Geddis v Sandycove Holiday Homes Ltd William McCombe [2011] NIIT 02848

THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS

CASE REF: 2848/10

CLAIMANT: Martin Geddis

RESPONDENTS: 1. Sandycove Holiday Homes Ltd

2. William McCombe

DECISION

The unanimous decision of the tribunal is that the claimant was not discriminated against on the grounds of disability and the claimant was not unfairly dismissed.

Constitution of Tribunal:

Chairman: Mr P Kinney

Members: Mr H Stevenson

Ms M McReynolds

Appearances:

The claimant was represented by Mrs Sandra Geddis.

The respondents were represented by Mr Richards, Barrister-at-Law, instructed by Worthingtons, Solicitors.

Issues

1. At the outset of the hearing the following issues were agreed for determination by the tribunal:-

(a) Was the claimant directly discriminated against on the grounds of his disability?

(b) Whether the alleged acts of discrimination are part of a continuing act culminating in the dismissal of the claimant?

For this aspect of the case the claimant’s claim was twofold:-

(i) In not considering providing the claimant with an alternative companion at the disciplinary and dismissal hearings and the delay in allowing Mrs Geddis to accompany the claimant to the disciplinary hearings. The claimant relies on his disability of dyslexia.

(ii) Whether the claimant should have been provided with assistance in moving a tripod on 20 August 2010. The claimant relies on his disability of osteoarthritis in his right knee.

(d) Was the claimant victimised by the respondents alleged delay in completion of a mortgage protection insurance claim form. The protected act relied upon by the claimant is the raising of the request for reasonable adjustments in the disability process?

(e) Was the claimant unfairly dismissed. The first-named respondent accepted it dismissed the claimant but says that it dismissed the claimant for a potentially fair reason, namely misconduct.

2. At the hearing the respondents conceded that the claimant had disabilities of dyslexia and osteoarthritis.

Findings of fact

3. The claimant started working for the first-named respondent as a general assistant on 14 August 2007. The post was a manual labouring position. The claimant completed an application form for the post. There was a monitoring form attached to the application form and the claimant confirmed that he was not disabled. The claimant was initially employed on a three month trial period.

4. Early in the claimant’s employment Mr McCombe, his supervisor, spoke to Mrs Kennedy who was the director responsible for HR matters. Mr McCombe mentioned that the claimant appeared to have a problem in completing his timesheet. The errors appeared to be largely confined to confusing Ps with Bs. The form was otherwise understandable. Following this conversation, Mrs Kennedy met with the claimant and asked him if he was dyslexic. He said that he was. He did not ask for any help or special arrangements to be made. Mrs Kennedy spoke to Mr McCombe and told Mr McCombe that the claimant was dyslexic. Mrs Kennedy asked Mr McCombe to assist the claimant if and when necessary. Mr McCombe then assisted the claimant with the completion of his timesheets as and when the claimant sought assistance. Mrs Kennedy told the claimant that he was to speak to Mr McCombe if he needed help with the timesheets.

5. At the completion of the three months initial contract, Mrs Kennedy spoke to the claimant to say that she was pleased with his work. She offered him a full-time permanent contract of employment. Mr McCombe had recommended to Mrs Kennedy that she employ the claimant on a permanent basis. The claimant received his new contract on 21 January 2008. There were no complaints or queries about the claimant’s attitude or approach to his work. However, the claimant subsequently was involved in a series of incidents which created a disciplinary record.

6. On 31 January 2008 the claimant reversed too far with a trailer attached to a landrover and broke the reversing light lens. On 21 March 2008 the claimant was involved in the maintenance of sewage pumps and the maintenance was not completed correctly causing problems with the system the following day. On 4 June 2008 damage was caused to a landrover involving a broken fog light and right hand indicator. Verbal warnings were issued by Mr McCombe to the claimant for the above incidents.

7. On 9 August 2008 the claimant was involved in an incident causing damage to a Ford van that he was driving when it collided with a JCB driven by Mr McCombe. Mrs Kennedy held a disciplinary meeting on 22 September 2008. The claimant was written to and informed of the purpose of the disciplinary meeting. He was advised of his right to be accompanied by a trade union official or by a work colleague. He did not request to be accompanied. He was issued with a First Written Warning relating to this incident and he did not appeal the decision. At the tribunal hearing the claimant asserted that Mr McCombe reversed the JCB into the van. However, he did not tell Mrs Kennedy this at the disciplinary meeting, nor did he tell Mrs Kennedy that another employee, Mr Scott, was present in the JCB at the time. Furthermore, Mr Scott gave evidence to the tribunal, on the claimant’s behalf, but did not mention this incident at all in his witness statement. The tribunal has concluded that Mrs Kennedy was entitled, on the evidence before her, to issue a First Written Warning against the claimant.

8. The claimant also accepted that he was aware of his right to have a trade union official or a work colleague accompany him. There was no trade union recognition within the respondents’ business although others had trade union representation at hearings on other occasions. The claimant understood his right to be accompanied at disciplinary meetings but decided not to avail of such company.

9. On 26 February 2009 the claimant was involved in an incident damaging a Kubota grass cover. Again a disciplinary meeting was held on 3 March 2009 by Mrs Kennedy. Again the claimant did not request to be accompanied, although he had been advised of his right to be accompanied and he received a Second Written Warning. The claimant accepted his responsibility for this incident.

10. On 6 October 2009, Mrs Kennedy wrote to the claimant asking him to attend a disciplinary meeting on 8 October 2009 relating to an incident on 18 September 2009. The claimant was involved in the maintenance of a tractor and it was alleged that he failed to check the oil level on the tractor and subsequently falsified the maintenance book by ticking the box to signify that he had carried out that task. Again the claimant was notified of his right to be accompanied at the meeting. The claimant did not ask for anyone to accompany him and a disciplinary meeting was held on 8 October 2009 by Mrs Kennedy. Mrs Kennedy recorded that the claimant’s explanation at the time was he could not remember Mr McCombe telling him how to check the oil and that if he had, the claimant could not remember. On 13 October 2009, Mrs Kennedy wrote to the claimant enclosing a copy of the decision. The company considered the incident to be gross misconduct. Mrs Kennedy said that having reviewed the claimant’s disciplinary record and the seriousness of this incident she had decided to dismiss the claimant. The claimant was also advised of his right to appeal. On 14 October 2009 the claimant appealed Mrs Kennedy’s decision. An appeal meeting was held on 16 October 2009 by Mr James Kennedy, the managing director of the respondent company. At the hearing the claimant advised that he felt he had been unfairly treated as he had not dealt with the tractor any differently from anyone else and that no one checked the hydraulic oil. Mr Kennedy carried out further investigations and determined that other employees did not properly check the oil level of the tractor when doing maintenance. However, he confirmed the finding that the claimant had falsified the maintenance record book by ticking the box to signify he had carried out the task. Mr Kennedy, in his decision, informed the claimant that the respondents had been very tolerant of the numerous incidents in which he had been involved and set out the history of the various incidents that we have recorded in this decision, including the two written warnings. In light of these the claimant was given a Final Written Warning and warned that any future breach of company rules and procedures would result in further disciplinary action which may result in his immediate dismissal from the company. The claimant was told there was no further right of appeal.

11. On 18 August 2010 the claimant was involved in an incident when using the Kubota grass cutting machine. Whilst cutting grass he cut electric cables and damaged an electric meter box. The claimant was invited to a disciplinary meeting. On 20 August 2010 the claimant had an accident whilst servicing sewage pumps. The claimant’s disciplinary hearing for the Kubota incident was re-scheduled as a result of this incident. At the disciplinary hearing on 1 September 2010 the claimant accepted his responsibility for the cutting of the electric wires and damage to the meter box. On 2 September 2010, Mrs Kennedy wrote to the claimant saying she wished to postpone the outcome of the Kubota hearing until she investigated a further incident, which was that on 20 August 2010 when assigned to carry out the weekly maintenance of the sewage pumps with a colleague, the claimant refused the colleague’s offer of help when lifting a tripod. Mrs Kennedy sent with the letter copies of statements made by the supervisor, Mr McCombe, and the claimant’s work colleague, Alan McMaster, together with photographs of the area and the equipment used. Mrs Kennedy again informed the claimant of his right to be accompanied by a colleague or suitably qualified trade union official and arranged a meeting for 3 September 2010.

12. The claimant attended a disciplinary meeting held by Mrs Kennedy and Mrs Rachael Pearson on 8 September 2010. The claimant wrote on 7 September 2010 saying that he intended to attend the meeting accompanied by Mrs Geddis to assist and support him due to his learning disability. The meeting was due to take place at 9.30 am on 8 September 2010. In the event, Mrs Kennedy sought advice on the morning of 8 September 2010 and then informed the claimant that Mrs Geddis was permitted to attend the disciplinary meeting with the claimant and the meeting was re-scheduled to 2.00 pm that afternoon. The meeting duly took place with Mrs Geddis present. On 9 September 2010, Mrs Kennedy wrote to the claimant. She found that the claimant had failed to take adequate care in relation to his own health & safety in the incident regarding the Kubota grass cutter on 18 August 2010, he had cut electric wires and caused irreparable damage to the meter box. In relation to the incident on 20 August 2010, Mrs Kennedy said she had taken into consideration the statement made by Mr McMaster and the statement by Mr McCombe, together with the statements from the claimant himself. Mrs Kennedy did not accept the claimant’s version of events on 20 August 2010. Mrs Kennedy primarily rejected the claimant’s version as she considered it likely that if he was pulling the tripod from a sunken area of some two feet below ground level, onto ground level, it was much more likely that he would have fallen backwards onto ground level rather than into the pit as the claimant has described.

13. Mrs Kennedy confirmed that the claimant was already on a Final Written Warning and terminated the claimant’s employment with the company on notice. She then confirmed the claimant had a right of appeal.

14. The claimant, on 13 September 2010, wrote seeking an appeal. The claimant also wrote seeking to have a grievance investigated.

15. A grievance meeting was held on 20 September 2010. The claimant raised three grievances:-

(a) an alleged incident involving Mr McCombe, where the claimant alleged Mr McCombe called the claimant a ‘moron’ in June 2009;

(b) a grievance in relation to the incident on 18 August 2010 when the electricity cables were cut, when the claimant alleged Mr McCombe used abusive language; and

(c) a grievance in relation to the behaviour of Mr and Mrs Kennedy on 30 August 2010 in relation to pursuing and pressurising the claimant in the disciplinary process.

16. On 11 October 2010, Mrs Kennedy wrote to the claimant. His grievances were not upheld. However, Mrs Kennedy did indicate that she proposed to issue a memo to all staff to remind them to report wrongdoing at the time of an incident and to be careful in their use of language. Mrs Kennedy also advised the claimant of his right to appeal the decision. Mrs Geddis had been allowed to accompany the claimant to this meeting.

17. The claimant also appealed the outcome of the disciplinary process and that appeal was held on 29 September 2010 by Mr James Kennedy. The appeal was not upheld. The claimant also appealed the outcome of the grievance hearing. This appeal was held on 20 October 2010 and heard by Mr John James Kennedy. The appeal was not upheld. At all hearings, Mrs Geddis was allowed to attend and participate.

18. The claimant has two disabilities, dyslexia and osteoarthritis of the right knee. Although the claimant was aware of difficulties with his right knee since the latter part of 2009, he did not bring these to the attention of his employer until July 2010. On 28 July 2010 the claimant’s GP wrote to the first-named respondent confirming problems with his right knee. The GP went onto confirm that the claimant could perform most of his duties at work with the exception of strimming. The GP recorded that the claimant was keen to continue work and would be grateful for any consideration the respondents could show. On 5 August 2010, Mrs Kennedy wrote to the claimant confirming receipt of the letter. She had spoken to Mr McCombe. Where possible the claimant’s condition would be borne in mind when allocating duties. In fact the claimant was not allocated any further strimming duties. Mrs Kennedy also indicated that she wanted further information from the doctor and attached a medical consent form for signature and return. The claimant confirmed that his disability did not cause any problems with servicing the sewage pump and that he never told the respondents that working with the sewage pump posed a problem.

The law

Direct Disability Discrimination

19. Under Section 3A(5) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, a person directly discriminates against a disabled person if, on the ground of the disabled person’s disability, he treats the disabled person less favourably than he treats or would treat a person not having that particular disability whose relevant circumstances, including disabilities, are the same as, or not materially different from, those of the disabled person. Direct disability therefore occurs where the person’s disability is the reason for the alleged less favourable treatment.

Reasonable Adjustments

20. An employer is under a duty to take such steps as are reasonable to prevent any provision, criterion or practice applied for or on his behalf, or any physical feature of the employer’s premises from placing a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in comparison to people who are not disabled (Section 4A of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995). Where such a duty has arisen the tribunal must decide whether it is reasonable for an employer to make any particular adjustment. In doing so, the tribunal must consider the factors set out in Section 18B of the 1995 Act. Examples of steps which employers should take include allocating some of the disabled person’s duties to other persons, making adjustments to premises, transferring the disabled person to fill an existing vacancy, altering the disabled person’s hours of working or training or acquiring or modifying equipment. In the case of Environment Agency v Rowan [2008] IRLR20 the EAT said that a tribunal in considering a claim of failure to make a reasonable adjustment must identify the provision, criterion or practice applied by or on behalf of an employer, the identity of non-disabled comparators where appropriate and the nature and extent of the substantial disadvantage suffered by the claimant. The question for the tribunal is an objective one namely has the employer complied with his obligations to make reasonable adjustments where the duty has arisen.

21. Section 17A(1C) sets out the burden of proof in disability discrimination claims. It provides:-

“Where, on the hearing of a complaint, under sub section (1), the complainant proves the facts from which the tribunal could, apart from this sub section, conclude in the absence of an adequate explanation that the respondent has acted in a way which is unlawful under this part, the tribunal shall uphold the complaint unless the respondent proves he did not so act.”

22. Guidance on how to apply the burden of proof was provided by the Court of Appeal in the case of Igen Ltd v Wong [2005] EWCA Civ142. The court pointed to a two-stage test. The claimant must firstly show facts from which the tribunal could, in the absence of an adequate explanation, conclude that the respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination. Once the tribunal has so concluded the burden then shifts to the respondent to prove that he did not commit an unlawful act of discrimination.

23. In the subsequent Court of Appeal decision of Madarassy v Nomura International PLC [2007] IRLR 246, Lord Justice Mummery said:–

“The bare facts of a difference in status and a difference in treatment only indicate a possibility of discrimination. They are not, without more, sufficient material from which a tribunal ‘could conclude’ that on the balance of probabilities the respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination.

‘Could conclude’ in Section 63A(2) must mean that "a reasonable tribunal could properly conclude" from all the evidence before it.”

24. Lord Justice Mummery went on to say:-

“Section 63(A) does not expressly or impliedly prevent the tribunal at the first stage from hearing, accepting or drawing inferences from evidence adduced by the respondent disputing and rebutting the complainant’s evidence of discrimination. The respondent may adduce evidence at the first stage to show that the acts which are alleged to be discriminatory never happened; or that, if they did, they were not less favourable treatment of the complainant; or that the comparators chosen by the complainant or the situation with which comparisons are made are not truly like the complainant or the situation of the complainant; or that, even if there has been less favourable treatment of the complainant, it was not on the ground of her sex or pregnancy.

Such evidence from the respondent could, if accepted by the tribunal, be relevant as showing that, contrary to the complainant’s allegations of discrimination, there is nothing in the evidence from which the Tribunal could properly infer a prima facie case of discrimination on the proscribed ground.”

25. In the case of Laing v Manchester City Council [2006] IRLR 748, Mr Justice Elias said:–

“The focus of the tribunal’s analysis must at all times be the question whether or not they can properly and fairly infer race discrimination. If they are satisfied that the reason given by the employer is a genuine one and does not disclose either conscious or unconscious racial discrimination, then that is the end of the matter. It is not improper for a tribunal to say, in effect, “there is a nice question as to whether or not the burden has shifted, but we are satisfied here that, even if it has, the employer has given a fully adequate explanation as to why he behaved as he did and it has nothing to do with race”.”

26. The English authorities have been endorsed by the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal. In the case of Nelson v Newry and Mourne District Council [2009] NICA 24, Lord Justice Girvan referred to Madarassy. He then said:–

“This approach makes clear that the complainant’s allegations of unlawful discrimination cannot be viewed in isolation from the whole relevant factual matrix out of which the complainant alleges unlawful discrimination. The whole context of the surrounding evidence must be considered in deciding whether the tribunal could properly conclude, in the absence of adequate explanation, that the respondent has committed an act of discrimination.

In Curley v Chief Constable [2009] NICA 8, Coghlin LJ emphasised the need for a tribunal engaged in determining this type of case to keep in mind the fact that the claim put forward is an allegation of unlawful discrimination. The need for the tribunal to retain such a focus is particularly important when applying the provisions of Article 63A. The tribunal’s approach must be informed by the need to stand back and focus on the issue of discrimination.”

27. Under Article 126 of the Employment Rights (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 an employee has a right not to be unfairly dismissed. By Article 130 of the same Order to determine whether a dismissal of an employee is fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show that the reason for the dismissal falls within the terms of that Article. By Article 130(2)(b) one such reason relates to the conduct of the employee. If a potentially fair reason is established the tribunal should then consider whether the respondent acted reasonably in all the circumstances. Dismissal must be within the band of reasonable responses which a reasonable employer might take and the tribunal must not substitute its own view for that of the employer.

28. Following the authority of British Home Stores v Burchell [1978] IRLR 379, the tribunal must be satisfied that the employer at the time of the dismissal had a genuine belief in the employee’s guilt of that misconduct, had reasonable grounds to hold that belief and carried out such investigation as was reasonable in all the circumstances. The penalty which the employer then imposes as a sanction must also be within a range of reasonable responses which a reasonable employer might take. The employer’s decision is taken on the balance of probabilities. In Burchell, Mr Justice Arnold said:-

“It is not relevant, as we think, for the tribunal to examine the quality of the material which the employer had before them, for instance to see whether it was the sort of material, objectively considered, which would lead to a certain conclusion on the balance of probabilities, or whether it was a sort of material which would lead to the same conclusion only upon the basis of being ‘sure’, as it is now said more normally in a criminal context, or, to use the more old fashioned term, such as to put the matter ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. The test, and the test all the way through, is reasonableness; and certainly, as it seems to us, a conclusion on the balance of probabilities will in any surmisable circumstance be a reasonable conclusion.”

29. In Dobbin v Citybus Ltd [2008] NICA 42, Lord Justice Higgins considered the question of whether or not the employer’s actions were reasonable in all the circumstances. He said at Paragraph 57:-

“In other words, it is not for the tribunal to determine whether the conduct of the investigation was reasonable but whether in the particular circumstances of the case the investigation was one which a reasonable employer would consider fell within the range of reasonable investigations to enable the particular allegations against the employee to be investigated and determined. Thus the nature and depth of any investigation will vary with the circumstances and conduct under consideration.”

30. In Rogan v South Eastern Health & Social Care Trust [2009] NICA 47, the Court of Appeal reminded tribunals that the function of a tribunal is to consider the reasonableness of the employer’s conduct and not simply whether they (the members of the industrial tribunal) considered the dismissal to be fair. In judging the reasonableness of the employer’s conduct a tribunal must not substitute its decision as to what was the right course to adopt for that of the employer. The Court of Appeal also stressed that the tribunal should not re-hear or re-investigate allegations but should consider whether the employer acted reasonably having regard to the material available to it and the investigation carried out by it.

The tribunal’s conclusions

Direct disability discrimination

31. The claimant has contended that he was subjected to a series of discriminatory actions amounting to a continuing act of discrimination. The claim is based on the claimant’s dyslexia. On the facts as found in this case, the tribunal does not consider that the claimant has been directly discriminated against on grounds of his disability. In relation to events up July 2010, the only disability of which the respondents had any awareness was of dyslexia. The tribunal does not consider that there has been a continuing act of discrimination. The claimant points to a series of disciplinary matters, the majority of which he has accepted responsibility for. He contends that he was aware of his right to be accompanied by disciplinary meetings and decided not to avail of that right. He was aware of his rights to appeal decisions and again decided, in the main, not to avail of that right. On those occasions, in which before the tribunal he asserted his innocence, he did not do so at the time during the disciplinary process. He asserts that he was discriminated against because of his dyslexia. However, the claimant’s dyslexia was proactively dealt with by the respondents when they discovered that there was a problem with the timesheets. The claimant made no other complaints nor raised any queries regarding his situation. Indeed, his work was overwhelmingly of a manual nature and there was little direct impact from his disability. The respondents were aware of his disability before they invited the claimant to have a permanent contract with them. Furthermore, in the incident in October 2009 involving the maintenance of tractor and falsification of records, the respondents in fact reduced the disciplinary penalty from dismissal to Final Written Warning. No other action was taken against the claimant from this time until the incident involving the cutting of electric cables and meter box which the claimant accepted was his fault. The claimant also accepted in evidence that someone without dyslexia and with the same record of disciplinary issues and accidents would be treated in the same way. The respondents were unaware of the claimant’s arthritis until the end of July 2010. They acceded to the only request made to stop the claimant strimming. The claimant raised no issues about servicing the sewage pump. The tribunal finds that there is no evidence of direct disability discrimination and dismisses that aspect of the claimant’s claim.

Reasonable adjustments

32. The claimant makes two claims for reasonable adjustment. The first is that the respondents should have made an adjustment to the disciplinary process to allow the claimant to be accompanied by someone other than a work colleague or a trade union official. The claimant, however, never made such a request until the Summer of 2010. When he made a request to be accompanied by his wife, that request was accommodated. The claimant pointed to difficulties that he had with following notes and dealing with questions at hearing. The tribunal was satisfied that the claimant had Mrs Geddis to assist him through those meetings. In any event, the tribunal was satisfied from its observations of how the claimant gave his evidence, dealt with witness statements and dealt with documents during cross-examination, that the disciplinary and appeal processes did not require any further adjustments.

33. The second reasonable adjustment sought was in relation to assistance in moving a tripod on 20 August 2010. The claimant asserts that because of his osteoarthritis the respondents should have provided more assistance. However, the claimant specifically requested assistance only with the strimming aspect of his duties and confirmed that he did not require any assistance with the servicing of the sewage pumps. The claimant also accepted that the accident on 20 August 2010 was his own fault. Indeed, it was his refusal to seek or accept help in moving the tripod that caused the respondent to investigate and then institute disciplinary hearings against the claimant. The tribunal is also satisfied that the respondent took reasonable steps to obtain further medical information regarding the claimant’s arthritis. The tribunal concluded that the claim for failure to make reasonable adjustments is unfounded and fails.

Victimisation

34. The claimant asserts that he performed a protected act, namely seeking reasonable adjustments in the disciplinary process. As a result of this, he says that he was victimised in the non-completion of a mortgage insurance form by the respondents. It is for the claimant to show that there is a causative connection between the two matters. The tribunal does not accept that there was any connection between the request for reasonable adjustments and the delay in completing the mortgage insurance form. Mrs Kennedy was the director who dealt with all the Human Resource matters. Both Mr and Mrs Kennedy were on holiday in New Zealand for the initial period of the delay in completing the form. Mrs Kennedy dealt promptly with the form on her return from holidays. The tribunal does not find that the claimant’s claim for victimisation is made out and the claimant’s claim is dismissed.

Unfair dismissal

35. The respondents have established that the potentially fair reason for dismissal was conduct. The respondents carried out an extensive investigation and provided the claimant with every opportunity to explain or challenge the allegations made against him. The respondents allowed the claimant’s wife to attend disciplinary and appeal hearings. The claimant accepted that he was responsible for the incident involving the Kubota grass cutter. The tribunal is satisfied that the respondents carried out an investigation which was reasonable in all the circumstances. The tribunal also finds that the sanction of summary dismissal is within the range of reasonable responses which a reasonable employer might make. The claimant had a Final Written Warning active on his file. He had an extensive disciplinary record culminating in that Final Written Warning. Whilst the claimant did not accept that the Final Written Warning should have been on his file, he did not seek to challenge that decision at the time. The tribunal does not consider there is any reason for it to look behind the Final Written Warning issued in November 2009. The respondents were entitled in relation to the investigation of the incident on 20 August 2010, taking into account the statements taken, and Mrs Kennedy’s reasoning as to why she did not accept the claimant’s version of events, that the claimant refused a colleague’s assistance in moving the tripod, to arrive at the conclusions she did. The tribunal is conscious that it is not to substitute its own view. It is sufficient that the employer has conducted a reasonable investigation and has reasonable grounds for making the finding that it did.

36. The tribunal therefore concludes unanimously that the claimant was not unfairly dismissed and was not discriminated against on the grounds of his disability.

Chairman:

Date and place of hearing: 20 – 23 June 2011, Belfast

Date decision recorded in register and issued to parties:

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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Industrial Tribunals Northern Ireland Decisions >> Geddis v Sandycove Holiday Homes Ltd William McCombe [2011] NIIT 02848_10IT (03 August 2011) URL: http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NIIT/2011/2848_10IT.html Cite as: [2011] NIIT 02848_10IT, [2011] NIIT 2848_10IT

Industrial Tribunals Northern Ireland Decisions