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Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Earl of Galloway v Lord Garlies [1838] CS 16_1212 (26 June 1838)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1838/016SS1212.html
Cite as: [1838] CS 16_1212

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SCOTTISH_Court_of_Session_Shaw

Page: 1212

016SS1212

Earl of Galloway

v.

Lord Garlies

No. 242.

Court of Session

2d Division

June 26 1838

Ld. Monereiff. F., Lord Justice-Clerk, Lord Glenlee, Lord Meadowbank, Lord Medwyn.

Earl of Galloway,     Pursuer.— Counsel:
Anderson— Moir.
Lord Garlies and Others,     Defenders.— Counsel:
Robertson.

Subject_Entail—Process—Declarator.— Headnote:

An heir in possession under three several deeds of entail, embracing different sets of lands, but in which the destinations and provisions were substantially the same, with the view of simplifying the titles, granted to himself and the other heirs of tailzie a disposition of all the lands in the three entails; upon his decease, the next heir of entail, having expede a general service as such under these different deeds, took infeftment on the precept in the disposition, and proposed to complete his title to the whole lands by taking a charter of confirmation from the Crown of the lands held of the Crown, and by charters of resignation or confirmation from subject-superiors of the lands held under such superiors; he then brought a declarator to have it found and declared that the title so to be made up was valid and effectual (on the authority of the Gartmore case, June 12, 1835), although the destinations and provisions in the several deeds of entail were only inserted once in the proposed charter of confirmation, and not repeated in reference to the several sets of lands contained in the deeds;—Action dismissed, the Court declining to advise ab ante the question involved in the declarator as to the validity of the proposed title, nothing having been done to raise such question; Opinion, however, intimated, that the above case was to he distinguished from the case of Gartmore, as there were here three entails and the method of completing the title was by confirmation instead of resignation.


Facts:

The late John, Karl of Galloway, executed, in 1804, a deed of entail of the lands of Garlies and others; in 1819, after his decease, his trustees executed an entail of the lands of Boldron and others; and in 1826 his son George Earl of Galloway, executed a third deed of entail, embracing other lands, which had been held by Earl John on apparency, or on personal titles. In the two last entails, the destinations, conditions, and limitations were, with certain variations as to provisions to wives and children in the second entail, identical with those in the first and leading entail, and were secured in the same manner. The deeds were duly recorded. Titles were made up separately by Earl George under these several deeds to the estates embraced by them. Thereafter, in 1827, he granted, in favour of himself and the other heirs of entail, a disposition of all the lands in the three entails, on the narrative that the destinations and conditions in each were identical, and that “it had been deemed expedient that he should grant the said disposition, for the purpose of bringing the whole lands and other heritages contained in the said three several deeds of entail under one deed, not only for the purpose of facilitating and rendering less expensive the completing of the titles thereto of the heirs of entail succeeding to him therein, but also in order that the same might form a title of possession, collateral and accessorial to the said several deeds of entail, for strengthening and supporting the same, and also in so far as not inconsistent with the said deeds of entail, that the said disposition might thereafter form a leading title and investiture of the said entailed lands and estates.”

Earl George having died in 1834, the pursuer Randolph, Earl of Galloway, his son, expede a general service as nearest and lawful heir-male of tailzie and provision to him, in terms of the three several deeds of entail, and also as nearest and lawful heirs-male of tailzie and provision, in terms of the disposition in 1827. Having thus acquired right to the unexecuted procuratory and precept in the disposition, he was infeft upon the precept in the whole lands therein contained.

Thereafter Earl Randolph raised action against his son Viscount Garlies, and the other heirs of entail under the deeds above-mentioned, upon the narrative, of the said deeds of entail and disposition, and of his general service and infeftment, and farther stating “that he has completed or is about to complete his titles to the whole of the said lands, by virtue of a charter of confirmation, under the Union seal, of the whole lands held of the Crown as superior, and also by charters of resignation or confirmation from the different subject-superiors of those parts of the said entailed lands held under such subject-superiors respectively, according to the state of the titles,” &c. subsuming that it was necessary to ascertain the validity of the titles so about to be completed; and concluding to have it found and declared “that the said pursuer was entitled and bound to make up titles in terms and by virtue of the said disposition by the said George Earl of Galloway; and that the titles in his person, thus completed and made up by him, or about to be completed and made up by him as heir of tailzie and provision under the said disposition, and also as heir of tailzie and provision under the said three several deeds of entail by the said John Earl of Galloway, by the trustees of the said John Earl of Galloway, and by the said George Earl of Galloway, are good, valid, and effectual titles, although the series and destination of heirs of entail, and the conditions, provisions, restrictions, limitations, exceptions, clauses irritant and resolutive, declarations, and reservations which are precisely the same in the said three several deeds of entail, have only been inserted once, and have not been repeated in reference to the several different lands specified and contained in the said respective deeds of entail;” and farther, to have it found and declared “that the titles thus completed in the person of the pursuer shall not be held to be inconsistent with or prejudicial to the deed of entail by Earl John, but that they shall be used as additional and accessorial titles to the said lands, for strengthening and supporting such deed of entail, and for no other purpose; and lastly, that the other heirs of entail (named) have no right or interest to object to any of the deeds executed by Earl George or Earl Randolph, nor to the titles that have been or shall be completed in the person of Earl Randolph, but that the same have been so executed and completed for the benefit of the entailed estate, and of the heirs succeeding thereto.”

Defences were put in by Lord Garlies and his uncle, the honourable Montgomerie Stewart, in which, while allowing that the mode proposed by the pursuer of completing his title under the entails to the lands therein described would, if competent, considerably simplify the title to these lands, and thereby be the means of saving expense to the pursuer and future heirs of entail, they submitted that the proposed method would be contrary to the provisions of the act 1685. They maintained, therefore, (in point of form), that the pursuer was bound by law to repeat, in all the titles to be expede by him, the whole of the conditions and irritant and resolutive clauses as applicable to the several sets of lands contained in each of the three entails.

The Lord Ordinary, at the desire of parties, reported the cause on cases, in which it was contended by the pursuer, on the authority of the Gartmore case, 1 that, under the titles now proposed to be completed, there was a reference throughout to the three several entails, both in the dispositive clause, and in the quæ quidem; each set of lands being pointed out by the deed, so that the extent to which a contravention would operate was distinctly definable; and, therefore, as the conditions and provisions of the three entails were substantially identical, the rule quod singula singulis sunt applicanda might properly be applied in the construction of the title to be made up under the disposition of

_________________ Footnote _________________

1 Bontine v. Graham, June 12, 1835 (ante, XIII. 905).

Earl George, by the charter of confirmation from the Crown, and the charters of resignation or confirmation from subjects-superiors.

By the defender it was contended, on the other hand, that, in making up titles under the entails in question, the rule of strict construction must be applied, and the course directed to be pursued by the several deeds of entail, each forming the lex feudi of the particular estate embraced by it, must be expressly and unequivocally followed; 1 besides, that the present action was of the nature of a call upon the Court to give their opinion as to how the pursuer's titles should be made up, and to decide a question, for raising which there were no proper terms, a mode of proceeding of which the Court disapproved. 2

_________________ Footnote _________________

1 Speid v. Speid, Feb. 21, 1837 (ante, XV. 618), Opinion of Lord Gillies, p. 623.

_________________ Footnote _________________

2 Murray v. Murray, May 21, 1833 (ante, XI. 629).

Lord Justice-Clerk.—I have great doubts if we are in a situation to decern in terms of the conclusions of this action. This is said to be like the Gartmore case. I concurred in the decision in that case, which was keenly litigated, where there was held to be a deed, with reference to the two entails, sufficiently embracing these entails, and effectual. But here there are three entails. The clauses are said to be identical, and a deed embracing all three is proposed; and the question we are asked is, will this deed be effectual? Now, there is no question actually raised as to the validity of this title; and are we to be called upon, at this stage, to give an opinion whether the course that has been followed is a legal course? This would be anticipating questions which may arise, and I think we are not so called upon. We are much in the same situation we were in when the case of Murray of Murraythwaite was presented to us, and when we said to the pursuer, you must take your course. I would hesitate extremely about giving decree.

Lord Glenlee.—I agree that it is an improper step to come to the Court for a consultation of this sort. This party has gone a certain length, and if he is really so sure that the deed he has executed and the others he proposes to be executed are right, according to the Gartmore case, why does he not go on, and afterwards he may get a judgment? There is, however, a difference between the cases. In the case of Gartmore there was a charter of resignation, which the party making up his titles obtained by resigning into the hands of the Crown all the lands holding of the Crown contained in both entails. Here there is no charter of resignation expede or even proposed. A private deed has been executed by the late Earl of Galloway, and it is proposed not to resign in the hands of the superior, in terms of the original deeds of entail, but to take a charter of confirmation. That is different from actually resigning the whole lands in the hands of the Crown and then taking a charter of resignation.

Lord Meadowbank.—I am of the same opinion.

Lord Medwyn.—I agree. I do not admire these consultations coming upon us ab ante. If it is thought that this is the same as the Gartmore case, let the pursuer proceed. Valuable as the action of declarator is, I do not think this is a proper use of it. We should in this way have declarators as to entails and all kinds of deeds. I think something ought to be done, before we are called upon to decide a question of validity. I am against telling a party beforehand that he will be right if he do this, and wrong if he do that.

The Court accordingly “dismissed the action.”

Solicitors: J. Russell, C.S.— Walker, Richardson, and Melville, W.S.—Agents.

SS 16 SS 1212 1838


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