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Scottish Court of Session Decisions >>
Michael Riddel v Robert Riddel of Glenriddel. [1766] Mor 13019 (4 January 1766)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1766/Mor3013019-136.html Cite as:
[1766] Mor 13019
Subject_1 PROVISION to HEIRS and CHILDREN. Subject_2 SECT. XV.
Can provisions in favour of Children in a Marriage-contract be disappointed by deeds of the Father?
Michael Riddel v. Robert Riddel of Glenriddel
Date: 4 January 1766 Case No. No 136.
A gratuitous deed in favour of a second son, found ineffectual against a prior obligation in a contract of marriage in favour of the heir-male.
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Walter Riddel, in his contract of marriage, 1694, became bound to secure his whole land estate to the heir-male of the marriage. In the year 1727, purposing to fulfil that obligation, he disponed to his eldest son, Robert, the lands therein specified, burdened with his debts, reserving only to himself an annuity of 2000 merks. The lands of Stewarton, which came under the obligation, were left out of the disposition 1727. But that they were omitted by the over-sight of the writer, without intention, was made evident from the following circumstances; 1mo, That the title-deeds of that farm were delivered to the son, along with the other title-deeds of the estate; 2do, That he entered into possession of the whole; 3tio, That a subsequent deed by the father, anno 1733, relative to the former, proceeds upon this narrative, ‘That the whole lands belonging to him were conveyed to his son, by the disposition 1727.’ Many years after, the father having discovered that Stewarton was not comprehended in the said disposition, ventured to convey them to his second son, who was already competently provided. In this case, it was not pretended that Stewarton was actually conveyed to the son, which could not be without a formal disposition. But as there was sufficient evidence of the agreement to convey these lands as part of the estate, which the father remained still bound to fulfil, the Court judged this a sufficient foundation to void the gratuitous disposition to the second son.
