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Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Menzies v Menzies [1835] CA 13_408 (5 February 1835)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1835/013SS0408.html
Cite as: [1835] CA 13_408

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SCOTTISH_Shaw_Court_of_Session

Page: 408

Menzies

v.

Menzies
No. 126.

Court of Session

2d Division

Feb. 5 1835

Ld. Jeffrey. T., Lord Glenlee, Lord Medwyn, Lord Meadowbank, Lord Justice-Clerk

Mrs Christian Stewart, or Menzies and Children,     Pursuers.— Cuninghame— Patton. John Menzies,     Defender.— D. F. Hope— Whigham.

Subject_Proof — Witness. —

Circumstances in which held that there was no ground for admitting as witnesses for the pursuer in a declarator of marriage, her own near relations.

The pursuer, Christian Stewart, and two children borne by her to the defender Menzies, raised a summons of declarator of marriage and legitimacy against him, founding partly on a certain letter addressed by him to her, and partly on the allegeance, “that, both previous and subsequent to the date of the said document, the said John Menzies, defender, owned and acknowledged to various and sundry persons, and on various and sundry occasions, and in various and sundry ways, that he was married to the pursuer, the said Mrs Christian Stewart or Menzies.” A record having been made up, certain questions were raised as to the letter founded on, in regard to which the Court pronounced the judgment mentioned ante XII. 179, whereby, inter alia, a proof was allowed before answer. Several witnesses adduced by the pursuer, were accordingly examined, who deponed to the intercourse which was openly carried on between the pursuer and defender, both in a cottage which he took for her, and in his own house, and to the footing on which they apparently lived, and also to the fact, that, on one or two occasions, he had used the term “wife” with reference to her. She further proposed to adduce her brother, two sisters, a brother-in-law, and a sister-in-law, with a view to prove the averments in the sixth article of her condescendence, which was as follows:—

“Although these acknowledgments were made, and the writings granted, the pursuer, at the request of the defender, and with a view to the feelings of his relations, did not assume publicly the rank of the pursuer's wife. The defender not only made these acknowledgments to the pursuer, which were communicated by her to her relations, but in presence of the relations, and particularly of Christian Stewart, then residing at Duneaves, he uniformly spoke of the pursuer as his wife, and so addressed her in their presence. In so far as was compatible with his purpose of concealment, he entertained, treated, and cohabited with the pursuer as his wife. The pursuer was not only vested with the full power of regulating the household, but appointed the whole servants. These were selected with a view to their being likely to keep secret the marriage of the defender with the pursuer, and the facts which indicated and proved that connexion between them. The pursuer had access to the whole repositories of the defender, and the complete control of all the effects in the household. She slept in the family apartments, both during the stay of the defender at Duneaves, and in his absence. She cohabited with the defender, and was otherwise treated and entertained as his wife, in so far as was compatible with the purpose of maintaining the secrecy. The pursuer never, while in the defender's house, received one farthing in name of wages, nor was any stipulation made upon the subject. No claim was ever preferred by her for wages, nor was she in that, or in other respects, placed upon the footing of other servants. The receipt by which it is pretended to be made out that the defender did receive wages, is holograph of the defender's factor, and was not given to, or subscribed by the pursuer. His conduct towards the pursuer was uniformly affectionate and respectful.”

To the admissibility of these parties, it was objected, that they were disqualified by their relationship to the pursuer, 1 and that, neither in the summons nor on the record, did the statements import such privacy or concealment as to authorize a plea founded on necessary penuria testium, even if such could be pleaded when the penuria, if it existed, was created by the act of the parties themselves; while the evidence, so far as led, showed that, whatever might be held to have been the character of the intercourse between the parties, there was, at all events, no concealment of it.

_________________ Footnote _________________

1 Dalzell v. Richmond, July 10, 1790 (M. 16780); Bell v. King, January 21, 1797 (M. 16786).

To this, it was answered, that the facts to be proved being in re domestica, relations were admissible, whatever effect their supposed interest might have in judging of their credibility; and, farther, that this was not a case where the pursuer's whole cause was to be made out by the evidence of relations, these being only corroborative of the evidence afforded by the letter and the testimony of the witnesses already adduced, for which purpose relations, otherwise objectionable, were in use to be admitted. 1

The Commissary examinator having made avizandum to the Lord Ordinary with the objection, his Lordship sustained it, issuing at the same time the subjoined note. *

_________________ Footnote _________________

1 Martin v. M'Kissoch, Feb. 8, 1816 (F.C.)

* “The Lord Ordinary gives this judgment with some hesitation, the authorities being somewhat contradictory, and their application to such a case as the present, by no means without difficulty. On the whole, however, he thinks that it comes within the principle of the decisions in the cases of Dalzell against Richmond, 10th July, 1790; and Bell against King, 21st January, 1797; and he has decided accordingly, In common reason, it is impossible to deny that the concern which such near relations will generally feel for the honour (and in cases like this) the aggrandizement of their family, must present at least as strong a motive for perverting the truth, as many of the patrimonial interests by which their testimony would be peremptorily excluded. And though it is highly expedient to adhere to such general rules as are established, it is necessary, when questionable cases occur, to look carefully to the principles on which they are founded. On the other hand, it is not to be forgotten, that the very magnitude of the interest to the parties immediately concerned, as well as the general maxim in dubio pro statu est respondendum, weigh strongly against the rejection of any evidence that can be safely admitted.

“If the Lord Ordinary had considered the pursuers as now seeking to establish a marriage by open marital cohabitation and mutual habitual acknowledgments (as the defender endeavoured to represent), he would have had no difficulty whatever in at once rejecting the evidence in question. Such cases being necessarily the very reverse of those in which there should be any penuria of unexceptionable witnesses. But he cannot view the case as being truly of this description. A certain degree of privacy and concealment undoubtedly hung on the character of the connexion which subsisted between the parties; and the allegation of the pursuer substantially is, that though there were disclosures made more or less freely in retired situations and narrow circles, which (along with the written evidence) she hopes may be sufficient for her purpose, the marriage was, on the whole, intended to be concealed for a time from the public; and the only full and complete acknowledgments of it to be looked for, therefore, exclusively in the circle of their confidential and domestic friends.

“The great extent to which her examination of stranger witnesses has already gone, no doubt very much weakens this view of the matter, as well as some strong expressions both in the summons and condescendence. And, on the whole, the Lord Ordinary feels that the course he has followed is, in a doubtful matter, the least liable to exception. It may be proper perhaps to explain, that by the deliverance now made, the Lord Ordinary means only to declare the witnesses referred to as incompetent to make out the case of the pursuers by their direct testimony. The effect of the written evidence, and especially of the letter of 25th March, 1826, he understands to be still entire; and if it should be necessary for the defender to make out his allegations as to the occasion of writing and delivering that letter, which plainly resolve into a conspiracy or collusion, of a most private and occult nature, between him and the pursuer, the Lord Ordinary is far from thinking that it may not be competent to the pursuer to examine her own relations, in meeting any proof which may be attempted of these allegations.”

The pursuers reclaimed.

Lord Glenlee.—There is nothing in the interlocutor leading me to think that the Lord Ordinary may not see cause afterwards to allow an examination of these parties. The only thing I considered to be decided is that they are not to be admitted to prove the sixth article of the condescendence. Now, when we read that article, it necessarily implies that there should be a great many witnesses. If it was enough to say that the party had acknowledged the marriage to relations alone, there would be an end to the whole law as to the constitution of marriage. Not to foreclose the pursuer afterwards, I would insert the qualification of “in hoc statu.”

Lord Medwyn.—I would wish the qualification to be confined to the matter of replication on the points alluded to by the Lord Ordinary. I cannot hold that the oases of Dalzell and Bell were decided on specialties. It was on the general ground, and the later authorities are all against the admission of near relations in cases of marriage.

Lord Meadowbank.—I would not foreclose the pursuer from renewing the tender of these witnesses after the proof has been led. I would insert “in hoc statu,” applicable generally.

Lord Justice-Clerk.—It would be hazardous to throw any doubt on the general question, though possibly in special circumstances it may be competent to examine relations on some particular point.

The Court, “in respect that no sufficient reasons have been stated for admitting the proposed proof on the part of the pursuer, in support of the sixth article of her condescendence generally,” adhered to the Lord Ordinary's interlocutor.

Solicitors: Greig and Morton, W.S.— James Ferguson, W.S.—Agents.

SS 13 SS 408 1835


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