

No 116.

tal, or price, but allowed either party to adduce witnesses what the land was worth, and might pay as at a constant rent, and what it was worth in buying and selling in that place of the country. See No 41. p. 911.

*Stair, v. 2. p. 494.*

1679. December 23.

GORDON against FERGUSON.

No 117.

A conveyance from a conjunct person to a singular successor, who could not plead *bona fides*, sustained only to the extent of the sums actually paid.

GORDON of Troquhen pursues a reduction of an infeftment granted by Cannon of Blackmark to Cannon of Marrogat, his brother, bearing, for undertaking all his debts, and for love and favour; and of a disposition granted by Marrogat to Ferguson of Keiroch; the reason of reduction was upon the act of Parliament 1621. The defender *alleged* absolvitor, because he was no conjunct person, nor partaker of the fraud betwixt the two brothers, but paid a competent price; and by the foresaid act, third parties not partaking in the fraud are secure.—The pursuer *answered*, That Ferguson was necessarily partaker of the fraud, it being in the body of his author's right, that albeit it bore *for undertaking the disponent's debt*, yet there was only 600l. mentioned in a blank, which is scored, and which could not be an adequate price.—THE LORDS found, That Ferguson could not be free of the participation of the fraud in his author's right.—It was further *alleged* by Ferguson, That the sum expressed in Blackmark's disposition to his brother, was due to him, and therefore he might lawfully take a disposition from Blackmark, or from Marrogat his brother, which behoved to be effectual, as to his own sum, which was Blackmark's anterior debt.

THE LORDS sustained the disposition, in so far as concerned Ferguson's own sum due by Blackmark, but declared the right might be affected by the pursuer *quoad reliquum*, that he might redeem upon payment of Ferguson's sum, unless it were proven that Blackmark was a notour bankrupt, when he disposed to his brother; and so could not dispoise to one creditor in prejudice of another.

*Stair, v. 2. p. 726.*

No 118.

A disposition by a man to his brother-in-law was found null, unless the cause onerous were instructed; and in a reduction against an onerous purchaser from the brother-in-law, the

1680. January 24.

CRAWFORD against KER.

ANDREW CRAWFORD having apprifed some tenements in Glasgow from Mungo Matthie, pursues the tenants for their duties. Compearance is made for James Ker, who produceth an anterior disposition by Mungo Matthie to James Wilson, and by James Wilson to Ker, with infeftment conform, and *alleged* that he had the prior and better right.—The pursuer *answered*, That the right by Matthie the common author did bear Wilson to be Mathie's good-brother, so that the narrative in the disposition proves not the onerous cause; and therefore law esteems it as a gratuitous deed between conjunct persons, and so is null by the act of Parliament 1621.—It was *replied* for Ker, That by that same act of Parliament, rights

acquired for a just price from the conjunct or confident person, are valid to a singular successor not partaking of the fraud; and therefore Ker's right from Wilton bearing an equivalent price paid, which the narrative of Ker's disposition sufficiently proves, Ker is secure, and needs not prove the onerous cause of Wilton's disposition, which he cannot do, it having been more than 20 years since that disposition.—It was *duplied* for Crawford, That the clause founded upon doth not bear, that third parties acquiring from conjunct persons should be secure; for though in the first clause, rights granted to conjunct or confident persons without a cause onerous, are declared null as to anterior creditors, yet the subsequent clause doth not bear, that purchasers from conjunct persons shall be secured, but only that purchasers from the interposed person shall be secure, not being partakers of the fraud, which indeed was a just and necessary exception; but purchasers from conjunct persons cannot be free of partaking of the fraud, unless they know and can instruct the cause onerous betwixt the conjunct persons, seeing the law allows not, that the narratives betwixt conjunct persons should instruct the cause onerous narrated, but it must be instructed *aliunde*; which conjunct persons the Lords have never extended further than to parents and children, brothers and good-brothers, uncles and nephews; and in this case the very disposition purchased by Ker, bears Wilton his author to be good-brother to Matthe the disponent; so that Ker could not be ignorant of their near conjunction, and so could be in no better case than Wilton his author, seeing his right acquired put him in *mala fide* to purchase from a good-brother, so designed in the disposition, without taking with the disposition, the instructions of the cause onerous.

THE LORDS found the disposition by Matthe, to Wilton his good-brother, null by the act of Parliament, unless the cause onerous were instructed; and that Ker, by the tenor of Wilton's disposition, purchased by him, behoved to instruct the cause onerous of Wilton's disposition, and was not secured by the clause in the act of Parliament, in favours of purchasers *bona fide* from intrusted persons, which doth not extend to purchasers knowing their author to be conjunct to the disponent in the degrees of conjunction aforesaid.

*Fol. Dic. v. 1. p. 74. Stair, v. 2. p. 747.*

\* \* Fountainhall remarks the same case :

THERE was a difficult point decided betwixt Ker, Matthe, and Crawford. One disponent lands to his brother-in-law, who had married his sister, whereon he is infeft publicly, and in possession: A creditor of the disponent appries these lands from him, and is infeft; and betwixt him and his author there is 28 years peaceable possession. Long after this apprising, a creditor to him who had disponent the lands appries them, and in a competition betwixt these two apprisers, (Pitmedden having reported) the LORDS preferred the posterior appriser, because he had appried from the disponent; unless the appriser from him who got the disposition will instruct the onerous cause of his author's rights, otherwise than by the narrative of his disposition: because, being *inter conjunctas personas*, law

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found obliged  
to instruct  
the onerous  
cause, it ap-  
pearing from  
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'presumes it simulate, unless the onerous cause be instructed.' This interlocutor offended many, and the LORDS resolved to re-consider it: For, *1<sup>mo</sup>*, What if he had paid him money for it over the table? or, *2<sup>do</sup>*, That they had retired and cancelled the accounts, (they being both merchants), how could the preceding onerous cause be proven? *3<sup>to</sup>*, An appriſer, who is a ſingular ſucceſſor, cannot be maſter of the writs by which the oneroſity of his author's diſpoſition can be inſtructed, eſpecially now after 28 years, and that they have peaceably poſſeſt during all that time. *4<sup>to</sup>*, Some thought brethren-in-law not ſo near conjunct perſons; yet they were found even before this conjunct as to the deſign of the act of Parliament 1621 againſt bankrupts. See M'Kenzie's Obſerv. on the ſaid act. THE LORDS afterwards mitigated this interlocutor.

*Fountainball, v. 1. p. 76.*

1692. December 2.

SPENCE against CREDITORS of DICK.\*

No 119.

Not only the immediate contriver of fraud againſt creditors, but ſingular ſucceſſors, purchaſing from conjunct and confident perſons, are affected by the act 1621; only they muſt be ſo far *participes fraudis*, as, from the circumſtances, not to be entitled to plead *bona fides*.

In this caſe, a ſingular ſucceſſor, whoſe right flowed from a perſon, *ex facie* of the deed, conjunct, was not bound, after 40 years, to prove either the actual ſolvency of his author, or even that he was habit and repute ſolvent.

THE LORDS adviſed the reduction on the act 1621, purſued by Elizabeth Spence and Andrew Martin, writer to the ſignet, her husband, againſt Skirling, Mr James Naſmith, and the other contract-creditors of Sir William and Sir Alexander Dicks, of their right to the lands of Craighouſe.—THE LORDS found a diſpoſition of theſe lands by James Naſmith to James Rutherford, his ſon in-law, fell under the precise terms of the ſaid act of Parliament; and though it bore to be for his tocher, and relief of cautionry wherein he ſtood engaged, yet that the ſaid narrative did not prove the onerous cauſe of the diſpoſition, unleſs it were *aliunde* inſtructed: But withall found, a father-in-law not being bankrupt, nor under diligence at his creditors inſtance, might diſpoſe lands to his goodſon as well as to any other perſon; but in that caſe, that the receiver behaved to prove the diſpoſer had another viſible eſtate; for though in law every man is preſumed ſolvent, and not bankrupt, yet when a man diſpoſes his lands to a near relation, it is preſumed that it is *omnium bonorum*, unleſs it be inſtructed, that he had a farther eſtate beyond that which is diſpoſed; and that the granter's aſſertion, in the writs, is not ſufficient to verify that. But if it be in a writ produced and uſed by the purſuer, he cannot object; *nam qui approbat reprobare nequit*. But the difficulty occurring here was, that the right was now out of the perſon of the conjunct, and come in the hands of ſingular ſucceſſors and ſtrangers, who could not inſtruct, after ſo long an interval as forty years, what was the onerous cauſe of their author's right; and yet if they be *participes fraudis* it is redeemable as well againſt them as their author. And here it was alleged ſufficient to put them in *mala fide*, that Naſmith's right to Rutherford, and his to Mr Alexander Dick, expreſſly bore his intereſt and relation as ſon-in-law, and ſo the ſubſequent ac-

\* In this caſe, the degrees of participation in the fraud of conjunct and confident perſons, which ought to affect ſingular ſucceſſors; the conſequences of their knowledge that the party who conveyed to the interpoſed perſon, with whom they tranſacted, was bankrupt or inſolvent at the time; and the evidence requiſite of ſuch knowledge, are minutely treated of; alſo the diſtinction between conjunct and confident perſons.