BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!

1. This appeal arises out of an application by the Applicant/Appellant (Mr Enright) for an order for discovery in the above proceedings against the Law Society of Ireland (“ the Society ”) who are not party to those proceedings. The application was, therefore, made under Order 31 Rule 29 of the Rules of the Superior Court which, so far as material, provides as follows:-

2. The circumstances in which the application arose are somewhat complex.

3. Mr Enright qualified as a solicitor in 1986. Between May 1988 and June 1994 he was employed in a commercial enterprise in Castleisland, County Kerry. In June 1994 he returned to private practice. On the 21st day of October, 1994, Mr Enright was interviewed by Detective Sergeant Patrick Sullivan and other members of the gardaí as a result of which it would appear that Mr Enright made and signed a statement in circumstances which, according to the sworn evidence of Mr Enright, constituted an abuse by the gardaí of their powers. In particular Mr Enright had sworn that the Detective Sergeant warned him that if he did not co-operate, the gardaí would inform the Society of the subject matter of their investigation. Mr Enright drew attention to the fact that on the 27th October, 1994, the Law Society commenced an investigation into his practice. Whilst it appears that that investigation was not completed a fine of £1,000 was imposed by the Society on Mr Enright and paid by him. The Society has issued to Mr Enright a Practising Certificate for the years 1995, 1996 and 1997.

4. Mr Enright particularly requested the Society to inform him of the name of the person or persons by whom complaint was made against him. The Society declined to do so and in consequence Mr Enright instituted plenary proceedings entitled “Patrick Enright .v. The Incorporated Law Society of Ireland, The High Court, Record No. 1996 number 67p” for the purpose of obtaining in particular the names of the persons or person who made the complaints against him to the Society. The Society delivered a defence to the statement of claim in those proceedings but the pleadings therein have not as yet been closed.

5. On the 15th August, 1996, Mr Enright was charged with ten offences involving allegations of fraudulent misconduct. Mr Enright pleaded not guilty and the matter was adjourned from time to time. The book of evidence was served on Mr Enright on the 25th February, 1997, and the matter subsequently adjourned to enable additional evidence to be produced. Mr Enright contended in correspondence and in argument that the requisite material was not contained in the book of evidence and when the matter ultimately came on for preliminary examination on the 9th June, 1997, it was contended on his behalf that the above named District Judge Terence Finn had no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter as the provisions of sections 6 and 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967, had not been complied with. In essence it was contended that numerous exhibits had been omitted from the book of evidence and in those circumstances, and having regard to the fact that 22 months had elapsed since the commencement of the investigation, that the proceedings should be struck out. The District Judge declined to strike out the proceedings but instead adjourned the matter to the 30th of June, 1997 to permit the production and service of the further exhibits and documentation.

6. In those circumstances the Applicant applied for and obtained leave of the High Court (Kelly J) on the 17th June, 1997, to apply for judicial review. The relief which had been sought is set out in the statement grounding the application and was identified as follows:-

7. Significantly Mr Justice Kelly expressly refused liberty to seek the declaration claimed in paragraph (d)(ii) above, that is to say, a declaration that the Director or his servants or agents had wrongfully caused an investigation to be initiated.

8. The grounds on which the relief were sought were set out in paragraph (e) of Mr Enright’s Statement. That paragraph was divided into three subparagraphs identified by roman numerals and those subparagraphs were again subdivided into further sub subparagraphs this time identified by lettering which repeated the style of the original paragraphs and to that extent may have given rise to some misunderstandings. In any event subparagraph (i) of paragraph (e) identifies the complaints made by Mr Enright in relation to the inadequacies in the book of evidence. Subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (e) relates to a ground involving the Society and is expressed in the following terms:-

9. Subparagraph (iii)(a) of paragraph (e) outlines grounds on which it might be claimed that the Director was estopped from pursuing the criminal proceedings. Subparagraph (iii)(c) identifies the delay which occurred between the commencement of the investigation and the service of the book of evidence. The remaining sub subparagraphs of subparagraph (iii) contain references to the Society and were expressed as follows:-

10. Having regard to the fact that the learned trial Judge expressly refused relief in the nature of a declaration that the Director had caused the investigation to be initiated and the refusal of the grounds [(e)(ii)] based on unlawful communications alleged to have taken place between the 21st and 26th October 1994 it is perhaps surprising that the grounds mentioned in paragraphs (b) and (d) were permitted but it is clear that this is what the order provides and the issues to be resolved in those proceedings must be determined by the statement of grounds permitted by the order and the statement of opposition delivered on behalf of the Respondents. From a reading of those documents it would appear that there is an issue of fact between Mr Enright and the Director, or, more correctly, Inspector Patrick Sullivan, as to whether any member of the Garda Siochana has had “any role in conveying any complaints or information to the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland as alleged by the applicant”. The relevance of that dispute is less clear.

11. In the notice of motion dated the 26th March, 1998, Mr Enright sought the discovery from the Society of two categories of documents, namely:-

12. It would appear from paragraph 1 aforesaid that Mr Enright was seeking documents relating to the investigation undertaken by the Society whereas paragraph 2 seems to relate exclusively the communications relating to the investigation “by agents of the secondly named respondent between the 21st October, 1994 until the 27th October, 1994”. The affidavit of Mr Enright grounding the motion and more particularly the letter of the 6th February, 1998, exhibited therein seems to make it clear that what Mr Enright was seeking was what was described in that letter in the following terms:-

13. When asked by the Society to advise them of the relevance of the documents sought Mr Enright in a letter of the 16th April, 1998 declined to respond contending that the relevance of the documents was a matter for the Court. Clearly Mr Enright was mistaken in refusing to provide information by which the relevance of documents in their possession fell to be considered.

14. On a consideration of the foregoing facts it is reasonably clear that the documents generated by the inquiry undertaken by the Society have no relevance to any matter in dispute or in issue between Mr Enright and the Director of Public Prosecutions or the learned Judge of the District Court. However, there is an issue as to whether the Director or any person who might be considered his agent entered into correspondence with or communicated to the Society between the 24th October and 27th October in such a manner as did or may have instigated the inquiry which took place. The resolution of that dispute does not seem of itself to be of decisive importance one way or another. Certainly the fact that documentation might cast doubt upon the credibility of a witness or provide material which could be helpful on cross-examination would not be sufficient justification for ordering discovery. However, it is a part of part Mr Enright’s case that the second named Respondent, his servants or agents, acted wrongfully and unlawfully in furnishing information to the Society and in causing the statutory investigative powers of the Society to be invoked. To that extent the documents relating to that issue would be relevant and material in the sense in which those words are used in the much quoted case of the Peruvian Guano Company Case [1882] 11 QBD 62 which continues to govern the law as to what is relevant or material for the purposes of an affidavit of discovery.

15. It would seem to me that the learned trial Judge was, understandably, misled by the extent of the leave given to bring the judicial review proceedings and that contrary to his conclusion there is this limited area in which discovery might be relevant for the reasons aforesaid.

16. That does not conclude the matter. The Plaintiff has, as already noted, instituted proceedings claiming a constitutional right to inspect the documents of which he is now seeking discovery. If he does possess such a right, an order for discovery would be unnecessary. If he does not possess such a right the granting of such an order would preclude an effective defence of those proceedings by the Society. In my view it would be inappropriate to make an order for discovery unless Mr Enright gives an undertaking to discontinue the plenary proceedings instituted by him against the Society.

17. In the event of an order issuing it will be limited to documentation in the possession, control or custody of the Society and received by it from the secondly named Respondent or his servants or agents during the period between the 21st October, 1994 and 27th October, 1994, and subject to the right of the Society to make a specific claim for privilege in respect of any document which may be identified in the affidavit of discovery. Any such claim for privilege would be determined by the High Court in the event of dispute. To avoid any doubt which might otherwise arise I would make it clear that the order should not extend to the discovery of documents containing communications to or with the Society by any persons other than the Director of Public Prosecutions, his servants or agents or members of the Garda Siochana.

18. To that extent and subject to those conditions I would allow the appeal.