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Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Wardrope v. The Duke of Hamilton and Others [1876] ScotLR 13_568 (24 June 1876)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1876/13SLR0568.html
Cite as: [1876] SLR 13_568, [1876] ScotLR 13_568

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SCOTTISH_SLR_Court_of_Session

Page: 568

Court of Session Inner House First Division.

Saturday, June 24. 1876.

Sheriff of Lanarkshire.

13 SLR 568

Wardrope

v.

The Duke of Hamilton and Others.

Subject_1Master and Servant
Subject_2Culpa
Subject_3Damage
Subject_4Responsibility — Relevancy.
Facts:

Two gamekeepers were alleged to have fired at a man and his dog upon the high road, killing the dog and wounding the man. In an action for damages against the keepers and their employer, it was averred that the former were acting with the authority, or at least for the behoof, of the latter.— Held that this averment was not sufficient to infer liability, and that there was no relevant ground for an issue against the employer.

Observed ( per Lord Deas) that where the act of a servant whereby damage is caused to any one is of a criminal nature, it is necessary to state something very specific indeed to infer liability against the master.

Headnote:

This action was brought by the pursuer, a tailor in Stonehouse, against the Duke of Hamilton and two of his gamekeepers, James Wood and John Tait, concluding for £200, as reparation for loss, injury, and damages for personal injuries and for the value of a greyhound belonging to the pursuer. He averred that the defenders Wood and Tait, then in the employment of the Duke of Hamilton, and acting with his authority, or at least for his behoof, fired at him (the pursuer) on the turnpike road near Stonehouse, killing his dog and wounding him.

The defenders Wood and Tait denied the pursuer's averments, and required the pursuer “to specify which one of the defenders he alleges fired the shot libelled, and to condescend upon the acts by which it is alleged that the defenders aided and abetted each other.”

The Duke of Hamilton pleaded—“(1) There being no sufficient averment that the present defender either did the acts complained of or gave any instructions or authority to the other defenders to do them, the action, so far as directed against the present defender, is irrelevant. (2) The act complained of being, and being alleged to be, of a criminal character, the present defender cannot be made liable therefor merely on

Page: 569

the ground that the other defenders were in his employment as gamekeepers, or without proof of special instructions. (3) The defenders at the time complained of not having in point of fact been employed in performance of their duties as the present defender's gamekeepers, nor at the time alleged on his estates, there are no grounds for the conclusions directed against him.”

The Sheriff-Substitute ( Spens) pronounced the following interlocutor:—“The Sheriff-Substitute having heard parties' procurators on the preliminary pleas, sustains the preliminary plea stated for the Duke of Hamilton, in respect there are no averments stated relevant to infer liability as against him, and assoilzies him from the conclusions of the action.”

On appeal the Sheriff repelled the preliminary pleas for the Duke of Hamilton, reserving them in so far as they might affect the merits, allowed a proof, and added to his interlocutor this note— “The summons is not framed on the best model, but the Sheriff thinks that it is sufficient to raise the issues (1st) whether either of the defenders Tait and Wood did the wrong in question; (2d) whether the other aided or abetted him in it; and (3d) whether in so doing they acted by the instructions or with the authority of the Duke of Hamilton. If such joint actings or co-operation is proved against Wood and Tait, and instructions or express authority to them so to act is proved against his Grace, it is difficult to see why the pursuer should not obtain decree against all the defenders.”

The pursuer appealed to the First Division, and proposed these issues—“(1) Whether, on or about the 5th day of November 1875, and on, at, or near the turnpike road leading from Glasgow to Carlisle, about a mile distant from Stonehouse, in the county of Lanark, the defenders James Wood and John Tait, or one or other, and which of them, wrongfully shot at the pursuer's dog, ‘Dolly Varden,’ whereby the said dog was killed and the pursuer wounded, to the pursuer's loss, injury, and damage? (2) Whether, on or about the 5th day of November 1875, and on, at, or near the turnpike road leading from Glasgow to Carlisle, about a mile distant from Stonehouse, in the county of Lanark, the defenders James Wood and John Tait, or one or other of them, acting in the employment of the defender his Grace the Duke of Hamilton and Brandon, wrongfully shot at the pursuer's dog ‘Dolly Varden,’ whereby the said dog was killed, and the pursuer wounded, to the pursuer's loss, injury, and damage. (3) Whether, on or about the 5th day of November 1875, and on, at, or near the turnpike road leading from Glasgow to Carlisle, about a mile distant from Stonehouse, in the county of Lanark, the pursuer's dog ‘Dolly Varden’ was killed, and the pursuer wounded, through the fault of the defenders his Grace the Duke of Hamilton and James Wood and John Tait, or one or more, and which of them, to the pursuer's loss, injury, and damage? Damages laid at £200.” No objection was made to the first of these by the defenders Wood and Tait, but it was argued that there were not any averments made on record sufficient to ground the second and third issues against the Duke of Hamilton.

At advising—

Judgment:

Lord President—It is necessary to consider and dispose of the first plea in law for the defender the Duke of Hamilton, viz.—“There being no sufficient averment that the present defender either did the acts complained of or gave any instructions or authority to the other defenders to do them, the action, so far as directed against the present defender, is relevant.” The question here is—Is there an averment here that in shooting this dog and wounding the pursuer these men, or whichever of them did it, was acting by the authority of the Duke of Hamilton? The only statement in the record with regard to the Duke of Hamilton is that “the defenders James Wood and John Tait being in the service of the other defender his Grace the Duke of Hamilton, and acting with his authority, or at least for his behoof, did fire at or in the direction of the pursuer and his greyhound bitch known by the name of ‘Dolly Varden,’ all wrongously, illegally, wantonly, and maliciously, and did shoot and kill the said animal (which was of the value of £70 or thereby), and did shoot and wound the pursuer;” and that is construed in the second issue as meaning that “the defenders James Wood and John Tait, or one or other of them, acting in the employment of the defender his Grace the Duke of Hamilton and Brandon, wrongfully shot at the pursuer's dog ‘Dolly Varden,’ whereby the said dog was killed and the pursuer wounded, to the pursuer's loss, injury, and damage.” Now, I am quite clear that that is not sufficient to infer liability against the Duke of Hamilton, and therefore I think that the second and third issues must go out.

Lord Deas—The Duke of Hamilton's first plea has been called preliminary in the margin of the record; the second, which is marked as being on the merits, is substantially the same. The Sheriff-Substitute, I see, repels the preliminary plea. Now, an objection to relevancy is not properly a preliminary plea, and it is unsatisfactory that it is so dealt with, although it may be advisable to dispose of it at that stage. If what these men are said to have done be true, it amounts to a criminal charge; if their act was reckless, that is sufficient to found such a charge. My brother Lord Mure and I had to consider such a charge in the Circuit Court at Aberdeen, where a landed gentleman, firing at a hare, as was stated in defence, killed a horse; that gentleman was tried in the Criminal Court and convicted. If, then, this is a good criminal charge, it is necessary to state something very specific indeed to infer liability against the Duke of Hamilton. It must amount to this, that he was art and part with his servants in this act. There is no such averment; to hold him liable would be to introduce a responsibility of a master for the acts of his servants wholly unknown in the law of Scotland, and one that should never be sanctioned.

Lord Ardmillan—I agree with your Lordship: a master is not responsible for his servant's crime. If the servant commits a careless act in the execution of his employment the master is responsible; but if the element of crime is brought in the master is no longer liable. If a particular direction had been given to shoot any dogs found at that place, it would have been a

Page: 570

different case. That is not alleged, nor is it alleged that there were any general instructions given by the Duke of Hamilton to his keepers to kill dogs. What is alleged is that “the defenders James Wood and John Tait, being in the service of the other defender his Grace the Duke of Hamilton, and acting with his authority or at least for his behoof, fired at or in the direction of the pursuer and his greyhound bitch known by the name of Dolly Varden, all wrongously, illegally, wantonly, and maliciously, and shot and killed the said animal, which was of the value of £70 sterling or thereby, and shot and wounded the pursuer, to the great effusion of his blood and injury of his person,” and these allegations are not sufficient to infer any liability against the Duke of Hamilton.

Lord Mure concurred.

Counsel:

Counsel for Pursuer— Rhind. Agent— George Begg, S.S.C.

Counsel for the Defender the Duke of Hamilton— Dean of Faculty (Watson)— Gloag. Agents — Tods, Murray, & Jamieson, W.S.

Counsel for the Defenders Wood and Tait— J. P.B.Robertson. Agents— Bruce & Kerr, W.S.

1876


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