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High Court of Ireland Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Igbinogun v H. S. E. [2010] IEHC 159 (05 May 2010) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2010/H159.html Cite as: [2010] IEHC 159 |
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Judgment Title: Igbinogun v H. S. E. Composition of Court: Judgment by: Hedigan J. Status of Judgment: Approved |
Neutral Citation Number: [2010] IEHC 159 THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW 2009 1228 JR BETWEEN MICHAEL IGBINOGUN APPLICANT AND
THE HEALTH SERVICE EXECUTIVE RESPONDENT Judgment of Mr. Justice Hedigan delivered on the 5th day of May, 2010.
(2) If so, is this an administration of justice and therefore a usurpation by the executive of judicial power? (3) Is the manner in which the respondent proposes to conduct this investigation in breach of the fair procedures to which the applicant is constitutionally entitled? 2. The relevant legislation is Section. 3 of the Childcare Act 1991, as amended. Section 3 reads:-
(2) In the performance of this function, a health board shall— (a) take such steps as it considers requisite to identify children who are not receiving adequate care and protection and co-ordinate information from all relevant sources relating to children in its area; (b) having regard to the rights and duties of parents, whether under the Constitution or otherwise— (i) regard the welfare of the child as the first and paramount consideration, and (ii) in so far as is practicable, give due consideration, having regard to his age and understanding, to the wishes of the child; and (c) have regard to the principle that it is generally in the best interests of a child to be brought up in his own family.” 3. The judgment of Barr J in M.Q. v. Gleeson [1998] 4 IR 85 has been opened to me by both sides. I consider a number of extracts to be very germane to the issues that arise in this case. At pp. 99-100:-
Arising out of its obligation to investigate allegations of child abuse made to it or of which it becomes aware, a health board is entitled to keep records of such allegations, whether substantiated or not, and, indeed, has an obligation so to do in the interests of professional competence.”
4. It seems to me that the judgment of Mr. Justice Barr in that case is a judgment of great common sense and also soundly grounded in the law. No adequate grounds have been raised before me today that would suggest that I should in any way disregard or should disagree with that judgment and I do not propose to do so. I note also that the principles established in that particular case have become known as the “Barr principles”.
(2) The respondent must afford the applicant fair procedures. (3) If the respondent comes to the conclusion that there is a risk, it is under a duty to communicate that to an appropriate party. (4) The respondent’s role in conducting this investigation is not an administration of justice. It does not make any determination of guilt or innocence. Its role is quite distinct from that of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Its role is the protection of vulnerable children. The Director of Public Prosecutions’s role is the detection and conviction of criminals, including child abusers. 6. Whether or not the respondent in its correspondence borrowed from the judgment of Mr. Justice Barr the phrase “investigate the likely veracity of the complaint” is not relevant. The nature of the investigation is and was to anyone taking the trouble to inquire quite clear. It was and is manifestly not one of a parallel criminal investigation. It is an inquiry into whether there are any concerns that arise for the safety of a girl from the allegation of sexual abuse against her which require to be addressed and dealt with. This type of investigation is a most serious obligation that falls on the respondent. The safety of vulnerable children is at stake. Such an investigation should always occur at the earliest possible time after the risk to a vulnerable child is apprehended and before the risk crystallises into actual harm. In this case the applicant was informed of the intention to conduct the investigation. He was invited to attend a meeting to assist the investigation and to comment on the allegation or to comment in writing. The applicant sought and got an adjournment of his meeting. The respondent wrote to the applicant’s solicitors on the 24th November, 2009 outlining its concerns and referring to the basis upon which it intended to proceed and to the standards of fair procedures to which the respondent considered the applicant was entitled, i.e. those as set out by Mr. Justice Barr in M. Q. The response of the applicant was the issue of these proceedings. I consider the issue of these proceedings precipitate in light of the principles set out in Mr. Justice Barr’s judgment in M.Q. The better and obvious course, in my view, was that the applicant’s solicitors, if they had any concerns, should have engaged further with the respondent and ascertained further information as to the procedures that concerned them. I share the views expressed by Butler-Sloss L.J. in Regina v. Harrow LBC ex parte D [1989] 3 W.L.R. 1239 that judicial review in this type of case should be very rare and limited to points of principle that need to be established. The HSE ought to be able to conduct these vital investigations without having to constantly look over their shoulder for possible intervention by the courts. The principles referred to as the “Barr principles” are well established and, based upon them, it is, in my view, perfectly feasible for the respondent to carry out an investigation of this kind with full regard to the applicant’s right to fair procedures and to a fair trial.
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