H473
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High Court of Ireland Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> J.C. -v- Refugee Appeals Tribunal & Ors [2014] IEHC 473 (20 August 2014) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2014/H473.html Cite as: [2014] IEHC 473 |
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Judgment Title: J.C. -v- Refugee Appeals Tribunal & Ors Neutral Citation: [2014] IEHC 473 High Court Record Number: 2009 209 JR Date of Delivery: 20/08/2014 Court: High Court Composition of Court: Judgment by: McDermott J. Status of Judgment: Approved |
Neutral Citation: [2014] IEHC 473 THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW [2009 No. 209 J.R.] BETWEEN J. C. APPLICANT AND
REFUGEE APPEALS TRIBUNAL AND THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice McDermott delivered on the 20th day of August, 2014 1. The applicant is a Nigerian national born in Lagos on 14th October, 1976. She is of Igbo ethnicity and claimed to be a member of the Osu caste, which is routinely subject to discrimination and persecution in Nigeria. She benefited from a first and second level education and obtained a BSc in accounting from the Enugue State University. She had a history of employment in Nigeria. 2. On 17th November, 2001, she married B.N.C. Her daughter, D. A., was included in her refugee application. She was born in Nigeria in 2003. 3. The applicant left Lagos and arrived in Ireland with her daughter and applied for refugee status on 24th November, 2005. 4. The applicant’s son, D.D., was born in Ireland on 28th December, 2005. A separate application for asylum was submitted on his behalf by the applicant. 5. Both applications were refused by the Refugee Applications Commissioner and appealed to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal which conducted oral hearings in respect of both on 10th March, 2008. Two separate decisions were delivered by the tribunal member on 27th January, 2009. The decision in respect of the applicant and her daughter is the subject of this judicial review application. The decision in respect of the applicant’s son has not been the subject of any legal challenge. The Claim 7. The marriage took place despite his family’s objections. Most of the family did not attend the wedding. In 2001 she and her husband went to his family’s village for Christmas, but were thrown out. In March, 2002 it was said that her husband returned to plead on her behalf and called upon the elders and the family uncles to assist in gaining acceptance by his family of the marriage. This failed. Two of her husband’s uncles came to their family home in August, 2002 and threatened them verbally. In September, 2002 they again went to her husband’s village to seek acceptance. This was refused. In December, 2002 she became pregnant with her first child. Her husband’s brother came to see them in their family home and on seeing that she was pregnant called her evil, cursed her and verbally abused her before leaving. In July, 2003 her husband returned to his family village where he was told that the applicant would bring a curse upon the land if she gave birth. It was alleged that the same two uncles called to their home in December, 2003 and damaged the house. In 2004 she claimed that she was assaulted by these uncles and in July, 2004 her husband’s brother came and warned them that he was going to ruin their lives and threatened to kill them. 8. She claimed that family members came five times to her home, broke down the door and attacked her husband, wounding him on one occasion with a knife. The matter was reported to the police, but no action was taken because it was regarded as a family dispute. 9. The applicant stated that she attended Women’s Aid Collective (WACOL). Two documents were submitted from WACOL dated 10th March, 2005 and 10th March, 2008. These documents identified WACOL as an organisation which provided free legal aid and advice to the applicant concerning the violence which she was facing at the hands of her in-laws. The report of 10th March, 2005, stated that following her marriage, her in-laws had:- “…made her life hell and this maltreatment she also receives from the extended family that strongly believe that she has brought a curse into their family. Sadly, they have also extended the degrading and inhuman treatment to her husband who incidentally is their son and brother. When she made this report to us, we initiated reconciliation between the feuding parties and integration of our client into the family. Unfortunately all efforts failed and they were bent on her leaving the family. As it is, she is under threat of violence and possibly loss of her life and that of her husband and children”. The applicant was advised by WACOL to keep away from her in-laws as her life was seriously under threat. The report states that they would have initiated court proceedings on her behalf, but the outcome might not have been positive. It was noted that many women face similar threats and intimidation in many Igbo communities despite the provisions of the Constitution which ban discrimination against the Osu caste. The letter of 10th March, 2008, confirmed that the previous report emanated from the legal department of WACOL. Section 13(1) Report
The Tribunal Decision
The Challenge Grounds A and B 15. I am satisfied that at all stages in the appeal process the question as to whether the applicant was Osu was a live issue. It is clear that the s. 13(1) report which addresses the credibility of the applicant on this issue and found it to be lacking, also stated that it was not credible that the applicant would not have been aware of the likely difficulties for an Osu who married into a non-Osu family. The issue was again addressed in the notice of appeal at para. 2(i). Furthermore, the applicant furnished an explanation that because she and her husband were Christians, she did not understand that his family would have “traditional” beliefs. It is also clear from the questionnaire, the s. 11 interview and the evidence given by the applicant that this hostility was clear to her before the couple were married and was evidenced by the fact that only one cousin from the husband’s family and extended family attended the marriage ceremony. 16. The issue of the applicant’s ethnicity on her own case, arose before marriage and was clearly a matter that was certain to give rise to difficulties on the basis of the country of origin information which was considered by the Tribunal, and which in large measure coincides with the experience described by the applicant. It was open to the Tribunal to conclude that the credibility of the applicant on this limited aspect of the evidence was undermined by the prevailing reality of societal discrimination against the Osu, and that, as an Osu with a third level education, she must have anticipated difficulties surrounding her pending marriage. I am also satisfied that this matter was clearly in issue during the course of the appeal having regard to the findings in the s. 13(1) report, the notice of appeal and the evidence adduced at the appeal hearing. Therefore, I am satisfied that on this limited issue the inference drawn was reasonably open to the tribunal member and that consequently the decision should not be quashed on Grounds A and B. However, a more difficult issue arises in respect of the finding concerning the WACOL letters. Grounds C and D 18. It is not clear what weight was given to the WACOL letters. If they were authentic, they offered support for the conclusion that the applicant was Osu and had engaged the organisation’s services as claimed. The second letter confirmed that position. Moreover, the letters confirmed the reason for the organisation’s involvement. Though the Tribunal considered the two letters, they were regarded as undermining the applicant’s case. The Tribunal concluded that even if one accepted that the applicant attended WACOL on the basis claimed, and that the organisation engaged in a futile attempt to mediate between the couple and the husband’s family, her husband’s further engagement with his family subsequent to the advice given and the failure of the applicant to take the advice in March, 2005 undermined her credibility. 19. The evidence given by the applicant was that a further attack was made by members of the family upon the couple at their home in May, 2005. Subsequently, in July 2005, the applicant made a complaint to the Nigerian police which is of a very general nature and does not contain any detail of the numerous assaults said to have occurred over the preceding four years, at least one of which involved the infliction of a knife wound on her husband. Following the making of that complaint on 26th July the applicant went to Lagos in August, and remained there in her friend’s home until October. She left her friend’s home because people came to that house looking for her. 20. The applicant claims that the Tribunal failed to consider the two letters from WACOL submitted as part of the appeal adequately or at all. In I.R. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2009] IEHC 353, Cooke J. at para. 11-9 when considering the general principles applicable to a challenge to a Tribunal decision based on credibility, stated the following in respect of how documents ought to be considered:-
22. I am satisfied that the two letters were presented as part of the events described by the applicant and were, therefore, evidence of the applicant’s history with her in-laws. While the documents were referred to in the decision, I am not satisfied that any adequate regard was given to their potential effect and value vis-à-vis the core claim of the applicant: rather, without dealing with their more obvious context, the letters were only referred to, without explanation, for the ancillary purpose of supporting the conclusion that the husband’s subsequent actions in seeking contact with his family were not credible. 23. This does not mean that there are no issues surrounding the two letters. No explanation was furnished as to why a letter was obtained from WACOL in March, 2005 “to whom it may concern” concerning these matters four months before the police complaint was made and seven months before the applicant left Nigeria. This and other matters may require further examination. 24. While I am satisfied that the respondents were entitled to come to a conclusion in relation to the suggested actions of the husband in pursuing a reconciliation in the face of repeated violence from his family, I am not satisfied that the WACOL correspondence was considered at all in determining whether the applicant was an Osu and I, therefore, find the limited reference to the two letters to be unsatisfactory. I am, therefore, satisfied that though Ground C has not been established, the applicant has established a substantial basis upon which to apply for judicial review in respect of Ground D. Grounds E and F 26. There remains the issue of relocation. If the applicant has a well founded fear of persecution based on her membership of the Osu Caste, and if no state protection was available to her, she may be entitled to a declaration of refugee status. However, the issue of relocation would then have to be examined with particular reference to the principles set out in K.D. (Nigeria) v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2013] IEHC 481. However, as noted by Clark J. there are a large number of decisions which refer to the relocation option notwithstanding a finding that there was no well founded fear of persecution on credibility grounds. In those cases the decision maker is really saying “if what you say is true, which is not accepted, you have given no credible explanation for coming to Ireland instead of moving elsewhere away from the claimed danger”. She stated that these “even if” findings are not internal relocation alternative findings requiring adherence to Regulation 7 of the European Communities (Eligibility for Protection) Regulations 2006 (S.I. No. 518 of 2006): rather, they are part of a general examination of whether an applicant has a well founded fear of persecution. She stated:-
30. Thus an ‘even if I am wrong’ finding which goes on to suggest internal relocation is not the equivalent of carefully exploring an antidote to a well-founded fear of persecution for Convention reasons and is often merely a facet of credibility. A reviewing Court must bear in mind that not every case which contains the ‘internal relocation’ phrase is subject to Regulation 7 principles. When a claim is rejected on credibility grounds and includes the statement that ‘even if I am wrong in my assessment of your credibility, there is in any event no good reason why you do not simply move and put a distance between you and the village elders / neighbours / spouse / mother in law’ as the case may be, it is not appropriate to characterise the credibility decision as an internal relocation decision as it is not an exploration of a relocation alternative to refugee status.” 28. I am satisfied, in granting leave to apply for judicial review in respect of Ground D, to extend the time for the bringing of this application. The applicant is only marginally outside the time limit prescribed and at all material times intended to pursue the challenge. The applicant has established that one of the grounds advanced has merit. I am satisfied in the interests of justice and because good and sufficient reason has been demonstrated, to extend the time for the bringing of this application. I am also satisfied having considered all of the evidence and submissions on the matter that the decision of the Tribunal is fundamentally flawed on Ground D and I will, therefore, grant an order of certiorari in respect of the Tribunal decision.
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