Start Mortgages DAC v Gawley & anor [2019] IEHC 830 (09 December 2019)

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JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Garrett Simons delivered on 9 December 2019

1. This matter comes before the High Court by way of an application pursuant to Order 42,

rule 24 of the Rules of the Superior Courts seeking leave to issue execution in respect of

2. The application for leave to issue execution is made by Start Mortgages DAC (“Start

Mortgages”). The original plaintiff in the proceedings had been a different company,

namely Nua Mortgages Ltd. Start Mortgages has, since 15 January 2015, been registered

as the owner of the charge pursuant to which the original order for possession had been

made. As explained presently, Start Mortgages has since been substituted as plaintiff in

the proceedings in place of Nua Mortgages Ltd. by order of the High Court.

3. Notwithstanding this procedural history, Mr. Peter Gawley, the first named defendant, has

sought to resist the application for leave to issue execution on the basis of an argument

that Start Mortgages are not entitled to ownership of the charge. An argument in

identical terms had been run before the High Court previously and had been rejected.

Orders substituting Start Mortgages Ltd. and Start Mortgages DAC as plaintiff were made

on 17 October 2016 and on 12 June 2018, respectively. No valid appeal has been taken

against either of these orders. This issue is, therefore, res judicata and Mr. Gawley is

estopped from reagitating arguments which have previously been rejected by the High

4. The only issue remaining to be determined on the present application is whether leave to

issue execution should be granted by reference to the principles set out in Smyth v.

5. The application was heard on 11 November 2019, and judgment was reserved until today

(9 December 2019). Mr. William Hamilton, BL, appeared on behalf of Start Mortgages

DAC; Mr. Gawley appeared as a litigant in person. Proof of service of the motion on the

second named defendant, Sandra Gawley, has been established by an affidavit of service

6. A party who has the benefit of an order is generally required to execute same within a

period of six years. If this is not done, then it is necessary to make an application for

leave to issue execution pursuant to Order 42, rule 24. That rule provides as follows.

(a) where six years have elapsed since the judgment or order, or any change has

taken place by death or otherwise in the parties entitled or liable to

(b) where a party is entitled to execution upon a judgment of assets in futuro;

company upon a judgment recorded against such company, or against a

the party alleging himself to be entitled to execution may apply to the Court for leave to

The Court may, if satisfied that the party so applying is entitled to issue execution, make

an order to that effect, or may order that any issue or question necessary to

determine the rights of the parties shall be tried in any of the ways in which any

question in an action may be tried: and in either case the Court may impose such

terms as to costs or otherwise as shall be just. Provided always that in case of

default of payment of any sum of money at the time appointed for payment thereof

by any judgment or order made in a matrimonial cause or matter, an order of fieri

facias may be issued as of course upon an affidavit of service of the judgment or

7. The grant of leave to issue execution under Order 42, rule 24 is discretionary. The

criteria governing the exercise of this discretion have been set out in Smyth v. Tunney

[2004] IESC 24; [2004] 1 IR 512. The Supreme Court held that it is not necessary to

give some unusual, exceptional or very special reasons for obtaining permission to

execute out of time provided that there is some explanation at least for the lapse of time.

Even if a good reason is given, the court must consider counterbalancing allegations of

8. An earlier order granting leave to issue execution had been made in favour of Start

Mortgages on 17 October 2016. In deciding whether or not there is an explanation for

the delay in execution, the focus will be principally, but not exclusively, on the period

between the date of that order and the date of the motion seeking a further extension of

9. The explanation for the delay has been set out in the affidavit of Mr. Justin Nevin sworn

herein on 7 August 2019. Mr. Nevin sets out the procedural history, including the making

of certain orders amending the title of the proceedings, in detail. I will return to these

10. The affidavit also explains the difficulties which had occurred in executing a writ of

“9. On 4 December 2013, a writ of execution issued out of the High Court in the form

of an order of possession regarding the property. And I beg to refer to a true copy

10. I say that thereafter Nua took steps to execute the possession order and in that

regard arrangements were made with the Sheriff to take possession of the

property. The Sheriff intended to take possession of the property on 2nd July 2014

but details of his scheduled attendance at the property were published on anti-

eviction group websites. In the circumstances, the Sheriff’s attendance at the

property was postponed. Subsequent scheduled dates to take possession of the

property were similarly postponed by the Sheriff due to the publication of his

intended attendance on anti-eviction social media sites. Furthermore, Nua were

threatened with injunctive proceedings seeking to restrain execution of the

possession order by an organisation providing assistance to distressed borrowers.”

11. It is then averred that Start Mortgages acquired all right, title and interest in the

defendants’ loan, security and all ancillary rights and claims related to the loan and

security on or about 4 December 2014. It is further averred that on, 15 January 2015,

Start Mortgages had been registered as the owner of the charge in the Land Registry. A

copy of the up-to-date folio (County Dublin, Folio 141614F) is exhibited as part of the

affidavit. Start Mortgages’ ownership of the charge appears at Entry 12.

12. Returning to Mr. Nevin’s affidavit, it addresses the period from 2016 onwards as follows.

“15. In circumstances where the mortgage account was deemed unsustainable, Start

sought to engage with the Defendants by inter alia offering a voluntary surrender

or assisted voluntary sale of the property, by way of letter dated 7 February 2018.

On 14 March 2018, the first named Defendant advised that he would not be

surrendering the property and maintained that Start are not his mortgage provider.

A further offer of voluntary surrender or assisted voluntary sale was made on 28

June 2018. No response was received to that correspondence. […]”

13. The relevant correspondence in this regard has been exhibited.

14. Mr. Gawley’s grounds for opposing the application for leave to issue execution have been

set out in an affidavit sworn by him on 4 November 2019. The affidavit sets out the

history of the proceedings prior to the making of the order for possession on 7 March

2011. In particular, reference is made to certain events before the Master of the High

Court. These matters are largely irrelevant to the application currently before the court.

The proceedings had been transferred from the Master’s List to the Judge’s List, and the

High Court (Dunne J.) had made an order for possession on 7 March 2011. The

defendants did not bring a valid appeal against the order for possession. (An application

for an extension of time to bring an appeal against the order for possession was refused

by the Supreme Court on 28 July 2014). The making of the order for possession is,

therefore, res judicata and the defendants are estopped from agitating issues which could

and should have been raised at the time of the original application for an order for

15. The affidavit next alleges that Start Mortgages were not entitled to be registered as the

owners of the charge. Although not entirely clear from the affidavit, the implication

seems to be that a third company, Investec Bank plc, should first have been registered as

the owner of the charge before any onward transfer to Start Mortgages.

16. The reference to Investec Bank plc arises in circumstances where it had been explained in

the affidavit filed on behalf of Start Mortgages at the time of the first substitution

application in 2016 that there had been two transfers involved as follows: (i) Investec

Bank plc transferred its security interests and contractual rights in the “Finance

Documents” as defined to LSA IX Java Investments Ltd.; and (ii) Nua Mortgage Ltd. had

agreed to transfer its security interests and contractual rights under the “Finance

Documents” as defined to Start Mortgages Ltd. See the affidavit of the Company

17. The principal matter to be addressed on an application for leave to issue execution is

whether the moving party has put forward a good reason or explanation for its delay in

execution. It is not necessary to give some unusual, exceptional or very special reasons.

18. The affidavit of Mr. Nevin indicates that Start Mortgages had sought to engage with the

defendants during the period between the date of the High Court order of 17 October

2016 and the filing of the motion seeking leave to issue execution on 7 August 2019. The

affidavit has also recited the previous difficulties encountered by the Sheriff in enforcing a

19. It is reasonable for a mortgagee (creditor) to engage with a mortgagor (debtor) to

ascertain whether measures short of the enforcement of an order for possession can be

agreed between the parties. Start Mortgages had written to the defendants on 28 June

2018 and had offered the option of an assisted voluntary sale or supported voluntary

surrender. One of the issues which could be addressed in such an arrangement was,

seemingly, an “agreed shortfall balance”. It appears that the defendants were being

offered an opportunity to at least discuss a form of “debt forgiveness”, whereby any

outstanding balance owing over and above the proceeds of sale of the mortgaged

20. The “delay” in seeking to execute against the mortgaged property pending this approach

to the defendants was reasonable. Were the court to refuse to issue leave to execute in

circumstances where the lapse of time in seeking to enforce an order for possession is

explicable, in part at least, by the taking of such steps, it would create a disincentive for

mortgagees to engage with mortgagors. This would not be in the public interest, and

21. Mr. Gawley has not identified any prejudice which he has suffered as a result of the lapse

of time between 17 October 2016 and the issuing of the motion on 7 August 2019.

Indeed, it seems that Mr. Gawley has been in residence in the mortgaged property during

that period, and that no payments have been made pursuant to the mortgage since June

22. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the test in Smyth v. Tunney has been met.

There is a good explanation for the delay in executing the order for possession, and there

23. Turning now to the allegations made by Mr. Gawley in his affidavit of 4 November 2019, I

am satisfied that these allegations do not represent a valid basis for refusing the

application for leave to issue execution for the following two reasons.

24. First and foremost, the very issues now relied upon by Mr. Gawley, i.e. the entitlement of

Start Mortgages to maintain the proceedings, and to enforce the order for possession,

have been dealt with by the High Court previously, and are res judicata. More

specifically, the High Court (Baker J.) made an order in 2016 in the following terms.

“1. An order pursuant to Order 42, rule 24 of the Rules of the Superior Courts granting

Start Mortgages Limited, of Trimleston House, Beech Hill Office Campus,

Clonskeagh, Dublin 4, liberty to issue execution on foot of the Order of this

2. If necessary, an Order pursuant to Order 17, rule 4 of the Rules of the Superior

Courts substituting Start Mortgages Limited, of Trimleston House, Beech Hill Office

Campus, Clonskeagh, Dublin 4, in place of Nua Mortgages Limited as plaintiff to the

25. As appears, the wording of the second part of this order is somewhat unusual in that it is

prefaced by the qualifying words “if necessary”. The order also omits any direction that

the amended title of the proceedings be duly entered in the Central Office.

26. These matters were clarified on a subsequent application made on 12 June 2018. That

application arose in circumstances where Start Mortgages had changed its status to a

“Designated Activity Company” or a “DAC”. The High Court (Baker J.) made an order in

“IT IS ORDERED pursuant to Order 17, rule 4 of the Rules of the Superior Courts that

Start Mortgages Designated Activity Company, of Trimleston House, Beech Hill

Office Campus, Clonskeagh, Dublin 4, be substituted in place of Nua Mortgages

The title thereof to be duly entered in the Central Office of the High Court with the proper

27. As appears, Start Mortgages DAC had been substituted in place of Nua Mortgages Ltd. as

28. The 2016 application to substitute Start Mortgages Ltd. as plaintiff had been opposed by

Mr. Gawley on almost identical grounds to those upon which he now relies to resist the

present application. This is evident from the terms of the affidavit of 28 June 2016 which

he had filed in response to the 2016 substitution application. The content and structure

of the affidavit of 28 June 2016 is substantially the same as Mr. Gawley’s affidavit of 4

November 2019. Crucially, the allegation that Start Mortgages are not entitled to be

registered as the holder of the charge under the Registration of Title Act 1964 is made in

29. It is evident from the existence of the orders of 17 October 2016 and 12 June 2018 that

Start Mortgages DAC has been substituted as plaintiff in the proceedings. This issue is

now res judicata, and Mr. Gawley is estopped from reagitating the arguments which he

had made (unsuccessfully) in opposition to the application on 17 October 2016.

30. Even if the matter was not res judicata, there is a second, separate reason for finding that

Mr. Gawley’s opposition to the (2019) application for leave to issue execution is not well

founded. The core of Mr. Gawley’s argument appears to be that Start Mortgages is not

entitled to be registered as the owner of the charge, i.e. the mortgage entered into by Mr.

and Mrs. Gawley on 2 April 2008. Yet, the evidence before the court establishes that

Start Mortgages DAC has been registered as owner of the charge since 15 January 2015.

As noted earlier, the relevant extract from the up-to-date folio has been exhibited.

31. Mr. Gawley’s argument entails an implicit challenge to the correctness of the Register of

Title. The Court of Appeal in Tanager DAC v. Kane [2018] IECA 352 held that the

correctness of the Register of Title cannot be challenged in possession proceedings. See

“A plaintiff seeking an order for possession must adduce proof, inter alia, that he or she is

the registered owner of the charge. It is registration that triggers the entitlement

to seek possession. In those proceedings, the court may not be asked to go behind

the Register and consider whether the registration is, in some manner, defective.

In the possession proceedings, the court must accept the correctness of the

particulars of registration as they appear on the folio, because the statutory basis

for the action for possession is registration. This is one consequence of the

statutory conclusiveness of the Register, and of the statutory limits to rectification.

The challenge to registration is brought by other types of proceedings inter partes, or

where the PRA is respondent, and in the manner I have described.”

32. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused by Determination dated 12 April 2019,

33. Mr. Gawley’s challenge to the correctness of the Register of Title, and, in particular, to the

entry which indicates that Start Mortgages is the registered owner of the charge, is

therefore inadmissible. It cannot be raised in these possession proceedings.

34. For all of the reasons above, I am satisfied that the test for granting leave to execute

outside the original six-year period, as set out by the Supreme Court in Smyth v. Tunney

35. Accordingly, I make an order pursuant to Order 42, rule 24 of the Rules of the Superior

Courts granting Start Mortgages DAC leave to issue execution on foot of the order for

possession made by the High Court in the within proceedings on 7 March 2011.

Result: Leave to issue execution outside six year period granted under Order 42, rule 24.

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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Start Mortgages DAC v Gawley & anor [2019] IEHC 830 (09 December 2019) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2019/2019IEHC830.html Cite as: [2019] IEHC 830

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