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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Drummond's Factor Petitioner [1894] ScotLR 31_777 (30 June 1894) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1894/31SLR0777.html Cite as: [1894] ScotLR 31_777, [1894] SLR 31_777 |
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Page: 777↓
A judicial factor who had obtained power from the Court to sell certain heritable property by public roup at an upset price of £9750, and failing such sale, to sell by private bargain at a price not less than the upset price, without exposing the property to public roup, sold it for £9800 by private bargain with the approval of all the creditors. A petition for approval of the sale was refused.
Opinions expressed that it was within the power of the Court to grant the prayer of the petition.
The judicial factor on the trust-estate of Drummond Brothers applied to the Court for power to sell certain heritable subjects at 82 George Street, Edinburgh, belonging to the factory.
Upon 19th October 1893 the Lord Ordinary authorised the judicial factor to expose them for sale by public roup, after due advertisement, at the upset price of £9750, and if not sold at or above said upset price, to re-expose the same for sale by public roup, after due advertisement, at such reduced upset price as the Accountant of Court might fix, or to sell the same by private bargain at a price not less than that at which they had been publicly exposed for sale.
The judicial factor duly advertised the property, but did not expose it for sale by public roup, and in May 1894 sold it by private bargain for a sum of £9800. All the heritable creditors, including postponed bondholders who would not receive any part of their debt, approved of the sale, and Mr Hippolyte Blanc, architect, reported that in his opinion the transaction was a judicious one. The purchaser, however, was apprehensive of the validity of the title he would get, and accordingly the judicial factor presented a petition praying the Court to approve of the sale. Along with the petition he lodged a report by the Accountant of Court, saying that in his opinion the factor's acting in selling by private bargain might be approved of.
Upon 23rd June 1894 the Lord Ordinary ( Low) having heard counsel for the factor and for the purchaser, reported the case to the First Division.
“ Opinion.—The petitioner is judicial factor upon a trust-estate. In May 1893 he obtained authority from the Court to sell certain house property in George Street, Edinburgh, belonging to the trust by public roup at the upset price of £9750, and if the property was not sold at or above that price, to re-expose it for sale at such reduced upset price as the Accountant might fix, or to sell the property by private bargain at a price not less than that at which it had previously been publicly exposed.
The petitioner, before he had exposed the property for sale by public roup, received a private offer to purchase it at the price of £9800. He accepted the offer, and has now presented the present application for approval of the sale. The Accountant of Court reports in favour of the application being granted.
The purchaser appeared, and referred to a judgment of the First Division in petition Clyne, June 5, 1894, in which it was held that although trustees might obtain authority from the Court to sell, they could not first conclude a contract of sale and then ask the approval of the Court. The purchaser in this case is quite willing to implement his contract, but he contended that in view of the decision referred to, it was doubtful whether the Court had power to confirm the sale, and he naturally desires to have an unimpeachable title.
The parties asked that the case should be reported to the Inner House, and as it raises a question of importance not only to the parties, but in regard to the administration of trust-estates in the hands of judicial factors, the Lord Ordinary has thought it right to do so.
Page: 778↓
There is this distinction between the present case and that of Clyne, that there the trustees had not, before entering into the contract of sale, obtained any authority to sell, while here authority was granted to the judicial factor to sell, and the present application has only been rendered necessary because he did not proceed precisely in terms of the powers which were conferred upon him.”
Argued for the petitioner—He had obtained power to sell from the Court, and that by private bargain failing sale by public roup. No doubt he had sold by private bargain without publicly exposing the property, but he had secured £50 more than the upset price, had acted in the best interests of the estate, and with the approval and consent of all interested. In Clyne's case, June 5, 1894, 31 S.L.R. 692, a testamentary trustee, without any power of sale in the trust-deed, had sold, and asked the Court to confirm the sale. Here there was a power of sale in the original trust-deed, and the factor had obtained a power of sale from the Court. If the course followed was not in entire conformity with that indicated by the Court, it was in substantial accordance with it, and might well be confirmed. In the case of Gilray, March 18, 1876, 3 R. 619, the Court had approved a sale effected by a curator bonis without any powers.
Argued for the purchaser—He was perfectly willing to buy the property, but he was entitled to an unimpeachable title. The factor here had practically sold without power, because he had received power under a definite limitation, which he had disregarded. The power in the original trust-deed was no good to a judicial factor; he required authority from the Court before he could sell. It was doubtful whether the Court could approve of what had been done, although they might authorise its now being done.
At advising—
The Lord Ordinary had before him all the facts of the case, and on these he came to the decision that public roup was the proper method and not private sale, at least until the state of the market had been tested by a public exposure. Now, we find that the factor, who had taken this power, did not exercise it, but, on the contrary, without ever exposing the subjects for public sale, sold them by private bargain for £9800, a £50 note above the upset price. I cannot say that the difference of price is very impressive, or much distinguishes the sale from one at the upset price. The factor in so acting took upon himself a very grave responsibility. One of the merits of our law with regard to estates under judicial management is that not merely formally, but in fact, no important or extraordinary step can be taken by the factor at his own hand, the Court having first to consider the expediency of what is proposed. I regard it as a grave error and a gross departure from proper practice for any officer of the Court to take upon himself to exercise powers which the Court has refused to him.
The next question is, what are we to do now? Is it competent for us to grant the authority which the petitioner asks? I am prepared to assume, and I believe that this would be within our competency. But then we must first be satisfied that it would be for the interest of the estate that we should take this step. The Lord Ordinary has decided that it was best for the interest of the estate to test the market by a public roup. I have heard nothing to indicate that the Lord Ordinary was wrong, or that a different course would now be right. Nothing has been said to reconcile me to the idea that people wanting to buy this George Street property are too shy to go to an auction; the guarded expressions of the Accountant of Court do not suggest this, and proceed upon the same meagre information which we have now had before us.
I see no ground, therefore, in the interest of the estate for supposing that they will be injured by our adhering to the ordinary and salutary course, and I am for refusing the prayer.
Page: 779↓
The Court refused the petition.
Counsel for the Judicial Factor— Sym. Agents— Murray, Beith, & Murray, W.S.
Counsel for the Purchaser— Dickson— Clyde. Agent— W. E. Armstrong, S.S.C.