1742. *June* 24. URQUHART *against* URQUHARTS.

No 14.

A DISPOSITION by a husband, who had been valetudinary even from his marriage to his death, in favours of his wife and some of his relations, reduced *ex capite lecti*, though he died of another disease, and though the wife was no otherways provided, in respect the marriage dissolved within the year.

1743. *January* 4. JAMES WOOD *against* NORRIE.

No. 15.

THOUGH promissory notes not holograph granted in England or Ireland are binding even in Scotland on the granter, yet found that they prove not their date against the heir, so as to affect heritage in Scotland.

1743. *November* 23. JANET SOMMERVELL *against* MARION GEDDIE.

No. 16.

DEATH-BED not relevant to reduce a disposition by a liferenter, though having the strongest powers to dispone, unless he be formally fiar; and here indeed the chief question was, whether by the conception of these deeds, which were very singular, this woman the disponer was not also fiar? The first point was determined the same way in February 1744, on a reclaiming bill against my interlocutor, without answers. (Murray, the pursuer, was wife to Mr Seton.) I have not kept the petition.

1744. *November* 2. JOHN LESLEY *against* ROBERT CLEUGH.

No. 17.

A FATHER disponed on death-bed his estate to his eldest son and heirs of his body, whom failing to the children of the second son; and after the father's death the eldest son accepted and ratified the disposition, but happened himself to be then on death-bed. After his death, the second son raised reduction against his own children of the disposition *ex capite lecti*, and likewise of his brother's ratification; but we found that he was barred by his brother's ratification from reducing the father's disposition, and that he could not quarrel that ratification, because he was not heir to his brother