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Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Yule v. M'Meeken and Another [1891] ScotLR 29_151 (25 November 1891)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1891/29SLR0151.html
Cite as: [1891] SLR 29_151, [1891] ScotLR 29_151

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SCOTTISH_SLR_Court_of_Session

Page: 151

Court of Session Inner House First Division.

Wednesday, November 25. 1891.

[ Lord Wellwood, Ordinary.

29 SLR 151

Yule

v.

M'Meeken and Another.

Subject_1Diligence
Subject_2Curator Bonis
Subject_3Competency of Charge at Instance of Party Under Curatory.
Facts:

Where a charge was given for payment to a curator bonis of a sum of money due to his ward, held that it was not a good objection to the charge that it proceeded at the instance of the ward.

Headnote:

On 26th April 1888 Charles Yule, accountant, Glasgow, in consideration of a sum of £500 which he had received from Ottho Adrian Clayton Alexander, curator bonis to George Russell Alexander, a person of unsound mind, granted a bond and assignation in security over certain heritable subjects, binding himself to repay the sum borrowed “to the said George Russell Alexander, his executors and assignees whom so ever.”

On 23d January 1890 James M'Meeken, accountant, Glasgow, was appointed curator bonis to George Russell Alexander in place of Ottho Adrian Clayton Alexander.

On 10th October 1890 George M'Meeken, having recorded the bond and assignation above mentioned, charged Charles Yule to

Page: 152

make payment of the principal sum due under the bond, with the interest thereon. The charge proceeded “at the instance of George Russell Alexander … against Charles Yule, accountant, Glasgow,” but Yule was charged to make payment of the sum due “to James M'Meeken, accountant, Glasgow, curator bonis to the said George Russell Alexander.”

Yule then presented a note of suspension of the above charge against M'Meeken, the curator bonis, and George Russell Alexander, the ward.

The complainer stated several objections to the competency of the charge, and, inter alia, pleaded—“(2) The charge under suspension bearing to proceed at the instance of and for payment to a person who is not capable of giving instructions or authority the reanent, is wrongous, and should be suspended as craved.”

On 15th January 1891 the Lord Ordinary ( Wellwood) repelled the second plea-in-law for the complainer, and before answer allowed parties a proof of their respective averments in regard to the validity of the charge.

Opinion.—The complainer's counsel addressed to me a subtle argument in support of the complainer's second plea-in-law, which is founded on the allegation that the charge sought to be suspended proceeds at the instance of the ward George Russell Alexander, and not of the respondent, his curator bonis. I am not prepared to sustain that plea. The obligation in the bond which was granted when the ward was under curatory is to repay the sum borrowed ‘to the said George Russell Alexander (the ward), his executors and assignees whom so ever.’ Thus the creditor in the bond is the ward. The granter of the bond consents to registration for preservation and execution; and the registered deed is therefore equivalent to a decree in favour of the ward. The warrant authorising execution, which is inserted in terms of 49 and 41 Vict. c. 40, simply runs—‘And the said Lords grant warrant for all lawful execution hereon.’ Now, it is true that the charge bears to be given by virtue of the bond and warrant thereon, ‘at the instance of George Russell Alexander;’ but then it charges the debtor to make payment to the respondent, curator bonis to the said George Russell Alexander. It may be that it would have been more correct to have stated at the outset of the charge that it was given at the instance of the curator bonis, but I think it sufficiently appears from the charge that it was given with the concurrence of the curator bonis, who was to receive the money and discharge the debtor. The debt is a debt due to the ward, and the decree is a decree in favour of the ward; and the position of the curator bonis in recovering the debt is simply that of commissioner or factor enforcing his ward's rights. I therefore think that this, very technical objection, although specious, is not well founded, and should be repelled. On the other matters I allow a proof before answer.”

On 21st July the Lord Ordinary pronounced this interlocutor—“Having considered the debate, together with the proof and whole process, in respect it is admitted by the respondent that on 13th February 1891 he received payment from the complainer's factor of a sum of £28, 5s. 6d., and that he is willing that the said sum should be imputed towards payment of the sum for which the charge complained of was given of consent to the respondent, suspends the charge to the extent of the said sum of twenty-eight pounds five shillings and sixpence sterling: Quoad ultra repels the reasons of suspension: Finds the letters orderly proceeded, and decerns.”

The complainer reclaimed and argued—The charge was irregular and illegal in form, in respect that it proceeded at the instance of the ward, who had been found incapable of managing his own affairs. The title was in the curator— Scott, Petitioner, February 21, 1856, 18 D. 624—and the diligence should proceed at his instance. An action at the instance of the ward would be incompetent; a fortiori therefore he had no title to proceed with diligence. It might be said that the concurrence of the curator was apparent on the face of the bond, but that would not make the ward's title to use the diligence good— Hislop v. M'Ritchie's Trustees, June 23, 1881, 8 R. (H. of L.) 95.

Argued for the respondent—The curator was appointed to act for the ward and in the ward's name— Wills, June 20, 1879, 6 R. 1096; Scott's case supra. He was in the position of a commissioner entitled to instruct diligence at the instance of the ward. The ward was the creditor in the bond, and therefore was the person at whose instance the charge should proceed, for the curator had made up no title to the ward's estate. In any case, the diligence, on the face of it, was practically at the instance of the curator bonis, as the payment was to be made to him.

At advising—

Judgment:

Lord President—The first question is of a technical quality, but is sufficiently important. It proceeds upon the terms of the charge which is the subject of the present suspension. The charge bears to be at the instance of the ward, but the debtor is called upon to make payment to Mr M'Meeken, the charger's curator bonis. It is admitted that it would have been competent for the curator to have stated his own instance, and with that difference to have gone on in the charge as at present, and it is contended that the use of the ward's name vitiates the charge.

The position of a curator bonis is not that he has transferred to him the estate of the ward, nor is the ward divested of that estate. The more accurate statement is that made by Mr Bell (Bell's Prin., sec. 2121), viz., that the ward's management of his estate is superseded in favour of the curator. Accordingly it would undoubtedly be incompetent for a person who had a curator bonis to charge for payment to himself, as that would be an act of management. On the other hand, because the ward is not

Page: 153

divested, it follows that he is the creditor, and the title is on him. Accordingly the curator has a right to make use of the title in the ward and of his name in managing his affairs, and, among other things, in charging for his debts. In theory therefore and principle the objection now made does not appear to me to be a valid objection to the charge, which shows on its face that demanding payment in the name of the ward the curator requires it to be made to himself. The point is a somewhat fine one, but I think the charge is good.

Lord Adam—With regard to the first point, I agree with your Lordship that it turns on the question whether or not the ward is divested of his estate by the appointment of the curator bonis. In this case the ward's estate has not been sequestrated. If that had been done, I do not know, and it is not necessary to consider, what effect it would have had on the present question, but the estate is still vested in the ward. It appears to me that the curator is appointed to supersede the ward in the management of his estate, as it is put in the passage quoted by your Lord-ship from Mr Bell, and the charge here seems to me to proceed on the authority of the curator, though in form at the instance of the ward. That, I think, is quite clear on the face of the charge from the fact that it demands that payment shall be made to the curator, and I think it is sufficient for the disposal of the case.

Lord M'Laren—I agree with your Lord-ships that the authority and right of a curator bonis is correctly defined by Mr Bell when he says that a curator is appointed to supersede the ward in the management of his affairs. The appointment of a curator does not imply that the ward is divested of his estate or deprived of his civil rights, except in so far as is inconsistent with the institorial power given to the curator. When therefore an act, such as giving a charge, is done by the ward with the consent of the curator, it does not appear to me that the recognition of a right in the ward to act with the consent of the curator is in any way inconsistent with the view that the curator is the sole administrator of the ward's estate. It must be kept in view that these appointments are made on prima facie evidence (usually medical certificates) pointing to permanent or temporary incapacity on the part of the ward. The proceedings are not of a continuous nature, because everything that is done is supposed to be for the benefit of the ward, and he is not to be put under disability except in so far as necessary for the protection of his estate. When it is desired to have a person declared incapable of doing any legal act, e.g., making a testament, a different form of proceeding is necessary. Therefore while I do not doubt that in most cases the more convenient course is for a curator bonis to act in his own name, I am not prepared to say that an act done by the ward with his consent is incompetent or invalid.

On the other points in the case I concur.

Lord Kinnear—I am of the same opinion. The first point is highly technical, but in the execution of diligence technical rules must be strictly observed, and if this objection were well founded we should be bound to give effect to it, however unsubstantial the point may be. But I agree with your Lordship, for the reasons that have been stated, that it is not well founded, because although the ward is superseded in the management of his estate, the estate is not transferred to the curator, and the ward still remains vested in the rights of creditor in the bond. But since he is superseded in the management of his estate a charge in his own name for payment to himself would be bad, not upon any technical, but on this very substantial ground, that the purpose and effect of the appointment of a curator is to disable the ward from determining for himself questions of management, such as whether a bond should be called up or not. That became a question for the curator, who was bound to act, irrespective of the ward's wishes, upon his own responsibility, and could derive no additional authority from the consent or concurrence of his ward. The ward therefore cannot charge for payment, because he has no power to grant a valid discharge. But I think that this charge discloses that it is not a charge at the instance of the ward at all, but at the instance of the curator using the ward's name, that the charge is at the ward's instance in form only, and that the curator is shown to be the real charger by his demanding payment to be made to himself. On all the other points I concur with your Lordships.

The Court adhered.

Counsel:

Counsel for the Complainer— Comrie Thomson— Salvesen. Agent— Thomas M'Naught, S.S.C.

Counsel for the Respondent— M'Kechnie— Dean Leslie. Agents— Webster, Will, & Ritchie, S.S.C.

1891


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URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1891/29SLR0151.html