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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> M'Donald (Petitioner) v. M'Donalds [1879] ScotLR 16_460 (18 March 1879) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1879/16SLR0460.html Cite as: [1879] SLR 16_460, [1879] ScotLR 16_460 |
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Page: 460↓
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(Vide Jan. 16, 1879, ante, p. 271.)
In valuing the “expectancy or interest” of the second and third substitute heirs of entail in an entailed estate, under sec. 5 of the Entail Amendment Act 1875— held ( rev. Lord Adam, Ordinary, and diss. Lord Ormidale) that an averment that the first substitute heir “was in good health, but had suffered from ailments which would tend to shorten his life” was not relevant to induce the Court to order an inquiry which was asked into the actual state of health of the first heir, but that his life must be taken as an average one.
Opinion per Lord Gifford reserved as to whether in any circumstances or upon any averments the Court would order an inquiry, or whether they would not in all cases under the section above quoted presume the life of the first heir to be an average one.
The facts of this case have been already reported ante, p. 271. The circumstances in which this discussion as to whether Captain M'Donald's life should be taken as an average one, or the precise state of his health ascertained, are fully detailed in the opinion of Lord Ormidale.
The arguments of parties are sufficiently detailed in the former report, at pp. 273–4.
At advising—
The question which is raised is a very important one for the parties, for it appears from the statements made at the debate it would make a difference to the respondents of about £3000 if in estimating Captain M'Donald's probable duration of life twenty years were added to his life as proposed by Mr Sprague. For myself, I should have been disposed to appoint the petitioner General M'Donald to grant the letter of authority asked for by Captain M'Donald, if that had been insisted on by the respondents, but as the petitioner objects to grant the requisite letter of authority, and as the respondents do not ask that he should be ordained to do so, but that the Lord Ordinary should be directed to allow a proof in ordinary terms in regard to the probable duration of Captain M'Donald's life, I am of opinion that this is the course which should be adopted, the petitioner General M'Donald leading in the proof. But this course was strenuously opposed on the part of the petitioner, and it was contended for him that now, on account of its turning out that
Page: 461↓
In regard to the other question, whether any proof at all ought to be allowed, I am very clearly of opinion that it ought. I was of opinion when the case was first considered by the Court in disposing of the petitioner's objections to Mr Sprague's report—and I am of opinion still—that the Lord Ordinary was right in holding that the ascertainment of Captain M'Donald's state of health was essential, and on this point I have to refer to the note of the Lord Ordinary to his interlocutor of 13th July 1878, and to quote the opinions of the Court in disposing of the reclaiming note against that interlocutor. It must be kept in view that the petitioner's third objection to Mr Sprague's report stands repelled in the final interlocutor, and that his fourth objection, which relates only to the number of years which must be added to Captain M'Donald's age, alone remains to be disposed of. Nor can I yield to the argument of the petitioner that there is no competent mode of inquiry as to Captain M'Donald's probably duration of life except a medical examination which he cannot be compelled to submit to. At present the Court cannot by anticipation deal with the proof that may or may not be tendered by the parties, but supposing that a medical examination of Captain M'Donald—an inspectio corporis—is the best evidence that can be adduced, it would by no means follow that, in the event of such evidence not being attainable, other though secondary evidence may not be competent. It rather appears to me that such evidence would be admissible provided all has been done to adduce the best evidence, and all such objections when set up by the petitioner, who refuses to grant a letter to Captain M'Donald, ought not to receive much consideration. But as the respondents will have it in their power to adduce medical gentlemen who have recently examined Captain M'Donald, and can speak perfectly well to his state of health, in no view would the objection referred to apply. They may, for example, be able to adduce the medical evidence of Dr Glyn, who subscribes the report which was procured and laid before the actuary. They may also adduce Professor Sanders, who might be able to give unexceptionable evidence in regard to Captain M'Donald's probable duration of life without again examining him, for it would appear from correspondence that not long before 4th March 1879 the Professor had already examined the Captain; and besides all that, the respondents may be able by unexceptionable evidence, medical as well as non-medical, to establish the important fact referred to.
I am therefore of opinion that the Court ought now to direct the Lord Ordinary to allow the parties to have a proof habili modo as to what is the probable duration of Captain M'Donald's life, and if this course is taken it would be for the Lord Ordinary to direct how it should be taken. Professor Sanders, and it may be others — the petitioner himself, for example—may be examined before the Lord Ordinary, and the evidence of Dr Glyn and other witnesses outside Scotland may be taken on commission, and it will be for the Lord Ordinary, on the proof being concluded, to determine the point at issue.
To the opinion thus expressed I still adhere, for I think the question just comes back to what it was there, with this difference, that it is now fixed that we cannot get Captain M'Donald's consent to a medical inspection. I think now, as I thought then, that a medical inspection should not be adopted, but I think it is still open—now that that course cannot be taken—to consider whether there should be a proof at large. I feel still, as I then felt, that the question is one of nicety and difficulty, and referring to my former opinion, I have only one or two observations to add thereto.
In the first place, if it had been alleged that Captain M'Donald was at the present moment
Page: 462↓
In the next place, I think the inquiry, if once opened, would, in many cases at least, be absolutely interminable. For what is it that these ladies propose to inquire into? It is of course all circumstances tending to impair Captain M'Donald's life or to render it shorter than it otherwise would be. Every act and every event in Captain M'Donald's life and history would in this view be relevant. Youthful indiscretions, if any, might be ruthlessly hunted up. I am not merely supposing this, for I see in the papers before me that such are suggested, and beyond all doubt, unless the inquiry were limited, such might be gone into and attempted to be proved. Captain M'Donald's habits, his mode of living, his diet, and in short his whole being and surroundings are to be asked about and sifted to the utmost. Where he has lived and what he has done are to be ascertained, and guesses are to be made as to what he will probably do, and what care and precaution he will probably take. Nay, more, his ancestral history for generations might be examined into, for this, you know, is always made a material inquiry by an insurance company; and all these are proper facts which cannot be ascertained by an expert by inspection, but must be ascertained by testimony or ordinary proof. I know not where such an inquiry would stop, and I fear if it were to be admitted here it must be admitted in every case where a postponed heir of entail avers that the life of a previous one is of less than average value.
Still further, all this inquiry and evidence is not to be led before a man of skill whose judgment as arbiter is to be final, but is to be submitted to this Court, that the Judges thereof may guess — for it can be nothing but a guess—how far the life is to be regarded as an inferior or a deteri orated one. For myself, I am not qualified at all for such an inquiry, and though of course if the duty was laid on me I must do the best I can, it would be with the utmost reluctance that I would return or pronounce any verdict saying how long it is probable Captain M'Donald will live. Of course I admit frankly and fully that in one sense all these inquiries are perfectly relevant. Everything that I have mentioned, and multitudes of other things that might be mentioned, may possibly affect Captain M'Donald's life—Who is now and who probably will be his medical attendant—has he an aversion to taking medicine—or is he careless of himself, and what care does his wife take of him—where will he probably reside—and so on indefinitely. All these are speculative questions which a speculative purchaser of Captain M'Donald's reversionary interest might fairly inquire into, so far as possible, and might quite rightly take into account in forming a judgment of what price as purchaser he will give for the reversion. But these matters are not to be made a subject of proof at large before a court of law, and the statute can surely never have intended that this Court was to enter into such inquiries either directly or through a commissioner. But this, I apprehend, is what the Misses M'Donald now ask. They ask a proof of all facts and circumstances tending to show that Captain M'Donald's probabilities of life are less than the average. And then, as I formerly pointed out, the proof if competent is one which must be competent the other way also. If the petitioner General M'Donald had alleged that Captain M'Donald's life was a better life than an average one, I do not see, on the principles contended for by the respondents, how they could have refused to allow such a proof, and such a proof might be demanded in the very next case that occurs under the statute. If averages are not to be taken, but each individual case is to stand by itself, then there will be as many special lives above the average as those which fall below it. Tables of average will be useless, and the experience of the past will point only to multifold and endless investigations. And then Captain M'Donald, who is to be the unfortunate subject of this investigation, is not even a party to the case or to the present dispute, and has no interest therein to the extent of a single farthing. His consent has been already purchased and paid for, as it must be under the statute, and I more than question not only whether Captain M'Donald could possibly be compelled to submit to medical inspection, but whether he could be compelled to disclose the secrets, not to say the possible peccadilloes, of his whole past life. But suppose he was a party to the question, or suppose, what is still more pertinent, that the question had arisen, not with regard to his probability of life, but with regard to the probability of life of the respondents the Misses M'Donald themselves, or either of them—suppose the petitioner General M'Donald averred that those two sisters, who are postponed to the Captain in the tailzie, had bad lives, and that they were likely to die very soon, and that the petitioner therefore proposed to pay them under the statute a sum much less than the
Page: 463↓
In my former opinion I pointed out that no real injustice is done and no prejudice suffered by taking Captain McDonald's life as an average one, for although when a life offers itself to an insurance company to be insured the insurance company always make inquiries into the individual and family history, and even into the personal habits of the proposer with whom they are making the contract, yet in selling or purchasing annuities they make no such inquiry, and when the lives of third parties are in question it often happens that all such inquiries are almost necessarily neglected. What the Misses M'Donald ought to receive are sums which would enable them to purchase from ordinary reversion companies, with sufficient security, contingent annuities which they would have the chance of getting if the estate had not been disentailed. Such purchases can always be made without any such inquiry as that now proposed. They are made, and necessarily too, upon averages.
I am therefore of opinion that we should direct the Lord Ordinary to refuse the proof at large which is now demanded by the respondents, and to ascertain the value of the expectancy or interest of the respondents on the footing that Captain M'Donald's life is an average one. I think there can now be no other result. I reach this conclusion, however, in the special circumstances of this case, and having regard to the nature of the respondents' averments, which I think would open up an impracticable field of inquiry.
Page: 464↓
On the whole matter, therefore, as we must decide this case, I regret the difference of opinion, and, as I have already said, I do not hold so strong or confident an opinion either way as to make it quite satisfactory to my mind, but the result at which I have arrived is to concur with Lord Gifford, and I think we must remit to the Lord Ordinary to proceed on the footing that Captain M'Donald's life is to be taken as an average life.
The Court accordingly pronounced an interlocutor remitting to the Lord Ordinary to proceed with the cause on the footing that Captain M'Donald's life was to be assumed to be an average life, and to be estimated according to his present age, &c.
Counsel for the Petitioner— M'Laren— Pearson. Agent— A. P. Purves, W.S.
Counsel for Misses M'Donald— Kinnear— Robertson. Agents— Webster, Will, & Ritchie, W.S.