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Harris v. Fagan [1999] IESC 21 (22nd January, 1999)
Hamilton
C.J.
Lynch
J.
Barron
J.
162/96
THE
SUPREME COURT
BETWEEN/
ANTHONY
HARRIS
Plaintiff/Respondent
and
STEPHEN
FAGAN
First
Defendant/Appellant
and
RORY
BURGESS
Second
Defendant
(2)
JUDGMENT
delivered on the 22nd day of January 1999 by LYNCH J. [Nem. Diss.]
1. This
is an appeal by the first defendant against an order of the High Court (Morris
J.) made on the 13th of May 1996 whereby he set aside an order of the Master of
the High Court of the 18th of January 1996 made on the application of the
appellant whereby the Master had ordered the plaintiff/respondent to make
discovery
“of
the documents which are or have been in his possession or power relating to the
matters in question in this action and in particular the documents referred to
at paragraph 5 of the said affidavit of Stephen Fagan filed on the 6th day of
December 1995 - the affidavit on behalf of the plaintiff to be made
personally.”
2. The
respondent’s action is for damages for slander alleged to have been
committed by the defendants on the 22nd September 1992 in the Village Inn,
Crumlin at the public inaugural meeting of the Crumlin
(3)
3. Development
Group. A number of different slanders are alleged by the respondent to have
been uttered in the course of and following the conclusion of the said meeting.
In paragraph 8 of the statement of claim the respondent alleges that the
various slanders meant in short that he was an incompetent and negligent
solicitor. The appellant denies that he uttered any of the said slanders save
for one namely:
“Mr.
Harris, you know who I am. What I want to know is what you are doing here and
why you are showing such a newfound interest in the environment of Crumlin when
you are only just moving into the village. I also want to know whether the
people of Crumlin know your motives for being on this committee and your
history. I grew up in Crumlin and lived here all my life.”
4. The
appellant then denies that the said words bore or were understood to bear or
were capable of bearing or being understood to bear
(4)
any
of the meanings set out in paragraph 8 of the statement of claim or any meaning
defamatory of the plaintiff as alleged or at all. He also goes on to plead:
“Further,
or in the alternative, the said words were true in substance and in fact.”
5. In
support of his motion for discovery the appellant swore an affidavit on the
16th August 1995, paragraphs 3 and 4 of which are as follows:
“3.
I
say that the plaintiff claims at paragraph 13 of the statement of claim
delivered herein on the 3rd August 1993 that he has suffered and continues to
suffer loss and damage. I say that I am advised by my solicitors Messrs L.K.
Shields and Partners of 31 Merrion Square, Dublin 2 that it is essential to the
proper defence of the plaintiff’s claim that I obtain sight of all
records of the plaintiff’s alleged loss and damage.
4. I
say that I am further advised by my solicitors that it is particularly
essential to the proper defence of the plaintiff’s
(5)
claim
that I obtain sight of all records of the plaintiff in respect of all his
dealings with your deponent, my wife, May Fagan (nee Malone) the second-named
defendant and all or any companies of which your deponent was a director or
shareholder and sought legal advice or legal service from the plaintiff.”
6. Before
the application for discovery was heard by the Master the appellant swore a
further affidavit on the 6th December 1995 paragraphs 3 and 5 of which are as
follows:
“3. The
plaintiff acted as solicitor for the first and second-named defendants herein
in both a personal capacity and in their capacity as directors of Greendale
Developments Limited. The plaintiff also acted in a personal capacity on behalf
of my wife, May Fagan (nee Malone) and also advised on matters relating to
Greendale Developments Limited of which she was a one third shareholder.
5. On
the 28th March 1995 my present solicitors Messrs L.K. Shields and Partners
received the file and papers from Rosemary Ryan and Company and advised that
for the purposes of
(6)
defending
the plaintiff’s claim on the basis of the defence already delivered on my
behalf steps urgently be taken to obtain sight of all documents, memoranda,
instructions, advices and attendances in the possession, power or procurement
of the plaintiff in relation to the activities of the plaintiff in his capacity
as solicitor for the defendants, May Fagan (nee Malone) and Greendale
Developments Limited in particular (but without prejudice to the generality of
the foregoing) the activities of the plaintiff in relation to:
(a) proposed
acquisition (in trust) by me and May Malone of premises known as Bridgewater
House from Greendale Developments Limited:
(b) All
activities of the plaintiff while acting as solicitor to Greendale Developments
Limited a company of which I was the Chairman and Managing Director and in
which I and May Malone each owned one third of the issued shared capital:
(c) All
activities of the plaintiff in relation to the allegation made by the plaintiff
in Circuit Court proceedings entitled ‘May Malone, plaintiff and Anthony
Harris, defendant Circuit Court Record No. 800 7/1993 that a fire which
(7)
occurred
on or about the 18th day of October 1991 was caused by the deliberate acts of
May Malone or of her servants or agents or other persons acting in consort with
her, their servants or agents and constituted a trespass against the property
of the plaintiff herein.”
7. The
Master of the High Court made the order already quoted on the 18th January
1996. The respondent then brought a motion dated the 30th January 1996 pursuant
to 0. 63, r. 9 of the Rules of the Superior Courts to discharge the order of
the Master of the High Court and in support of this application the respondent
swore an affidavit on the 30th January 1996 in which at paragraphs 2,3 and 4 he
says:
“2. I
say and believe that I have made it clear to the first defendant herein and to
his then solicitors that I make no claim for special damages in the action
herein including specifically no claim for loss of any earnings arising out of
the matters herein complained of
(8)
3. I
say and believe that the first-named defendant herein does not plead
justification in respect of any of the matters complained of and set forth in
the statement of claim herein save those words which the defendant rephrases
and sets forth at paragraph 3 of his defence herein.
4. I
say and believe that in the circumstances where the first defendant does not
plead justification and in fact denies that he spoke the said words that it is
not open to him to bring discovery herein in order to peruse and trawl through
documentation in my possession in order to ascertain whether or not he ought to
have pleaded justification in respect of same or for any other reason.
The
learned High Court judge in a short
ex
tempore
judgment on the 13th May 1996 said:
“The
order made by the learned Master of the High Court on the 18th January 1996
should be reversed. None of the documents which are sought bear on the issues
of the case. I acknowledge the
Shell
v. Dan Ryan
case referred to by counsel for the first
(9)
defendant
but that principle must be construed within the issues of the case. In relation
to justification, I hold that the justification which is pleaded in this case,
is not wide enough to allow the discovery sought.”
THE
SUBMISSIONS
8. Counsel
for the appellant submitted that the appellant was entitled to an order for
discovery in relation to the matters pleaded as true. He laid emphasis on the
fact that the words
“and
your history”
were
included in the plea of justification. The appellant was a former client of
the respondent. He was not seeking to trawl through all the respondent’s
files relating to the business of the appellant, his wife and Greendale: he
sought discovery only of the three files mentioned in his affidavit. Counsel
referred to
B.
v. B.
[1975] IR 54 at p. 65;
Irish
Shell Limited v. Dan Ryan Ltd. and Esso Ireland PLC
,(unreported,
Costello
P. 22nd April
(10)
1996);
Sterling
Wenthrop Group Limited v. Farbenfabriken Bayer
[1967] IR 97;
Galvin
v. Graham Twomey
[1994] 2 ILRM 315 at 318
.
9. Counsel
for the respondents submitted that the main purpose of the application for
discovery in this case was to delay the trial of the plaintiff’s action.
The application was first brought in November 1995 when the case was already in
the list to fix a date for the trial and since the notice of appeal of the 28th
May 1996 was served the respondent has had to bring two motions to dismiss for
want of prosecution in order to compel the appellant to lodge the necessary
books of appeal.
10. The
issue is whether the words are defamatory or not. The admitted words are
denied to have any defamatory meaning such as pleaded in paragraph 8 of the
statement of claim relating to the competence of the respondent as a solicitor.
The decided cases do not
(11)
contemplate
that discovery should be ordered solely for the purposes of cross-examination
as to credit.
11. Counsel
referred to
Matthews
and Malek
on Discovery at paragraphs 4.26 and 4.27.
CONCLUSIONS
12. The
plea of justification in this case is as to words which without the meanings
attributed to them by the respondent in paragraph 8 of the statement of claim
are not defamatory in themselves. It is clear for example that the respondent
did know who the appellant was. Counsel for the appellant however emphasises
the inclusion in the passage quoted above of the words
“and
your history”.
He
seems to be suggesting that the plea of justification so far as it relates to
those words amounts to a justification of the meanings set out in paragraph 8
of the statement of claim. If that was the intention of the appellant it should
have been
(12)
plainly
pleaded that the respondent was an incompetent and negligent solicitor. That
could have been quite simply done by pleading that the said words including the
meanings attributed to them in paragraph 8 of the statement of claim (or such
of those meanings as the appellant chose to stand over) were true in substance
and in fact. No such clear and specific plea is included in the defence.
13. It
is not acceptable that such a serious plea as a justification of the meaning
set out in paragraph 8 of the statement of claim should be sought to be
introduced by reliance on such vague words as
“and
your history”
in
the passage quoted above. I agree with the learned High Court judge that the
justification which is pleaded in this case is not wide enough to allow the
discovery sought and I would dismiss this appeal.
© 1999 Irish Supreme Court
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