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MacCarthaigh v. Éire [1998] IESC 11; [1999] 1 IR 186 (15th July, 1998)
AN
CHÚIRT UACHTARACH
Ó
HAIMILÍN, PRIOMH-BHREITHEAMH
Ó
FLAITHEARTAIGH, BREITHEAMH
Ó
BEARAIN, BREITHEAMH
Ó
MURCHÚ, BREITHEAMH
Ó
LOINGSIGH, BREITHEAMH
379/95
IDIR
RUAIRÍ
Mac CÁRTHAIGH
Iarratasóir/Achomharcóir
agus
ÉIRE,
AN t-ÁRD AIGHNE agus STIURTHÓIR na n-IONCHUISEAMH POIBLÍ
Freagróirí
Breithiúnas
a thus an Príomh-Bhreitheamh Ó h-Aimiltín, an 15ú
lá d’Iúil 1998. [Nem. Diss.]
Acomharc
é seo atá á dhéanamh ag an
t-Iarratasóir/Acomharcóir Ruairí Mac Carthaigh i
gcoinne
Ordú na h-Ard Cúirte, 14/09/1994, ag diúltiú (agus
costasaí dá gearradh air comh maith) don t-Iarratasóir
iarratas athbhreithnithe a dhéanamh ar mhaithe leis na faoisimh seo a
leanas, sé sin:
(2)
1.
Ordú choisc ag fógairt don Freagróir triú-luaite
gan dul ar aghaidh le h-aon triail don Iarratasóir ach amháin os
comhair giúire atá ar a gcumas Gaeilge a thuiscint gan cabhair
ath-teangaire;
2.
Ordú mandamus ag fógairt
don
Freagróir triú-luaite giúire feidhmiúil a
thionól maidir le riachtanasaí triail de réir cirt a
bheith ag an t-Iarratasóir in-luaite;
3.
Dearbhú chomh maith nó ina ionad sin go bhfuil an
Iarratasóir dteideal giúire nach bhfuil baill éagcumasacha
páirteach ann de réir forálacha Acht na Giúirithe,
1976.
Cúisiodh
an Iarratasóir i dteannta duine eile agus cuireadh ina leith:-
1.
Go rinne sé, ar an 28ú 1á Bealtaine, 1990, ag
Bóthar Suardais, Corballis, Iaistigh de Dhúiche Chathrach Atha
Cliath, meascán seaclaidí agus milseogra go raibh luach
iomlán £11,252.50 orthu a goid, contrartha d’alt 23 den
Larceny Act, 1916, mar leasaíodh ag an Acht urn Dlí
Coirúil (Dlinse), 1976;
2.
Go rinne sé, ar an 1á in-luaite, le bagairt foirnirt, feithicil a
ghabháil go neamhdleathach, contrartha d’alt 10 den Acht urn
Dlí Coiriúil (Dlinse), 1976;
3.
Go rinne sé, ar an 1á in-luaite, ag
5
Lána
Henrietta, Baile Atha Cliath, in nDúiche Chathrach Átha Cliath,
meascán seaclaidáí, milseáin agus
(3)
milseogra,
maoin John Nelson, go raibh luach iomlán £11,252.50 orthu, a
ghlacadh agus fios aige gur maoin goidte a bhi iontu, contrartha d’alt
33(1) den Larceny Act, 1916
Tá
sé socraithe go dtrialfar an Iarratasóir ar na cúiseanna
sin os comhair breitheamh den Chúirt Chuarda agus giúiré,
ach caithfear an triail a chur ar ath-1ó go dti go dtabharfaí
breith ar an acomharc seo a leanas.
Tógadh
an t-Iarratasóir i mBaile Átha Cliath, agus dearbhaíonn
sé gur tógadh le Gaeilge é. Dá bhrí sin
b’fhearr leis a chás féin a phlé tri Gaeilge.
Mothaíonn sé nach mbeadh an éifeacht céanna le
h-aon rud a deireadh sé féin, nó a deireadh
dliodóir ar a shon, mura mbeadh cruinn-eolas na Gaeilge ag gach ball den
giúire. Aighníonn an tIarratasóir go ndéanfar
sarú ar a chearta bhunreachtúla, mura roghnófar
giúire a mbeidh an Ghaeilge go líofa acu, gur féidir leo
gach rud a bheas ráite in nGaeilge le linn na trialach a thuiscint, gan
cabhair ateangaire.
Seo
iad forálacha na Bunreachta a bhaineann leis an acomharc seo:
(4)
Airteagal
8.
1.
Os í an Ghaeilge an teanga náisiúnta is i an
phriomhtheanga oifigiúil í.
2.
Glactar leis an Sacs-Bhéarla mar theanga oifigiúil eile.
3.
Ach féadfar socrú a dhéanamh le dlí d’fhonn
ceachtar den dá theanga sin a bheith ma haonteanga le haghaidh aon
ghnó nó gnóthaí oifigiúla ar fud an
Stáit ar fad nó in aon chuid de.
Airteagal
38
1.
Ní cead aon duine a thriail in aon chúis choiriúil ach mar
is cuí de réir dlí.
2.
...
3.
...
4.
...
5.
Ní cead duine a thriail in aon chúis choiriúil ach i
láthair choiste tiomanta, ach amháin i gcás cionta a
thriail faoi alt 2, alt 3 nó alt 4 den Airteagal seo.
Ins
an Ard-Chúirt, rinne an Breitheamh Ó hAnluain coimriú ar
chásanna ina raibh ceisteanna cosúla á chur phlé
trí chéile - ó Éireann, ó Cheanada agus
ó na Stáit Aontaithe. D’admhaigh sé go raibh
céim speisialta ag baint leis an
(5)
Ghaeilge
mar phríomh-theanga, agus go raibh sé de chomhacht ag an
Iarratasóir a chosaint a dhéanamh trí Ghaeilge más
mian leis. Ach ó thaobh roghnú an ghiúiré de,
bhí bun-phrionsabal ag obair narbh fhéidir a chur ar leataobh,
sé sin:-
“Ba
chóir go bhfeadfaí a rá i dtaobh giúiré ar
bith i ngach cás coiriúil go seasann siad do ghach aicme den
phobal sa cheantar ma bhfuil an chúis le héisteacht.”
Tá
a thios ag an saol nach bhfuil morán daoine in Éireann faoi
láthair gur féidir leo cúrsaí dlí a
thuiscint as Gaeilge gan cabhair ateangaire. Tar éis staitistic a luadh
ón daonáirearnh ón mbliain 1986, dúirt an
Breitheamh Ó hAnluain:-
“Fagann
san, dá mbeifí ag tabhairt faoi rolla giúire do chur le
chéile agus gan éinne ar an rolla ach daoine go raibh eolas maith
acu ar an dteangain labhartha, go gaithfí 75% ar a laghad de phobal
Chathair Átha Cliath d’fhágáil ar leataobh ó
thús, agus táim den bharúil go mbeadh an figiúr
níos comhgaraí do 90% nó os a chionn nuair a bhiefi ag
plé le daoine a bheadh ag dul i ngleic le ceisteanna casta san
dlí choiriúil do phlé is do thuiscint.”
(6)
De
réir an breitheamh Ó
hAnluain,
dá ngéillfeá d’éileamh an Iarratasóra,
ní bheadh formhór muintir na hÉireann in ann freastal ar
giúiré i gcás mar sin; agus bheadh sé sin
contrartha don chiall a bhain an Cúirt Uachtarach as Airteagal
38.5
den
Bhunreacht i gcás
de
Béirca v. Attorney General
[197ó] IR 38. Luaigh sé sliocht ó bhreithúThas an
Breitheamh 0 Griofa sa chás sin:-
“Therefore,
in my opinion, the jury should be a body which is truly representative, and a
fair cross-section of the community. This is widely recognised and accepted in
many jurisdictions and, in particular, in the United States, where, by reason
of the diversity of the ethnic groups in the population, the question has been
considered frequently by the Supreme Court in that country. I would adopt what
was stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Company
:
-
‘Trial
by jury presupposes a jury drawn from a pool broadly representative of the
community as well as impartial in a specific case.... The broad representative
character of the jury should be maintained, partly as assurance of a diffused
impartiality and partly because sharing in the administration of justice is a
phase of civic responsibility.
(7)
Séard
a bhí i gceist i
De
Búrca
ná Acht na nGiúrithe, 1927. D’ordaigh alt 2 den acht go
mbeadh cáilíocht rátúcháin
iosmhóideadh choisteoirí i ngach
giúiré-dhúthaigh. De réir ailt
5
agus
16, ní bheadh mná in ann fónamh mar choisteoirí ach
amháin ar a iarraidh sin dóibh. Bhí an Acht céanna
á phlé i gcás
The
State (Byrne) v. Frawley
[1978] IR 326
In
a bhreithiunas dúirt an Breitheamh Ó hInnse ag paiste 347 agus
348:-
“The
gravimen of the complaint made in the de Burca case against such jury lists was
not that the system was unfair to those who, although eligible were excluded
(for no excluded person has come ever come forward to complain) that his or her
exclusion was unconstitutional but that such jury lists were so artificially
shrunken and selective that an accused person was denied the representative
jury source which is vital for the jury guaranteed by s.5 ofArticle 38 of the
Constitution. The extent to which juries drawn from those lists were incapable
of presenting a genuine reflection of community values and standards is shown
when it is pointed out that the combined effect of the rating qualification and
the exclusion of women meant that some 80% of the adult citizens in a jury
district were shut out from jury service. The proposition that juries drawn
from the remaining 20% were valid because no ineligible persons served on them
I find no more supportable
(8)
than
a proposition that an election would be valid when 80% of those who should have
had an opportunity of voting were barred from the polls
For
that conclusion I would respectfully adopt (in addition to the reasons I gave
in my judgment in the de Burca case) the reasoning of the United States Supreme
Court in
Taylor
v. Louisiana
(1975) 419 US. 522
where
that court, in condemning as unconstitutional a jury system which resulted in
the exclusion of women jurors, said at p.530 of the report.
In
a bhreithiúnas léigh an Breitheamh Ó hInnse an
páirt so den bhreithiúnas:-
“We
accept the fair-cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury trial
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and are convinced that the requirement has
solid foundation. The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of
arbitrary power to make available the common sense judgment of the community as
a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the
professional or perhaps over-conditioned or biased response of a judge.
Duncan
v. Louisiana at 155-156
This prophylactic vehicle is not provided if
the
jury pool is made up of only special segments of the populace or if large,
distinctive
(9)
groups
are excluded from the pool. Community participation in the administration of
the criminal law, moreover, is not only consistent with our democratic heritage
but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal
justice system. Restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding
identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be squared
with the constitutional concept of jury trial.”
Aontaíonn
an Chúirt seo leis sin, agus leis an méid a bhi le rá ag
an mBreitheamh Ó hAnluain sa chás seo. Cinnte tá
deacrachtaí ag baint le ateangaireacht - deacrachtai a luaigh Michael
Shulman san
Vanderbilt
Law Review
(1993) vol. 46, p175 at 177
mar
seo:-
“When
a defendant testifies in a criminal case his testimony is critically important
to the jury ‘s determination of his guilt or innocence. The first
noticeable difficulty in the present system of court interpretation is that
non-English speaking defendants are not judged on their own words. The words
attributed to the defendant are those of the interpreter. No matter how
accurate the interpretation is, the words are not the defendant ‘s, nor
is the style, the syntax, or the emotion. Furthermore, some words are
culturally specific and, therefore, are incapable of
(10)
being
translated. Perfect interpretations do not exist, as no interpretation will
convey precisely the same meaning as the original testimony. While juries
should not attribute to the defendant the exact wording of the interpretation
and the emotion expressed by the interpreter, they typically do just that....
Given that juries often determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence
based on small nuances of language or slight variations in emotion, how can it
be fair for the defendant to be judged on the words chosen and the emotion
expressed by the interpreter?”
Tá
sé sin fíor go leor, ach caithfear a rá, in Eireann faoi
láthair, nach bhfuil réiteach níos fearr ann. Dá
mbeadh ar gach ball den ghiúire bheith in ann cúrsai dlí a
thuiscint as Gaeilge gan cabhair ateangaire, chuirfí formhór de
mhuintir na hÉireann ar leataobh. Dhéanadh sé sin
sarú ar Airteagal
38.5
den
Bhunreacht, mar a mhinigh an Chúirt Uachtarach é i gcás
de
Búrca v. Attorney General
agus
The
State (Byrne) v. Frawley
.
Ar
an ábhar sin, dúiltaíonn an Chúirt don acomharc seo.
© 1998 Irish Supreme Court
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