High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland Queen's Bench Division Decisions

"This charge covers physical obstruction but not exclusively so. A prisoner who deliberately provides false information to an officer might be charged with this offence.

Evidence – Before an adjudicator can be satisfied of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the following must be established –

There was an obstruction of some sort physical or otherwise;

The person obstructed was an officer of the Prison Service or anyone else (other than a prisoner) who was at the prison for the purpose of working there;

The officer was attempting to carry out his or her duty or the person was attempting to perform his or her work; and

The accused intended such a person to be obstructed in such a way."

"A defendant obstructs a police constable if he makes it more difficult for him to carry out his duty (Hinchcliffe v Sheldon (1955) 1 WLR 1207, obiter). While 'resisting' implies some physical action, no physical action is necessary to constitute obstruction. Simple refusal to answer questions does not constitute an obstruction (Rice v Connolly (1966) 2 QB 414), neither does advising another person not to answer (Green v DPP (1991) 155 JP 816). Answering questions incorrectly may, however, amount to obstruction, although the distinction is not always clear (see Ledger v DPP (1991) Crim. LR 439).

A person may obstruct by omission, provided that such a person is under an initial duty to act (Lunt v DPP (1993) Crim. LR 534)."

This issue has been recently considered by the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland in Chief Constable v Devlin. The charge against the defendant of obstructing a constable under Section 66(1) of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 arose from his refusal to give the police officer his name and address after he had been arrested for disorderly behaviour. The Court of Appeal found that the failure to give the name and address could not amount to obstruction as there was no legal duty to give the information.

The policy considerations relating to the offence of obstruction of a constable were considered by Dr. Glanville Williams in his Textbook of Criminal Law 2^nd Ed. at p 202 and led him to conclude that, in the absence of a legal duty to answer a question, obstruction must be taken to mean active obstruction -

"…. the logical and proper reason why a failure to answer the questions of the police is not an obstruction is not because of any specific right the citizen has but simply because an "obstruction" must be taken to mean an active obstruction, not a mere failure to co-operate. If we are to be put under a legal duty to help the police, it must be by an Act of Parliament; and Parliament should say in what respects we are required to help the police on their request, and it should provide proper exemptions, and name the appropriate penalty for refusal. The job ought not to be done by judicial "interpretation" of the obstruction offence, which was obviously designed to do nothing more than prevent active obstructions."

Blackstone's Criminal Practice refers to Ledger v DPP where the defendant had given an obviously false name and was convicted of obstructing a police officer. Professor Smith's commentary on the report in the Criminal Law Review states that the reply was not intended to be believed and was no more than a contemptuous way of telling the police that he was not going to give his name and address. The constable had no right to an answer to the question and so the refusal to answer was not obstruction.

In The Matter by Her Majesty's Attorney General under Section 15 of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980 and in the Matter of The Queen v Lee William Clegg and Others (NICA 21 October 1994) the question before the Court of Appeal concerned obstruction of a constable contrary to Section 7(1)(a) of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (Northern Ireland) 1968. The Court of Appeal stated that a constable may be obstructed in the execution of his duty by physical or non-physical acts and the latter acts may include the making of a false statement. The Court of Appeal also stated that in every case the tribunal of fact must be satisfied beyond doubt that the constable was in fact obstructed.

[14] The false statement relied on in the present case was the applicant's false denial of knowledge of the presence of unauthorised articles in the cell. Whether that denial is capable of amounting to the act of obstruction depends on whether the applicant had a legal duty to provide the information requested. The applicant contended that there is no such legal duty. The respondent contended that there is such a legal duty imposed on the applicant in the circumstances. It is contended that in the general context of the prison and the requirements for control and discipline of prisoners by prison staff there is a duty on prisoners to respond to requests for information. Further it is contended that, as Rule 38(24) provides that it is an offence against prison discipline to offend against good order and discipline, this imposes an obligation on prisoners to maintain good order and discipline and that positive obligation includes the duty to provide accurate information on request.

[18] The second ingredient of obstruction set out in the Manual, that PO Otley and PO Boyle were prison officers, was not in dispute. The third ingredient that the prison officers were carrying out their duties was not in dispute. The fourth ingredient is that the applicant intended to obstruct the prison officers. Had the action of the applicant in falsely denying knowledge of the unauthorised article amounted to obstruction I would have been satisfied that the applicant intended such obstruction. However I am satisfied that the action of the applicant did not amount to "obstruction" for the purposes of Rule 38(9). Accordingly the finding in the adjudication will be quashed.