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High Court of Ireland Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Sallim v. Minister for Justice [2001] IEHC 90 (10th May, 2001)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2001/90.html
Cite as: [2001] IEHC 90

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Sallim v. Minister for Justice [2001] IEHC 90 (10th May, 2001)

THE HIGH COURT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
2000 No. 110JR
BETWEEN
MOHAMID AHMED SALLIM
APPLICANT
AND
THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM, INTERIM REFUGEE APPEALS AUTHORITY, IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
RESPONDENTS.
JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Finnegan delivered the 10th day of May, 2001.
The Applicant sought an order extending the time limited by the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000 Section 5 (2)(a) for making an application for leave to apply for Judicial Review and on the 2nd day of April 2001 I refused to extend time. The Applicant wishes to appeal my decision and issues now arise as to whether leave to appeal is required by reason of the provisions of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000 Section 5 (3)(a) and if so whether leave to appeal should be granted.
The Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000 Section 5 (2)(a) provides as follows -
(2) An application for leave to apply for Judicial Review under the order in respect of any of the matters referred to in subsection (1) shall -
Section 5 (3)(a) provides as follows -
(3)(a) The determination of the High Court of an application for leave to apply for Judicial Review as aforesaid or of an application for such Judicial Review shall be final and no appeal shall lie from the decision of the High Court to the Supreme Court in either case except with the leave of the High Court which leave shall only be granted where the High Court certifies that its decision involves a point of law of exceptional public importance and that it is desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to the Supreme Court.

It seems to me that there are three possible constructions of Section 5 (3)(a) available-
  1. The requirement for leave to appeal applies only to the determination i.e., an order finally disposing of
  2. an application for leave to apply for Judicial Review
  3. an application for Judicial Review.
  4. The requirement applies to any order which has the effect of finally disposing of either such application. An order refusing to extend time comes within this construction. There could be other orders having this effect e.g., an order striking out an application for failing to comply with an order directing discovery or replies to interrogatories or striking out the proceedings for want of prosecution.
  5. The requirement applies to any order made in the course of either such application whether or not such order has the effect of determining the application e.g., an order for discovery.

Section 5 (3)(a) refers to the determination of
  1. an application for leave to apply for Judicial Review
  2. an application for Judicial Review

1. It is argued on behalf of the Applicant that as no application for leave was made within the time limited by Section 5 (2)(a) and no application for leave can be made without an order of the High Court extending that time the decision on an application to extend time cannot be a determination of either an application for leave or an application for Judicial Review and accordingly no leave to appeal is required. For the Respondent it is argued that in construing the Section full weight must be given to the word “determination”: the effect of the refusal of an extension of time is to determine the application for leave the application for an extension of time being part of the application of leave and so within the terms of Section 5 (3)(a).

2. An application for an extension of time can be taken separately from the application for leave by a Notice of Motion seeking only that relief or can be sought as one of the relief's in the Notice of Motion seeking leave. The procedure adopted should not be in any way determinative of the nature of the application and should not influence me in construing the Act. Further in construing the Act I must have regard to the clear policy of the Act that applications for Judicial Review of decisions coming within the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000 Section 5 should in the interests of the State and of persons affected by such decisions and other applicants for refugee status be processed and given effect to with expedition. Again I must have regard to the provisions of the Constitution Article 34.4.3º which provides -

“The Supreme Court shall, with such exceptions and subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have appellate jurisdiction from all decisions of the High Court”

3. The Local Government (Planning and Development) Act, 1992 Section 19 inserted into the Local Government (Planning and Development) Act, 1963 Section 82 a provision in identical terms to that contained in the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000 Section 5 (3)(a). This provision was considered by the Supreme Court in Irish Asphalt Limited -v- An Bord Pleanala 1996 2 I.R. 174. Barrigton J. in giving Judgment said -

“(Counsel for the Appellant) submitted that the High Court when it is dealing with an application for Judicial Review in a planning matter may be confronted by two different kinds of decision. The first is whether to grant or refuse the application. If, however, it refuses the application it will be confronted with a second decision to wit whether the application for review raises a point of exceptional public importance. But he submitted that there is nothing in the provision which clearly excludes an appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision refusing to certify that the application raises a point of law of exceptional public importance. Therefore he submitted that Article 34.4.3º of the Constitution mandates that an appeal should lie to the Supreme Court against the second decision”.

4. He went on to say -

“The correct interpretation appears to me to be that the first portion of the provision under discussion is a statutory provision and does exclude all appeals from the High Court to the Supreme Court in questions of Judicial Review. This result is achieved by the words:-
“The determination of the High Court of an application for leave to apply for Judicial Review as aforesaid or of an application for such Judicial Review shall be final and no appeal shall lie from the decision of the High Court to the Supreme Court in either case.”
The subsection having excepted these cases from the Appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, then goes on to create what (Counsel) for the Respondent called “an exception to an exception”. As (Counsel) puts it, it is the subsection which excludes the appeals but at the same time there is a provision whereby the High Court may, as an exception to this exception, allow an appeal if the case involves a point of law of exceptional public importance and it is in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to the Supreme Court”.

5. The passage was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Irish Hardware Association -v- An Bord Pleanala & Others 23rd January, 2001 Keane J. The determination sought to be appealed in Irish Asphalt Limited -v- An Bord Pleanala was the refusal by the High Court to grant leave to appeal against a decision refusing relief by way of Judicial Review and the Supreme Court held that that determination was not amenable to an appeal to the Supreme Court. The decision accordingly is consistent with the second possible construction which I mention above - it has the effect of finally disposing of the application for Judicial Review. The same reasoning applies with equal force to the determination with which I am concerned as it also has the effect of finally disposing of an application for leave to apply for Judicial Review. The statement by Barrington J that the provision in the Local Government (Planning and Development) Acts excludes all appeals from the High Court to the Supreme Court in questions of Judicial Review is obiter but it is one to which I must have regard and to which I must pay due deference. If the matter was free of authority I would prefer to adopt the first possible construction particularly having regard to the expression in Section 5 (3)(a) - the determination of the High Court of an application” as opposed to “ on an application”- and having regard to the provision of the Constitution cited above. However, the view of the Supreme Court is that the identical provision in the Local Government (Planning and Development) Acts has the effect of excluding from the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cases mentioned in Section 82 of the Local Government (Planning and Development) Act, 1963 as amended. I hold that Section 5 (3)(a) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000 has the like effect. Accordingly leave of the High Court is required in order to appeal a decision of the High Court refusing to extend time pursuant to the provisions of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000 Section 5 (2)(a). Indeed I so held in Benson -v- The Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform without the point being argued.

6. I am satisfied that the issue as to the true construction of Section 5 (3)(a) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000 raises a point of law of exceptional public importance and that it is desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to the Supreme Court. The very strict time limits imposed by the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000 Section 5 (2)(a) result in a large number of applications in this Court for an extension of time within which to seek leave to apply for Judicial Review . A decision of the Supreme Court would be of assistance to litigants and their legal advisors and in ease of this Court. However as to the circumstances which affect the Applicant which formed the basis of the application for an extension of time and my decision on the basis of such circumstances to refuse to extend time I do not consider that the same involve a point of law of exceptional public importance or that it is desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to the Supreme Court and accordingly I refuse leave to appeal in respect of my decision in that behalf. However, it may be that in the event that the Supreme Court come to a different conclusion as to the true construction of Section 5 (3)(a) and hold that leave is not required to appeal my decision not to extend time they may well proceed to determine the appeal against my decision in that regard.


© 2001 Irish High Court


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