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High Court of Ireland Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Malocco v. Disciplinary Tribunal [2002] IEHC 105 (16 October 2002)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2002/105.html
Cite as: [2002] IEHC 105

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    Malocco v. Disciplinary Tribunal [2002] IEHC 105 (16 October 2002)

    THE HIGH COURT
    2000 No 238 JR
    BETWEEN
    ELIO MALOCCO
    APPLICANT
    AND
    THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL
    RESPONDENT
    AND
    THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    NOTICE PARTY
    AND
    THE LAW SOCIETY OF IRELAND
    NOTICE PARTY
    JUDGMENT of Miss Justice Carroll delivered on the 16th day of October 2002.
    1.      By order dated 26th May 2000 Ó Caoimh J. gave leave to apply by way of judicial review for the reliefs set out in paragraph 4 (I) (II) (III) and (IV) of the statement grounding the application on the grounds set forth in paragraph 5 (i) (iii) (iv) and (vii).
    2.      The reliefs sought are as follows:-
    I. A declaration that the provisions of Section 7 of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1960 as inserted by Section 17 of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994 are contrary to Bunreacht na hÉireann.
    II. A declaration that paragraph (a) of Section 8 of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1960 as inserted by Section 18 of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994 is contrary to the provisions of Bunreacht na hÉireann and particularly Article 34.1 thereof or in the alternative a declaration that the list set out at paragraph (a) of Section 8 of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1960 as inserted by Section 18 of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994 is not exhaustive and is without prejudice to the making of such further or other order in respect of the report mentioned therein as shall seem meet and fit to this Honourable Court.
    III. An order by way of certiorari quashing the findings and/or recommendations and/or report of the respondent body dated 28th February 2000.
    IV. Further and/or in the alternative an order by way of certiorari quashing so much of the aforementioned findings and/or recommendations and/or report as relate to allegations which were denied and/or put in issue by the applicant herein.
    3.      The grounds on which the application was allowed are as follows:-
    "5(i) The provisions of Section 7 of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1960 as inserted by Section 17 of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994 are contrary to Bunreacht na hÉireann and in particular Articles 40.3.2 thereof in that they:-
    (a) make no, or no adequate, provision for the appointment of counsel to and/or legal representation for a solicitor into whose conduct an inquiry is being held;
    (b) make no, or no adequate, provision for the payment of counsel and/or legal representatives to assist a solicitor into whose conduct an inquiry is being held;
    (c) make no, or no adequate, provision for the payment of counsel and/or legal representatives to assist a solicitor into whose conduct an inquiry is being held, in circumstances where the Disciplinary Tribunal has been notified that the said solicitor does not have the means to retain legal representatives and
    (d) make no, or no adequate, provision for the payment of costs to a solicitor into whose conduct an inquiry is being held.
    5(iii) The respondent was guilty of inexcusable and/or excessive delay in commencing the purported inquiry into the conduct of the applicant and/or acted unreasonably in acceding to the application of the Law Society of Ireland for an inquiry into the conduct of the applicant in circumstances where there had been inexcusable and/or excessive delay.
    (This ground was not pursued at the hearing).
    5. (iv) Further and/or in the alternative the respondent prejudiced the applicant in meeting the case made against him by reason of its delay in commencing an inquiry into the affairs of the applicant and/or by acceding to the application of the Law Society of Ireland for an inquiry into the conduct of the applicant in circumstances where there had been inexcusable and/or excessive delay.
    (This ground was not pursued at the hearing).
    5. (vii) In addition or in the alternative to the foregoing, the respondent tribunal acted unreasonably and/or unfairly and/or the proceedings had before the respondent tribunal were unfair and/or in breach of natural and constitutional justice and/or ultra vires in that:-
    (a) the applicant was not given access to relevant documentation in the possession of the Law Society of Ireland
    (b) insofar as the respondent gave reasons for its refusal to order the discovery of documentation in the possession of the Law Society the said reasons were inadequate and/or ultra vires
    (c) the applicant's application for an adjournment of the purported inquiry pending the determination of the proceedings brought by the Law Society before this honourable court, was refused for no, or no adequate, reason and/or in circumstances where such a refusal was unreasonable and/or unfair;
    (This ground was not pursued at the hearing).
    (d) the respondent tribunal did not appoint nor did it furnish the applicant with any or any adequate means to appoint counsel
    (e) The respondent tribunal proceeded with its inquiry in circumstances where it knew that the applicant was impecunious and/or unable to retain full legal representation
    (f) the sittings of the respondent tribunal were inordinately long and/or afforded the applicant an insufficient opportunity to prepare his defence and/or defend the case made against him
    (g) the refusal of the respondent tribunal to adjourn the proceedings so as to allow the applicant to consider aspects of the voluminous evidence adduced against him was unreasonable and unfair
    (h) the respondent tribunal refused to order the disclosure in advance of evidence which was to be adduced against the applicant and/or deprived the applicant of a fair hearing and/or an adequate opportunity to meet the case brought against him.
    4.      The factual background to the application is as follows. The respondent is a statutory body established pursuant to the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1960 (the 1960 Act) as amended by the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994 (the 1994 Act). Section 6 of the 1960 Act (as inserted by Section 16 of the 1994 Act), prescribes the composition of the tribunal. Section 7 of the 1960 Act (as inserted by Section 17 of the 1994 Act) provides that the Law Society may refer a complaint to the tribunal with respect to the alleged misconduct of a solicitor.
    5.      The Law Society referred such a complaint to the tribunal with respect to the alleged misconduct of the applicant on 2nd July 1998. This complaint was considered by a division of the tribunal on 22nd October 1998. The division considered a prima facie case was disclosed and directed an inquiry into the alleged misconduct of the applicant to commence on 14th December 1998. On 26th November 1998 the applicant through his solicitor made an unsupported application to the tribunal for discovery of documents. The application was refused by the tribunal on that date. On 1st December 1998 the applicant through his solicitor made an application for discovery based on an affidavit and sought an adjournment of the disciplinary proceedings pending the outcome of High Court proceedings then in being between the Law Society and the applicant. Following an adjournment to permit the Law Society to put in a replying affidavit the application was considered by the tribunal on 14th December 1998 and was refused on that date. The tribunal directed that the inquiry would commence on 4th February 1999.
    6.      On 4th February 1999 prior to the commencement of the inquiry the applicant applied to the tribunal through his solicitor for
    (a) a dismissal of the complaints against him on the grounds of delay
    (b) a declaration that certain evidence embodied in an affidavit of PJ Connolly should be declared inadmissible and
    (c) a ruling that certain evidence be disclosed to him in advance.
    7.      The tribunal considered these applications and
    (a) refused the application for dismissal due to delay on the ground that the delay of two years and two months from the disposal of the criminal appeal to the commencement of disciplinary proceedings was not prejudicial to the Applicant's case,
    (b) noted that the Law Society was going to rely on oral evidence alone and not on any Affidavits and would let the matter proceed on that basis,
    (c) agreed that anyone coming before the Tribunal was entitled to know the case to be met but understood that the Affidavit of Mr. Connolly set out the nature of the case. This with other documentation amply set out the case the Law Society was going to make.
    8.      The tribunal adjourned the commencement of hearings to 2nd March 1999. The Tribunal said that if the applicant was taken by surprise the Tribunal would deal with it if it happened.
    9.      On 2nd March 1999 the applicant's solicitor made an application to come off record which was refused by the tribunal. The inquiry continued and the applicant's solicitor participated on behalf of the applicant. Later that day an adjournment was sought by the applicant's solicitor and was granted. Following this, the applicant appeared on his own and informed the tribunal that he had dismissed his solicitor. The tribunal adjourned to enable the applicant to obtain alternative representation if he so wished.
    10.      The applicant did not appoint an alternative solicitor to represent him at the hearings which commenced on 20th April 1999. Evidence was heard on 20th, 21st, 26th and 27th April 1999; and on 20th May 1999 the applicant gave evidence himself. On 20th May 1999 submissions were made by the Law Society and the hearing was adjourned to the 9th of June 1999 to enable the applicant to prepare his submissions. The applicant made submissions on that day.
    11.      The report of the tribunal issued on 28th February 2000. The tribunal found the applicant guilty in respect of 58 of the 70 complaints submitted to the tribunal.
    12.      In accordance with Section 7(3)(b)(ii) of the 1960 Act (as substituted by Section 17 of the 1994 Act) the tribunal was of opinion that the applicant was not fit to be a member of the solicitor's profession and referred the matter to the President of the High Court with the recommendation that:
    1. the applicant's name be struck off the roll of solicitors;
    2. the applicant be required to pay a money penalty of £50,000 to the compensation fund of the Society;
    3. the applicant to pay the costs of the Society of the hearing together with the witnesses expenses, such costs and expenses to be taxed in default of agreement.
    These proceedings were instituted on 22nd May, 2000.
    13.      Sections 7 and 8 of the 1960 Act (as inserted by sections 17 and 18 of the 1994 Act) are set out in full as an appendix to this judgment.
    14.      The applicant seeks a declaration that Section 7 and Section 8 (a) are unconstitutional. The basis on which leave to seek judicial review for Section 7 was granted dealt with the absence of some form of legal aid. No specific grounds are set out as a basis for a declaration as to the constitutionality of Section 8(a).
    15.      When it came to submissions in court the applicant submitted that Section 8(a) was unconstitutional because a solicitor cannot appeal against a finding of misconduct by the disciplinary tribunal by reason of the fact that the President cannot reverse such a finding. He submitted that Section 8(a) sets out the powers of the High Court on consideration of a report from the disciplinary tribunal. These do not include a power to allow the appeal.
    16.      The content of the report by the disciplinary tribunal is described in Section 7(3)(b)(i) and (ii). It should contain the nature of the application, the evidence laid before them and any other matter relating to the solicitor in question which they think fit to report. Where there is a finding of misconduct and the Disciplinary Tribunal does not intend to make an order under subsection 9 (i.e. impose a minor penalty) the Disciplinary Tribunal shall give their opinion as to the fitness or otherwise of the solicitor to be a member of the solicitor's profession having regard to the contents of the report and the recommendation as to the sanction which in their opinion should be imposed. The subsection then provides that the Law Society shall bring the report before the High Court. This is not a case involving a minor penalty.
    17.      Subsection (13) provides that a solicitor may appeal to the High Court against a finding of misconduct on his part by the Disciplinary Tribunal under subsection (3) and the Court "shall determine such appeal when it considers the report of the disciplinary tribunal in accordance with the provisions of Section 8…".
    18.      It should be noted that there has as yet been no appeal to the High Court against the finding of misconduct on the part of the applicant by the Disciplinary Tribunal.
    19.      Section 8 is concerned with the consideration by the High Court of the report of the Disciplinary Tribunal made under Section 7 and sets out what the High Court may do following such consideration. Section 8 applies whether or not there is an appeal. It is silent as to any appeal. The provisions in relation to an appeal are contained in Section 7(13) which gives a right of appeal and provides for its determination.
    20.      Section 38 of the 1994 Act provides in subsection (1) that on any application coming before it under the Solicitors Acts 1954 to1994 the High Court may make such order as it thinks fit in relation to a solicitor, including etc. … Subsection (2) provides that the High Court on the hearing of any application or appeal coming before it under the Solicitors Acts 1954 to 1994 may make such order as to costs as the court thinks fit.
    21.      In view of the fact that subsection (2) refers to any "application or appeal" and subsection (1) refers only to "application", I do not accept that it was intended that subsection (1) would include appeals.
    22.      But it is not necessary for the Oireachtas when providing that there could be an appeal to the High Court to be determined at a particular time, to provide also that the appeal could be allowed or disallowed. It goes without saying that if an appeal is to be determined it can be allowed or refused in whole or in part by the High Court as part of its inherent jurisdiction. Section 7 (13) provides for an appeal and its determination. Section 8 does not prescribe in any way how the appeal to be decided.
    23.      The applicant pursued no arguments that Section 7 was unconstitutional on the grounds of the lack of some form of legal aid.
    24.      It follows therefore that the applicant's claim that Sections 7 and 8(a) of the 1960 Act are unconstitutional is unsubstantiated.
    25.      I also refuse the alternative declaratory relief sought in relation to Section 8(a), namely that the list set out at paragraph (a) of Section 8 is not exhaustive and is without prejudice to the making of such or further order in respect of the report mentioned therein as shall seem meet and fit to this honourable court.
    26.      As said above Section 8(a) has nothing to do with the determination of an appeal against a finding of misconduct which must be dealt with on its merits. The only relevance of Section 8(a) to an appeal is that the appeal is to be determined when the report is being considered in accordance with the provisions of Section 8(a). The interpretation of Section 8(a) is a matter for the High Court to determine when considering the report under Section 8(a).
    27.      What is left is an allegation that the proceedings before the tribunal were unfair, in breach of natural and constitutional justice and ultra vires because (in summary)
    a) he had no access to relevant documents,
    b) the reasons given for refusing discovery were inadequate or ultra vires,
    c) he did not have legal aid, and was impecunious
    d) the sittings were inordinately long, thus he had insufficient opportunity to prepare his defence,
    e) he had insufficient time to consider aspects of evidence, and
    f) there was no disclosure in advance of evidence to be adduced and there was no opportunity to meet the case against him.
    28.      With regard to access to relevant documents in advance, the applicants sought discovery of documents being minutes and decisions of the Law Society from 12th November, 1992 to date of application. No problem arose over supplying copies of correspondence between the applicant and the Law Society from 1st January, 1992 to 1st January, 1993. The applicant's solicitor agreed with the chair of the tribunal that the documents sought were material in the context of delay in instituting the proceedings before the disciplinary tribunal. The application was refused on the grounds that it was in the nature of a fishing expedition but the tribunal ruled that should the applicant apply for an order to stop the prosecution on the grounds of delay, he could renew his application for discovery.
    29.      There was no application for an order of prohibition and there was no further application for discovery. Therefore any complaint relating to non-production of material documents does not arise in the context of discovery.
    30.      The complaint about no access to relevant documents is echoed in the complaint that there was no disclosure in advance of evidence to be adduced. This is strongly contested by the tribunal and the Law Society claiming that the case made against the applicant was set out in the affidavit of P.J. Connolly . In addition the applicant was furnished with eight lever arch files of documents relevant to the proceedings.
    31.      As appears from the note of the proceedings on 4th February, 1999 Mr. Leahy, counsel for the Law Society outlined for the tribunal that the precise allegations of misconduct were set out with particularity. The nature of the transactions that gave rise to that were set out with particularity and eight lever arch files in total set out all the documents the Society would say were relevant. He could indicate the witness he had arranged for that day. He would furnish a list of the order he proposed to call the witnesses and the matters that would be dealt with. The chair of the tribunal said to the applicant's solicitor that if anything came up whereby he was taken by surprise (which should not happen) the tribunal would deal with it. On that particular day the tribunal was asked for an adjournment by consent after lunch which was agreed. The next day the tribunal sat was the 2nd March, 1999. On that day the tribunal also rose early because the applicant dispensed with his solicitor. The enquiry resumed on 20th, 21st , 26th, 27th April and 20th May, 1999. These five sittings generally lasted from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. and included breaks of 10 to 15 minutes morning and afternoon plus one hour for lunch. There was a further sitting on 9th June to enable the applicant to make his submissions.
    32.      While the applicant says in his affidavit that he applied on a number of occasions for adjournments to consider evidence this was contested by the respondent. I was referred by the applicant to no place in the transcript to substantiate his claim. In my opinion the applicant has not established that he was not furnished with the relevant documents in advance or that there was no disclosure of the evidence to be adduced in advance or that he had insufficient opportunity to prepare his defence or consider aspects of the evidence. In my opinion the conduct of the enquiry was not oppressive and the applicant had full opportunity to meet the case against him.
    33.      Insofar as it may be necessary to deal with it, the reason given for refusal of an order for discovery was that it was "a fishing expedition". This was in the context that the documents were irrelevant except if delay was an issue. That is a perfectly adequate explanation. The applicant does not advance any argument to show that the decision was irrational. It is not sufficient in judicial review proceedings to disagree with the decision impugned, the applicant must show that the decision is irrational.
    34.      In regard to the question of legal aid, the applicant argues that he is entitled to legal aid because it is a serious case where his livelihood is at stake. He cites in The State(Healy) v. O'Donoghue (1976) I.R.325.
    35.      The tribunal does not accept that the applicant is impecunious but in any event submitted the tribunal has no duty or power to appoint legal representation for persons who appearing before it or to grant legal aid.
    36.      In my opinion the only statutory basis for the tribunal making an order in relation to costs is contained in Section 8(a) 9(d) of the 1960 Act dealing with the imposition of a minor penalty which can include an order for the payment of taxed costs to the Law Society or other person. The High Court has power under Section 8(a)(iv) to make an order for costs incurred in the proceedings. It also has power under Section 38(2) of the 1994 Act on the hearing of any application or appeal under the Solicitors Acts, 1954 to 1994 coming before it to make such order as to costs as the court thinks fit.
    37.      In the absence of any statutory basis, the question arises whether there is any general principle that legal costs must be paid where a person appears before a disciplinary tribunal/board. The case of The State(Healy) v. O'Donoghue (1992) I.L.R.M. 133 is authority for the granting of legal aid to an accused in a criminal trial. No authority is advanced extending that principle to disciplinary tribunals.
    38.      In my opinion no duty is imposed on the state to provide legal aid in a case such as the present one. The applicant is a qualified solicitor. He was represented by another solicitor and he himself dismissed him.
    39.      In view of the fact that I found against the applicant on the case submitted by him I do not consider it necessary to deal with the additional argument made by the disciplinary tribunal that the applicant is estopped from applying for relief by way of judicial review.
    Appendix
    17. – (1) The Act of 1960 is hereby amended by the substitution of the following section for section 7: 7. – (1) An application by a person (not being a person who has made a complaint to an independent adjudicator under section 15 of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act, 1994, about the conduct of a solicitor referred to in the application) or by the Society for an inquiry into the conduct of a solicitor on the ground of alleged misconduct shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be made to and heard by the Disciplinary Tribunal in accordance with rules made under section 16 of this Act.
    (2) Where an application in relation to a solicitor is duly made under this section and the Disciplinary Tribunal, after consideration of the application, are of opinion that there is no prima facie case for inquiry, they shall so inform the applicant in writing and shall take no further action in relation to the application.
    (3) Where an application in relation to a solicitor is duly made under this section and the Disciplinary Tribunal, after consideration of the application, are of opinion that there is a pima facie case for inquiry, the following provisions shall have effect:
    (a) they shall proceed to hold an inquiry;
    (b) on the completion of the inquiry, the Disciplinary Tribunal shall-
    (i) embody their findings in a report to the High Court, specifying therein the nature of the application and the evidence laid before them and any other matters in relation to the solicitor (hereinafter referred to in this section as the 'respondent solicitor') which they may think fit to report;
    (ii) in a case where the Disciplinary Tribunal find that there has been misconduct on the part of the respondent solicitor and they have not made, and do not intend to make, an order under subsection (9) (minor penalty) of this section, the Disciplinary Tribunal shall include in their report their opinion as to the fitness or otherwise of the respondent solicitor to be a member of the solicitor's profession having regard to the contents of the report and their recommendations as to the sanction which in their opinion should be imposed, and the Society shall bring the report before the High Court.
    (4) Where, on completion of an inquiry under subsection (3) of this section, the Disciplinary Tribunal find that there has been misconduct on the part of the respondent solicitor but they have made or are of the opinion that it is appropriate that they should make an order under subsection (9) of this section, the Disciplinary Tribunal shall include in their report the reasons for their opinion that it is appropriate to make an order under subsection (9) of this section
    (5) The Disciplinary Tribunal shall, as soon as possible after it has been prepared, make available to the respondent solicitor a copy of their report prepared pursuant to subsections (3) and (4) of this section, as the case may be.
    (6) Where, on completion of an inquiry under subsection (3) of this section, the Disciplinary Tribunal have found that there has been no misconduct on the part of the respondent solicitor, they shall take no further action in relation to the matter and they shall so inform the respondent solicitor and the Society or other person who made the application as the case may be.
    (7) Where an application is made under this section, the Disciplinary Tribunal may, at any stage of the proceedings in relation to the application and before the completion of any inquiry under subsection (3) of this section, postpone the taking of any steps or further steps in the matter for a specified period and, if they do so, then, if before the expiration of that period the applicant applies to the Disciplinary Tribunal for leave to withdraw the application, the Disciplinary Tribunal may, if they think fit, allow the application to be withdrawn and, if they do so, no further action shall be taken by them in relation to the application
    (8) The Society shall be entitled to make an application to the Disciplinary Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of this section, notwithstanding that any other person may be entitled to make such an application.
    (9) Where, on completion of an inquiry under subsection (3) of this section, the Disciplinary Tribunal find that there has been misconduct on the part of the respondent solicitor, they shall have power, by order, to do one or more of the following things, namely-
    (a) to advise and admonish or censure the respondent solicitor:
    (b) to direct payment of a sum, not exceeding £5,000, to be paid by the respondent solicitor to the Compensation Fund;
    (c) to direct that the respondent solicitor shall pay a sum, not exceeding £5,000, as restitution or part restitution to any aggrieved party, without prejudice to any legal right of such party;
    (d) to direct that the whole or part of the costs of the Society or of any person appearing before them, as taxed by a Taxing Master of the High Court, in default of the agreement, shall be paid by the respondent solicitor.
    (10) On the making of an order under subsection (9) of this section, the Disciplinary Tribunal shall, as soon as possible, serve a copy of such order on the respondent solicitor, either personally or by sending same by prepaid registered post to his address as stated in the register (or, if never on the register, the roll).
    (11) A respondent solicitor in respect of whom an order has been made by the Disciplinary Tribunal under subsection (9) of this section may, within the period of 21 days beginning on the date of the due service of the order, appeal to the High Court to rescind or vary the order in whole or in part, and the Court on hearing such an appeal may-
    (i) rescind or vary the order, or
    (ii) confirm that it was proper for the Disciplinary Tribunal to make the order.
    (12) The Society, or any person who has made an application under subsection (1) of this section, may, within the period provided under subsection (11) of this section, appeal to the High Court against an order made by the Disciplinary Tribunal under subsection (9) of this section on the ground that the sanction is imposed by the Disciplinary Tribunal is inadequate, or that the Disciplinary Tribunal, in lieu of making such an order, ought to have exercised their powers under subsection (3) (b) (ii) of this section, and the Court, on hearing such an appeal, may-
    (i) confirm the sanction imposed by the Disciplinary Tribunal on the respondent solicitor, or
    (ii) in relation to the respondent solicitor, do one or more of the things specified in sections 8 (1) (a) (as substituted by the Solicitors (Amendment) Act, 1994) of this Act.
    (13) A respondent solicitor may appeal to the High Court against a finding of misconduct on his part by the Disciplinary Tribunal pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, and the Court shall determine such appeal when it considers the report of the Disciplinary Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of section 8 (as substituted by the Solicitors (Amendment) Act, 1994) of this Act, or as part of its determination of any appeal under subsection (11) of this section, as the case may be.
    (14) Where a respondent solicitor refuses, neglects or otherwise fails to comply with an order made under subsection (9) (b) or (c) of this section (to an extent that it has not been rescinded or varied by the High Court consequent on an appeal to the High Court under subsection (11) of this section), the Society or any aggrieved party to whom a sum by way of restitution or part restitution has been ordered, may recover that sum as a liquidated debt.
    (15) An application brought under subsection (1) of this section may relate to one or more complaints against a respondent solicitor.
    (16) An application by the Society under subsection (1) of this section shall include an application made by the Society pursuant to a direction by an adjudicator appointed under section 15 of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act, 1994.
    (17) The Society may authorise any person on their behalf to do all such things and acts as may be necessary for the purposes of any application made or inquiry held under this section.
    (2) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to any application under section 7 of the Act of 1960 made before the coming into operation of this section.
    18.-(1) The Act of 1960 is hereby amended by the substitution of the following section for section 8:
    8.-(1) Where the Disciplinary Tribunal, after holding an inquiry into the conduct of a solicitor, make a report to the High Court under section 7 (as substituted by the Solicitors (Amendment) Act, 1994) of this Act which is brought before the Court by the Society under the said section 7, the following provisions shall have effect:
    (a)High Court, after consideration of the report-
    (i) may by order do one or more of the following things, namely-
    (I) strike the name of the solicitor off the roll;
    (II) suspend the solicitor from practice for such specified period and on such terms as the Court thinks fit;
    (III) prohibit the solicitor from practising on his own account as a sole practitioner or in partnership for such period, and subject to such further limitation as to the nature of his employment, as the Court may provide;
    (IV) restrict the solicitor practising in a particular area of work for such period as the Court may provide;
    (V) censure the solicitor or censure him and require him to pay a money penalty;
    (ii) may by order direct that a specified bank shall furnish any information in its possession that the Society may require relating to any aspect of the financial affairs of the practice of the solicitor;
    (iii) may by order direct that the solicitor shall swear an affidavit disclosing all information relating to or contained in any accounts, held in his own name or in the name of his firm or jointly with third parties, with any bank within a specified duration of time, to be fixed by the Court;
    (iv) may make such order as to the costs incurred in the proceedings before it and the Disciplinary Tribunal as the Court thinks fit:
    (v) may make any ancillary order in relation to the matter which the Court thinks fit:
    (b) the High Court may, if it thinks fit, remit the case to the Disciplinary Tribunal to take further evidence for submission to it and to make to it a supplementary report, and the Court may adjourn the hearing of the matter pending the submission to it of such further evidence and the making of such supplementary report;
    (c) in addition to doing any of the things specified in the foregoing paragraphs of this subsection, the Court may also by order do any one or more of the following things, namely-
    (i) direct the solicitor to make such restitution to any aggrieved party as the Court thinks fit;
    (ii) on the application of the Society, direct that the solicitor swear an affidavit (within a specified duration of time to be fixed by the Court) disclosing all information as to his assets either then in his possession or control or within his procurement or which had been but no longer are in his possession or control or within his procurement and, if no longer in his possession or control or within his procurement, his belief as to the present whereabouts of those assets;
    (iii) direct that the solicitor make himself available before the Court on a specified date and at a specified time for oral examination under oath in relation to the contents of any affidavit of assets sworn by him pursuant to subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph;
    (iv) on the application of the Society, and where it is shown that the conduct of the solicitor or of any clerk or servant of that solicitor arising from that solicitor's practice as a solicitor has given or is likely to give rise to the making by the Society of a grant or grants out of the Compensation Fund under section 21 (as substituted by the Solicitors (Amendment) Act, 1994) of this Act, direct that the solicitor shall not reduce his assets below a certain specified amount or value unless the Court otherwise directs;
    (v) on the application of the Society, direct the delivery to any person appointed by the Society of all or any documents in the possession or control or within the procurement of the solicitor arising from his practice as a solicitor;
    (vi) direct either-
    (I) that no bank shall, without leave of the Court, make any payment out of an account in the name of the solicitor or his firm, or
    (II) that a specified bank shall not, without leave of the Court, make any payment out of an account in the name of the solicitor or his firm;
    (vii) direct that the solicitor shall not attend at the place of business of his practice as a solicitor unless otherwise permitted by the Court;
    (viii) direct that the solicitor shall not represent himself as having, or hold himself out as having, any connection with his former practice as a solicitor, or permit any other person to so represent that solicitor, unless otherwise permitted by the Court.
    (2) (a) Where an order in respect of documents is made by the High Court under subparagraph (v) of paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section, the Society may make such enquiries as may be reasonably necessary to ascertain the person or persons entitled to the possession or custody of such documents and may thereafter deal with such documents, or any of them, in accordance with the directions of such person or persons so entitled.
    (b) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of this subsection, the Second Schedule (as amended by the Solicitors (Amendment) Act, 1994) to this Act shall have effect.
    (3) Where the High Court by an order under subsection (1) of this section requires a solicitor to pay a money penalty, the order shall operate as a judgment against the solicitor in favour of the Society, and the money penalty, when recovered, shall be paid into the Compensation Fund.
    (4) Where any person acts as agent or nominee of a solicitor or his firm so as to render nugatory an order made by the High Court under subparagraph (vi) of paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section, such person shall be guilty of an offence under this subsection and shall be liable on summary conviction thereof to a fine not exceeding £1,500."
    (2) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to any report to the High Court made under section 7 of the Act of 1960 before the coming into operation of this section.

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URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2002/105.html