
further, or in the alternative, prior to and at the date of the marriage
ceremony, by reason of his emotional immaturity, mental state, personality,
temperament and/or nature, the Petitioner had not the capacity to enter into or
sustain a normal marital relationship with the Respondent.
3. There
is one child to the marriage who was born on the 30th December, 1988. The
Petitioner and the Respondent separated in or around 1993 and have not resided
or cohabited together since that date. By Order of the Master of the High
Court made the 25th February, 1998 the issues to be determined were listed and
it was ordered that Dr. Gerry Byrne, Psychiatrist, be appointed to carry out a
psychiatric rather than a physical examination of the Petitioner and also of
the Respondent and to report in writing to the Court.
5. By
answer dated the 2nd March, 1998 the Respondent denies, inter alia, that the
consent of the Petitioner to the marriage ceremony was not a full, free and/or
informed consent;
6. The
Respondent denies and awaits proof that prior to and of the date of the
marriage ceremony, the Petitioner by reason of his emotional immaturity, mental
state, personality, temperament and/or nature, had not the capacity to enter
into and sustain a normal marital relationship with the Respondent whether for
the reasons set out in the Petition or otherwise and the Respondent further
denies that the said marriage ceremony was null and void and of no affect on
that basis.
7. Both
the Petitioner and the Respondent say that there has been no connivance or
conclusion between them in any way whatsoever.
8. A
preliminary issue arose regarding the presence of the medical examiner, Dr.
Gerard Byrne while evidence was to be given by Dr. Brian O’Shea,
Consultant Psychiatrist, in relation to his treatment of his Petitioner and of
the Respondent. A further issue arose as to whether Dr. O’Shea’s
evidence should be taken before that of the Petitioner.
9. I
directed that, as Dr. Byrne had been appointed as Medical Inspector he was
entitled to be present during the evidence given by Dr. O’Shea. I also
directed that it was a matter for Counsel for the Petitioner to decide as to
the order of witnesses (so long as the witness confined himself to facts rather
than opinions which were not adduced in evidence.)
10. Counsel
for the Respondent objected to evidence being given in relation to her client.
I directed that, as Dr. O’Shea had been subpoenaed he could be required
to give evidence in relation to the Respondent as well as to the Petitioner.
11. In
any event the issues were narrowed to those referred to above on the second day
of hearing and Dr. O’Shea did not give any evidence in relation to the
treatment of the Respondent.
12. Dr.
O’Shea first saw the Petitioner on the 4th July, 1986 when he presented
with panic attacks in work. He came along with his mother.
13. He
was then unemployed having been through five previous jobs and felt that he had
wasted his life.
14. Dr.
O’Shea believed that he suffered from depersonalisation and was like an
antelope incapable of responding to the presence of a lion. In relationships
he was possessive, with a high need to be appreciated and with the significant
separation anxiety problem he required constant availability.
16. He
was seen by Dr. Timms, Dr. Matthews and Dr. Stokes who were part of Dr.
O’Shea’s team and he agreed with her diagnosis of personality
disorder and that the Petitioner was compulsively obsessive.
17. Pharmacological
interventions such as antidepressants and benzodiaspines made little difference
and he had a poor tolerance to Prozac.
18. The
Petitioner attended Dr. O’Shea on the 16th October, 1988, three months
after his marriage; he attended twice in 1989 and his last visit was on the
21st September, 1993. In 1995 there were three telephone conversations between
the Petitioner and Dr. O’Shea.
19. In
relation to this marriage he told Dr. O’Shea that he was being sucked
into a situation that he couldn’t handle and that his wife knocked the
confidence out of him and that there were fighting all the time. As time went
on this was affecting their daughter.
26. Dr.
O’Shea believed that such problems normally resolved themselves at
adolescence but did not happen in the case of the Petitioner.
27. There
was a disparity between the emotional development and the logical development.
The Petitioner was not capable of viewing his life partner as a separate
individual. There was no mutuality in the relationship. While the Petitioner
had an intellectual insight into this condition he did not have control over
his emotions. He was drawn by an immature set of emotions.
28. In
relation to the Petitioners ability to sustain marriage, Dr. O’Shea
believed that it would be extremely difficult. Problems such as those referred
to above tend to erode whatever relationship there is. It would need a
“perfect”
partner, a mother figure who was constantly available.
29. The
general impression of Dr. O’Shea is given in his report to the medical
inspector as follows:-
30. The
Petitioner is now thirty five years of age. He feels he was denigrated by his
father and developed a strong bond with his mother.
31. In
relation to school he was average, drifting along and missed school staying at
home when he was not feeling well.
32. At
mid teens he says that the began
“drinking
to be drunk”.
He
passed the leaving certificate and without focus or without a plan, worked in
shops from time to time he dispersed with unemployment.
33. When
he was twenty or twenty one he went out with a student but felt uneasy with her
friends and possessive of her.
34. A
year later the student told him that he was pregnant and was having an
abortion. This created a moral problem for him. He was distressed. His
anxiety intensified. He had panic attacks. At one stage he got off the bus
and felt like a rabbit caught in its headlights. He told his parents. His
mother was distressed, his father seemed indifferent.
35. He
agreed with Dr. O’Shea’s evidence regarded the personlisation. His
feelings seemed to wash over him: he cried a lot. He drank until he was drunk,
gave up work felt a bleak depression and believed he was going mad.
36. His
eldest sister advised him to go to his general practitioner who referred him to
Dr. O’Shea as an outpatient. He stayed at home between visits to the GP
and to Dr. O’Shea. It was a long nightmare with regular crisis points
weekly. He became obsessed with his depression and withdrew completely. It
was a dark period.
37. By
late 1987 he began work as a Salesman but was still deeply involved with his
illness. He moved from home with a friend of his and met the Respondent who
was living close by.
38. Within
a few weeks the Respondent told him that she was pregnant. He reacted with
great concern. It was a repeat disaster for him he was concerned for his
mother. He was concerned for his new girlfriend. He was determined not to
disturb his mother. He would have done anything to avoid that. Yet he had no
long term plans.
39. He
decided to tell his parents first that they were getting married and then that
she was pregnant so as to bring a solution to the problem. His mother accepted
that he says his father took a sneering attitude and remained distant.
40. The
wedding was organised by his girlfriend’s father. He was still focused
on panic attacks and depression. He had no sense of his own worth. He was
detached from his wedding. He was in contact with Dr. O’Shea six times
between the wedding and the birth of their baby daughter in December 1998.
42. The
Respondent became aggressive towards him and he believed that she was
absolutely not supportive of his situation. It made things ten times worse.
His life was miserable. He moved continuously down to his family sometimes
with his daughter.
43. In
relation to work he believed he got on well with his employers in the short
term but not in the long term.
44. In
1994 matters came to a head and spiralled out of control. Their daughter was
deeply embroiled in the mess. He left his job.
45. He
said the Respondent sought medical advice and was hospitalised for a few weeks.
However this did not solve the difficulties. At Christmas of 1994 he left the
family home.
46. Both
the Petitioner and the Respondent are at the date of hearing in new
relationships. The Petitioner has a child of his new relationship.
47. In
relation to his understanding of marriage at age twenty three, the Petitioner
gave evidence that he was obsessed with the idea of not walking away. He felt
he was the cause of his mother’s changed behaviour.
48. He
now believed his life had changed. He was improved, stronger, more self aware.
Nonetheless he would not disagree with Dr. O’Shea’s evidence with
regard to his prognosis.
50. Dr.
Byrne believed that the diagnosis gravely affected the Petitioner's consent.
The personality and psychiatric illness of a personality disorder coincided
with his own view. He concurred with Dr. O’Shea’s diagnosis. The
Petitioner was immature. He would go further and say that the immaturity was
grose and not just abnormal immaturity.
51. Dr.
Byrne believed that the Petitioner's decision to marry depended on his attitude
to his parents and not to his own need. His decisions were made on a more
proximate need and not on any long term basis. The Petitioner’s
difficulty with his exams and his not being able to hold down jobs was caused
by a personality disorder, depression, anxiety and panic attacks.
52. The
medical examiner believed that the Respondent was not supportive. As he
perceived it the relationship was doomed. The Petitioner would have to find a
particular foil:
“a
perfect person”.
That
person would have to calm, materialistic. As he perceived it this was not the
relationship that he had formed it was not conducive to his being able to cope.
53. Dr.
Byrne believed that the Petitioner's parents did not force him into marriage.
However the Petitioners inordinate need to please led to his decision to get
married. He was immature and not able to consent.
55. Counsel
for the Respondent, Ms. Ann Dunne S.C., stated in relation to the Answer filed
the 2nd March, 1998 that such answer was intended to take issue with
allegations made in relation to the Respondents' state of mind. Since the
answer was filed, the Respondent had the evidence of the medical inspector in
relation to the Petitioner’s state of mind. No issue was being taken in
relation to that evidence. Counsel declined to cross examine.
56. Ms.
Inge Clissman S.C., for the Petitioner, submitted, as a preliminary point, that
the Court had enough evidence to ground the petition on the basis of the
Petitioner’s emotional immaturity, mental state, personality, in that he
had not the capacity to enter into or sustain a normal marital relationship
with the Respondent.
58. The
issue before the Court is whether the contract of marriage entered into between
the parties is voidable by reason of the inability of the Petitioner to enter
into or sustain a normal marriage relationship.
59. This
ground for nullity, first noted in the Attorney General’s Office Report
entitled
“The
Law of Nullity in Ireland”
in 1996 was accepted in 1982 by Barrington J. in
RSJ
-v- JSJ
referred to above.
60. The
leading case in relation to the matter is
D
-v- C,
a judgment by Costello J. (unreported 1984) in which the trial Judge found
that the law should have regard to the psychological relationship just as it
does to the physical one. In that case it was found that the husband at the
time of marriage suffering from a
“cyclical
manic depressive disorder...(whcih) affected personality and behaviour. (It
was) significantly severe as to impair his consent to form and sustain a normal
viable marriage relationship
”.
61. Budd
J. referred to the difficulty a Court has in moving from the cold objectivity
of ascertainable clinical findings to the elusive and impalpable area of the
emotions. An illness that is preventing a spouse from
“entering
into a caring or even considerate relationship”
(per Barrington J.)
or
sustaining the normal interpersonal relationship which marriage requires
(per Costello J.) depends on the objective findings of the medical examiner and
not on the subjective perception of the Petitioner.
62. This
is not to say that the paramount importance of the evidence of the medical
inspector is decisive. The role of the Court, as asserted by Murphy J. in
KWT -v- DAT
[1992] 2IR 11 at pg. 21 is instructive;
63. The
only evidence before the Court relating to the validity of this marriage is the
certificate of a solemnised marriage duly witnesses and recorded.
64. The
evidence of Dr. O’Shea and of Dr. Byrne, the medical inspector appointed
by the Court, is that the Petitioner did not have an adequate emotional
capacity to enter into or sustain a normal marital relationship with the
Respondent.
65. It
would appear also that because of that the Petitioner was not fully free in his
mind or fully informed to consent to the marriage ceremony with the Respondent.
66. Accordingly
the Court decrees that the ceremony of marriage celebrated on the 9th July,
1988 between the Petitioner and the Respondent is null and void and that the
said Petitioner is free of all bonds of marriage with the said Respondent.