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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Special Case - Macgregor and Others [1876] ScotLR 13_450 (20 May 1876) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1876/13SLR0450.html Cite as: [1876] ScotLR 13_450, [1876] SLR 13_450 |
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Page: 450↓
Certain house property being held in trust for Mrs A in liferent and her seven daughters in fee, the sole surviving trustee in 1782 executed a disposition, the dispositive clause of which was in these terms:—“I, by these presents, alienate and dispone to and in favour of the said” Mrs A “in liferent, and the said” seven daughters, “and their heirs and assignees whomsoever, equally in fee, and failing any of them by decease to the survivors,” the said property. The procuratory of resignation was “in favour of and for new infeftment to be made and granted to the said” Mrs A “in liferent, and to the said seven daughters, and their heirs and assignees whomsoever, equally in fee, with this provision always, as it is hereby expressly provided and declared, that after the death of the said” Mrs A “the house above mentioned shall be rented by the said” seven daughters “and each of them, so long as any one of them shall remain unmarried, without paying any rent or acknowledgment for the said house to the sisters who shall happen to be married, and in the event of the marriage of the said whole sisters, or on the death of all who shall remain unmarried, then the house above mentioned shall be sold, and the price thereof be divided among the surviving married sisters and the child or children of the deceased sisters, equally, as the fee is provided in manner above written.” This deed was
Page: 451↓
in the possession of one of the sisters in 1829, and was in that year recorded in the Books of Council and Session. No feudal title was ever made up in the person of Mrs A, or of any of her daughters. The last survivor of the daughters, Miss S A, who remained in possession of the house down to her death, obtained herself served in 1855 as one of two of the nearest and lawful heirs-portioners in general of three of her deceased sisters, and at the same time she expede services to the same ladies as their nearest and lawful heir in provision in general under and by virtue of the disposition of 1782. Miss S A died in 1864, at the age of 100, leaving a disposition and settlement whereby she conveyed to her great-grandniece Miss M her whole estate, and in particular, the house property in question, so far as she then had or might acquire right thereto. Miss M died intestate in 1872. In a Special Case, brought, on the one hand, by the heirs-at-law of the whole seven sisters and of Miss M (the heirs-at-law in both cases being the same persons), and on the other hand, by the other descendants of the seven sisters—: held (1) that the deed of 1872 must be held to have been taken with consent of the beneficiaries, and intended by them to regulate the succession of the property in question; (2) that under the said deed each sister had an absolute right of fee in her own pro indiviso share; (3) that the surviving sister rightly made up her title as heir of provision under the deed; (4) that the deed operated conversion as at the date of the death of the last surviving sister, when the property was directed to be sold; and (5) that in these circumstances the property fell to be sold, and the whole parties to participate in the price in certain specified shares.
This was a Special Case brought to determine the right to five-seventh parts of the heritable property No. 16 South St David Street, Edinburgh, and the ground behind the same. The first parties were William D. J. O'Reilly and James Macgregor, the heirs-at-law of the whole daughters of Ann Sempill or Austin and of Josepha Macgregor; and the second parties were the other descendants of the daughters. Both the first and second parties laid claim to the whole five-seventh shares of the property.
The circumstances of the case are fully narrated in the opinion of Lord Gifford.
At advising—
The property was originally acquired so far back as 1776 in two portions, one portion for the price of £500, and the other at the price of £160, but both portions were on the same day—27th March 1776—conveyed to certain trustees for trust purposes, afterwards specified and declared in two separate declarations of trust, dated in June 1777 and May 1780. Ever since 1776 the two subjects have been united and possessed as one undivided property.
By the two declarations of trust of 1777 and 1780, the trustees, who were feudally vested in the subjects, declared that they held the same in trust for behoof of Mrs Anne Sempill or Austin, widow of Dr Adam Austin, physician in Edinburgh, in liferent, and of Ann Austin, Mariann Austin, Katharine Austin, Rebecca Austin, Sempill Austin, Collins Austin, and Jean Gordon Austin, their seven daughters, equally in fee, “or in such other terms, proportions, and conditions, with regard to the said daughters, as should be signified by Major-General John Scott of Balcombie in his lifetime, or by the tutors for his (the said General Scott's) children after his decease.” General Scott was a friend of Mrs Austin and her daughters, and he had gifted the £500, being the price of the larger portion of the subjects, for behoof of Mrs Austin and her daughters.
General Scott died very shortly after the date of the above deeds, without giving any directions as to the fee of the subjects, and the tutors for his children declined to interfere, so that in 1782, after General Scott's death, the trustees or their survivor held the property simply for Mrs Austin in liferent and for her seven daughters nominatim in fee. At that date, therefore, each daughter had absolute right to one-seventh of the fee of the subjects, and each of them had right to dispose of her respective seventh, and failing any disposition thereof the same would descend to the heirs of each daughter respectively.
In this state of matters, however, Dr Hay, the last survivor of the trustees, and in whom the title to the subjects stood vested by infeftment, executed on, 5th April 1782 a disposition of the subjects in favour of Mrs Austin and her daughters, in order to denude himself of the trust, but instead of conveying the subjects simply to Mrs Austin in liferent and her seven daughters nominatim in fee, in exact terms of the declarations of trust, he conveyed the subjects in certain special terms, and under certain special conditions, without having, so far as now appears or can now be discovered, a special written authority to do so.
This disposition of 5th April 1782 narrates the original purchase of the property and the two declarations of trust. It mentions that the tutors appointed by General Scott had declined to interfere, and it then merely bears that it is “proper and necessary” that the last surviving trustee should denude himself of the subjects in manner underwritten. The deed does not expressly bear that the fiars had requested Dr Hay, the surviving trustee, to vary the terms in which the subjects were destined. Dr Hay, as sole surviving trustee, then conveys the subjects “under the provisions and declarations after mentioned, …to and in favour of Mrs Ann Sempill alias Austin in liferent, and the said Ann Austin, Mary-Ann Austin, Catherine Austin, Rebecca Austin, Sempill Austin, Collins Austin, and Jean Gordon Austin, her said daughters, and their heirs and assignees whomsoever, equally in fee, and failing any of them by decease, to the survivors equally, heritably and irredeemably.” The provision referred
Page: 452↓
It does not appear when and to whom this disposition and deed of denuding by Dr Hay was delivered. Looking to its terms and purposes, I think it must be held in law to have been delivered at or shortly after its date. The granter, Dr Hay, died sometime in last century. The deed itself was recorded in the books of this Court on 14th September 1829, when it appears to have been in the possession of Miss Sempill Austin, who afterwards became the last survivor of the seven sisters, and from the date of the deed in 1782 down to the present time, not only no objection of any kind has been taken by any one to the terms of Dr Hay's deed, but no other title has been made up by any of the sisters, or by any one in their right, to the subjects in question. No infeftment followed upon Dr Hay's deed of 1782, and no feudal title has been made up to the subjects since its date.
Mrs Austin, the liferentrix, died long ago, and the whole of her seven daughters are now deceased, the last surviving daughter having been Miss Sempill Austin, who died upon 4th March 1864. Two of the daughters were married. Ann, who became Mrs Macgregor of Inverardoran, who has left descendants, and Catherine, who was Mrs General Robertson of Lawers, but who left no issue. The parties to the present case are all grandchildren of Mrs Ann Austin or Macgregor, being the children of Ann Austin or Macgregor's two daughters, Mrs O'Reilly and Mrs John Macgregor, and the questions put to the Court are limited to the fee of five shares out of the seven original shares, the other two of the shares being those of Catherine Austin (Mrs Robertson) and of Miss Collins Austin, both of which were specially conveyed, and are now said to belong to the Baroness Sempill. As to these two shares the parties to the present case are agreed, and no question is now before the Court. The Baroness Sempill is not a party to this Special Case.
In reference to the five-seventh shares now in dispute, the first two questions which arise are— first, Under what deeds or title were these shares held at the dates of the deaths of the five daughters, to whom the fee thereof originally belonged? and second, What is the legal effect of the terms of the title under which these five shares are now held?
Upon the first of these questions, viz., What is the regulating title under which this heritable subject was held at the deaths of Mrs Austin's seven daughters respectively, and upon which it is now held, I am of opinion that the regulating title, the terms of which must determine where the right of fee now is, is Dr Hay's disposition of 5th April 1782. The opposite view, contended for by the first parties to the case, that that deed was ultra vires of Dr Hay, and must be laid out of view, and that the regulating titles are the declarations of trust of 1777 and 1780, is, I think, altogether untenable.
It is no doubt true that failing any special directions by General Scott, or by the tutors named by him, each of Mrs Austin's seven daughters was simply and absolutely fiar of one-seventh of the property. But, then, in 1782 Mrs Austin's seven daughters, as absolute fiars, might take the title to themselves in any terms they chose. They were the absolute proprietors each of her own seventh share, and they might have required Dr Hay, who was simply trustee for them, to convey their property in such manner and with such destination as they might prescribe. If, therefore, they had subscribed Dr Hay's disposition of 1782 as consenters, or if in any other way they had recorded their desire to have the deed in its existing terms, or their approval or acceptance thereof, this would have been conclusive of the mere question of title. It would have made Dr Hay's deed the deed of the seven fiars themselves.
But I am very clearly of opinion that the want of an explicit written consent to Dr Hay's deed is sufficiently and most amply supplied by the circumstances which have occurred, and by the time which has now elapsed. The deed, as I have already stated, must be held to have been delivered at or about its date in 1782, now ninety-four years ago. It was executed for the very purpose of being delivered. It bears a clause of delivery of itself and of the whole title-deeds of the subjects. It must have been delivered before the death of Dr Hay, the trustee, and there is no trace of its having ever been in the possession of anybody else than the seven daughters, or one or more of them for behoof of them all. The deed was publicly recorded in the Books of Council and Session in 1829, which in law is equivalent to delivery, even as between third parties in an ordinary transaction, and it seems to have been acted upon in reference to a threatened encroachment. The terms of the deed were never objected to by any of the fiars, or by any one in their right, for a period of nearly a century, and all that time this deed has been held by or under the control of the fiars (for undoubtedly each of them had a right to it, and a right to challenge it or its special terms), as it formed their sole title to the property in question.
Nothing is more common than for a purchaser or disponee to take the title to the estate which he purchases in special terms or with a special destination, and although the purchaser may not sign the deed, or may not execute any written approval, yet if he accepts and holds the deed, its terms will as effectually regulate the destination of the subject as if the purchaser had executed a separate and special conveyance for this
Page: 453↓
Second, But there remain the further questions,—and these are not unattended with difficulty,—What are the legal effects of the terms of Dr Hay's deed of 1782 as applied to the circumstances which have occurred, and as affected by the deeds and services which have been expede by some of Mrs Austin's daughters. And here it is necessary to attend with some closeness to the terms of the deed, and to the circumstances which have occurred.
In the first place, I am of opinion that by the terms of the deed of 1782 the daughters of Mrs Austin were made ultimate and absolute proprietors each of one-seventh of the fee of the subjects. Each daughter was ultimate and absolute fiar in her respective seventh. I am laying out of view in the meantime the mother's liferent, and the successive liferents or rights of possession in favour of the unmarried daughters which may be held to have been created by the special declaration in Dr Hay's deed. Whatever be the effect of these successive liferents or quasi-liferents—for it is rather a right of occupation while unmarried than a proper liferent—I think that each daughter was absolute fiar of one-seventh share of the fee.
The terms of the dispositive clause are conclusive as to this. The subject is conveyed to the seven daughters nominatim, and to “their heirs and assignees whomsoever, equally in fee.” The words are express and unambiguous, and they are repeated in the procuratory of resignation. The expression “heirs and assignees” leaves no room for doubt as to the complete vesting of the fee in each daughter—each fiar's heir is to take if she dies intestate, but she may sell, dispone, or assign to whom she pleases.
This full right of fee is not in the least affected by the further destination to the survivors of the seven sisters who are made fiars. This ulterior provision is a mere simple destination which may define and fix that the survivors will be the heirs of the predeceasers if no other disposition is made, or if the condition si sine liberis does not intervene, but it will not prevent each sister from disposing of her share as she pleases either inter vivos or mortis causa. There are no prohibitions against altering the order of succession, and there are no limiting or fettering clauses of any kind. It is a mere simple destination defeasible at pleasure, and if survivors take, they will take simply as heirs of provision or substitutes, their right being entirely defeasible at the pleasure of each original grantee. No doubt the deed is in some senses a mutual deed, but it gives mutual freedom, and precisely the same freedom, of disposal to each of the seven fiars.
Accordingly, this power of disposal was hardly seriously disputed at the bar, and it could not well be. It was admitted on all hands that one of the sisters, Catherine Austin or Robertson, who died without issue, had by her deed of settlement of 1826 validly conveyed her seventh of the fee to her sister Miss Collins Austin, and it was admitted that Miss Collins Austin, in her turn dying unmarried in 1852, left both her own share and Catherine's share of the fee to the Baroness Sempill under a deed of settlement and relative codicil or appointment, which took effect, and in virtue of which the Baroness Sempill is now in undisputed possession of two-seventh shares of the property. I take it therefore to be quite indisputable that each of the seven daughters had from first to last absolute right to dispose of her own seventh share of the ultimate fee.
And here, I think, I may dismiss the question of liferent or quasi-liferent, for whatever were the strict legal rights of the sisters in the liferent, they have settled these rights amicably, and the quasi-liferents have all long since expired. The clause is only of use as an aid in construing the ultimate destination.
In the next place, I am of opinion that under Dr Hay's deed there is a valid substitution or destination to survivors, which would take effect if any of the sisters predeceased without issue, and without making any disposition or settlement of their special shares. I cannot deny effect to the express destination in the deed, in the dispositive clause—“failing any of them by decease, to the survivors equally, heritably and irredeemably.” No doubt this destination is not repeated totidem verbis in the procuratory of resignation, but the rule is quite fixed that if there is discrepancy between the dispositive clause and the procuratory the dispositive clause must rule, the procuratory in such a deed being a mere accessory clause for the purpose of completing the title. But there is really no discrepancy in the present case, for although the procuratory does not direct new infeftment to be given to the survivors, it substitutes what I hold to be an explanatory equivalent, for it directs that on the death of all the unmarried sisters “then the house above mentioned shall be sold, and the price thereof be divided among the surviving married sisters and the child or children of the deceased sisters equally, as the fee is provided in manner above written.” The concluding words here used seem to me to be conclusive as to the meaning of the deed. The price is to be divided “equally” as the fee is provided in manner above written—that is, above written in the dispositive clause, for there is no other provision of the fee. I think it plain that the declaration merely provides the manner in which the subject is to be divided or the rights of parties therein made effectual when the ultimate destination comes into play. The subject being one indivisible residence instead of continuing joint possession or pro indiviso occupancy, it is to be sold, and the ultimate destinees are to divide the price.
Now, if I am right in this view of the destination, it follows that when Miss Sempill Austin in 1855 had become the last survivor of the seven sisters, she quite rightly and effectually, by general service as heir of provision, took up and vested in herself the three shares which had belonged to her three sisters, Jane, Rebecca, and
Page: 454↓
I need scarcely add the reason why Miss Sempill Austin only served heir of provision to three of her sisters, although all but herself were then dead. The reason was that two of the others, Catherine and Collins, had disposed of their shares by settlement, and the remaining sister, Ann, had left issue, who, it was assumed, and I think rightly assumed, would take their mother's share.
At the death of Miss Sempill Austin, the last surviving sister, on 4th March 1864, the right to the shares stood thus—Two of the shares, namely, those of Catherine and Collins, belonged to the Baroness Sempill, in virtue of special conveyances. One was in the hereditas jacens of Ann (Mrs M'Gregor), and belonged to her heir or descendants, and the remaining four stood at Miss Sempill Austin's death fully vested in her person.
But Miss Sempill Austin left a disposition and settlement whereby she conveyed her whole estate, and in particular all right which she had to the St David Street property, to Miss Josepha Macgregor, and this conveyance took effect, and in virtue thereof Miss Josepha Macgregor possessed and enjoyed four-sevenths of the property from Miss Sempill Austin's death in 1864 down to her own death on 27th January 1872. I shall consider immediately to whom these four shares now belong.
The next question which requires to be decided is the effect of the provision contained in Dr Hay's disposition of 1782, that on the death of the last unmarried sister “the house above mentioned shall be sold, and the price thereof be divided among the surviving married sisters and the child or children of the deceased sisters equally.” I am of opinion, although not without some hesitation, that this provision is effectual and binding on the ultimate beneficiaries, and operates as a conversion of the whole subjects as at the period fixed for the sale. It is a valid and effectual agreement and appointment by the whole seven daughters of Mrs Austin, the absolute and unlimited fiars of the property, as to what shall be done with it after their death. They absolutely direct it to be sold. It is not a mere option of sale or power of sale which is given—not a mere faculty which may or may not be exercised as one of the modes of dividing the property if no other method is agreed upon. It is the will of the testators, the absolute proprietors, as to how their succession shall be dealt with at a particular date, and as such the direction must be obeyed, unless the whole of the beneficiaries specially dispense therewith. It will have the same effect in law as in the ordinary case, where a testator expressly directs his trustees to sell his heritable estate and to divide the proceeds. It was suggested by your Lordship in the chair during the discussion that the clause was meant merely to secure the liferent or right of occupation of the unmarried daughters, and meant no more than that the property should not be sold till their death. There is great force in this view, and it has caused me much hesitation, but I have ultimately felt that the express words “the house shall be sold” are too strong to admit of a mere negative reading. They seem to be not merely a postponement of the powers of division which each fiar had at common law, but also an express contract that at a fixed period the subject shall be sold. It is this fixed and express contract or direction which fixes the intention of parties, and unless altered operates as conversion.
Still further, the direction is to divide the proceeds not among the heirs of the fiars, but among the surviving married sisters and the child or children of the deceased sisters equally. There were no married sisters to participate in the division, because both the married sisters predeceased Miss Sempill Austin, the last survivor of the whole, so that the direction, when applied to the actual facts which have occurred, is to sell the subjects upon Miss Sempill Austin's death in 1864, and to divide the price among the parties entitled thereto. Now, all the shares were disposed of by special deed, excepting the one-seventh share of Ann Austin-or Macgregor, and in reference to it the question is, Whether her heir-at-law takes the price of her seventh share, or whether the same falls to be divided among all her children equally? I am of. opinion that the latter construction is the true one. A direction to divide among children or bairns is quite different from a destination to heirs, although sometimes the objects may be the same. Where children are called or favoured without any mention of heirs, the general presumption is that all the children are meant, and not merely the eldest son, and especially in this case, where the thing to be divided is a sum of money, even although it be the produce of heritage. The natural meaning of the word children must receive effect, and all the children of Ann Austin or Macgregor, and not merely the eldest son or heir-at-law, are entitled to divide among them the price of their mother's proper seventh share of the property.
But who were the children of Ann Austin or Macgregor as at 4th March 1864, the date of Miss Sempill Austin's death? for that is the punctum temporis at which the property is to be sold and the price divided. I incline to think that the provision to children equally must be held, when applied to grandchildren, to be a provision per stirpes, and not per capita, and the result will be that the price of Ann Austin or Macgregor's seventh share will be divided, one-third to Miss Josepha Macgregor (Mrs Macgregor's granddaughter, through her son Sir Gregor Macgregor) or her representatives, one-third to the children of Mrs O'Reilly (Mrs Ann Austin or Macgregor's eldest daughter) equally among them, and one-third to James Macgregor for himself, and as representing his late brother Gregor Macgregor, the children of Ann Austin's younger daughter.
Page: 455↓
There only remains the question, To whom do the four shares which were effectually conveyed by Miss Sempill Austin's settlement to, and vested in, Miss Josepha Macgregor, now belong?
These shares are no longer under Dr Hay's deed of 1782. The destinations and provisions of that deed were effectually evacuated by Miss Sempill Austin's settlement, by which she gave them absolutely to Miss Josephsa Macgregor. They now belong undoubtedly to Miss Josepha Macgregor's legal representatives, and the only question is, Were they heritable or moveable as in a question of Miss Josephs Macgregor's succession? and this question depends not upon the destination in Dr Hay's deed, but upon the effect of the direction to sell contained therein.
I have already explained my opinion that the direction to sell operated as a conversion of the subject as at 4th March 1864, the date when the direction took effect, and if Miss Josepha Macgregor had died at or shortly after that date, I think there can be no doubt that her share of the price, being four-sevenths of the whole, would have been moveable in her person, and would have descended to her executors, and not to her heirs. The difficulty is occasioned by the fact that Miss Josepha Macgregor survived for eight years without using or calling into operation the direction to sell, and it may very plausibly be contended that this implies an option to retain the heritage as heritage—and thus operates what is called a reconversion. This was the ground of the decision in Grindlay v. Grindlay, 9th November 1853, 16 D. 27, and the principle has been recognised in many other cases.—See some of them quoted in M'Laren on Succession, i. 223. In Grindlay's case, although the truster had expressly directed a sale, yet as the beneficiary took possession of the subjects themselves, and let them on a ten years' lease, and referred to them in a settlement as her heritable estate, this was held to operate reconversion.
In the present case, however, I do not think that reconversion can be held to have taken place. It was not in Miss Josepha Macgregor's power, by herself alone, to have dispensed with or negatived the direction to sell. It would have required the concurrence of all the beneficiaries, and the mere delay in enforcing a sale is not enough to operate as an election to take the subject in forma specifica. There are no circumstances disclosed in the present case sufficient to import reconversion or an intention to reconvert, and as the parties have finally agreed upon the facts, we cannot order any further inquiry as to whether there has been any election not to sell the property but to retain it as a pro indiviso whole. I am of opinion, therefore, that there are no termini habiles upon which reconversion could be rested, that Miss Josepha's four-seventh shares of the subjects must be held moveable in her succession, and now belong to her executors or heirs in moveables or next-of-kin. Her next-of-kin appear to be the whole children of Mrs O'Reilly, including Mrs Overend (who survived Miss Josepha) and the son of Mrs John Macgregor of Glengyle. These will all take per capita, as equally related to the late Miss Josepha Macgregor. Mrs Overend's children will take their mother's share.
The result is, that the first of the questions put in the Special Case must be answered in the negative, and the second question in the affirmative—that is to say, that the whole parties to the Special Case will divide among them the price of the five-seventh shares in the proportions above specified.
It cannot be disputed that parties may so destine property in its own nature heritable as to impress upon it the character of moveable estate quoad succession. The ordinary illustration of this is the case of heritable property being left in trust by a mortis causa disposition and settlement, with an express direction to the trustees to sell it in order that the proceeds may be divided and paid amongst certain beneficiaries. In such a case the property must, on the principle of constructive conversion, be dealt with as moveable. But here there is no trust, and no immediate direction for a sale. On the contrary, in place of it being the intention of the parties that the property should be sold when the deed of 1782 was obtained from Dr Hay, it is expressly provided by the deed that it should remain as it was, not only for the liferent use of Mrs Austin the mother, but after her death for the occupancy of her daughters, and each of them, till they were all married, or until the death of the last of the unmarried ones; and then only does a sale of the property appear to have been contemplated or directed to take place. . Keeping this in view, I am disposed to concur with Lord Gifford in what I understand to be his opinion, that until the event so contemplated occurred, the house property in question could not, in any correct view that can be taken of the deed of 1782, be held on the principle of constructive conversion to be moveable estate. Any other conclusion would, I think, be inconsistent with the intention of the parties to the deed of 1782 as manifested in that deed. And, as was stated in a very marked manner by Lord Rutherfurd in Grindlay v. Grindlay's Trs. (9 Nov. 1853, 16 D. 35) in reference to a question of conversion—“It is one in regard to which the Court must go to a large extent on intention.” I find also that, in conformity with the same principle, Lord Westbury remarked in Buchanan v. Angus (May 1862, 4 Macph. 379–80) when dealing with a question of constructive conversion, that till “the necessity arises and is acted on, or after the particular purposes are answered, or if the sale is not indispensable, there is no change in the quality of the property.” Now, certainly in the present case the necessity did not arise, or the particular purposes were not answered, and the sale was not indispensable till the death of Miss Sempill Austin, when, accordingly, and not before, I concur with Lord Gifford in thinking that
Page: 456↓
The Court pronounced this interlocutor:—
“The Lords having heard counsel on the Special Case, are of opinion and find—(1) that the parties of the first part are not entitled to the whole of the five-seventh shares of the property in question; and (2) that the parties of the second part are entitled to share in the value thereof; and appoint the expenses of both parties to be paid out of the said five-seventh shares, and decern; and remit to the Auditor to tax the expenses now found due, and to report.”
Counsel for James Macgregor— Adam— Hon. H. J. Moncrieff. Agent— William Montgomery, W.S.
Counsel for W. D. J. O'Reilly and Miss O'Reilly— J. A. Crichton. Agent— Ebenezer Mill, S.S.C.
Counsel for Mrs Jones and Charles Overend and Children— Darling. Agent— George Burns, W.S.
