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Northern Ireland - Social Security and Child Support Commissioners' Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Northern Ireland - Social Security and Child Support Commissioners' Decisions >> [1993] NISSCSC A1/93(CRS) (13 September 1993) URL: http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NISSCSC/1993/A1_93(CRS).html Cite as: [1993] NISSCSC A1/93(CRS) |
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[1993] NISSCSC A1/93(CRS) (13 September 1993)
A1/93(CRS)
"(1) Wrongly interpreted the law
(2) Breach of the rules of natural justice."
In response to a request for more information these grounds were amplified in a letter dated 23 March 1993 from the victim's solicitors. The letter is on the case file and it is unnecessary for me to set it out in full. Shortly stated the arguments were that the Appeal Tribunal had not addressed their minds to the true interpretation of "a compensation payment" as referred to in Article 24 of the Social Security (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 - now section 78(1) of the Administration Act. It was said that a compensation payment had wrongly been taken to be "the global figure representing the accumulation of the figures representing both the general and special heads of damages, these being separate entities in themselves." It was further submitted that the purpose of the legislation was to curb the injustice caused by "over compensation" or "double compensation", which might arise where an injured party received special damages for loss of wages in addition to state benefits. Where, as in the present case, there was no claim for loss of earnings, it was said that Article 24 did not apply. So far as the alleged breach of the rules of natural justice was concerned, this was again said to result from the Tribunal's interpretation of Article 24 in that an unemployed claimant was treated less favourably than an employed claimant by having his benefits deducted from his general damages and not from his loss of earnings.
Mr McD… indicated that the grounds upon which he was relying were those set out in the letter of 23 March 1993: namely that the Tribunal had misinterpreted the legislation and had breached the rules of natural justice in failing to apply the fundamental principle of equality before the law. I enquired if this really meant that he was asserting that the legislation as interpreted by the Tribunal was unfair and unjust. He agreed that this was indeed the case which he was making. In his submission, benefit should only be recouped from loss of wages, and it was unjust that a victim who was unemployed and in receipt of income support should have to suffer a reduction from his compensation award of an amount of benefit which he would have received in any event. I pointed out that it was not for the Commissioner to rule on the fairness of the legislation within his jurisdiction. That was a matter for Parliament, and so far as the Commissioner was concerned, he was bound to apply the relevant legislation whether or not it seemed to him to result in unfairness. I further enquired of Mr McD... whether he was aware of any provision in the legislation to the effect that the relevant benefits could only be recouped from special damage or loss of wages and he said that he was not.
Mrs Fitzpatrick submitted that there was nothing in the legislation to limit the recoupment of benefit to cases in which there was loss of earnings, and she referred to my decision in No. C2/92(CRS). There was, she said, no ambiguity in the legislation and there was accordingly no reason to consider what might have been the mischief against which it was directed. The sickness benefit which the victim had received had clearly been paid in consequence of the injury he sustained and the Tribunal had been correct to decide that it was recoverable.
"I accept that, because he was unemployed at the date of theaccident, [the victim] may not have been able to claim special
damage by way of loss of wages as such; but it was nevertheless
open to him to claim that he had been deprived of the opportunity
of earning wages which he might otherwise have earned and his
claim for general damages for pain and suffering and loss of
amenity was no doubt enhanced to some extent by the fact that
he was being certified unfit for work by his GP. It is also
right to say, as was pointed out by Mr G… at the hearing, that
it is not for the Tribunal or the Commissioner to investigate
the scope or basis of a compensation payment to a victim. They
are not concerned with the amount of the compensation paid nor
with the possible headings under which it may have been assessed.
Whatever may have been the underlying intention of the legislation,
there is no provision that benefit is only to be recoverable if a
victim is compensated for an actual or potential loss of earnings.
So far as the adjudication authorities may be concerned, their task
in a case of this nature is to determine whether, in the words of
section 94(1)(b) of the 1992 Administration Act, any benefit paid or
payable otherwise than in consequence of the accident or injury in
question has been included in the certificate of total benefit."
I am also satisfied that there is nothing to suggest that there has been a breach of the rules of natural justice as they apply in a case of this nature. My views on this subject were explained in more detail in paragraph 4 of C2/91(IS) as follows:-
"It is correct to say that, like any adjudicating authority, an Appeal
Tribunal must observe the rules of natural justice and any breach
thereof will constitute an error in point of law. The rules of
natural justice are, however, concerned with procedure and are
designed to ensure that a claimant is accorded a fair hearing and
given a reasonable opportunity to present his case. There is no
overriding general "law of natural justice" which takes precedence
over the law of the land and upon which the individual citizen may
rely when he considers that a particular provision of a Statute or
Regulations operates unfairly against him or others. If any change
in the law is thought to be required, that is a matter for Parliament,
or possibly nowadays for the Council of the European Communities; but
so far as the Appeal Tribunal are concerned they have no power to
disregard or override a provision of the Regulations, however unjust
or unfair they may consider that provision to be. Similarly, the
Commissioner cannot intervene, but is bound to apply the legislation
relevant to the circumstances of the case."
(Signed): R R Chambers
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
13 September 1993