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Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions >> Quinlivan v. Conroy [1998] IESC 31; [1999] 1 IR 271 (29th October, 1998) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/1998/31.html Cite as: [1998] IESC 31 |
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1. This
is an appeal brought by Nessan Quinlivan from the judgment and order of the
High Court (Kinlen J.) of 3rd April, 1998, refusing him an order for discovery
against the respondents, who are both assistant commissioners in the Garda
Síochána.
2. The
return of the appellant to England to face charges is sought pursuant to four
warrants issued by the relevant judicial authorities in England and endorsed
for execution in the State by the respondents. His extradition is being sought
on the following charges,
viz:-
3. On
the 11th September, 1995, the President of the District Court, Judge Smithwick,
made orders for the delivery of the appellant into the custody of a member of
the City of London police force for conveyance to London on foot of the said
four warrants.
4. The
appellant applied to the High Court and claims that he should K released
pursuant to s. 50 of the Extradition Act, 1965.
6. Mr.
Quinlivan’ s essential claim in the main proceedings is that the offences
alleged are political offences, or offences connected with political offences
and, as regards the charge of escaping from lawful custody. It is asserted on
his behalf that there is a lack of a corresponding offence in this
jurisdiction
on account of
agent
provocateur:
he
asserts that his escape was
7. He
also has a complaint, in separate proceedings, that because of the adverse
publicity that surrounded his arrest in October, 1990, he would not get a fair
trial in England. Seemingly, the Attorney General of the United Kingdom issued
a directive to newspapers and other media outlets to be careful as to what they
would publish in relation to Mr. Quinlivan and he seeks discovery of that
correspondence. To dispose of this point immediately, such adverse publicity as
there may have been is now so long ago as not likely to pose any threat to the
fairness of his trial, and so I can pass from it.
9. “I
say and believe that the conspiracy charges in question arise out of a campaign
of violence which was conducted by the Irish Republican Army (hereinafter the
“IRA”) in England in 1990 during which,
inter
alia,
Mr.
Ian Gow M.P. was murdered, a former Governor of Gibraltar was shot and wounded
and one soldier was shot dead and two soldiers wounded at Lichfield railway
station. I further say and believe that in the course of their investigations
into IRA activities in England, the police authorities there had earlier found
a list of intended IRA targets, which included Sir Charles Tidbury, the person
named as the intended
10. Then
he makes the case that he and another prisoner, Pearse McCauley, were
approached by a prison officer at Brixton Prison, Prison Officer Marshall, and
that he, having gone to considerable lengths to gain the confidence of the
prisoners, told them that he would help them to escape. This was first
mentioned in December, 1990, or early 1991, when, according to the appellant,
they were returning from a court appearance. Later the prison officer advised
them that the best time to effect an escape would be when returning from Mass
on Sunday and he advised them as to what he believed was the weakest point of
the prison’s perimeter wall. The appellant went on to depose:-
12. The
purpose behind this plot, seemingly, was that the police considered that they
might be led to find out more about their possible accomplices in the terrorist
crimes that the police were investigating.
13. It
is to advance this case that the discovery motion was brought in the High Court
on behalf of the appellant. The documents sought to be discovered were
described as follows in the notice of motion:
7
14. In
the course of an affidavit (filed on behalf of the respondents) Detective
Constable Clive Robinson of the Metropolitan Police, New Scotland Yard, London,
gave a full background to the offences in respect of which the return of the
appellant is sought, including the prison escape, but in the course of that
affidavit there is no denial of the allegation that his escape was facilitated
in the way that the appellant has deposed.
15. The
issue as it appears to me that arises for resolution in this appeal, therefore,
is of what relevance are the documents sought to be discovered in the light of
the failure to deny the appellant’s essential assertion that his escape
was facilitated by the authorities? If that is accepted by the High Court.
When it comes to hear the substantive matter, that may well help to advance his
submissions that the offences in respect of which he is being sought are
16. I
should emphasise, however, that I regard the charge in relation to Mr. Kemp as
something distinct and separate from the other charges. According to the
detective constable’s affidavit, Mr. Kemp was attacked
after
the
escape; he was an ordinary citizen driving along in his motor car when his car
was hijacked and he was shot and wounded.
17. The
learned High Court judge held that the documents sought by the appellant were
not in the possession or power of the respondents. It is clear that the
documents specified in the notice of motion are not in fact in the
“possession” of the garda officers who are named as respondents in
both the proceedings and in the motion. Even if one were to assume in favour of
the appellant that the respondents are the “agents” of the British
authorities in whose possession the documents now are (and I am not so finding)
that relationship clearly would not place the physical custody of the documents
with
18. If
the appellant had sought to rely upon the alleged relationship so as to procure
discovery by the British government or other authority having possession or
power in respect of the specified or any other document which might be relevant
on the basis of the principle established in
Willis
v Baddeley
[1892] 2 QBD 324
,
or some extension of that principle, the notice of motion and perhaps the
substantive proceedings would require significant amendment. This problem was
anticipated by counsel on behalf of the appellant who in their written
submissions dealt with the difficulty in the following terms:-
19. Apart
from the obvious difficulties in identifying and making what might be
appropriate amendments at this stage, the reality of the application is that the