BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?

No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!



BAILII [Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]

Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> M'Dougall and Mandatory v. Girdwood [1867] ScotLR 4_140 (25 June 1867)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1867/04SLR0140.html
Cite as: [1867] SLR 4_140, [1867] ScotLR 4_140

[New search] [Printable PDF version] [Help]


SCOTTISH_SLR_Court_of_Session

Page: 140

Court of Session Outer House First Division.

Tuesday, June 25 1867.

Lord Curriehill

4 SLR 140

M'Dougall and Mandatory

v.

Girdwood.

( Ante vol. iii, p. 367.)


Subject_1Jury Trial
Subject_2New Trial
Subject_3Bill of Exceptions
Subject_4Infringement of Patent.
Facts:

Motion for new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against evidence, refused. Exceptions disallowed.

Headnote:

In this case, Alexander M'Dougall, manufacturing chemist, Manchester, was pursuer and Robert Girdwood, wool-broker, Tanfield, Ediburgh, was defender. The pursuer set forth that, by letters-patent, he had obtained for fourteen years the exclusive privilege of making and vending his invention within the United Kingdom. In his specification he claimed, as secured to him by the letters-patent,—1st, The use of carbolic acid in the preparation of materials or compositions for destroying vermin on sheep and other animals, and for protecting them therefrom; 2d, The use of alkalies and tallow, or other saponifiable substance, in combination with the above products, when used for the purposes set forth. In his subsequent disclaimer and memorandum of alteration, the pursuer declared—“My invention consists in the use of the heavy oil of tar, or dead oil, or crude carbolic acid, as it is sometimes called, or creosote obtained in the destructive distillation of carbonaceous substances. These materials I treat with an alkali, and add a saponifiable fatty substance.” The issues tried before the Lord President and a jury in April last, were—1. “Whether, between 28th January 17th May 1866, the defender did, within or near his premises at Tanfield, near Edinburgh, wrongfully, and in contravention of the said letters-patent, use the invention described in the said specification, as altered as aforesaid?” 2. “Whether, between 28th January and 17th May 1866, the defender did, wrongfully, and in contravention of the said letters-patent, vend a material for destroying vermin on sheep and other animals, and for protecting them therefrom, manufactured by the use of the invention in the said specification, as altered as aforesaid?”

The defender denied that the “Improved Melossoon or Sheep Protecting Dip” sold by him was the same, or substantially the same, as the pursuer's invention, and explained that he used in his manufacture light pitch oil, having a less specific gravity and a lower boiling point than water, and also vegetable poisons; heavy oil of tar, or dead oil, or crude carbolic acid, or creosote, being carefully excluded, as being injurious to the wool. A number of scientific witnesses were examined. The jury returned a verdict for the pursuer. The defender now presented a bill of exceptions to the Judge's charge, in so far as he had left it to the jury to say, on the evidence, whether the words in the specification, “the heavy oil of tar,” &c., do, in their ordinary meaning, as known in trade, comprehend oils produced from the destructive distillation of coal tar, of a specific gravity less than the specific gravity of water; and, particularly, the oil used by the defenders in the manufacture of the composition complained of, as a contravention of the patent; and had directed them in law, that they must find for the defender if they should be of opinion that the said words did not comprehend such oils. The defender also asked the Judge to direct the jury (1) that, according to the true construction of the letters-patent, specification, and disclaimer, no oil of a less specific gravity than water is comprehended within the said patent, specification, and disclaimer; (2) that if the tar oil used by the defender was, prior to the date of the patent, commercially known and used, and was of a lighter specific gravity than water, the pursuer was not entitled to a verdict on either issue. The Judge refused to give these directions.

A hearing took place on the bill of exceptions and also on a rule, obtained by the defender on the pursuer, to show cause why the verdict should not be set aside as against evidence.

Young, Mackenzie, and Balfour for pursuer.

Clark, Watson, and R. V. Campbell for defender.

Judgment:

Lord Curriehill, after reading the issues sent to trial, and the first exception, said that the question was, whether the judge ought to have left it to the jury to say so and so, and it appeared to him that the judge could do nothing else with propriety. The article was described by the words “the heavy oil of tar,” &c.; and the defender said that the judge should have told the jury whether or not these words, in their ordinary meaning as known in trade, comprehended oils of a certain specific gravity. How could the judge do that? How was he to know the meaning of the words “heavy oil of tar,” &c.? These were not technical words, or words of which the judge was bound to know the meaning. They indicated a certain mercantile commodity,—their meaning was to be ascertained from people who are acquainted with that commodity. But the argument was, that in the specification itself words were to be found which enabled

Page: 141

the judge to construe the words; and that he was bound, having to read that document, to take the information which it afforded in order to give that construction. It was said that, in the clause of the specification which set forth the modus operandi, there were words making it incumbent on the judge to say to the jury that the heavy oil of tar must have been of a certain specific gravity. Now, in that part of the specification which described the invention, there were no such words; and with regard to the words occurring in the other part which specified the modus operandi, the exception proceeded upon a mistake as to the nature and object of that part of the patent. A patentee, besides describing his invention in words that admitted of no dubiety, was bound to describe a mode in which it could be carried into practical effect, so that any third party of ordinary intelligence in such matters should be able to perform the operation with the prescription before him, and without farther instruction. The object of that clause was to instruct the public, and that was the price the patentee had to pay for their getting a monopoly for a certain time. It was sufficient if the patentee described one mode; and accordingly, in the clause in question, nothing more was done. The patentee described a method of carrying his invention into effect, and, in that description, he said that he was in the habit of taking oil having a greater specific gravity and a higher boiling point than water. That simply came to this—that he was in the habit of taking oil of that particular kind for that particular method. But these words did not occur anywhere in these clauses of the patent which were meant to describe the patent itself; and, accordingly, the judge would not have been entitled to take upon him to construe the meaning of the description of the patent. as occurring in the proper clauses of the specification, by resorting to this allusion to the gravity of the oil in the particular mode of carrying it into execution stated here. The first exception, therefore, was not well founded; and the same must be said of the second. The patent, specification, and disclaimer, read all together, said nothing about the specific gravity of the oil at all. The second branch of the exception—“that if the tar oil used by the defender was, prior to the date of the patent, commercially known and used, and was of a lighter specific gravity than water, the pursuer is not entitled to a verdict on either issue,”—was not a direction in point of law at all, and the judge properly refused to give it. As to the rule, it was undoubtedly a fair jury question whether or not these words, in their ordinary meaning, comprehended the use of oil of a gravity less than the specific gravity of water. The evidence was various. The jury gave a verdict for the pursuer, and it was not a case for a new trial.

The other Judges concurred.

Counsel:

Agents for Pursuer— Macnaughton & Finlay, W.S.

Agent for Defender— Andrew Webster, S.S.C.

1867


BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1867/04SLR0140.html