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1. These proceedings arise out of the death of John Morris, the son of the applicants, who was shot on the 4th June 1997 at a premises in the Goldenbridge Industrial Estate, Inchicore and died from his injuries the following day. Members of An Garda Siochána were involved in the incident which led to his death.

2. At a sitting of the court of the respondent/appellant (hereafter “the coroner”) on the 9th July 1998, counsel on behalf of the members of the Garda [*2] Siochána concerned made an application to the coroner that they should not be required to give evidence in person, as a threat to their safety had been made by a subversive organisation, namely, the INLA. It was said by counsel that the threat had been made to RTE in the first instance and that the gardaí had serious concerns for their personal safety and the safety of their families, should they be required to give evidence in person at the inquest. It was also submitted that the forensic reports on the garda weapons used should not be admitted in evidence, as this would identify the garda or gardaí who fired the fatal shot or shots. It was said that the gardaí concerned did not know who had fired the fatal shot and that there were security considerations in their not so knowing. Counsel for the applicants opposed the applications on the ground that the inquest was required to be heard in public and that the gardaí concerned should give evidence in person: they also opposed the application for exclusion of the forensic report.

3. In an affidavit sworn in these proceedings, the coroner said:

4. No affidavit was filed on behalf of the applicants in response to that affidavit nor was notice to cross examine the coroner served on behalf of the applicants. The hearing in this court proceeded, accordingly, on the basis that this was a correct account of what transpired at the sitting in question.

5. The inquest having been adjourned by the coroner to enable him to consider the submissions of counsel, he made a ruling on the 10th September 1998, which is set out at paragraph 9 of his affidavit as follows:-

6. A further submission was then made by counsel for the gardaí that in the event of their being present to give evidence in person, they could be visually identified, which would also give rise to concerns as to security, and the coroner thereupon made a further ruling that the gardaí, while being present in person, could be screened from the public gallery, but be visible to the coroner, jury, legal representatives and members of the press. Counsel for the applicants having objected that he had no notice of this application, it was adjourned to enable him to make further submissions. On 28th October 1998, he made further submissions in support of his objections to this application: the coroner, however, confirmed his ruling but adjourned the further hearing of the inquest at the request of the applicants who indicated that they wished to seek a judicial review of the rulings he had made. [*5]

7. The applicants having been given leave by the High Court to apply by way of judicial review for orders of certiorari in respect of the rulings of the coroner and an order of prohibition prohibiting the coroner from taking any further steps in the hearing of the inquest, and a statement of opposition having been filed on behalf of the coroner, the matter came on for hearing before Kinlen J. In a reserved judgment delivered on the 8th October 1999, he concluded that the coroner had no jurisdiction to make orders of this nature and, accordingly, granted the orders of certiorari sought. From that decision, the coroner now appeals to this court.

8. Section 28 of the Coroners’ Act, 1962 (hereafter “the 1962 Act”) provides that:-

9. Section 29 of the 1962 Act, so far as material, provides that

10. The learned High Court judge was of the view that, since the 1962 Act did not confer any power on the coroner such as he had sought to exercise in the present case but, on the contrary, required him to record the names and addresses of witnesses and furnish them to anyone who applied for them, the orders he had made were ultra vires . [*7]

11. As was pointed out by this court in Farrell .v. The Attorney General (1998) 1 IR 203, the holding by a coroner of an inquest is a purely fact finding exercise which has no legal consequence other than the provisions as to the registration of the death under s. 50(1). While, for the purpose of the present case, it is unnecessary for this court to express any view on the matter, it would appear that the coroner, in conducting the inquest, is not exercising the judicial power of the State and, accordingly, is not affected by the provisions of Article 34.1 of the Constitution requiring justice to be administered in public. Inquests, however, have traditionally been held in public and understandably so, since they would fail to serve at least some of the grounds of public interest which they should serve, if they were to be held in private. As was pointed out in England in the Report of the Broderick Committee on Death Certification and Coroners’ Inquests (Cmd 4810), those grounds are:-

12. In a case decided as long ago as 1827, Garnett .v. Ferrand & Another , (6 B & C, 610) Lord Tenterden C.J. said that:

13. Under the modern law of judicial review, it could not, of course, be safely asserted that a decision by the coroner to hold any part of the proceedings in private would not be amenable to judicial review.

14. It remains to be noted that the 1962 Act is described in its long title as

15. Although the 1962 Act does not expressly require the holding of inquests in public, it cannot be inferred from the absence of such a provision that the Oireachtas intended to alter the principle apparently established at common law that, in general, the court of the coroner was a public court. [*10]

16. However, it is not necessary for the court in this case to express any concluded view on that matter, because the issue in this case is not as to whether the coroner was obliged to hold the inquest in public. It is as to whether he was entitled to make the rulings which he did because of the threats to the personal security of the gardaí concerned. In that context, the provisions of s. 28 and s. 29 of the 1962 Act do not appear to me to be of any particular relevance. It is not disputed on behalf of the coroner that he must comply with the requirements of those sections: it is, however, submitted on his behalf that he can do so while also implementing during the inquest itself the rulings which are the subject matter of these proceedings. Should the garda witnesses concerned give evidence in the normal way, and not in the form of a deposition, he can permit them to identify themselves simply as “Garda A B” and so on. He must require them to furnish their full names and addresses to him in compliance with s. 28 and, in the event of any person applying to him for those names and addresses, he may be obliged to furnish them by virtue of s. 29(3). That may, of course, render less effective the precautions the coroner wishes to take in order to preserve the anonymity of the gardaí concerned: the fact remains that he will have complied fully with the requirements of s. 28 and s. 29 and the fact that those precautions are less effective of itself affords no ground for holding that they are unlawful. [*11]

17. Similar considerations will apply should the coroner elect to follow the procedure of taking a deposition in the case of any witness. The learned High Court judge has, in his judgment, carefully analysed the nature of a deposition and it was also the subject of some debate in the hearing in this court. No doubt, one would normally expect a deposition to consist of a record of evidence given orally and on oath or affirmation by the witness concerned and then signed by him or her. Curiously enough, the form set out in the Third Schedule to the Coroners’ Act, 1962 (Forms) Regulations 1962 (S.I. No. 94 of 1962) appears to envisage that the deposition will be signed only by the coroner, but the form also indicates, of course, that the name of the deponent is to be recorded. I am prepared to assume that, where the coroner takes the evidence of a witness in the form of a deposition, the deposition must at least record the name of the deponent and it may be that it should also be signed by him or her. But that again does not preclude the coroner from permitting the garda witnesses in this case to identify themselves by initials only when giving their evidence. As to the undoubted statutory obligation imposed on the coroner to furnish the depositions to any person who applies for them, and who will thereby learn at least the name of the deponent concerned, the same considerations apply: it is again no ground for attacking the legality of the rulings made by the coroner. [*12]

18. I am satisfied that, provided the coroner complies with the requirements of the 1962 Act and observes the requirements of natural justice and fair procedures, he is entitled to conduct the inquest in the manner which he thinks best adapted to serve the grounds of public interest identified at an earlier part of this judgment. Given that there are no provisions in the 1962 Act or in any regulations made thereunder either permitting or prohibiting the procedures proposed to be adopted by the coroner in the present case, he was clearly entitled to adopt the course he did of preserving the anonymity of the gardaí concerned, so far as he could, while ensuring that the inquest was held in public and that the other legal requirements to which I have referred were observed. That also applies to the deletion of the identification of the particular weapon used from the forensic report and the screening of the garda witnesses from the public gallery.

19. I would allow the appeal and substitute for the order of the High Court an order dismissing the application for judicial review.