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Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions >> McCall v. An Post [1998] IESC 53 (4th December, 1998) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/1998/53.html Cite as: [1998] IESC 53 |
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1. The
Court has heard very helpful submissions on both sides. The Court has reached a
conclusion on the matter and therefore does not feel it necessary to reserve
judgment.
2. This
is a case stated by His Honour Judge Raymond Groarke pursuant to s. 16 of the
Courts of Justice Act, 1947, and in pursuance of an application by counsel for
the appellant for the determination of questions of law by the Supreme Court.
4. It
was accepted in the course of the hearing before the learned Circuit Court
judge, and also as before us, that the document described as
Procedures
for Dealing with Grievances and Disputes
and
entered into between the union and An Post in June, 1990, is indeed part of the
terms of employment of the workers with An Post. It should be construed
however, in my belief, in a sensible way as something that employers and
workers have decided together, as set forth in the preamble to it, and that its
objective is to make sure that all grievances, disputes and disciplinary
matters, however arising, are dealt with promptly and fairly. That is what the
two parties set out to do.
7. The
learned Circuit Court judge went on to describe the history of the matter and
recounts that the following facts were agreed by the parties:-
8. That
was challenged in judicial review proceedings. The challenge was to the
decision of the Employment Appeals Tribunal and Peter Kelly J. made an order of
22nd July, 1996, setting forth that the matter now could go back for re-hearing
but before a differently constituted tribunal. What was obviously achieved by
that was that the decision to exclude the man’s previous record was
vacated. Mr. Finlay tells us that his client was really only a notice party to
that application, and so had no part to play in the compromise that was
reached. In any event, the matter was then duly re-heard on 27th May, 1997, and
the Employment Appeals Tribunal in its written determination of 10th
September, 1997, held that the appellant had not been unfairly dismissed and in
the course of that hearing, the entitlement of the employers to take into
account his record from 1981 on was upheld. Then the matter was appealed to the
Circuit Court and, in the course of that hearing, the problem has been posed
for us to resolve.
9. I
have no doubt that the part of Article 1.4 which says “the right to have
a disciplinary record purged after a specified period of satisfactory service
governs what is contained in Article 3.3. The employee must have a clear period
of four years before he can be entitled to have his record cleared. That is the
essential stance that the employers took in examining the matter and that is
the case advanced on behalf of An Post here.
10. Mr.
Finlay in the course of his very careful submission says, no, that really
Article 1.4 is by way of preamble and that Article 3.3 should stand alone and
that what it means is that after four years from a serious offence then, as it
says, all the relevant papers will be destroyed. I am unable to accept that
submission. I think it would not make any sense. The obligation on the man is
to preserve a clean sheet for four years, once he does that then of course
there is no doubt that the record should be expunged. Mr. Finlay argues, in the
alternative, that if you read Article 3.3 that perhaps a reasonable time is
what should be allowed but I do not think so. I think that the matter is
clearly governed by Article 1.4 and that when it refers to a specified period
of satisfactory service it means to refer to the period contained in Article 3.3.
11. I
think the matter is further confirmed by a section that was not referred to in
the Circuit Court. It is Article 3.4.2 which reads:-
12. That
sets forth that if the person commits a second offence in the four years then
he is in real trouble because he is facing dismissal. There is a
13. So
accordingly, I would answer the first question posed, no, and as regards the
second question, that does not arise.